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                                                        Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the causal effects of the different components of managerial 
compensation on the value-critical risk-taking activities, particularly those linked to 
investment, and financial leverage. Employing a three-stage least squares (3SLS) technique in 
a system of equations, the study makes interesting contributions to the growing strand of 
literature using datasets from the UK (FTSE 350) companies for the period 2006 – 2015. 
Specifically, this scholarly study contributes to the extant literature in three ways.  
First, the study finds that higher long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) and stock options incentive 
cause more investment in capital expenditure and fixed intangible but less in research and 
development activity, whilst greater cash bonus induces more intangibles (research and 
development and fixed intangible) investment but less capital expenditure activity. Largely, 
the presented evidence is contrary to the view that the risk-motivated incentives (stock options 
and LTIPs) encourage more riskier activity like R&D. Rather, shareholders use risk-avoiding 
incentive (cash bonus) to reduce managerial risk-related agency problems. Further, the result 
suggests that higher LTIPs and stock options lead to lower spending on other fixed asset 
activities, which is inconsistent with the risk-related argument.   
Second, the study further contributes to the optimal contracting theory by suggesting that the 
level and the effectiveness of managerial compensation induces capital expenditure investment 
distortions. Specifically, the research finds that extremely over-compensated (under-
compensated) managers are more (less) likely to commit over-investment in capital 
expenditure. In contrast, extremely over-compensated (under-compensated) managers have a 
decreased (increased) probability of over-investing in research and development.  
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Finally, the finding shows that LTIPs (stock options) has a positive (negative) impact on 
leverage, which is consistent (inconsistent) with the alignment (risk-motivated incentive) 
hypothesis, whilst the cash bonus finding shows support for the risk-reduction assumption. The 
study also observes that shareholders use more debt-like incentive (deferred stock) to reduce 
the risk-shifting incentive problem and lower agency cost of debt. The evidence further reveals 
that the effectiveness of the stock options (risk-motivated) incentive to induce managerial risk-
taking decisions via borrowings is limited to high-growth opportunity firms. Additionally, 
consistent with the alignment hypothesis, the study finds that highly monitored (governed) 
firms use the LTIPs incentive to influence managers to contract more debt; however, the stock 
options incentive discourages more borrowing in such governing state. This tends to support 
the view that the firm’s remuneration committee applies LTIPs in lieu of stock options to 
minimise managerial excessive risk-taking.     
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                                                       Chapter 1 
 
                                                  1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
In a modern business form, ownership is separated from the management, leading to conflicts 
of interest amongst the principal(s) and the agent(s). The divergent interests of managers and 
shareholders can lead managers to pursue egocentric policies, which can negatively impact the 
owner’s value-maximisation aspiration. As suggested in the literature, a risk-averse manager 
with undiversified human and economic wealth is more likely to forgo risky but positive net 
present value (NPV) activities (Fama, 1980; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985) at 
the detriment of risk-neutral shareholders. Shareholders want corporate managers to embark 
on all positive risky activities to enhance the firm’s value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Modern scholarly studies in the area of accounting, management and finance have offered 
many suggestions on how to minimise the divergence of owner(s) – agent(s) interests. 
Significant among them include effective corporate governance practices (Carter et al., 2003; 
Ozkan, 2007), and efficient design of managerial compensation (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Coles 
et al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Kini and Williams, 2012; Nguyen, 2018). The 
literature argues that, through an efficient compensation contract designed by shareholders, the 
incentive conflict over risk is reduced, thereby causing managers to make value-critical 
investment and financing decisions (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Coles et al. 2006; Kini and Williams, 
2012). However, the widespread usage of different components of managerial compensation – 
cash-based, stock options and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; 
Conyon et al. 2011) – has coincided with some catastrophic economic events. Some of these 
 13 
unfortunate events include the dot.com bubble in the late 1990s, the 2001 – 2002 corporate 
scandals and the more recent 2007 – 2009 financial crisis, which are often precipitated by 
excessive risk-taking by corporate officers. This raises legitimate concerns regarding the 
economic impacts of managerial compensation on value-critical risk-taking decisions. 
In the United Kingdom, for instance, the guidelines for best practices in the form of the 
Greenbury Report (1995) and the Association of British Insurers (ABI) reports (1995, 1996) 
made recommendations to the board of directors (BODs) and remuneration committees on the 
form of executive remuneration schemes. In particular, the Greenbury Report (1995) 
recommends substituting the executive stock options incentive with other forms of 
compensation such as long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) or annual bonuses (Main, 2011; 
Conyon et al., 2011) to curtail managerial excessive risk-taking, particularly when the firm’s 
performance targets are unrealistic (Committee on Corporate Governance Report, 1998 p. 33; 
Greenbury Report, 1995 6.19 – 6.40). It seems to imply that giving UK managers a large 
component of stock options encourages more risk-taking policies. With this suggestion, it is 
reasonable to find out what kind of activities managers consider more risky and how their 
compensation design relates to such activities, knowing that the probability distribution of the 
firm’s performance (cash flow or stock returns) is dependent on the interaction of these two 
corporate variables and other firm-related characteristics. 
Furthermore, managerial risk-taking may be reflected in both investment and financing 
policies. For example, some existing studies typically viewed research and development 
activity as highly risky compared to capital expenditure on property, plant and equipment 
(Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Kothari et al., 2001). Others including Amihud and Lev (1981), May 
(1995), and Tufano (1996) describe diversification through acquisition as low risk investment. 
Additionally, managers can also increase the firm’s idiosyncratic risk through more borrowing 
(Grossman and Hart, 1982; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Following this, an obvious empirical 
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question is how, through a risk-motivated reason, managers’ compensation packages relate to 
the selection of investment and the concomitant financing policies. Therefore, given the 
recommendation of the Greenbury Report (1995), it is unclear at this stage how the UK 
managers’ compensation components affect the value-critical managerial decisions, 
specifically those derived from investment and financial leverage policies. This remains the 
focal point of the study.  
 
1.2 Motivation for the study 
As indicated, one of the recommendations of the Greenbury Report (1995, 6.19 – 6.40) 
suggests that the board of directors should curtail the use of stock options and apply other forms 
of incentives, particularly when the firm has no realistic performance targets, in order to 
minimise managerial excessive risk-taking. The risk-taking activities often emanate from 
managerial operational activities, i.e. investment and financial leverage, suggesting a linkage 
between executive pay components and the nature of the activities they undertake. 
Interestingly, prior studies (e.g. Bhagat and Welch, 1995; May 1995; Kothari et al., 2001; 
Manso, 2011) view intangible activities as more risky than tangible ones, whilst high debt ratio 
is also considered risky (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). Extending this link to find out how managerial compensation design impacts 
the nature of firm investment and its concomitant leverage decisions is important to enhancing 
our understanding on how their interdependence helps influence managerial quality to achieve 
shareholder value.  
Based on optimal compensation theory, some US researchers including Coles et al. (2006), 
Chava and Purnanandam (2010), Croci and Petzemas (2015), Nguyen (2018) among others 
provide a detailed analysis of the potential link between managerial compensation incentives 
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and their risk-taking activities. Specifically, this stream of research shows that, through stock 
options incentive, managers are more (less) likely to increase the firm’s idiosyncratic risks by 
spending more (less) on intangibles (capital expenditure) as well as increase debt level.  
The Greenbury Report (1995) proposal on management remuneration differs in structural 
levels to that of the United States. For instance, Conyon and Murphy (2000) confirm this by 
arguing that UK managers receive substantial cash-based compensation relative to their US 
counterparts. More specifically, for the UK in 1997, they suggest the following pay 
components: cash-based 77% (salary 59% and cash bonus 18%) and with 19% constituting 
stock options and LTIPs. However, the US executive pay components show a composition of 
46% and 46% respectively.  
Furthermore, though firms operating in these economies (the US and the UK) enjoy similar 
financial and institutional traditions, the UK firms are seen to have a relatively low leverage 
ratio compared to the US ones (Antoniou et al., 2008; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). For instance, 
capital structure literature, e.g. Antoniou et al. (2008), made this empirical observation. The 
authors report a descriptive leverage mean (median) of 27.4% (26.9%) for American firms 
while the British firms show 17.9% (16.0%) (see Table 1.1 below). Clearly, the observed 
statistics show different risk appetite among managers operating in a relatively similar system 
and that such difference is likely to be instigated by the way these corporate officers are 
remunerated. Therefore, given the differences in the level and composition of managerial 
compensation and corporate governance practices between these Anglo-Saxon countries (the 
US and the UK), it becomes an interesting question as to whether the UK shareholders use 
different pay components to influence managerial operational risk-taking activities.  
The present study is closely related to certain prior literature (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010; Kini and Williams, 2012) but also makes several important extensions to 
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this relatively new strand of literature, on the link between managerial compensation incentives 
and the firm’s operational risk-taking activities using the UK FTSE 350 companies.  
 
Table 1. 1 Comparative Leverage Descriptive Statistics 
 
                               UK                            US 
 
 
 
 Leverage 
 
    0.179  
           Leverage 
 
                     0.274                    Mean    
Median        0.160                          0.269                  
Std Dev        0.146                          0.185                  
Kurtosis        2.271                          1.265                  
Skewness        1.182                          0.790                   
Minimum        0.000                          0.000                   
Maximum        0.995                          0.998                   
 
 
1.3 Contributions of the study 
Although academic research on executive compensation is quite voluminous, the focus has 
been substantially tilted towards the determinants (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Core and, 
Guay, 1999; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Ozkan, 2007). Until recently, it was unclear how 
managerial compensation influences a firm’s risk-taking (see Coles et al., 2006; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010; Kini and Williams, 2012; Croci and Petmezas, 2015; Nguyen, 2018). 
These studies are predominantly limited to the US setting, though limited evidence does exist 
for the UK (Kabir et al., 2013; Florackis et al., 2009). Specifically, the current study makes 
important contributions to this growing strand of literature, operational risk-taking activities 
(investment and/or leverage) and managerial compensation, and these are fourfold: 
1) How the level and composition of managerial compensation influence risk-taking 
related to investment. 
2) How compensation deviations (excesses) are related to the probability of managers 
committing investment distortion. 
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3) The link between managerial compensation and financial leverage; and 
4) Adopting a more stringent modelling and econometric remedies to analyse risk-taking 
activities and managerial compensation using a wide coverage of three top executives’ 
compensation data.  
First, in relation to the link between managerial compensation and investment activities, the 
study makes three important contributions to the literature. Unlike Coles et al. (2006), who 
limit their investment data to only research and development and net capital expenditure 
(measured as net property, plant and equipment), the present study extends the data coverage 
to include other fixed assets expenditure and fixed intangible activities. In fact, the exclusion 
of these major investments is more likely to underestimate investment – managerial pay 
relationships, particularly in an attempt to uncover how managers behave relative to risky 
investment activities given the level and the composition of their pay incentives. For instance, 
Lewellen and Lewellen (2014, 2016) argue that the net capital expenditure measure does not 
represent a fair view of the firm’s fixed tangible investment activity. Therefore, studying the 
impact of executive compensation incentives on corporate investment within the context of 
only R&D and net capital expenditure is likely to underestimate the effect of average executive 
pay on corporate investment activities.  
Furthermore, the authors (Lewellen and Lewellen, 2014, 2016) indicated that the other fixed 
assets investments reported in the Compustat database are often cash-sponsored activities. The 
implication of the non-inclusion of such observable fixed assets expenditure in Coles et al. 
leaves a gap in our understanding of how managers’ compensation packages influence this type 
of managerial decision, particularly when analysing the linkage from risk-motivated 
perspectives. Corporate executives often receive lucrative compensation packages for such 
major corporate activity (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Ozkan, 2012) and such activity tends to 
change a firm’s idiosyncratic risk profile (Datta et al., 2001). More precisely, regarding whether 
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other fixed assets activity typically increase a firm’s risk profile is still unclear. One view claims 
that it increases executives’ risk exposure (Lehn and Zhao, 2006; Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; 
Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987) whilst other authors posit risk reduction (Lewellen, 1971; 
Amihud and Lev, 1981; Shastri, 1990; May, 1995). Therefore, based on a risk-related 
explanation, the present study seeks to provide further evidence on executive pay - investment 
linkage using more recent data to reconcile how different pay components (e.g. stock options 
grants, long-term incentive plans (hereafter LTIPs) grant, cash bonuses) relate to such activity. 
Additionally, if the other fixed assets investments are often cash-sponsored items, as indicated 
by Lewellen and Lewellen, then it is reasonable that the board of directors is likely to substitute 
cash compensation with other forms of compensation as the firm’s cash flow depletes (Guay, 
1999) via other fixed assets activity. Despite this intuitive reasoning, empirical examination on 
this issue is limited, and non-existing in the UK context. This present study fills this knowledge 
gap in our understanding to detect how stock-based and/or cash-based compensation induces 
other fixed assets investment.  
Moreover, the non-treatment of fixed intangible expenditure does not provide a clear picture 
on the managerial pay - investment relation under the risk-based explanation. This is because 
executive managers are likely to be influenced to undertake this kind of investment activity 
given the level and the composition of their pay incentives. Without advancing any reasons (as 
in the case of Coles et al., 2006; Croci and Petmezas, 2015; Nguyen, 2018), the non-inclusion 
of fixed intangible activity leaves a gap in our understanding of how managerial compensation 
packages relate to this type of activity. Hence, by investigating how executives’ remuneration 
packages influence a complete set of firm investment activities (using broad investment 
measures: capital expenditure – net property, plant and equipment and other fixed assets’ 
acquisition and intangibles – R&D and fixed intangible), we are able to present a relatively 
complete analysis and draw concrete conclusions for investment in general and not just for 
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only R&D and property, plant and equipment activities as intimated by prior literature. Our 
unique datasets aid our contribution to the literature in this direction by examining the extent 
to which the nature and the level of executives’ pay affect the riskiness of corporate investment 
decisions.  
Second, the study makes further contribution to the literature on investment inefficiency 
(distortions) and compensation deviation. As theoretically demonstrated by Strobl (2014), 
shareholders may tend to deviate from normal compensation levels to influence managers to 
continually undertake both positive and negative investment activities, which can potentially 
lead to investment distortions. Coles et al. (2006) also made a similar conjecture by arguing 
that shareholders can intentionally apply excessive pay incentives to induce managers to 
substantially alter investment policy. This seems to suggest that the quality of a firm’s 
investment activity may be affected when managerial compensation incentives are inefficiently 
designed.  
Drawing on the above proposition, it is imperative to find out if indeed shareholders 
intentionally award executives more compensation incentives to induce investment distortion. 
In this regard, the present study attempts to provide evidence on the extent to which managerial 
compensation deviation induces the probability of investment distortions (i.e. under-
investment and/or over-investment). This is the first study that has considered the issue using 
UK datasets.  
Third, regarding managerial flow compensation and the firm’s observed leverage linkage, the 
study advances the existing literature in three ways:  
a) Examining the effect of managerial compensation on leverage level.  
b) Examining the association between managerial compensation and the firm’s leverage 
level within the context of growth opportunities. 
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c) Exploring how the corporate governance mechanism interacts with compensation to 
influence managerial leverage policies. 
 
In particular, on the impact of managerial compensation on leverage, the study contributes to 
this relatively limited research in the UK. Significantly, the existing literature in this area is 
limited to the US market (see Coles et al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Cassell et al., 
2012; Kini and Williams, 2012) with little attention given to the subject area outside the US 
environment. This study specifically re-examines the managerial compensation effect on 
leverage using UK data. This is because capital structure decisions vary across countries (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995; Antoniou et al., 2008) and leverage can mitigate agency problems between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen, 
1986), which can ultimately affect the design of executive compensation (John and John, 
1993). More explicitly, UK firm managers are seen to use debt more conservatively compared 
to American corporate officers. Therefore, if US executives’ appetite for debt financing is 
substantially different from that of their UK counterparts, then the US-based evidence (e.g. 
Coles et al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012) may not necessarily be applicable to the UK, hence 
re-examination of the issue in a different environment is urgently needed. 
In fact, one study that has come close to the issue is Florackis and Ozkan (2009), who examine 
this issue but with limited data on managerial incentives. Specifically, the authors used only 
CEO’s inside ownership to proxy for manager’s incentives. The present scholarly study 
provides relatively more direct evidence on how executives’ compensation influences 
corporate leverage while accounting for their ownership incentive. With this, the study provides 
more direct evidence on the compensation - leverage relationship.  
Furthermore, the study also examines the extent to which executive compensation – leverage 
is influenced by a firm’s growth opportunities. Prior studies assume that the association 
 21 
between managerial compensation and leverage is symmetric across all firms. Therefore, the 
present study attempts to show the extent to which managerial compensation and the firm’s 
growth opportunities interact to affect leverage level.  
Existing literature posits that high-growth firms often face higher information asymmetry than 
low-growth firms (Myers and Majluf, 1984), due to the inherent unpredictability associated 
with the nature of the firms’ growth investment opportunities (Core, 2001; MacLaughlin et al., 
1996), and this can affect executives’ compensation design (Holmstrom, 1979). High-growth 
firms are likely to influence managerial leverage policies via generous compensation. In line 
with this view, the literature argues that shareholders should apply more (less) equity-based 
(cash-based) incentives to motivate managers of high-growth firms (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Holmstrom, 1979; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). Consistent with this intuition, we argue 
that executive compensation – leverage link is likely to be affected by the firm’s growth 
opportunities.  
Lastly, in the same breath, the study further considers the role of the firm’s corporate 
governance practices within the context of executive compensation – leverage linkage. 
 As posited by Florackis and Ozkan (2009), firms with a good corporate governance system 
tend to use less stock-based compensation and can easily access the debt market at a lower cost 
of debt capital (see Cremers et al., 2004; Klock et al., 2005), which plays a significant role in 
determining the firm’s choice of capital structure. In line with this, we examine how well-
governed firms design executives’ compensation to influence their leverage decisions. 
Fourth, the study applies a research technique similar to that of Coles et al. (2006) but makes 
further improvement. Specifically, Coles et al. develop a system of simultaneous equations and 
apply a three-stage least squares (3SLS) technique to estimate their empirical models. In the 
pay for performance estimation, the authors apply just an identifying restriction procedure. 
This approach restricts internal instruments to these variables: capital expenditure, R&D, firm 
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risk and leverage in the compensation incentives framework, thereby excluding other 
governance variables. However, the present study employs three-stages least squares (3SLS) 
estimation and utilises executive pay both as a predictor and/or predicted within the framework 
of investment – pay incentives and pay incentives – investment sensitivity by controlling a 
variety of other governance variables (e.g. managerial ownership, institutional and block-
holders’ ownership, and non-executive directors’ shareholdings), consistent with Nguyen 
(2018). For instance, it is argued that a firm with effective corporate governance practices 
influences not only executives’ excessive pay levels but also the structure of their pay packages 
(Mallin et al., 2015; Newton, 2015; Jouber and Fakhfakh, 2012), which can consequently affect 
their risk-related decisions. This is important, particularly for the UK firms that have witnessed 
significant corporate governance reforms since the rise of the corporate failure debacle.  
Moreover, our comprehensive data on managerial compensation afford us the opportunity to 
specifically examine how these compensation components (cash bonus, LTIPs and stock 
options) influence the firm’s risk-taking activities, different from the prior studies (e.g. Coles 
et al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012; Eisdorfer et al., 2013; Croci and Petmezas, 2015). More 
specifically, the Hampel (1998) and Higgs (2003) disclosure mandate of top executives’ 
compensation enables the study to obtain annual pay components of the three (3) top 
executives: CEO (chief executive officer), CFO (chief financial officer) and CO (chief 
operating officer). Extant literature (e.g. Kim et al., 2011; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; 
Sainani, 2018) shows the extent to which CFOs impact corporate policies. For instance, Sainani 
(2018) argues that a strong CFO influences a firm’s value-maximising acquisition projects, 
whilst Kim et al. (2011) conclude that a CFO’s option-based incentives induce a firm’s risky 
policies. Therefore, by using compensation data of the three top executives, we are able to 
incorporate and relate the incentive of other top executives together with the CEO on the firm’s 
risk-taking decisions within the UK context. 
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1.4 Objectives of the study 
Having indicated the primary contribution of the study in the previous section, the research 
proceeds to formally state the objectives. Broadly, this study aims to establish a causal relation 
between managerial compensation packages and the firm’s risk-taking activities. The key 
objectives of this study are threefold: 
1. To demonstrate whether the association between executives’ compensation and firm’s 
investment persists in the UK dataset that includes fixed intangible and other fixed assets 
expenditure. This gives a comprehensive analysis of the firm’s investment in a single study.  
2. To provide supplementary and exploratory evidence to show the extent to which 
managerial compensation deviation induces investment distortions. This part attempts to 
further explain how incentive deviation affects managerial behaviour to under- or over-
invest.   
3. To examine the role of managerial compensation on the firm’s observed leverage level. It 
also seeks to show the extent to which the relationship is conditioned on the firm’s growth 
opportunities. More so, it intends to provide further evidence on how the firm’s governance 
system shapes the leverage – compensation association.  
The thesis’s contributions to the literature are directly related to the achievement of the stated 
objectives. The outlined issues have not received much attention, and the empirical 
examination of these issues in the UK context is urgently needed. 
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1.5 The structure of the thesis 
 
We structure the rest of the chapters along these strands: 
Chapter 2 concentrates on risk-taking activities and managerial compensation. It structures the 
risk-taking activities into two parts (parts 2a & 2b). 
Part 2a reviews the literature on investment and managerial compensation. It focuses on why 
managers undertake investment: i) agency-related motives and ii) behavioural imbalances 
(overconfidence). It also shows why managerial compensation is related to the firm’s 
investment style. It discusses various components of executive compensation. In addition, 
literature that covers managerial compensation and investment linkages is also reviewed. The 
issues arising from the reviewed literature are utilised to develop investment hypotheses 
(Chapter 4). 
Chapter 2b examines financial leverage and managerial compensation. The chapter discusses 
why firms borrow, theories of capital structure. It also shows how executives’ compensation 
relates to leverage. It reviews relevant literature on financial leverage and executive 
compensation. The central hypotheses are developed in a later chapter (5).  
Chapter 3 presents and discusses general data collection procedure. Specifically, it shows the 
designed methods and variable definitions and measurements of key explanatory variable. It 
shows the estimation strategy adopted by the study and discusses its suitability for the empirical 
analyses. It also provides descriptive statistics for the independent variables. It also presents 
pie and bar charts of the independent variables, and a conclusion.  
Chapter 4 concentrates on the empirical part of executive compensation and investment. It 
develops hypotheses and defines and measures the key variables – investment measures – and 
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other control variables to be utilised in the analysis. It provides and discusses empirical results, 
and also conducts robustness checks, and finally provides a conclusion.  
Further, Chapter 4 section 4.8 discusses executive compensation deviation and investment 
distortions. It provides a brief literature review on investment distortion and managerial 
compensation and develops testable hypotheses. It states the empirical method (i.e. investment 
distortion probability model), defines two main variables – investment distortions and 
compensation deviation – and discusses the results.  
Chapter 5 examines financial leverage and managerial compensation. The chapter develops 
hypotheses and discusses variable descriptions. It presents the empirical model, i.e. system of 
equations, and justifies the estimation technique. It provides analyses of the descriptive 
statistics and provides discussions of the empirical leverage findings based on the tested 
hypotheses. It also performs and discusses robustness tests and includes a conclusion to the 
chapter. The chapter also covers the moderating effects of managerial compensation and 
growth opportunity and or governance on leverage policy.    
Finally, Chapter 6 presents a summary of the results and conclusions of the study. It highlights 
the implications of the findings and the overall contributions of the study to the knowledge 
literature. It also provides the study’s limitations and some suggestions for future research.  
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                                                      Chapter 2 
 
2.0 Managerial Risk-Taking Activities and Compensation Incentives 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As stated earlier, the primary objective of this study is to establish a causal relation between 
corporate operational risk-taking activities and managerial compensation scheme. Largely, 
corporate firms often embark on many operational activities which partly contribute to 
determine the overall value of the firm. Specifically, the scope of operational risk-taking 
policies covered by the study is those derived from both investment policy and financial 
leverage policy. These corporate value-critical decisions interact with the organisational 
characteristics including management compensation scheme and governance mechanisms to 
determine the probability distribution of the firm’s stock return and cash flow, suggesting a 
possible linkage between the valued-critical operational risk activities and the management 
compensation design. More specifically, the chapter delineates operational risk-taking 
activities into two parts: a) investment and b) financial leverage and discusses the relevant 
literature along this line. The first section starts with the investment literature before we move 
on to the leverage literature. 
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                2.2 Corporate Investment Activities (Part A) 
 
2.2a Corporate investment activities: A literature review 
Investment is one of the key observable managerial decisions, which, in part, determines the 
probability distribution of the firm’s cash flow. Such operational risk-taking decisions of 
managers are often influenced by their personal characteristics, which make them not act as 
ideal Bayesian decision-makers. Specifically, this section offers an explanation of how these 
factors define corporate investment. This explanation is offered under two theoretical themes: 
agency theory and managerial hubris. 
Furthermore, the chapter also explains the extent to which compensation helps minimise 
managerial personal incentive and induces them to select appropriate investment. Within this 
context, we build upon the managerial compensation literature to explain why the level and 
composition of managers’ compensation influence investment activities. Again, we review the 
relevant literature that relates managerial compensation to firm investment. This enables us to 
formulate a framework to analyse the study’s empirical work in the later chapter.   
Importantly, the investment part (1) is organised as follows. Section 2.2.1 reviews the key 
views on the theory of investment, which is grouped under two main themes: agency theory 
and managerial hubris/optimism. Section 2.2.2 lays emphasis on the theoretical framework 
under which managerial compensation is linked with investment. Section 2.2.3 provides a 
comprehensive review of the literature. It covers the two perspectives: literature that considers 
the effect of managerial compensation on investment, and literature that explores the reverse 
question. Section 2.2.4 provides an overall conclusion for the investment part. 
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2.2.1a The dominant views on the theory of investment 
The existing literature on corporate finance offers a possible explanation of why managers 
undertake investments. Investment literature has put forward a variety of reasons (Stein, 2003 
p. 121). Significant among them include agency motives – where managers pursue corporate 
policies to suit their own interests, to shareholders’ detriment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1986, 1993; Tirole, 2005) – and managerial optimism/hubris motives – managers 
become overly optimistic about investment outcome (Roll, 1986). The underlying idea is that, 
due to imperfection in the corporate governance system, managers’ selection of operational 
activities is likely to be motivated by either agency and/or overconfidence reasons, which can 
be costly to the shareholders. Thus, managerial risk-taking activities such as property, plant 
and equipment, and other fixed asset acquisition, and intangibles (i.e. R&D and fixed 
intangible) are based on non-economic factors. We discuss these significant theoretical 
implications that are relevant to understanding the primary reasons for which corporate 
managers are more likely to undertake these kinds of investment activities. 
More specifically, this section focuses on literature that speaks directly to the issue of agency 
theory and managerial optimism on a firm’s investment behaviour relating to tangible and 
intangible investments. Considerably, we devote more special attention to the agency-
motivated reasons relative to managerial optimism/hubris. This helps to unearth the extent to 
which compensation incentives induce managerial behaviour to make efficient investment 
decisions. 
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2.2.1.1a Agency-motivated reasons for corporate investments 
 
An agency problem is one of the dominant themes in management, accounting and corporate 
finance literature. In particular, the theme “agency theory” is at the heart of virtually every 
major topic in corporate finance from capital structure, corporate governance, compensation 
contracts and financial intermediation, to mention but a few (Stein, 2003). Indeed, these strands 
of literature underscore the importance of the paradigm in corporate settings with a lineage 
dating back to Berle and Means (1932), and the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
Primarily, a key assumption underlying the theory is that managers of publicly traded firms 
may pursue policies to benefit themselves even if these policies lead to shareholder value 
destruction (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Tirole, 2005). In fact, such acts of non-benevolence 
towards shareholders often manifest in managers’ risk-taking activity, particularly investment 
and/or financing decisions. Specifically, at this point and for the purposes of this discussion, 
we will survey those variants of the agency problem that pose direct implications for firms’ 
investment behaviour. 
 
a) Empire-building 
One major rationale under the agency theoretic framework for investment is empire-building. 
The literature posits that managers may develop an excessive appetite to run larger firms, as 
opposed to profitable ones (see Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964; Williamson, 1964; Jensen, 1986, 
1993). For instance, Jensen (1986) argues that managers with a private incentive to build their 
“empire” are more likely to spend essentially all internal cash surplus on low return or even 
negative net present value (NPV) activities (Stulz, 1990). Some of these unprofitable risky 
activities include acquisitions, property, plant and equipment, and other intangibles’ 
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investment. Consequently, the literature suggests ex-ante over-investment and eventual ex-post 
under-investment as the firm’s internal cash flow depletes (Jensen, 1986; Myers, 1977).   
In a related development, other literature highlights executive managers’ desire to pursue 
empire-building ambitions. Significantly, both social and economic benefits associated with a 
manager’s decision to overly invest corporate resources, either through merger acquisitions or 
property, plant and equipment or knowledge-based assets, have been advanced in the literature.  
More specifically, corporate managers may gain private incentives for managing bigger 
corporations. This includes a sense of self-satisfaction and personal achievement, upliftment 
of social stature in their community and among their peers, and, more importantly, increase in 
remuneration as well as an enhanced consumption of perquisites (Masulis et al., 2007). Again, 
in support of size anomaly literature, for instance, the British Airways CEO (Willie Walsh) and 
finance director saw their base salary rise by 12% and 43% respectively following the 
successful merger with Iberia in 2010 (Arnold, 2013, p. 863). Though some of these individual 
unobservable characteristics are often not openly debated, it is worthwhile stating that these 
may in part affect a manager’s investment decision-making process. 
 
b) Empire-preservation, entrenchment and diversification 
Another important agency-motivated factor for a firm’s investment is the managers’ desire to 
continually maintain their market power through various investment-related strategic ways 
including empire-preservation, entrenchment and diversification. Unlike the synergy motive 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984), the empire-driven managers’ main concern is to continually 
maintain and appropriate the benefits that come along with managing larger corporations.  
Underlying this strand of literature, several reasons have been articulated by the prior studies 
(see Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993). They advance the view that 
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managers may spend corporate resources on low-yielding investment, because such projects 
suit their own knowledge and expertise. 
Gordon et al. (2009) articulate a similar sentiment through their defensive mechanism model. 
Specifically, the authors point out that manager may embark on acquisition for safeguarding 
their firm from being acquired by other market competitors. In the same spirit, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989) posit that managers may tend to deliberately pursue investment activity that 
suits their “specialist” area of expertise. This type of agency-incentivised decision is common 
to inorganic investment activities such as acquisitions of assets in which executive managers 
are keen to acquire a line of business or firm that may eminently require their specific human 
capital (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993). Relatedly, Masulis et al. (2007) also show that 
corporate managers may undertake certain investment decisions with the common aim of 
enlarging their firm size, which, in turn, afford them the opportunity to extend their market 
influence and eventually augment their pay incentives. A consistent view is held by other prior 
literature (e.g. Ozkan, 2012; Moeller and Schlingmann, 2005; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987).  
Moreover, corporate diversification is another significant element that is more likely to show 
up if indeed managers have the taste to manage large corporate empires. Thus, managers use 
diversification as a strategic investment tool. One paramount reason that has been cited in the 
corporate finance literature is risk-reduction incentives (Amihud and Levi, 1981; May, 1995). 
For instance, Amihud and Levi (1981) argue that managers diversify their investment portfolio 
partly to minimise the firm’s risk exposure and to enjoy their continual presence in the market 
through the empire ambition strategy. 
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c) Reputational and career concerns 
Another important factor that reflects on how managers’ interest may deviate from 
shareholders’ through investment is career concern. The markets reward good managers and 
punish bad ones. Due to this, managers may tend to select risk-taking activities that are likely 
to increase their career prospects as well as professional reputations. Because the markets 
consume information regarding investment, managers with such private incentive tend to 
announce their presence in the market via more investment. For instance, Holmstrom (1999a) 
points out that, for an undervalued manager to ascertain recognition and reputation in the public 
eye, they may tend to pursue many investment projects, likewise the talented managers. In 
essence, the market’s recognition of the managerial talent is synonymous with risk-taking 
preference.   
In addition, such managers are more likely to overly invest in activities they consider less risky 
with the intention to eliminate their employment and/or career risk. Therefore, managers’ 
incentives, via reputation and future career opportunities, can induce them to manipulate firm 
investment policy irrespective of the long-term wealth implication to shareholders (see 
Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).  
Overall, it is worth noting that some implicit considerations, i.e. reputation and career risk, 
influence managers when assessing and selecting investment preference, which to some extent 
can result in a firm’s investment distortions. Within this vein, Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 
(1999) argue that, in cases where the firm’s formal incentives scheme is crude and constrained, 
implicit managerial incentives often become more problematic. In that circumstance, 
managers’ decisions are extremely tailored towards their personal satisfaction, with little or no 
concern for shareholders’ needs or interests. 
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d) Short-termism    
It is also argued that managerial concern for reputation often impels managers to take a decision 
purposely to boost short-term performance at the detriment of long-run stockholders’ value 
(Narayanan, 1985; Bebchuk and Stole, 1993). For instance, Narayanan (1985) points out those 
managers may embark on an aggressive investment policy with the aim of inflating short-run 
profitability. 
In a related way, Stein (1989) contends that, due to information asymmetry, managers’ myopic 
investment decisions can affect the market assessment of their firms’ stock prices and cash flow 
over a short-term horizon. In some cases, however, managers may, for short-term incentive 
reasons, intentionally boost reported earnings by undertaking less investment in hard-to 
measure assets, such as plant and equipment maintenance, research and development, 
employee training and development, customer care and loyalty, etc., even though disinvesting 
in such activities could ultimately impoverish shareholders in the long run. In a more 
corroborated sense, Bebchuk and Stole (1993) observe that short-term reputation influences 
managers to engage in investment distortions. For example, managers may choose to over-
invest to create artificial near-term stock prices rise, as this is interpreted by the markets to 
represent the quality and efficiency of managers’ skills.  
Furthermore, Gompers (1996) and Baker (2000) assert that managers of newly established 
firms with no market reputation are more prone to engage in distortionary activities to 
announce their presence in the markets.  
The overall material implication of the short-termism model suggests that firm managers’ risk-
taking decisions, particularly investment-related ones, create incentive for managers to boost 
short-term performance.  
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e) Herding 
Another specific manifestation of managers’ career threat is linked to the excessive tendency 
of managers to follow the investment styles of others. The literature on behavioural economics 
offers a possible explanation for why managers may have an incentive to herd. One notable 
point indicates that managers may tend to conform to the judgements and behaviours of their 
professional counterparts with the intention to minimise career concerns (Hirshleifer, 2001). 
Taking note of the inefficient management hypothesis (Manne, 1965), corporate managers’ 
performance is often evaluated based on certain benchmarks such as stock indices or average 
industry performance indicators. This tends to imply that firm managers whose share price falls 
below the standardised industry indicator are assumed to be inefficient managers. 
Consequently, such managers are more likely to face career risks once their stocks perform 
poorly relative to the market benchmark. To salvage their career prospects, managers may have 
an incentive to copy the investment tactics of other industry competitors to prevent substantial 
underperformance and to secure their job.  
Moreover, Scharfstein and Stein (1990), using a reputation-based model, predict how managers 
are incentivised to do as others (managers) do. They suggest that managers tend to disregard 
their own information and follow group information particularly when their contrarian 
investment views are unattractive to the markets. The authors offer managerial reputation, age 
and experience as likely factors to cause managers to herd. For instance, they argue that young 
and inexperienced managers may prefer to fail conventionally than to succeed 
unconventionally. 
Managerial herding behaviour can be either intentional or unintentional. For instance, Walter 
and Weber (2006) argue that intentional herding arises when a manager blatantly copies the 
investment actions of others. However, unintentional herding occurs when managers analyse 
from a similar perspective because they have access to similar information. 
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In the light of this, it is important to note that managers, for fear of job security and damage 
reputation, may tend to design their investment activities to follow the majority views. 
 
f) The quiet life hypothesis 
As an extension to Hicks (1935), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) proposed what became 
known as the “quiet life hypothesis”, another classic principal – agent problem which can pose 
serious implications for managerial investment decisions. Contrarily to the empire-building 
and career concerns models, “the quiet life theory” suggests that managers’ investment 
behaviour may be influenced by some inherent risk-averse determinants. They highlight that 
managers become excessively conservative when it comes to either taking a new or 
disembarking an old investment decision. In fact, such a cross-sectional variation in managers’ 
decisions may have potential implications for both over- and under-investment incentives. For 
instance, a manager may be reluctant to shut down a non-performing business project, which 
could exacerbate the firm’s over-investment problem. Significant reasons may contribute to the 
manager’s indecision to off-load or diversify the poorly performing line of business. Notable 
among them includes the manager’s inherent risk-aversion characteristics, and the market’s 
perception regarding management efficiency if the firm decides to terminate an unprofitable 
activity. Supporting this view, Boot (1992) and Baker (2000) argue that managers disembarking 
on new or already existing non-profitable projects may be viewed by the market to represent 
an admission of failure on the part of management. Therefore, in an attempt to minimise 
information asymmetry effects, managers may tend to keep such a poorly performing venture 
irrespective of how value destroying the project may seem to be.  
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The managerial labour market posits that the “quiet life” managers are seen to be content with 
their current wages and that they may not anticipate any future opportunistic wage revision as 
they have revealed no further information about their abilities. 
In short, the existing evidence suggests that management risk-taking preference may 
potentially be influenced by some unobserved risk-motivated factors. 
 
2.2.1.2a Managerial overconfidence/hubris 
Another potential investment-related problem is offered by behavioural economists (Roll, 
1986). It is argued that managers may be overly optimistic about the prospects of their 
investment activity, and that they may fail to act as ideal Bayesian decision-makers (De Bondt 
and Thaler, 1985; Malmendier and Tate, 2002). 
Research studies show that overconfident managers are more susceptible to valuation errors 
because they tend to attach extra weight to their private information regarding the prospects of 
the said investment (Foster, 1983). Such optimistic behaviour is often influenced by factors 
including talent, faith, beliefs, experience and sometimes one’s entrepreneurial flair to turn 
uncontrollable events (Arnold, 2013, p. 863). These implicit systemic distortions can inhibit 
managers’ decisions not only to over-invest in projects such as fixed tangible assets, fixed 
intangibles and R&Ds, but they may also end up spending more on acquiring the said activity 
(DePamphilis, 2010; Roll, 1986). 
In addition, the literature posits that managers’ overconfidence about a particular investment 
project is often induced by the firm’s internal available funds. Citing signalling effect and rent-
seeking hypothesis (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Travlos, 1987), research shows 
that managers may prefer to finance their overly optimistic investment decisions with internal 
cash reserves rather than to use other external sources, all things being equal.  
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One pertinent issue associated with the “hubris hypothesis” is that the managers’ motive may 
not necessarily depict a deliberate pursuit of their self-interest, but, however, their sense of 
judgement on investment prospects is often distorted by some behavioural imbalances, which 
in turn affect the firm value. 
Collectively, this section has advanced two broad perspectives on why executive managers 
undertake investments: agency motives and managerial optimism. The agency-motivated 
reasons show how managers’ risk-taking (investment) decisions tend to safeguard their own 
interests to the detriment of shareholders’. Managerial optimism (hubris) also indicates 
managers’ unwarranted overconfidence about investment outcomes, which can affect the firm’s 
level of investment. Clearly, these managerial egocentric tendencies (resulting from agency 
and overconfidence) are likely to affect managers’ allocation of resources to these risk-taking 
activities (e.g. property, plant and equipment, R&D, fixed intangible, other fixed assets), and 
the consequential effects on firm value. Through efficient compensation contracts, these 
managerial investment-related imbalances are reduced, thereby causing managers to select 
value-critical investment projects (Coles et al. 2006; Jensen and Murphy, 1989 p. 1). 
The next section provides reasons to suggest why managerial compensation impacts the way 
they (managers) make investment decisions, before we move on to provide a detailed literature 
review on investment and managerial compensation incentives.  
 
2.3a Managerial compensation theory 
The previous discussion highlighted the various factors that can affect managers’ risk-taking 
(investment) decisions. Other researchers have also theorised that, through efficient contractual 
provision, managers are able to make value-critical decisions including investment and/or 
financial leverage (Holmstrom, 1979; Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Coles et al., 2006). 
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In fact, there are two opposing views on managerial compensation contract (Ntim et al., 2016 
p. 4; Weisbach, 2007). These are: i) optimal contracting theory (OCT) (Holmstrom, 1979; 
Murphy, 1985; Coles et al. 2006) and ii) managerial power hypothesis (MPH) (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003, 2004; Weisbach, 2007). The next subsections provide a brief overview of these 
theories of managerial compensation.  
  
i) Optimal contracting theory (OCT) 
As extant literature suggests, managers may be sufficiently self-interested (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989) and/or risk averse due to the over-investment problem and the consequent under-
diversification of their human and economic wealth portfolio (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980). Thus, such an agency-motivated incentive could hurt shareholder value-
enhancement via inefficient investment selection.  
The optimal contracting theory (OPT) suggests that, by rewarding managers with appropriate 
compensation incentives (e.g. salary, cash bonus, long-term incentive plans, stock options), 
managerial investment-related imbalances may be significantly reduced, thereby enhancing the 
quality of investment (Kini and Williams, 2012; Coles et al. 2006; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
Since the structure and the level of compensation components offer different risk incentives to 
managers, the optimal contracting theory assumes that shareholders through the board of 
directors should offer a suitable compensation package to managers to improve the quality and 
efficiency of managerial decisions regarding investment and/or leverage (Benston, 1985). 
 
ii) Managerial power hypothesis (MPH) 
Contrary to optimal contracting theory, the managerial power hypothesis (MPH) views 
executive compensation arrangements as products of close negotiations between powerful 
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executives and a weak corporate board of directors (hereafter BODs) (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2003; Weisbach, 2007). Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that executives with excessive power 
can easily manipulate appointment to the BOD, which could afford executives the leeway to 
gain control over the board’s decisions regarding compensation determination and to facilitate 
excessive rent extraction (Gomez-Majia et al., 1987). In such a case, the compromised BODs 
may approve generous pay packages to executives in anticipation of receiving similar 
reciprocal gestures including appointment to another directorship position in the firm (Morse 
et al., 2011; Brick, Palmon and Wald, 2005; Core et al., 2003; Crystal, 1991). Supporting this 
view is Brick, Palmon and Wald’s (2005) mutual backscratching or cronyism proposition. The 
authors argue for the presence of mutually beneficial collusion between top management and 
the board of directors when setting managerial compensation incentives. 
One significant issue associated with managers’ power to influence their own pay setting is 
that it can erode the efficiency of compensation incentives to affect managerial utility function. 
Thus, the quality of risk-taking decisions (investment and/or leverage) is likely to deviate from 
the expected standard, which, in turn, can affect a firm’s value (Weisbach, 2007; Grinstein and 
Hribar, 2004; Core et al., 1999). 
In sum, this section highlights the theoretical frameworks through which risk-taking policy and 
managerial compensation interaction is analysed. As stated, the key argument of the study is 
that shareholders use different components of managerial compensation to influence risk-
taking activities arising from investment and/or leverage by addressing the extent to which 
managerial compensation is predicted by other firm-related characteristics including risk-
taking activities.   
A considerable amount of research on executive compensation often utilises different incentive 
components such as salary, cash bonuses, value of stock options and value of long-term 
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incentive plans (value of restricted stock and performance stock), and each component has a 
different implication for the managerial decision-making process, particularly regarding risk-
taking projects. One important advantage of the present work is that we are able to provide 
wide data coverage on the managerial compensation and relate it to managerial risk-taking 
activities. Essentially, before we look at the different components of managerial compensation, 
we first provide a brief overview of the UK regulatory system which has influenced the way 
executives are remunerated in the UK.  
 
2.3.1a Institutional framework and executives’ compensation in the UK  
The United Kingdom is known to have one of the most developed and advanced financial 
markets in the world. As a global player in the capital markets, the UK legislative and 
regulatory frameworks on corporate governance have systematically evolved due to a series of 
high profile “ad-hoc” committee reports, some of which were designed to respond to internally 
generated corporate failures in the UK or as a reaction to similar failures in other parts of the 
world. Largely, several corporate governance reports were issued in the 1990s, as governance 
and compensation issues led to many policy documents, which were later incorporated in the 
London Stock Exchange Combined Code. The reports include Cadbury Reports (1992), 
Greenbury Reports (1995), Hampel Reports (1998), Higgs Reports (2003) and the relatively 
more recent Walker Reports (2009). The study provides a cursory glance at the various reports. 
The Cadbury Report (1992) mainly highlights the responsibilities of institutional shareholders 
as an important powerhouse to restrain management from any expropriation behaviour through 
consumption of perquisites, awarding themselves bumper pay bonuses and other forms of 
corporate misbehaviour. The report was commissioned in the aftermath of several high-profile 
corporate bankruptcies in the early 1990s and recommended some important corporate 
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governance changes including the role of remuneration committees, institutional investors, and 
the board of directors. For instance, the report makes a quasi-mandatory call for corporations 
to have in place an independent remuneration committee to oversee managers’ compensation 
schemes, although the report shows little specific guidance on the executive directors’ 
remuneration packages.  
The Greenbury Report (1995) specifically focused on the design of executives’ compensation 
scheme and the performance evaluation criteria. The report states that management should not 
be compensated based on share price behaviour and that the use of a share options incentive 
should be curtailed, particularly if the performance target is unrealistic. The implication of the 
committee position was to prevent corporate managers from taking excessive risks, and instead 
proposes that performance-related pay components (e.g. long-term shares, other annual 
bonuses) can be used to motivate managers. More explicitly, the committee recommends that 
a share options package can be issued to executives only to help stimulate realistic performance 
goals and it also ruled out the common practice of discounting share options by 15% at the 
grant date share price.    
A simple observation that can be drawn from the Greenbury findings is that the distinctive 
nature of the executive pay components (LTIPs, bonuses and share options) poses different 
risk-related incentives. In other words, these compensation components differently influence 
managerial risk-taking activities relating to investment and financing. This constitutes one of 
the primary motivations of this study. In this way, the study aims to find out if indeed the board 
of directors apply certain type of compensation for risk-motivated purposes. 
The Hampel Reports (1998), on the other hand, stressed the need for corporations to disclose 
detailed information on executives’ compensation entitlements similar to the US style of 
reporting managerial compensation information. In addition to the full disclosure of boardroom 
members’ pay packages, the committee further highlights remuneration committees’ 
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membership and compositions as well as clarification of any compliance issues. Hampel 
findings suggest that non-executive directors should be rewarded with fixed fees, and where 
possible part of their remuneration can be given in the form of shares for the purposes of 
aligning their incentives with the shareholders.    
It is important to mention that the various committees’ reports were incorporated into the 
London Stock Exchange Combined Code (hereafter LSE) and then in statute by the 2002 UK 
Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (UK DRRR Bulletin, 2002). Specifically, the 
2002 Act makes it mandatory for the remuneration committees through the board to seek the 
approval of the shareholders on executives’ remuneration packages at the annual general 
meeting, although the vote is only advisory and may not constitute a binding document on the 
company.  
The Higgs Reports (2003), a relatively more recent report, tasked corporate firms to be more 
transparent in setting up executive compensation schemes as well as individual board of 
directors’ pay structure. The draft that was incorporated into the Combined Code further 
recommends that executive directors’ compensation packages should be structured in a way to 
entice management to work hard to achieve the shareholder value maximisation objective.  
Moreover, another specific regulatory framework was also introduced in the financial sector 
following the series of banking failures in 2007. The Banking Remuneration Code underpinned 
by the recommendation of the Walker Report (2009) make it mandatory for financial 
institutions (i.e. UK banking and other financial sectors) to fully disclose the levels and the 
nature of executives’ remuneration packages. The report further indicated that executives’ 
compensation components (e.g. long-term incentive plans-LTIPs, bonuses) should constitute 
at least half of the overall compensation entitlement and that the eligibility requirement should 
have a minimal three-year period. The consultative bill (Banking Remuneration Code) became 
operationalised in January 2011, although it has still not yet received the statutory status. The 
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Financial Service Authority (FSA) has made it a requirement for all financial institutions to 
follow such guidance in order to participate in the Government’s Asset Protection Code. The 
Walker commission also makes it mandatory for remuneration committees to fully engage in 
the setting up of lower workforce remuneration within a firm’s overall risk framework.  
Overall, these reports played a crucial role in enforcing detailed disclosure rules for UK 
executive compensation. Clearly, UK public listed companies now provide sufficient annual 
information on executive compensation packages and this has enabled the current study to 
specifically examine the raised issues. The next discussion is centred on the different 
remuneration components used by UK shareholders to reward executives. 
 
2.3.2 Cash-based compensation 
Corporate institutions often tend to use cash-related compensation to attract, retain and 
motivate managers to adhere to shareholder wealth maximisation (Chen et al., 2016).The 
literature posits that the use of a cash-based incentive is a less powerful instrument in reducing 
the risk-motivated agency problem (see Core and Guay, 1999; Fenn and Liang, 2001). This is 
because risk-averse managers are less likely to increase the firm’s idiosyncratic risk when a 
large component of their compensation is cash-related. It can also encourage earnings 
management. The two forms of cash-based compensation, salary and cash bonus, are discussed 
below. 
 
2.3.2.1 Basic salary 
Basic salary is the foundational component of executives’ structural compensation 
arrangement, often featured in the employment contract (Murphy, 1998). It guarantees a fixed 
minimum pay for the executive for the stipulated period of the contract. It also forms the basis 
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upon which further incentive claims including cash bonus, LTIPs, stock options, defined 
pension and other severance arrangements are largely measured.  
Specifically, early research on the agency problem shows that a higher salary encourages 
management-shareholders’ unity, because any upward adjustment in managerial salary 
component is linked to firm performance (cash flow or earnings). This, in effect, may 
contribute to the reduction of agency conflicts as shareholders and managers share the benefit 
together. For instance, Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that management salary increases 
($0.02) are associated with a $1000 increase in corporate value.  
However, other literature subscribes to a different view regarding the salary adjustment mode 
of compensation. Based on the risk-motivated explanation, in cases where executives only have 
a fixed incentive claim and face the decision to implement an aggressive debt policy, risk-
averse managers may be more reluctant to favour a high-risk policy, even if such a decision 
can improve shareholders’ value. In essence, shareholders’ frequent revision of managerial 
salary can discourage risk-taking activities.  
 
2.3.2.2 Cash bonus  
Cash bonus incentive is one of the components of executive compensation packages. The pay-
out is often dependent on meeting certain specific accounting performance targets such as cash 
flow, earnings, sales revenue. Thus, a manager is motivated to attain the accounting-related 
threshold (Chen et al., 2017). However, cash bonus can also create an incentive problem. For 
instance, the surveyed literature suggests that managers may be more inclined to decrease 
maintenance expenditure on certain investment projects, especially research and development, 
in order to increase the reported profit when their performance is tied to such short-term 
accounting metrics (Xue, 2007; Coles et al., 2006). Sacrificing long-term investment 
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opportunities, managers are able to artificially generate positive and immediate stable cash 
flow and earnings to meet their financial targets, a requirement for cash rewards (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom, 1987).  
Against this background, Lambert and Larcker (1985) suggest that giving managers a deferred 
cash compensation package would potentially reduce their under-investment incentive. Thus, 
deferred cash incentives minimise myopic managerial behaviour. 
Furthermore, some studies also suggest another agency theoretic implication for cash 
compensation plans. Specifically, Smith and Watts (1983) argue that, in instances where senior 
executives’ compensation is tilted towards cash component, top management may have an 
incentive to convince the firm’s board of directors to retain a substantial part of corporate profit 
as a buffer to meet any expected future cash payment obligation. Consequently, financial slack 
is encouraged to some extent, which could have a negative effect on the firm’s investment 
opportunity sets and ultimately shareholders’ value (Kashyap, Lamont and Stein, 1994; 
Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Hall, 1992). In ameliorating this, Lewellen et al. (1987) 
contend that a firm’s compensation package could be selectively structured in a manner that 
the proportional increase in cash compensation (salary and bonus) affects the firm’s dividend 
pay-out, especially where there is no feasible investment present. 
In brief, although cash bonus can be used to motivate managers, it is evident that managers 
with substantial cash bonus compensation may develop a more risk-avoiding incentive to limit 
the firm’s overall risk profile, which can be beneficial to bondholders (Duru, Mansi and Reeb, 
2005; Coles et al., 2006).  
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2.3.3 Equity-based compensation 
Agency theory suggests divergence of interest between managers and shareholders in matters 
relating to the operational activities of the firm. Equity-based incentives are seen as an effective 
mechanism in ameliorating the conflict of interest. The differences may be reflected in 
decisions such as investments, debt level, cash holdings and earnings management, which the 
equity compensation incentive is assumed to resolve. We discuss the equity-based components 
below. 
   
 2.3.3.1 Stock options compensation 
Stock options incentive is a relatively modern compensation package designed to induce 
managers’ risk-increasing incentives (Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 
2010). The convex payoff features inherent in stock options influence managers to pursue and 
implement risky investment and financing policies. This is because the probability of the firm’s 
positive stock return is closely associated with the managerial risky investment and financial 
policies, which may directly increase the value of the manager’s stock options as the firm’s 
stock volatility goes up. This makes both managers and shareholders benefit as stock volatility 
increases, thereby aligning shareholders and managers’ interests (e.g. Chava and Purnanandam, 
2010; Coles et al., 2006; Palia, 2001; Mehran, 1995; John and John, 1993). Thus, tying agents’ 
expected utility to the principal(s) value via stock options incentives increases the likelihood 
of managerial risk-taking particularly for high-growth opportunities (Holmstrom and Ricarti 
Costa, 1986; Smith and Watts, 1992; Bizjak, Brickley and Coles, 1993; Core and Guay, 1999). 
One of the major implications of the stock options incentive is that it encourages managers’ 
risk-shifting incentive (John and John, 1993). For instance, the increase in the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risks via investment and higher leverage ratio may inadvertently lead to a higher 
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probability of financial distress and the possible bankruptcy risk, which can influence rational 
debtholders to demand a high lending rate before they lend to the firm. This effect can be 
mitigated by the firm using convertible debt and or more deferred stock incentive (Ortiz-
Molina, 2007).    
Moreover, others point out that financial accounting treatment makes the stock options 
component much more preferable to cash bonus or restricted stocks. More specifically, cash 
and restricted stocks bonuses are treated as income and expenditure items, while stock options 
grants are shown in a footnote and treated in the financial balance sheet. This can influence the 
board to offer more managerial stock options. In addition, because share options are not 
reconciled as an expenditure item, a financially constrained firm with low accumulated 
earnings, perhaps because of regular debt covenant payments, may resort to a stock options 
package to enhance its ability to continually incentivise its managers (Core and Guay, 1999, 
2001a; Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 1996). 
 
 2.3.3.2 Performance stock compensation 
This component of the compensation package often has special performance targets as a vesting 
condition. This distinctive feature provides different risk incentives to managers compared to 
other forms of compensation incentives. Like stock options, performance stocks may induce 
more risk-taking behaviour. This is because managers may not be able to benefit from such an 
incentives scheme if they fail to achieve the required performance benchmarks (e.g. stock 
return, cash flow, profits). This, therefore, encourage managers to pursue risky policies in order 
to meet the required performance criteria. However, as managers’ willingness to increase firm 
risk goes up via more debt, bondholders or creditors anticipating this will demand a higher risk 
premium to lend to the firm.  
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Other existing literature argues that setting a specific performance benchmark via performance 
stock compensation encourages opportunistic managerial behaviour (Kuang, 2008; Prevost, 
Rao and Skousen, 2008). Specifically, Prevost, Rao and Skousen (2008) argue that managers 
are likely to commit earnings management when a large component of their incentive is 
performance stock. Moreover, Yermack (1995) and Bryan, Hwang and Lilien (2000) show that, 
through tax motivation purposes, many corporate institutions use performance stock-based 
compensation to reward top management and it is less expensive for firms with lower marginal 
tax rates. 
 
2.3.3.3 Restricted/deferred stock compensation 
Like performance stock, restricted stock incentives also provide certain prescribed targets and 
such targets must be achieved before vesting. In the UK, for instance, executives are often 
handed a restricted stock package for achieving a stipulated shareholder return target. In some 
cases, the expected target to be met by the executive is to remain at the firm for a stated time 
duration. One of the implied reasons underlying the firm’s decision to offer duration-specific 
incentives (e.g. three- or five-years’ deferred stock) to well-performing managers is to induce 
them to stay and to some extent prevent competitors from hiring them, so that they can continue 
to sustain and increase shareholders’ value. Yermack (1995) offers a managerial “horizon 
problem” argument by stating that shareholders use restricted stock to motivate managers 
nearing retirement to continue to undertake risky decisions.  
 
 2.3.3.4 Camouflage payments  
As the name suggests, this form of payment to executives is often relatively less transparent to 
the principal(s) (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Examples of this type of incentives payment 
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include golden hello, goodbye payment and executive loans. Specifically, the “golden hello” 
payment is applied by firms (the board on behalf of shareholders) to attract the services of the 
most talented managers to join them. This payment can be in the form of cash or stocks or a 
stock options grant and is relatively transparent (Murphy, 1999). In many cases, firms use a 
golden hello as a compensation for the loss of bonuses, stocks and stock options from the 
manager’s previous employment. A typical example in the UK was the payment of £4 million 
to Pascal Soriot when he became the CEO of AstraZeneca. 
On the other hand, “golden goodbye” or “parachute” rewards are made to an executive on 
departure, either voluntary or otherwise. Largely, this kind of payment is sometimes kept away 
from shareholders and this has raised genuine concerns from both the public and shareholders 
regarding whether such payments are often part of a manager’s contractual arrangement 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003).       
Executive loans were predominantly used in the US until early 2000s, and are loans offered to 
executives at a preferential rate (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). In the UK, this type of incentives 
package is relatively limited, and to some extent non-existent, because such a scheme is 
prohibited by UK company law. 
Overall, the discussion so far has enumerated various components of executive compensation. 
We have also shown the underlying intuition of firms implementing stock-based and cash-
based incentives and that their distinctive feature makes it empirically testable to see how these 
incentives’ components relate to managerial risk-taking, specifically, those of investment and 
financial leverage decisions. In particular, the variable equity-based incentives reflect an 
integration of management into the ownership structure with the purposes of increasing 
managers’ motivation and organisational commitment to improving the firm’s value (Hall, 
2000; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In contrast, although the cash-related incentive deepens 
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manager-shareholder unity, it can also induce managerial opportunism, if not appropriately 
designed. 
One important observation in our annual compensation data is that the board of directors uses 
a mixture of equity-based and cash-based compensation to reward their executives. The 
simultaneous application of these incentive packages, salary adjustment, cash bonuses, stock 
options and LTIPs (performance stock and restricted stock), calls for a more sophisticated 
modelling and econometric technique to isolate the effect of managerial compensation on a 
firm’s risk-taking activities.    
In the later chapters (4&5), we will develop the study’s testable hypotheses utilising these 
highlighted compensation components (e.g. cash bonus, value of LTIPs grant – value of 
performance stock plus restricted stocks, value of stock options) to explain separately how each 
component impacts managerial investment and the concomitant financing decisions using UK 
data. The next subsection provides a literature review on investment and managerial 
compensation. 
 
2.4a Literature review on investment and managerial compensation 
As stated earlier, one of the key objectives of the study is to examine a causal relation between 
managerial compensation and investment decisions. Having indicated the reasons under which 
compensation is likely to influence managerial investment policies, this section specifically 
reviews the existing material evidence on investment and managerial compensation. 
Importantly, two strands of literature on investment and compensation are reviewed: the first 
review concentrates on the literature that looks at the effect of managerial compensation on 
investment (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Xue, 2007; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez and Stuart, 2012; Kini 
and Williams, 2012; Hayes et al., 2012; Shen and Zhang, 2013; O’Connor et al., 2013; Croci 
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and Petmezas, 2015; Chen et al., 2017; Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog,, 2017; Nguyen, 2018), and 
the second focuses on the literature that applies investment activities as a determinant of 
managerial compensation. Thus, the studies that concentrate on the reverse question, 
investment and other characteristics as predictor of managerial compensation (e.g. Core and 
Guay, 1999; Guay, 1999; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Adu-Amoako et al. 2011; Humphery-
Jenner et al., 2016). It is worth indicating that the current study is closely related to the former 
and guided by this literature we develop the study’s central hypotheses in chapter 4.  
Using a sample of US oil and gas firms spanning 1992-1997, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2001) 
examine the extent to which stock option incentive links with corporate exploration investment 
activities. The authors report a positive relation between executive stock option (ESO) 
incentives and the future exploration of risk-taking activity. Specifically, they define dependent 
variable as the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from exploration activity, a proxy 
for investment, whilst executive stock option (ESO – independent variable) incentives is 
measured as the sensitivity of the CEO’s options portfolio value to a 1% change in the 
underlying stock return volatility. Applying simultaneous equation technique to the following 
proxies: exploration investment activity, ESO risk incentives and other exogenous factors 
including firm leverage and growth opportunities (using exploration risk factor score analysis), 
they find that an increase in stock option rewards endogenously determines future exploration 
investment activity. They interpret the result to show that shareholders use stock options to 
encourage executive risk-taking, consistent with the central assumption of the agency model 
of managerial risk aversion (Holmstrom, 1979; Guay, 1999; Knopf et al., 2002).  
In furtherance of the risk-motivated idea, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2001) provide additional 
evidence on managerial stock options and the oil price risk hedging. Specifically, they find a 
significant negative relationship between the executive stock option incentives and the oil price 
risk hedging in their system of equation model. The result tends to imply that stock options 
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reduce managerial incentive to hedge against oil price fluctuation. The key implication of these 
results is that shareholders use option-based packages to encourage risk-taking rather than risk 
reduction.  
Similar evidence is also presented by Xue (2007) when he examines how management 
compensation incentives influence strategic investment choices for US high-tech companies. 
Employing a simultaneous equations framework, the author finds that managers with heavily 
weighted cash compensation are more likely to embark on acquisition of high-technology 
assets, whilst those with a stock-based incentive are likely to spend more resources on research 
and development in an attempt to develop such high-tech internally.  
In a related vein, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) provide further evidence on the relation 
between CEOs’ compensation incentives and corporate policy (investment) using a US dataset 
for the period 1992 to 2002. They define dependent variables: R&D scaled by total assets and 
capital expenditure (i.e. property, plant and equipment) scaled by total assets, whilst CEO’s 
option-based incentives – vega (measured as a dollar change in the value of CEO wealth 
portfolio for 0.01 change in the stock return volatility), delta (dollar change in the value of 
CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock price) and cash compensation (salary plus cash bonus) 
as a fraction of total compensation. Applying different estimation techniques, three-stage least 
squares regression (3SLS) and ordinary least squares (OLS) to the data, they report some 
interesting results. Specifically, they find a positive and significant association between stock-
based (measured vega and delta) compensation and R&D investment but find a negative effect 
on capital expenditure. The authors suggest that giving managers a greater vega component in 
their compensation portfolio induces them to invest more in riskier assets including more 
investment in firm innovation activity and less capital expenditure activity.  
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Moreover, regarding delta incentives, the paper attributes it to the alignment hypothesis, where 
managers seek to satisfy the interests of shareholders when a large component of their 
compensation is equity-based incentives. Applying cash compensation as a control variable, 
they show a negative relation between R&D and cash compensation, whilst a positive 
coefficient estimate on cash incentive is reported in the capital expenditure model. They 
suggest that managers become more wary of increasing firm risk, i.e. R&D expenditure (e.g. 
Bhagat and Welch, 1995), particularly when they are motivated with cash incentives. One 
possible implication of the result is that managers are more likely to cut down on R&D 
expenses in order to boost reported earnings and cash flow, which is often used by the 
shareholders as the key performance indicator for cash bonuses. In contrast, managers with 
more cash-based incentives prefer to invest more in relatively low-risk capital tangible 
investment. Clearly, the evidence lends credence to the managerial risk-aversion assumption 
(Fama, 1980). 
On the control variables, the researchers find R&D expense and firm size, CEO tenure, market-
to-book and stock return to be negatively related, whilst surplus cash, sales growth and leverage 
are all positively linked.  
Relatedly, Kini and Williams (2012), based on a tournament incentives proposition, argue that 
option-like compensation encourages more risk-taking investment. Specifically, the authors 
find that greater tournament incentives to senior managers induce them to allocate more 
spending on research and development, but lower capital expenditure intensity.  
Cassell, Huang, Sanchez and Stuart (2012) examine the extent to which managerial inside debt 
compensation affects the selection of the riskiness of investment and financial policies. 
Specifically, this part of the review concentrates on risk investment activities: R&D expenses 
and diversification activity. They define R&D expense as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total 
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sales, and diversification activity similar to Jacquemin and Berry (1979), and Bushman, 
Indjeikian and Smith (1995), whilst CEO’s inside debt compensation is measured as the natural 
log of the ratio of the CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio to the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. The authors 
find that pension and deferred (CEO’s inside debt) compensation is negatively related to R&D 
expense, whilst a positive relation is reported among inside debt and diversification activity. 
The authors explained this to imply that CEOs with large inside debt compensation tend to 
prefer less risky investment activities than risky ones. They made this conclusion when they 
applied different estimation methods (OLS, two-stage least squares) to the data and controlling 
other firm-specific factors. 
Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu (2012) also look at the relationship between risk-taking activities and 
the CEOs’ compensation, employing data for firms listed on the Standards and Poor’s index 
from 2002 through 2008. The risk-taking activities include research and development, capital 
expenditure, leverage, cash holdings and volatility. We only concentrate on variables relevant 
to this review. They define dependent variables research and development (R&D) scaled by 
total assets and capital expenditure (CAPEX) divided by total assets, and measure independent 
variables, CEO’s compensation using vega, delta and cash compensation proxies similar to 
Coles et al. (2006). In the investment equations, they modelled individual activities (R&D and 
CAPEX) and regressed each dependent variable on vega, delta and cash compensation together 
with other control variables. The authors report a positive but insignificant relation between 
vega and R&D expense, whilst delta is negative and significant. Cash incentives and R&D are 
positively related. On the capital expenditure, vega is negative and significant. They argued 
that CEOs with vega incentives tend to decrease spending on low-risk capital expenditure; 
however, delta and cash compensation show a positive insignificant coefficient. The authors 
made this revelation after applying a fixed effect estimator to the data and controlling other 
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factors including firm size, market-to-book, surplus cash flow, sales growth, leverage and 
annual stock return. 
Shen and Zhang (2013), on the other hand, investigate the extent to which CEOs’ risk 
incentives interact with research and development investment within the dynamic framework 
of the firm value. They measure CEOs’ risk incentives as the sensitivity of the executive 
compensation portfolio value to stock return volatility (vega) and find that firms with a higher 
CEOs’ vega compensation component have a greater propensity to significantly increase 
research and development investment. They use two identification strategies, probit model and 
ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques, and employ four different proxies for research and 
development expenditure: large _R&D (is a dummy variable equal to one when a firm is 
experiencing large R&D investment and zero otherwise), R&D expenses is given as the ratio 
of R&D to total assets, %𝛥(R&D) is the percentage change in R&D expenses and 
the %𝛥(R&D/Assets) shows the percentage change in the ratio of R&D expense to total assets. 
The authors find the following results after regressing the dependent variable (large_R&D 
expense) on the option incentives (vega) and other predetermined factors (e.g. firm size, 
market-to-book ratio, leverage, CEOs’ characteristics, cash flow, industry effect and year 
effects) that have been found to explain R&D investment (see Lang et al., 1996; Coles et al., 
2006). They show that the coefficient estimate on CEOs’ vega incentive is positive and 
statistically significant. The result tends to imply that shareholders apply option-based 
packages to induce managerial risk-taking attitude.  
Significantly, similar results were also observed across the two main specification techniques, 
using the additional three different (R&D) measures. 
Shen and Zhang (2013) further extend their empirical analysis by examining the efficiency of 
research and development investment to show if indeed there is a systematic difference in long-
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run abnormal returns as a result of large R&D investment across excess vega compensation 
rewards. Specifically, applying high-vega as the explanatory variable of interest, they conclude 
that CEOs’ higher vega incentive does not support both firm abnormal stock returns and 
abnormal operating performance following R&D increases; instead, high-vega encourages 
managers to engage in over-investment distortion in R&D projects. 
In sum, the findings seek to suggest that corporate executives’ inefficiently over-invest in R&D 
activity when they have a substantial vega compensation portfolio. A plausible implication is 
that higher vega incentives create an intangible over-investment incentive, which can 
ultimately constrain or hurt shareholder value.  
O’Connor, Rafferty and Sheikh (2013) also provide further support for the relation between 
equity compensation and the sensitivity of research and development expenditure to financial 
market abnormalities. Here, the authors examine two important issues: first, whether executive 
equity compensation drives R&D spending, and, second, to test the extent to which equity 
compensation affects the sensitivity of R&D investment to the firm’s internal funds. Employing 
an unbalanced dataset for 1104 US firms for the period 1994–2005 with 7,884 firm-level 
observations, they define research and development investment activity as the ratio of R&D 
expenditure to total assets and measure compensation with these proxies: vega (sensitivity of 
CEOs’ equity-based wealth portfolio to stock market return volatility), delta (sensitivity of 
CEOs’ equity-based incentives to the firm’s stock market price) and cash compensation (salary 
plus cash bonus).  
Applying a dynamic generalised methods of moment (GMM) estimator to deal with the 
interrelated problem, their empirical evidence shows that equity incentives and corporate R&D 
activity are negatively correlated after regressing investment (R&D) on equity compensation 
and other exogenous factors. This may possibly suggest that, as executives’ equity incentives 
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increases, they become more cautious of the overall firm risk, and hence may decide to cut 
down long-term investment projects (R&D). In other words, rewarding equity-based managers 
to incur more risk has a minimal effect on the firm’s overall R&D expenditure. This, in contrast, 
undermines the predictive power or intended purpose of equity incentives in resolving agency 
problems and financial market frictions. In addition, using a similar econometric technique and 
modelling cash compensation as endogenously determined, they document a significant 
negative association between cash incentive and R&D expenditure. With this, it can be inferred 
from the US data that cash compensation tends to reduce the sensitivity of R&D investment to 
financial market frictions. 
Using a sample of US firms from 1996 – 2010, Croci and Petmezas (2015) examine the extent 
to which managerial stock-based compensation affects: (1) acquisition investment activity, (2) 
the role of CEOs’ overconfidence, and (3) the role of corporate governance.  
Croci and Petmezas (2015) postulate that risk-taking incentives (vega) induce CEOs to 
undertake more acquisition activity. They made this conjecture after analysing total 
observations of 28,853 firm-year acquisitions composed of 3144 publicly listed firms on 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ indexes. Specifically, they defined key variables of follows: the 
dependent variable is the sum of the deal values of acquisition investment made in a given year 
scaled by sales in the previous year, whilst the independent variables are vega measures 
compensation incentives as the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s wealth portfolio to a 
percentage change in the stock volatility, delta incentives is the dollar change in the value of 
the CEO’s wealth portfolio to a percentage change in the stock price at the end of the fiscal 
year, and other control variables including firm size, cash reserve, cash flow, market-to-book, 
leverage, firm risk, CEO tenure, age, gender, abnormal return, industry and year effects. 
Applying different estimation techniques (OLS, predicted value approach and three-stage least 
squares) to the data and controlling for the stated factors, they show that vega is positive and 
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significantly related to the acquisition activity, whilst delta shows a positive sign but lacks 
statistical significance. The authors suggest that shareholders use risk-motivated (vega) 
incentives to encourage acquisition investment.  
On the role of CEOs’ overconfidence, their evidence shows that, offering risk-incentives to 
overconfident CEOs does not increase acquisition investment. Again, in the presence of good 
governance factors, vega incentives still induce managers to spend more on acquisition activity. 
The control variables including cash compensation, size, cash reserves, cash flows, abnormal 
return and M&A liquidity are all positive whilst leverage and CEOs’ characteristics (gender, 
age and tenure) show a negative relation with acquisition.   
Nguyen (2018), based on an investment risk-related explanation, provides further practical 
evidence on how chief executive officers’ stock-based (i.e. unvested stock options) 
compensation influences long-term innovative activity. In his empirical analysis, the author 
applied a sample of 13,279 firm-year observations associated with 1900 listed firms in the US 
stock market from 1992 to 2006. In particular, the author applies two main measures for the 
dependent variables. First, he defines innovation variable as the number of patent applications 
filled scaled by the average number of patents of all firms in the NBER patent database in a 
given year. The second measure of innovation activity is the number of citations per patent.  
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Coles et al.,2006), the author 
defines CEO’s total compensation as the sum of the CEO’s annual total pay (salary and 
bonuses) plus the changes in the value of the CEO’s portfolio of stock and stock options. The 
author measures compensation incentives as the change in the value of the CEO’s stock-based 
portfolio to a percentage change in the firm value divided by the total annual pay. The 
researcher further measures the individual compensation components; for instance, he 
computes each compensation component ratio for vested stock options and unvested options 
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scaled by the total annual pay. Again, he obtains ratios of restricted stock and unrestricted stock 
by dividing each component by total annual pay.                   
Using a fixed effect technique and regressing the innovation patent variable on the key separate 
independent variables (options and stock incentives) and long-term incentives and short-term 
incentives) together with other control variables, the author finds all these CEO compensation 
components to be positively linked to innovation activity, with only stock options incentives 
and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) being highly significant. Specifically, he reports 
coefficient estimates for the respective compensation components: options (0.0026, t-statistics 
2.76) and stock (0.0001, t-statistics 0.65) after accounting for other control variables in his 
model.   
Additionally, Nguyen later separately includes all the compensation components – unvested 
options, vested options, restricted stock and unrestricted stock – in a single regression model 
to test its effects on the innovation output variable. He finds the coefficient estimate on 
unvested options (0.0076, t-stats 2.87) to be positive and statistically significant, whilst vested 
options, restricted and unrestricted stocks are all positive but insignificant. The author 
interprets this to suggest that an unvested option induces more risk-taking activity. He also 
reports similar findings when he applies citations patent as the dependent variable, implying 
managers’ willingness to spend more on innovation (citation patent) when a large component 
of unvested options forms their compensation incentive. The result remains unchanged after 
controlling for firm-specific characteristics and other corporate governance variables (e.g. CEO 
duality, board independence, tenure, etc.) in the multivariate regression model.  
The author applies a three-stage least squares (3SLS) strategy to test if the result is robust to 
the endogeneity problem existing among investment (innovation output) and stock-based 
compensation incentives. Still, the researcher’s evidence further confirms the positive linkage 
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between innovation activity and unvested options incentives, which indicate that the 
innovation-compensation (unvested options) nexus is robust to the 3SLS identification 
strategy.     
Moreover, other studies have also considered managerial compensation and risk-taking 
activities from a non-US setting; for instance: Feitu-Ruiz and Renneboog (2017), Sainani 
(2018), Chen, Chen and Yang (2017) and Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001).  
Feitu-Ruiz and Renneboog (2017) provide empirical evidence on the link between acquisitions 
and CEOs’ equity-based compensation using companies in the European markets. They 
measure the dependent variable as the shareholder valuation following acquisitions activity 
(abnormal returns) and the independent variable as the CEO’s equity-based compensation 
(long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) plus stock options). Applying an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method, they find a positive association between equity-based compensation and 
acquisitions value after they control for other variables. However, the positive relation is 
eroded when they interact equity incentives with other monitoring proxy (concentrated 
ownership), postulating substitution effects. The researchers interpret the results as implying 
that the efficacy of equity incentives to motivate managers to undertake a risky acquisitions 
project is dependent on the level of concentrated ownership. In addition, Feitu-Ruiz and 
Renneboog (2017) further explore CEOs’ excess equity compensation and acquisition value 
and find a negative relation between them. They explain this to show that managerial rent 
extraction from shareholders is noticed by the market and that they are able to ignore the firm’s 
acquisition activity.   
Sainani (2018), on the other hand, specifically considers how chief financial officers’ 
characteristics affect mergers and acquisitions (M&As) activity. He characterises the following 
CFO features – executive director, outside board, age, financial expertise, education, relative 
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pay tenure and CFO index – and segregates these characteristics into strong and weak. He 
defines the dependent variable using an M&As dummy proxy of one (1) and zero (0) otherwise. 
Utilising logit regression analysis and regressing acquisition dummy on CFO characteristics, 
the author reports that a strong CFO influences takeover activity. He made this observation 
after accounting for other firm-related characteristics such as sales growth, leverage, cash flow, 
firm size, board size, executive ownership, non-executive ownership, board independence, etc. 
He further shows that the strong CFOs are able to detect valued acquisitions, thereby creating 
value for shareholders. 
In another vein, Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001) provide further evidence on how 
managerial compensation affects investment decisions. With a sample consisting of 1,719 
acquisitions including mergers and tender offers for the period 1993 – 1998, they report a 
significant and positive relation between high CEO equity-based incentives (stock options) and 
the corporate merger activities. The authors find their results still robust after controlling for 
some observable determinants (payment methods, executive ownership, growth opportunities). 
With this, they postulate that the selection of appropriate risky investment activity by managers 
is linked to their incentive’s rewards (stock options grants) (Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
In the Asian Pacific environment, Chen, Chen and Yang (2017) contribute to the literature on 
the managerial compensation incentives and research and development expense after 
examining a sample of 4,436 firm-year observations spanning the period 2008 – 2013. Using 
firms listed on the Taiwan Security Exchange and Tapei Exchange and applying simultaneous 
equation modelling, their evidence shows that R&D expenditure and equity and cash incentives 
are positively associated. More specifically, employing a two-stage least squares estimator to 
the data and regressing the dependent variable (R&D expenditure) on the tested variables 
(equity and cash incentives) and other determinants of R&D, the authors report a significant 
increasing relationship between R&D activity and compensation packages. Additionally, the 
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authors further confirm that the investment (R&D) and CEO compensation association is 
intensified by the managerial liability insurance scheme. Thus, managers with a liability 
insurance scheme are more likely to encourage CEOs to spend more resources on R&D 
activities and make the executive compensation incentive efficacious on the firm’s long-term 
investment projects. 
On the control factors (e.g. lagged R&D, CEO ownership, leverage, size, market-to-book, free 
cash flow, CEO tenure, institutional ownership, market share, industry and year effects), the 
authors show the following relationship. They find that lagged R&D, CEOs’ shareholdings, 
tenure, institutional ownership and market share are positive, whilst leverage, cash flow, firm 
size, market-to-book and square of CEOs’ tenure are all negatively related to R&D investment. 
Overall, these findings tend to portray that CEOs are motivated to invest more in risky R&D 
activities particularly when the agency problem is severe.  
Contrary to the studies that consider the investment – compensation relation, other existing 
literature also argues that shareholders consider the nature of the firm’s investment, leverage 
and future growth opportunities together with other governance factors when determining 
executives’ compensation incentives. In other words, this type of literature looks at the 
determinants of the managerial optimal compensation contract (e.g. Chen et al., 2016; 
Humphery-Jenner, 2016; Ozkan, 2012; Duru et al., 2005; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). For the 
purposes of time and space constraints, we only provide a review of some of these studies that 
have considered this issue. 
Chen, Lin, Lu and Ma (2016) use executives’ cash compensation incentives (salary component) 
to empirically examine the interaction between salary compensation, research and development 
and accounting performance, and the extent to which an effective governance mechanism 
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affects pay for accounting performance and corporate innovation expenditure using China’s 
stock market for the period 2007 to 2011.  
Specifically, they use the total salary compensation for three main executives’ as a proxy for 
the  dependent variable, whilst return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are used as 
proxies for accounting performance (independent variable), and a dummy of one for reported 
R&D and zero otherwise. They perform regression analysis after controlling other explanatory 
variables (size, leverage, growth opportunity, risk, capital expenditure, board size, and the 
percentage of independent directors), and report a positive linkage between R&D expenditure 
and executives’ salary compensation. They argue that corporate owners become more 
comfortable to offer executives a higher salary to induce them to increase R&D activity 
particularly in a severe agency environment to reduce agency cost associated with innovative 
activity. 
Another direct inference from the R&D expenditure and salary compensation positive 
correlation argument is that, because managers receive physical cash incentives instead of 
equity-based compensation, they (managers) can diversify and reduce their risk exposure to 
the firms they manage. Consequently, a managerial risk aversion incentive is reduced, causing 
managers to downplay the complexity associated with long-term investment in research and 
development activity. Chen et al.’s (2016) further analysis shows that the strong positive 
association between pay for accounting performance and the corresponding R&D expenditure 
increase is dependent on low governance practices, postulating a weaker relationship with an 
improved corporate governance system. In other words, firms use cash incentive benefits to 
minimise the agency cost of under-investment in R&D expenditure.   
Moreover, their reported evidence shows these control variables (e.g. capital expenditure, 
leverage, firm risk, size and growth) are negatively related to salary compensation except for 
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firm size, which posits a positive connection. However, the capital expenditure coefficient is 
insignificant, whilst leverage, firm risk, size and growth variables are all economically and 
statistically significant. The findings (leverage, firm risk) conjecture that managers become 
wary of increasing the overall risk of their firms when they are cash motivated.  
In conclusion, the empirical study by Chen et al. (2016) contributes to the literature by 
providing evidence to suggest that firms in a severe agency environment consider accounting 
performance (ROA, ROE) and investment in research & development activity in setting up 
managerial cash compensation incentives. 
Humphery-Jenner et al. (2016) also explore the managerial overconfidence and compensation 
structure using a US dataset. They define the dependent compensation variables, stock options, 
equity and cash incentives, as a ratio of total annual compensation value, while overconfidence 
is measured as the average value per vested option scaled by average strike price. Applying an 
OLS method to their model, they find a positive relation between managerial overconfidence 
and stock-based (option, equity) incentives, while a negative sign is reported on cash 
incentives. The authors interpret this to suggest that shareholders of firms with overconfident 
managers use more (less) stock-based (cash-based) incentives to exploit their positive bias 
views of the firm’s operational prospects.  
Employing 147 completed mergers and acquisitions dataset spanning 1999 – 2005, Ozkan 
(2012) documents a positive relationship between managerial compensation (measured as cash 
bonuses, salary, stock options and long-term incentive plans) and acquisition activity (using an 
investment dummy for cross-border M&As). Her results remain positive and statistically 
significant after accounting for other control variables such as growth opportunities and firm 
size. The author interprets the result to suggest that managers are heavily rewarded for 
undertaking cross-border M&As. In a separate cross-sectional regression analysis, she includes 
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domestic M&As in the compensation model and finds a positive but insignificant effect on 
executive pay incentives. This tends to imply that executives gain extra benefit for undertaking 
cross-border acquisition activity.     
In short, Ozkan (2012) later concluded that managerial preference for cross-border M&As 
deals is motivated by the managerial incentive problem because the increase in executive 
incentives following the cross-border M&As is indifferent to firm performance.  
In contrast, Girma and Wright (2006) find a weak correlation between executive compensation 
and merger activity in the UK context. Examining 472 firms’ merger activity spanning 1981 to 
1996, their data fail to explore a strong connection among executive incentives and their 
investment efficiency. 
Similarly, Ryan and Wiggins (2001) provide evidence of the effect of firm and managerial 
characteristics on the structure of executive compensation. They apply an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) technique to a sample of 1,095 US firms for fiscal year 1997. Their results suggest that 
other determinants including capital expenditure, R&D expense, leverage, firm size, block 
ownership, institutional ownership, CEOs’ ownership, CEO age, tenure and cash volatility 
variously influence the managerial compensation structure (cash bonus, stock options and 
restricted stock). Specifically, the authors document a positive relation between R&D 
investment and stock options incentives, whilst R&D expense is negatively related to cash 
bonus and restricted stocks. It shows that shareholders use risk-motivated incentives to 
encourage risky intangible activity but apply less cash bonus and restricted stock to motivate 
R&D expense. Capital expenditure is negatively related to cash bonus and restricted stock, 
whilst stock options and capital expenditure are positively linked. 
Bizjak, Brickley and Coles (1993) provide evidence on how managerial compensation affects 
the neoclassical investment behaviour using Jensen and Murphy’s (1990c) data with a few 
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modifications to the dataset. Their analyses were based on the compensation sample of 430 
firms in the Forbes executives’ survey over the period 1975 – 1989. They use growth 
opportunities (market-to-book) and relative R&D expenditure as key explanatory proxies for 
investment behaviour for both regulated and non-regulated firms. They separate compensation 
into salary and bonuses (dependent variables) and perform an ordinary least squares regression 
analysis. Their reported results show that both independent variables – growth opportunities 
and R&D expenditure – are inversely related to managerial salary and/or bonus incentives. The 
results tend to suggest that firms with huge growth opportunities (measured market-to-book) 
and R&D expense offer lower cash-based incentives to managers. Again, they find similar 
results when they perform a separate regression using total incentives as a dependent variable. 
Specifically, the coefficients for the independent variables (market-to-book and research and 
development) are negative and marginally significant, after controlling other determinants. In 
all cases, the supplied findings across regulated and non-regulated firms show similar results. 
The authors’ evidence suggests that high-growth firms provide relatively lower incentives 
packages (salary/bonus) to their managers, compared to low-growth firms, which is 
inconsistent with the conventional compensation model (Clinch, 1991; Gaver and Gaver, 
1993). An alternative explanation could be that, because R&D activities are less supported by 
the debt markets, managers tend to use internal resources to finance such activities, leading to 
lower managerial cash compensation for high-growth firms.   
In brief, the reviewed evidence shows that shareholders consider other firm characteristics 
when designing managerial compensation schemes. 
Collectively, the observed review conducted in this subsection provides substantial evidence 
to suggest that managers’ risk-taking activities (e.g. capital expenditure, R&D, other fixed 
expenditure, fixed intangible) are influenced by the level and composition of their 
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compensation incentives (i.e. salary, cash bonuses, long-term incentive plans, stock options). 
In contrast, we also observe other factors that determine managerial compensation.  
Essentially, these two independent strands of literature suggest the existence of endogeneity 
and causation problems in the study’s empirical design, particularly in the attempt to establish 
a direct causal impact of management compensation on risk-taking investment. Simultaneity 
bias is a major problem in research that ignores the simultaneous determination of the two 
corporate variables. This study adds to the existing literature that examines the impact of 
managerial compensation components on risk-taking activities by suggesting and addressing 
the presence of reverse causality bias. Accordingly, the literature review conducted on 
investment and compensation will be utilised to develop the study’s main hypotheses in 
Chapter 4.  
 
2.5a Overall conclusions 
This part of Chapter 2 has utilised the existing literature to establish the causal relation between 
managerial compensation and investment activities. The following sections were explored: the 
central tenets of investment activities – agency-related issues and managerial 
overconfidence/hubris. Again, due to the imperfections in corporate governance system and 
risk-related incentive problem, it theorised the extent to which managerial compensation 
affects the firm’s investment activities. Thus, under optimal contracting theory (OPT), 
shareholders use different pay components to encourage (discourage) the nature of risk-taking 
investment activities, which, in turn, increases the value of the firm. However, in cases where 
professional managers determine their “own pay” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004), the 
efficiency of managerial investment could be undermined, which can ultimately prove costly 
for shareholders. The chapter also discusses two related strands of literature that consider the 
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investment – compensation nexus. For instance, one strand of study argues that, through a risk-
related motive, executive compensation and investment are potentially related (e.g. Coles et 
al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012; Croci and Petmezas, 2015). The other strand discusses the 
literature that concentrates on the reverse question, i.e. the determinants of managerial 
compensation. Essentially, the two interdependent literature strands raise concerns about the 
possible endogeneity problem, particularly in an attempt to establish a direct causal effect of 
compensation on investment. One major contribution of the present study is the adopted 
research modelling and robust econometric technique (3SLS) to estimate the direct causal 
relationship among the corporate variables using data from UK publicly listed companies.  
A later chapter (4) develops the central hypotheses and states the empirical specification and 
the analytical strategy to be used to test the study hypotheses. 
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                                  2.2B: Financial Leverage (Part B) 
 
2.2b A literature review: Financial leverage 
 
2.2.1b Introduction 
As shown by the previous part (i.e. investment literature), managerial compensation incentives 
influence optimal investment decisions under the agency framework. It is also argued in the 
literature that managerial compensation induces managers to sponsor corporate projects with 
debt finance (e.g. Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987). For instance, in the wave of the leveraged 
buyout (LBO) of the 1980s, firms (financiers) applied high performance-sensitivity 
compensation packages to encourage managers to use high levels of debt (Berkovitch, Israel 
and Spiegel, 2000), postulating a linkage between managerial compensation and the leverage 
level.   
In a related vein, the Greenbury Report (1995) recommends that shareholders should substitute 
stock options with long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) and cash bonuses to minimise excessive 
risk-taking (i.e. via more borrowing). It seems to show that, through compensation design, risk 
averse managers are likely to increase the firm’s idiosyncratic risks by using a greater debt 
source of financing to sponsor value-enhancing corporate activities. Therefore, with different 
sources of financing (e.g. internal sources, debt, equity, etc.) available to firm managers, we 
specifically investigate if the managerial compensation scheme is important in the setting of 
the firm’s capital structure (observed leverage ratio) level, and more importantly, to find out if 
the relationship between the leverage – executive compensation nexus is predicated on risk-
related motives. In other words, do shareholders apply compensation packages to affect the 
firm’s observed leverage level? This is because the two corporate variables (i.e. financial 
leverage and managers’ compensation scheme) interact through the agency framework to 
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achieve the probability distribution of the firm’s cash flow and stock returns (Berkovitch, Israel 
and Spiegel, 2000).     
More specifically, the empirical analysis in this part seeks to extend the existing literature on 
the link between financial leverage and managerial compensation incentives by directly 
investigating the following issues:  
1. Is there a link between financial leverage and managerial compensation pay packages? 
This part contributes to the relatively new growing literature that considers the effect of 
managerial compensation on the firm’s observed leverage level.    
2. The role of the firm’s growth opportunities in the executive compensation – leverage 
linkage. It suggests that the effect of compensation on leverage is either accentuated or 
moderated by the firm’s growth potential, and, lastly 
3. The extent to which corporate governance practices impact the compensation and 
financial leverage policy relationship. Through substitution effects, well-governed firms are 
more likely to monitor managers’ activities, thereby limiting the level of managerial 
compensation, which in turn can affect managerial financing decisions.         
This part makes important contributions to the existing literature by simultaneously linking 
financial leverage and managerial compensation incentives. With this approach, we are able to 
deal with the associated reverse causality concern and other possible endogeneity. In fact, no 
direct study has considered the matter from the UK perspective, and extending this to the FTSE 
350 companies is important to enhance our knowledge of managerial compensation incentives 
and financial leverage policy based on a risk-related argument.  
Moreover, this part also suggests that the presence of good corporate governance practice is 
likely to impact managerial compensation and capital structure linkage. In the same breath, it 
also considers the extent to which firms’ growth opportunities influence compensation – 
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leverage association. Further, utilising the compensation packages of the three top executives 
(CEOs, CFOs and COO (chief operating officer)) further aids our understanding of the 
discussed issues. For example, Chava and Purnanandam (2010) argue that the chief financial 
officer (CFO) plays a more important role in determining the firm’s capital structure (leverage 
ratio) than the chief executive officer (CEO). With this, the current study can be seen to provide 
an in-depth analysis of the compensation – leverage relationship by incorporating CFOs’ 
incentives into our framework.    
The remaining part is organised as follows: section 2.2b looks at the central theory of capital 
structure, subsection 2.3b considers the key empirical studies on the relation between capital 
structure and compensation structure, and finally section 2.4b concludes. A later chapter (5) 
formulates capital structure and executives’ compensation hypotheses and provides empirical 
analyses of the relationship.  
 
2.3b The central theory of capital structure 
The literature on capital structure is large and significant, following the seminal work of 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) “capital structure irrelevance theory”, which started the 
discussion on the subject matter. An extensive stream of research (both theoretical and 
empirical) has variously tested and challenged the ‘irrelevance’ theory and made a unanimous 
conclusion that capital structure plays a significant role in determining firm value under real-
world conditions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Stulz, 1990; Rajan and Zingales, 
1995). For instance, by incorporating real investment frictions and traditional financial 
imperfections such as transaction costs, taxation, bankruptcy costs, agency problem and 
asymmetry information, etc., capital structure may affect a firm’s value (Myers, 1977; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984; Graham, 2000; Tsyplakov, 2008). Following these stylised facts, others (e.g. 
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Coles et al. 2006; Berkovitch, Israel and Spiegel, 2000) argue that managers should be given 
appropriate compensation incentives to influence them to make value-critical financial 
decisions. This part of the thesis seeks to further such thinking by examining the effect of 
managerial compensation incentives on firm financial leverage.  
Meanwhile, in the next subsection, we briefly discuss the two dominant views under capital 
structure: trade-off theory and the asymmetry information theory. 
 
2.3.1b The trade-off theory 
The theory “trade-off model” posits that corporate managers through optimal design of the 
capital structure are more likely to generate extra value for their firms. Thus, the model suggests 
that firm value is created when the benefits of debt usage are just enough to offset the costs of 
debt (Fama and French, 2005; Graham, 2000). The underlying economic intuition is that 
corporate firms may forfeit debt-related benefits if their leverage ratio is below the expected 
level. Likewise, firms may face huge costs if their actual borrowing exceeds the optimal debt 
level. Within this context, Frank and Goyal (2007) postulate that the optimal financing 
decisions depend on rational evaluation of the various benefits and costs of alternative leverage 
arrangements. Therefore, because of the implication associated with leverage deviation, a 
wealth-increasing manager may try to achieve the optimal leverage target in an attempt to 
create value for shareholders.  
The trade-off literature highlights the following important reasons that are associated with costs 
and benefits of debt financing: bankruptcy costs, agency problem and tax benefits. Specifically, 
we provide a brief discussion on these themes that runs through the setting of optimal capital 
structure. We first start with the literature that highlights debt capital benefits.  
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a) Tax benefits 
Following the pioneering work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), one dominant view that has 
emerged is that the different tax codes among countries provide extra benefits for firms with a 
debt component in their capital structure (van Binsbergen, Graham and Yang, 2010; Graham, 
2000; Graham, 1996a). The trade-off literature argues that, by expensing interest payment in 
the income and expenditure statement, firms with debt capital tend to benefit through a tax-
savings mechanism, whereas no such potential benefit exists for dividend payment on equity 
capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Modigliani and Miller, 1963). In essence, the debt-
financing instrument becomes an important wealth-maximising and a preferable financing 
option over equity finance, ceteris paribus.   
Consistent with tax savings generated by debt financing, van Binsbergen, Graham and Yang 
(2010) provide empirical support to show that, through the tax shield mechanism, an estimated 
10.4% of the book value of total assets for 126,611 firm-year observations was attributed to 
debt policy benefits. In a related vein, Graham (2000) provides similar findings. The author 
notes that on average about 9.7% of asset value for his sampled firm observations of 87,643 
spanning 1973 to 1994, were estimated tax benefits. Within this context, it worth stating that, 
all other things being equal, the benefit of corporate taxation significantly reduces the cost of 
debt capital, but the caveat is that such incremental tax reward is wiped out, especially in cases 
where borrowings exceed the expected marginal threshold.  
 
b) Bankruptcy costs   
Notwithstanding the benefits accrued from debt capital, other literature posits that management 
becomes more disciplined because of the threat of bankruptcy (Grossman and Hart, 1982; 
Borio, 1990; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). Graham (2000) suggests that corporate firms often 
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adjust their debt portfolio below the optimal level in order to minimise bankruptcy risks. In his 
empirical investigation, he found about 44% of the total sample used debt significantly below 
the optimal target (underleveraged). The author further argues that among these extremely 
underleveraged firms are those large, liquid and profitable ones.  
Similarly, Molina (2005) attributes less debt usage by firms to predominantly financial distress 
motives. Molina stresses that the increased in debt issuance are closely linked with debt rating 
downgrades and higher default probabilities. Relatedly, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) note that 
bankruptcy and financial distress threats are very costly for firms and that increasing leverage 
above the expected level could make firms more vulnerable or susceptible to facing high future 
costs of capital, and possible bankruptcy.  
  
c) Agency problem 
Through agency theory, capital structure plays an important role among these three players:  
shareholders, bondholders and the agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Jensen, 
1986). For instance, Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) formalised the discussion on the free cash 
flow problem by suggesting that, through debt contraction, managers and shareholders’ 
interests are aligned. Specifically, the literature argues that through debt managers become 
disciplined and may tend to use the firm’s surplus cash flow efficiently. Thus, since debt capital 
commits firms to making regular annual interest payments as well as constant periodic 
monitoring by creditors, bondholders and other rating agencies, managers become conscious 
of and may take decisions that seek to enhance shareholder wealth, rather than concentrating 
on those decisions that advance their parochial interests (Bhawaradji and Shivdasani, 2003; 
Stulz, 1990; Grossman and Hart, 1982).  
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In contrast to the agency benefit of free cash flow resulting from debt acquisition, others 
highlight the risk-shifting or asset substitution problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 
1977; Stulz, 1990; John and John, 1993). The theory posits that bondholders may demand a 
high rate of borrowing as a firm keeps a high debt level on its books (Leland, 1998), which can 
consequently affect the firm’s future debt level.       
In another development, Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) also offer an entrenchment effect 
explanation. They argue that managers may prefer to keep a conservative debt level in their 
books to avoid external control and constant supervision by both bond market and other 
lenders. Such self-serving behaviour can affect the firm’s debt level, which, in turn, can affect 
firm value. Related to the entrenchment motives, Jung, Lang and Stulz (1996) concede that 
corporate managers through their discretional power may intentionally issue equity instead of, 
say, “debt” finance to sponsor investment activity. The authors highlight the disciplinary role 
of debt finance as the key underlying motive of managers’ intention to use debt more carefully 
or conservatively.  
 
2.3.2b Information asymmetry-based model 
The informational asymmetry model offers a different explanation for capital structure. The 
theory rests on the simple assumption that, when management are taking financing decisions, 
they often consider their private information about the “true” value of their firms (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Unlike the trade-off model, existing studies argue 
that, because the privileged managers hold some vital information about their managed 
corporations, they may tend to use this discretionary information at the detriment of 
disadvantaged owners, when selecting available financing options (Baker and Wurgler, 2002).  
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Mainly, the two strands of literature on asymmetric information models for capital structure 
are organised under these themes: a) pecking order theory and b) market timing hypothesis. 
We now provide a brief discussion on these theories. 
  
a) The pecking order theory 
This line of reasoning suggests that raising external finance (e.g. debt or equity) from the capital 
market is relatively expensive because the investors feel that corporate managers do know the 
true prospects of the firm, compared to the shareholders (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 
1984). The theory argues that managers may prefer financing options in these sequential orders: 
internal cash flow, debt and equity finance. It suggests that stock issues become a second-order 
importance to debt financing because of the adverse selection problem associated with equity 
finance. Other studies have also shown empirical supports for the pecking order hypothesis. 
For example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) report that firms directly use leverage when an 
internal financing deficit exists. Thus, firms apply leverage after they have fully exhausted all 
internal earnings to sponsor investment projects. 
 
b) The market timing theory 
The theory posits that firm managers may issue equity when the cost of equity is lower relative 
to alternative sources of financing (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; 
Huang and Ritter, 2005). It suggests that a firm’s managers opportunistically exploit temporary 
abnormal fluctuations in the share price and sponsor their activities with equity capital (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002; Huang and Ritter, 2005). An opportunistic manager may prefer to issue 
equity instead of debt when the market value is relatively high (i.e. when firm stock is mis-
priced by the markets). Similarly, others including Loughran and Ritter (1997), Rajan and 
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Servaes (1997) and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) connote that managers use equity finance 
particularly in cases where investors (shareholders) are enthusiastic about the firm’s earnings. 
In general, capital structure theories offer possible different explanations for why corporations 
may prefer one external capital (debt) to other (equity). Mainly, trade-off theory suggests tax 
benefits and the possibility of mitigating the agency cost of cash flow as the primary motivating 
factor for firms’ usage of debt capital. However, managers also feel cautious about adverse 
effects of debt, including bankruptcy costs and debt overhang problem, leading to possible 
asset substitution or risk-shifting problem. Despite these numerated concerns, the trade-off 
theory and pecking order models suggest debt capital should be chosen over equity if the 
accrued benefits to debt capital exceed the costs, albeit for different reasoning.      
Again, market timing theory also suggests that equity financing would be more preferred by 
managers, particularly when the firm’s stock price is overvalued by the capital markets. 
Although the market timing model is unrelated to the study’s main hypotheses, of primary 
importance is that it is possible that managers’ exploitation of a stock market’s mis-valuation 
could affect firm leverage behaviour.  
Overall, these theories provide reasons to suggest the extent to which firm leverage behaviour 
is affected. The present study offers a different view by arguing that the efficiency of a firm’s 
financial leverage policy to enhance its value is dependent on how managers are compensated. 
In other words, through an optimal compensation scheme, managers are able to make quality 
financing decisions, which could ultimately affect shareholders’ value. In this way, we 
contribute to the new strand of literature that looks at the effect of managerial compensation 
on firm leverage level.  
The next section highlights the extent to which financial leverage and managerial compensation 
are related before we move on to review the extant literature on the subject. 
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2.4b Financial leverage policy and managerial compensation theory 
This section seeks to establish a link between the predictions of managerial compensation and 
the firm’s capital structure by summarising the key theoretical arguments and reviewing some 
empirical studies on the subject in the later subsection.  
 
2.4.1b The major arguments 
The literature on capital structure suggests that, through agency motivated reasons, capital 
structure and managerial incentives may be directly related (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Berkovitch et al., 2000; Coles et al. 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012). For instance, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that a risk-averse manager may choose to apply debt more 
conservatively (Kim and Knofsinger, 2007) to prevent financial distress and possible 
bankruptcy charges. That is, a manager’s reluctance to borrow more to sponsor corporate 
activities can cause the firm to lose out on profitable activity, which may consequently affect 
the firm value. Attempting to minimise managerial risk aversion, shareholders design the 
compensation contract to induce managers to undertake appropriate risky activities including 
increasing leverage level (Kini and Williams, 2012). Thus, through an efficient compensation 
scheme, managers are able to make efficient decisions regarding leverage level (Berkovitch et 
al., 2000).  
In fact, shareholders use different compensation components to influence managerial value-
critical decisions. These are, stock-based (risk-taking incentive) and cash-based/restricted 
stocks (risk-avoiding incentive) (Coles et al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Cassell et 
al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2012). The risk-taking incentive motivates managers to increase 
leverage level (Coles et al., 2006). Contrarily, a risk-avoiding incentive is employed by 
shareholders in a highly levered firm to minimise possible agency costs of debt finance (John 
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and John, 1993; Duru et al. 2005). This means that, through the compensation scheme, 
shareholders can induce managers to increase (reduce) managerial excessive risk-taking 
activities.   
A clear implication of the executive financial compensation incentives on capital structure is 
that the efficient design of managerial compensation helps optimise the benefits associated 
with optimal debt financing. In fact, the key argument underlying this scholarly work is to 
explore how executives’ financial incentives packages affect the firm’s debt level. We review 
the relevant related literature in the next subsection.  
 
2.4.2b Literature review on leverage and compensation incentives.   
The main intention of this section is to draw on a comprehensive review of empirical studies 
that concentrate on how debt financial policies and compensation structure policies are related. 
An implication of this will help us formulate the study’s central hypotheses to show the extent 
to which compensation contracts influence managerial risk-taking such as corporate leverage 
policy. Moreover, we also consider other literature that looks at the opposite question: how 
financial leverage influences optimal managerial compensation.   
Specifically, we structure the literature as follows: first, review literature on the impact of 
compensation incentives on leverage; second, literature that considers the reverse issue; and 
finally draw a conclusion.   
Freund, Latif and Phan (2017) provide evidence on how chief executive officers’ inside debt 
compensation incentives affects the firm’s choice of accessing external debt (equity) finance. 
They base their analysis on a sample of 5,955 firm-year observations of 1,371 unique firms 
from the Standard and Poor’s database during the period 2007 – 2012. They construct two 
measures for CEOs’ inside debt holdings: first, relative CEOs’ leverage defined as the ratio of 
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a CEO’s debt compensation to equity scaled by the firm’s debt to equity ratio, and, second, 
relative CEOs’ incentives measured as the marginal change in the CEO’s inside debt 
compensation over the marginal change in their inside equity, divided by the marginal change 
in the firm debt over the marginal change in the firm equity, given an overall unit change in the 
firm value. Freund et al. measure the firm’s net debt issue (i.e. long-term debt issuance minus 
long-term debt reduction scaled by the assets’ book value) and financing choice (as the sum of 
cash dividends, net investment, and change in working capital minus surplus cash flow, all 
normalised by the book value of assets at the start of the firm year). The authors use dummy 
variables to represent the dependent variable, i.e. corporate financing choices available. 
Specifically, they apply financing choices dummies: 1 for equity only, 2 for equity and debt 
and 3 for debt only.  
Using a multinomial logit regression analysis, and regressing financing choice on the test 
variable - CEO inside debt compensation together with other standard control variables used 
in the capital structure model (size, growth opportunities, profitability, tangibility, leverage, 
fixed effects etc.), they find some interesting evidence. Given the relevance of this review, we 
concentrate more on the debt issue financing option. They document a positive and statistically 
significant link between CEO’s inside debt compensation and firm’s financing choice. 
Specifically, the relative CEO leverage shows a positive coefficient of 0.815 on debt finance 
choice, implying that, the higher the relative CEO’s debt compensation, the greater the 
likelihood of the firm issuing a debt source of financing, all else equal. Again, the authors report 
a similar result (coefficient 0.788) when the relative CEO’s incentives test variable is used. 
Further, the magnitude of effects was relatively much larger when they applied predictive 
values of relative CEO’s leverage (inside debt) compensation and relative CEO’s incentives 
(i.e. showing coefficients of 5.378 and 7.172 respectively) on debt financing choice.  
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Moreover, the authors later applied real data on the firm’s net debt issue to provide further 
analysis on whether firms with greater CEO’s inside debt incentives show increased preference 
for the debt financing option. Consistent with their earlier results, their empirical evidence 
suggests an increasing impact between the firm’s net debt issues and relative CEO’s leverage 
compensation. Reportedly, the relative CEO’s leverage coefficients estimate ranges from 0.019 
to 0.106 after controlling for other firm characteristics such as firm size, growth, profitability, 
tangibility, lagged book leverage, year and industry effects. Again, they find similar qualitative 
results when they apply net debt and equity issues on CEO’s inside debt holdings.                             
The overall findings postulate that CEOs’ inside holdings do not influence them to adopt a risk-
decreasing attitude to firm risk (debt ratio), which is a worrying case for debtholders in a more 
levered firm. This is because debtholders tend to suffer more in bankruptcy instances as 
shareholders can easily walk away due to the limited liability principle. Suffice to say that 
Freund et al.’s (2017) data provide evidence to suggest an accentuating effect on the agency 
cost of debt financing. 
Kabir, Li and Veld-Merkoulova (2013), using a sample of UK firms listed on the Financial 
Times Stock Exchange All Share Index for the period 2003 – 2006, provide further supporting 
evidence to suggest the link between CEO compensation incentives and the firm’s cost of debt 
finance. Specifically, they define their dependent variable (i.e. cost of debt) as the yield spread 
of corporate bond, estimated as the difference between the firm’s bond and a UK government 
bond of comparable maturity, and construct the parameter of interests (e.g. salary, cash bonus, 
stock options, pension, restricted stock and stock) as a proportion of total CEO’s compensation 
incentives. Applying an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator to the measure of yield spread, 
CEO’s pay incentives and other control variables (e.g. firm size, debt ratio, profitability, 
market-to-book, firm risk, year and industry fixed effects), the authors reveal some interesting 
results. With relatively small firm-year observations (150), they report that the CEO’s debt-like 
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incentives (defined as pensions and deferred rewards) are negatively related to the firm’s cost 
of debt. Specifically, the coefficients for debt-holding incentives range from -1.52 to -1.90 
using different estimates, and they are all statistically significant at 1% confidence level. They 
argue that the CEOs’ long-term deferred incentives in the form of pensions induce them to be 
cautious and adopt a more conservative risk-management style, which, in turn, naturally aligns 
the CEO’s interest with that of other debt holders. This, according to the researchers, shows 
that bondholders take into consideration the CEO’s debt-like pay elements before requiring a 
lower risk premium. On the cash bonus-yield spread relationship, they show a negative link 
across all the different estimators (pooled regression and multivariate analyses). With the 
coefficient estimates ranging from -1.48 to -1.63, the authors stress that cash incentives 
influence managers to concentrate on relatively short-term projects, instead of risky ones, 
which debtholders often consider when lending to corporations. In other words, bondholders 
pay attention to the CEO’s cash bonus to see the firm’s ability to honour the debt covenants 
(e.g. constantly meeting annual debt interest payments and the later deposits).     
The authors also document that stock options and stock grants are positively related to the bond 
yield spread. They highlight that the debt markets strongly respond to the CEO’s stock options 
incentives, which suggests that shareholders use options and stock incentives to align 
shareholder-agent interests, thereby jeopardising bondholders’ welfare (benefit). Moreover, 
when the authors split stock options (performance-vested options and traditional options) and 
run a separate regression, their evidence indicates that the CEOs with performance-based 
options pay a relatively high cost of borrowing compared to executives with traditional options. 
Shen and Zhang (2015) empirically analyse the sensitivity of CEOs’ inside-debt incentives on 
the costs of equity capital using datasets from the Standard and Poor’s Compustat database 
spanning 2006–2013. They document that CEOs’ debt-like incentives have a significant 
negative effect on the cost of equity. They carefully argue that the CEOs’ debt-equity ratio may 
 83 
incentivise minimal aggressive managerial behaviours, which, in effect, can lead to lower 
demand from the shareholders as firms languish in such an uncompetitive position. In addition, 
they note that, as CEOs’ inside-debt increases, the negative relation is constrained. With this, 
the authors suggest that the shareholders become wary of the endangered shareholder-
bondholder conflicts and may tend to use lower pay performance sensitivity. Again, the inverse 
relationship is much stronger, particularly with companies that fall on the edge of possible 
bankruptcy. 
Hayes et al. (2012) also investigate the role of managerial stock compensation on risk-taking 
investment and financing policies: capital expenditure, research and development, leverage, 
cash holdings and stock volatility. Measuring independent variables similar to Coles et al. 
(2006) and applying fixed effect cross-sectional regressions, they find that both vega and delta 
incentives are negative and significantly related to the changes in debt ratio. For example, they 
report coefficients for both vega (-0.000034) and delta (-0.00000425) after controlling for the 
following factors: firm size, return on assets, research and development, property, plant and 
equipment) in the leverage model. This result indicates that vega and delta compensation 
incentives encourage a managerial risk-reduction attitude rather than risk-increasing incentive, 
which is a concern to shareholders using stock options to induce managers to undertake more 
risky decisions. Again, the authors also find that delta and vega incentives are negatively related 
to the cash holding, which confirms the risk-motivated incentive of stock-based compensation. 
Using a sample of US firms from 1993 to 2005, Chava and Purnanandam (2010) examine how 
managerial (i.e. CEOs and CFOs) compensation incentives affect: (1) book leverage, (2) cash 
holding, (3) debt maturity and (4) accruals. Here, the review will place more emphasis on those 
aspects of their study that are of direct relevance to the subject matter. They construct the main 
key dependent variables as follows: book leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to the 
book value of total assets, cash holding as the ratio of cash and short-term investment to the 
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book value of total assets, whilst debt maturity is measured as the ratio of debt with maturity 
greater than three years to the total debt of the firm. The key independent variables are delta 
(measured as a percentage change in the stock price of the executive stock portfolio) and vega 
(measured as 0.01 change in the stock return volatility of the executive stock portfolio).   
In general, Chava and Purnanandam (2010) postulate that managerial compensation incentives 
influence a firm’s financial policies. In particular, in the book leverage model, the authors find 
the coefficient (-0.0063, t-stats -2.52) on delta incentives to be negative and statistically 
significant. They interpret this to suggest that CEOs with risk-decreasing compensation are 
more likely to decrease leverage level and increase cash balances. However, vega incentives 
show a positive coefficient of 0.0059 (t-stats 1.99), implying that vega increases managerial 
incentives to increase debt ratio. Further, they also show a negative relation between vega and 
cash balance, which confirms the risk-taking incentive when a large component is vega 
incentives. The researchers find similar results for the CFOs’ incentives: delta is negative 
(-0.0020, t-stats, -0.70) and vega shows a positive coefficient (0.0009); however, the 
coefficients are insignificant in statistical terms.  
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find the CFO’s incentives to be statistically significant in the 
firm’s debt maturity and accrual models. Thus, delta and debt maturity are positively related, 
whilst vega shows a positive link with debt maturity. They argue that CFOs’ financial expertise 
enables earnings smoothing and that they manage debt maturity more cautiously than the 
CEOs.   
In a relatively different setting, Florackis and Ozkan, (2009) use UK data to examine how 
executive ownership (incentives) and corporate governance help explain leverage behaviour. 
Extracting data on all industries excluding financial and utilities companies for the period 
1999–2004, their data reveals some interesting results. The researchers measure the dependent 
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variable as book leverage as the ratio of book value of total debt to the book value of total 
assets, whilst executive incentives are measured as the percentage of executive ownership. 
First, the univariate regression shows a negative relationship between executive wealth 
(ownership) and leverage. However, because of the statistical estimation problems associated 
with the univariate test, they run a separate regression using three different estimators: pooled 
OLS estimator, fixed effect estimator and OLS lagged method. Regressing book leverage on 
executive ownership and corporate governance interactive term and other control variables, 
Florackis and Ozkan find non-monotonic relation between leverage and executive wealth. 
Specifically, their evidence suggests that, when CEO ownership is low, an increase in CEO 
ownership causes firm leverage (debt) to rise. However, when CEO ownership is high, leverage 
turn out to be low. They interpret this to suggest that CEOs become wary of debt levels when 
their residual interest is high. Again, on the role of corporate governance, the authors find that 
governance factors play a significant role in the executive incentives and leverage linkage. 
They also document a positive and significant relation between leverage (debt) and other 
control variables (assets tangibility, firm size and profitability), except for market-to-book 
value, which shows a negative interaction.  
With these findings, the authors argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance practices 
may define the non-monotonic relationship between CEOs’ wealth and leverage.  
Moreover, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) empirically investigate the link between 
managerial incentives and risk-taking applying Standard and Poor’s and Compustat Industrial 
segment datasets spanning the period 1992 to 2002.  
Specifically, they examine the extent to which managerial incentives affect: (1) capital 
expenditure, (2) research and development, (3) leverage and (4) firm risk. The review 
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conducted here places more emphasis on leverage level measures which have direct relevance 
to this analysis.  
The authors measure the key explanatory variables for executive compensation incentives as 
follows: delta (i.e. defined as the change in the dollar value of total executive wealth for a 
percentage change in stock price), vega (defined as sensitivity of executive wealth to a change 
in stock return volatility) and cash compensation (salary plus bonus), and define the dependent 
variable (book leverage) as the book leverage scaled by total assets.  
Using three different explanatory variables, lagged values, residual and predicted values for 
both vega and delta to control the endogeneity problem, they find a positive and significant 
relation between vega and leverage across all specifications after controlling for these 
additional proxies (e.g. size, tenure, market-to-book, ROA, Z-score, net fixed assets, research 
and development, year and industry effects). The result suggests managers’ preference to 
increase firm risk (leverage) when their vega incentives component increases. The delta 
component and book leverage were negatively linked with the coefficient estimate ranges (-
0.008 to -0.087). Also, cash compensation is negative and significant, postulating a decrease in 
financial leverage following an increase in executive cash incentives.  
Coles et al. (2006) further utilise a three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimator to deal with the 
issue of reverse causality inherent in the compensation and leverage association. The results 
for vega and delta incentives continue to hold, although the coefficient estimates seem much 
larger in magnitude. Specifically, the estimated coefficient for vega (1.32) is positive and both 
economically and statistically significant at 1% confidence level. The delta, in contrast, is 
negative and significant, which implies that higher delta influences managers to implement 
lower leverage. Again, cash compensation and book leverage still show a negative correlation.  
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In short, Coles et al.’s (2006) evidence suggests that executive compensation structure provides 
enough explanation for our understanding on the firms observed financial leverage behaviour.  
Similarly, in support of the risk-motivated argument, Kini and Williams (2012), using a US 
data sample, find that an option-based incentive induces a managerial risk-taking incentive. 
The authors made this conjecture when their empirical examination revealed a positive relation 
between option-like (defined as vega) incentive and firm leverage.   
Lewellen (2006) explores how managerial incentives explain firms’ observed corporate 
leveraging using a sample of 1,568 large US publicly traded companies during the period 1993 
– 2001. From the data, he computes managerial incentives as a certainty equivalent (CE) of the 
CEO’s wealth, and any variation in firm debt is associated with a corresponding change in the 
CEO’s wealth. Employing this estimate (CEO wealth incentives or CE), Lewellen provides 
evidence (both time-series and cross-section analyses) to suggest that managerial incentives 
(CE) have an important impact on firm financing policies. In particular, regressing debt 
changes on lagged changes in managerial incentives (CE) and other determinants of debt, his 
results show a negative relationship between incentives and firm debt. The author draws a 
simple interpretation from the results. He argues that managers’ incentives to seek more risk 
declines particularly if their stock options are in the money and that can substantially decrease 
executive preference for risks. 
Furthermore, the author finds that a change in CEO compensation (CE) has an incremental 
impact on debt-equity choice. Applying a probit model to 3,376 firm-year observations, the 
coefficient on incentives’ compensation (CE) for all specifications is positive and statistically 
and economically significant (1% level) with reported t-statistic ranging from 4.7 to 10.7. 
Again, his results show similar significance (t -3.7 to -7.1) when he accounts for cross-
correlation problems by estimating a separate probit regression. The author connotes that 
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increasing managerial incentives by one standard deviation decreases the probability of debt 
issue by 4.3-6.2% percentage points, depending on specification used. He also finds the 
probability of debt issue to be positively related to other control variables: stock options and 
return on assets. 
Using multiple data sources from the US market, Cohen, Hall and Viceira (2000) examine how 
managerial stock options incentives impact a manager’s risk-appetite. Applying modelling and 
econometric methods to a sample of 478 randomly selected firms tracking from 1980 through 
1994, they report that the sensitivity of stock options incentives to firm risks (debt ratio) is 
positive and significant. Specifically, after controlling fixed and firm-specific characteristics, 
the coefficient of CEO wealth elasticity (i.e. defined as stock return change) on the log of 
leverage is 0.163 (t-statistic 3.32). In addition, estimating the magnitude of such change, they 
apply a standard increase starting from zero (0) to 0.36 (0 – 0.36) and find that stock option 
grant on average would produce a change in log leverage of (0.06), which is a significant, given 
the median sample on log leverage as -0.30. Further, their evidence shows that firm leverage 
and cash bonuses are positively related. 
Also, consistent with Cohen, Hall and Viceira’s (2000), leverage – CEO wealth positive 
connection, Mehran (1992) finds similar results when he investigates the relation between 
capital structure and managerial incentive plans using US market data.   
Contrarily to the studies that concentrate on the effect of compensation on leverage, others 
suggest that shareholders consider the firm’s leverage level when setting managerial 
compensation. In other words, this strand of research looks at the role of leverage in the optimal 
design of executives’ compensation (e.g. Kim, Patro and Pereira, 2016; Brockman, Martin and 
Unlu, 2010; Ortiz-Molina, 2007; Duru et al. 2005).   
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 Kim, Patro and Pereira (2016) make an important contribution to the managerial compensation 
incentives and risk-taking linkage literature. Specifically, they investigate how firm leverage 
levels influence the link between option-based incentives and managerial risk-taking by 
employing US datasets for the period 1995 – 2011. They define the dependent variable (risk-
taking) as the standard deviation of monthly stock return (i.e. stock return volatility) and 
measure the key explanatory variable, option-based incentives, using three different estimates: 
options incentives (as measured as current option grants normalised by total annual 
compensation), options delta ratio (measured as the sensitivity of the manager’s current option 
grants to 1% change in firm stock price scaled by total compensation), and option vega ratio 
(sensitivity of option value to changes in firm’s return volatility), all normalised by total 
compensation incentives, whilst book leverage is the ratio of total leverage scaled by total 
assets).  
To empirically test this hypothesis, thus, leverage effect on options incentives and risk-taking 
relation, they first apply univariate regression tests and observe that firm leverage status 
influences a positive relationship between option incentives and risk-taking. More specifically, 
they find that, in the highest leverage quintile, the correlations among options incentives and 
risk-taking (5.70% – 13.30%) are all negative and significant at 1% level, across the three 
measures. At the lowest leverage quintile, however, a positive and significant correlation is 
observed among options and risk, and the change in correlation from lowest to highest leverage 
quintile still remains significant at 1% confidence level. Accordingly, Kim et al. argue that the 
univariate tests explain the attenuation role of leverage pertaining to the existing linkage 
between options incentives and managerial risk-taking. 
Further, using the multivariate regression analysis, Kim et al. provide strong support for the 
moderating effect of leverage. They find the coefficient for the interaction term (option 
incentives multiplied by leverage) is negative and statistically significant at 1% level across all 
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the three different incentives measures after controlling for other exogenous factors including 
growth opportunities, firm size, capital expenditure, research and development, plant property 
and equipment, etc. With this result, the authors suggest that a 1% increase in firm leverage 
reduces the positive impact of option-based incentives on risk-taking. Again, the authors 
observe similar qualitative results when they apply a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
specification. 
Similarly, Kim, Li and Zhang (2011) also provide evidence on the extent to which managerial 
equity compensation induces stock market crash (risk). Using a large US sample spanning 
1993–2009, they reveal these findings. Specifically, the researchers apply a logit multivariate 
regression model and find that the CFO’s option incentive is positively related to the firm’s 
stock crash, whilst the CEO’s option incentive is negative and insignificant.  
Further, the authors run a separate regression, by taking account of the role of firm leverage. 
They report that, for those firms with high leverage status, CEO’s option incentive (coefficient 
-0.649 t-stats -1.68) is negative, whilst CFO’s option (1.578 t-stats 2.53) is positive and are 
both statistically significant. With this tentative evidence, the authors argue that a CFO’s 
options incentive to induce stock crash is more significant for those with a high level of debt 
ratio on the books. 
Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) investigate the role of short-term debt within the 
framework of executive compensation incentives for US publicly traded companies over the 
period 1992–2005. With a sample of 6,825 firm-year observations, they show that short-term 
debt (i.e. using proxy of debt maturity) plays a role in explaining the sensitivity of CEOs’ 
incentives portfolio on both stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). They 
estimate the two CEO incentives packages, stocks (delta) and stock options (vega), using the 
Black-Sholes (1973) option pricing model, adjusted for dividend pay-out. Firstly, their results 
 91 
from pooled cross-section and time-series regressions document these findings. Specifically, 
the authors show that CEOs’ incentives (e.g. delta, coefficient -0.0385) are negatively and 
significantly related to short-term debt, whilst there is a positive and significant relation 
between CEOs’ incentives (vega, coefficient 0.0309) and short-term debt. Given the statistical 
evaluation and economic significance of the results, they argue that, when the stock price 
sensitivity (delta) changes from the 50th percentile to the 95th percentile, the firm’s short-term 
debt decreases by 8.7%, likewise in return vega incentives increase by 4.4%. 
Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) provide further tests by employing the generalised method 
of moments (GMM) to find if indeed a correlation exists between debt maturity and leverage 
(long term). Again, regressing short-term debt on the CEOs’ incentives sensitivity and other 
control variables, they still find both the estimated coefficients for CEOs’ incentives (delta -
0.0829 and vega 0.0984) and both are statistically significant. 
Finally, regressing leverage (long-term debt) on CEOs’ incentives portfolio, Brockman, Martin 
and Unlu (2010) document that managers’ use of long-term debt finance is negatively related 
to delta (-0.3495) and positively (0.0720) related to vega, whilst short-term maturity and 
leverage are negatively linked (-0.3495). The authors argue that managers use short-term debt 
to mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. 
Ortiz-Molina (2007) examines the effects of financial leverage on executive pay incentives of 
the largest publicly traded companies in the US for the period 1993–1999. The final sample 
consists of 1,652 CEOs data and a total of 7,499 firm-year observations. Ortiz-Molina provides 
an interesting revelation by reporting an economically significant effect among leverage and 
the structure of CEOs’ pay packages. The author defines both dependent and independent 
variables as follows: dependent variable (i.e. pay-performance sensitivity) as the change in 
firm’s specific wealth, and the independent variable: market leverage (measured as book value 
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of debt scaled by market value of equity and the book value of debt) and book leverage (e.g. 
book value of debt as a fraction of book value of assets). 
Employing median regression (MR) and two-stage least absolute deviation (2SLAD) 
estimation techniques to the sampled data, he reports a statistically significant negative 
relationship between CEOs’ pay performance sensitivity and leverage after controlling for 
other exogenous factors (e.g. size, market-to-book). Specifically, the negative coefficient 
estimates on leverage are much larger in magnitude when the 2SLAD approach is applied, 
which suggests that neglecting the simultaneity bias existing in the leverage and compensation 
relation could potentially underestimate the strength of the analysis. Furthermore, the author 
makes two leverage classifications, straight debt and convertible debt, and performs separate 
regression analyses. The findings show that convertible debt is positive and significant, whilst 
straight debt maintains a strong inverse relation after controlling for simultaneity and other 
control factors (e.g. firm size, growth opportunities, ownership, tenure).  
In addition, Ortiz- Molina shows that the stock options compensation scheme is more sensitive 
to differences in capital structure. His evidence reveals a significantly negative relation among 
stock options incentive and leverage increases, in contrast to the positive variance effect on 
convertible debt. He further connotes that, in a highly levered firm, stock options incentives 
become less effective in mitigating shareholder-bondholder conflicts of interest as shareholders 
anticipate minimising the cost of debt financing. In support of this view, Duru et al. (2005) 
further contend that shareholders of firms with high leverage use more cash bonus 
compensation to lower future cost of debt.     
In short, these results imply that financial structure and executive compensation practices 
interact in a unique manner to attenuate agency cost of debt. 
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Ryan and Wiggins (2001) also examine the influence of firm and manager characteristics on 
the level and structure of executive compensation using US datasets. Specifically, they find 
that leverage relates positively (negatively) to cash bonus (stock-based incentives – stock 
options, restricted stock). However, the coefficients on cash bonus and restricted stock are 
insignificant. Further, on the convertible debt ratio, the authors’ results show leverage is 
negatively related to risk-avoiding incentive (cash bonus, restricted stock) but has a positive 
relation with stock options.   
Overall, the observed empirical literature suggests two ways by which capital structure and 
managerial compensation are related. The literature shows the effect of managerial 
compensation on financial leverage (Coles et al., 2006; Chava and Punanandam, 2010; Hayes 
et al., 2012; Kini and Williams, 2012). More specifically, the evidence on stock options 
incentives (vega) produces mixed findings. Thus, large stock options incentives induce 
managers to increase firm leverage level (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 
2010), whilst other authors postulate a negative relationship (Lewellen, 2006; Hayes et al., 
2012). More so, the increment in risk-avoiding incentives (i.e. restricted stock, cash bonus) 
influences managers to decrease firm financial leverage (Coles et al., 2006; Hayes et al., 2012; 
Cassell et al., 2012), all else equal. These findings tend to suggest that executives’ attitude to 
either increase or decrease firm risk (leverage level) is influenced by the level and structure of 
their compensation incentives.  
In contrast, others including Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010), Ortiz-Molina (2007), Duru 
et al. (2005) also find evidence to support the role of leverage in the determination of 
managerial compensation. In fact, this evidence (i.e. determinants of managerial compensation) 
raises theoretical and econometric concerns, particularly when considering the causal relation 
between financial leverage and compensation. Endogeneity is likely to be present and so the 
study adopts suitable econometric modelling and a technique to isolate the causal effect of 
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managerial compensation on leverage. In this way, the study clearly shows how managerial 
compensation components influence leverage decision. Thus, the core contribution of this 
academic thesis is to explore a direct causal effect of compensation components on financial 
policy by modelling a simultaneous system of equations and applying a 3SLS method to extract 
the intricate link. This is important to clearly establish the idea that it is the level and nature of 
compensation incentives that influence managers operational decisions (Coles et al., 2006).  
Moreover, investigating this issue within the UK context is important because UK firms are 
seen to use leverage more conservatively relative to US firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Antoniou et al., 2008), and considering the issue from compensation perspectives would further 
enhance our understanding of UK firms’ conservative debt policy. 
   
 
2.5b Overall conclusions 
This part of Chapter 2 has utilised the existing literature to establish a causal relation between 
managerial compensation and corporate leverage. The following issues were explored in the 
chapter. It theorised the extent to which managerial compensation, due to the imperfections in 
corporate governance system and risk-related incentive problem, is an important determinant 
of firm leverage. Thus, under optimal contracting theory (OPT), shareholders use different pay 
components to encourage (discourage) corporate borrowing, which in part contributes to the 
overall value of the firm. The chapter also discusses the two related strands of literature on 
leverage: compensation linkage (the impact of compensation on leverage) and the reverse issue 
of whether leverage is a predictor of managerial compensation. This interdependent literature 
highlights the simultaneity problem, especially in an attempt to establish a direct causal effect 
of managerial compensation on leverage. This issue will be given the needed attention in a later 
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chapter. Again, the later chapter (5) will extract from the direct relevant literature to develop 
the central hypotheses.  
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                                                     Chapter 3 
 
                       3.0 Data and Method for Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The overall aim of the study is to critically analyse the extent to which a firm’s operational 
risk-taking activities and managerial financial compensation incentives are related. 
Specifically, two broad research questions are formulated under the risk-taking activities: first, 
the link between investment and managerial compensation, and second, the interdependence 
among leverage and managerial compensation incentives (in Chapter 5). In attempting to 
achieve the research objectives, it is important to choose a suitable research approach and to 
collect an appropriate set of data, as well as to employ the required analytical techniques needed 
to satisfy the study’s specific aims. This is because an inappropriate research design can lead 
to inconsistent estimates and draw wrong inferences. 
For instance, the reviewed literature on risk-taking investment suggests a two-sided 
relationship between investment and executive compensation incentives. This can generate the 
wrong causal effect if a single model analysis is adopted. Considering this econometric 
problem, therefore, the study must be able to identify the right research method that is robust 
enough to deal with the said problem in order to produce consistent estimates and to arrive at 
a logical conclusion. In support of this view, Murphy (1997, p.4) suggests that a chosen 
research method should be suitable to answer the research question so that the inferences drawn 
can be consistent with what was intended. Given the importance of this research (i.e. 
understanding how managers make risk-taking decisions given the level and the composition 
of their compensation incentives), the choice of research design and analysis method is of 
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primary concern, particularly because establishing valid causal claims among two interrelated 
corporate policies can be a daunting task for researchers. Thus, using a single model may not 
consistently be able to produce a true causal estimate, which could ultimately lead to wrong 
causal inferences. As stated earlier, the overriding goal is to establish a causal effect of 
managerial compensation on risk-taking decisions, therefore adopting appropriate causal 
designs and applying econometric procedures and techniques to the UK data is crucial to 
achieving the research objectives.  
In order to facilitate the research, aim and purpose, the study needs to collect the required data 
and define appropriate proxies to examine the linkage. For instance, Bryman (1984) suggested 
two main methods of data collection can be applied in empirical studies. They are quantitative 
and qualitative methods. The quantitative methods are characterised by using hypothesis 
testing and fixed measurements, while qualitative methods are interpretative in nature, seeking 
to explore rather than verify, and often provide the bases for further studies (Bryman, 1984; 
Thomas, 2003). Consequently, the present study applies quantitative methods to provide 
analyses for the study’s questions and the chapter is discussed along this line.  
The chapter primarily focuses on sample collection, variables’ definitions and estimations of 
the core variables. We highlight various challenges and limitations of the data and provide 
possible explanations and justifications for the chosen technique. We also state the research 
empirical model. The main analytical strategy relevant to estimate the testable hypotheses is 
also discussed in this chapter.  
More specifically, the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 shows the data availability 
and sample selection process. We also highlight data limitation challenges. Section 3.3 outlines 
and defines the key variables that are of utmost importance to the study: corporate investment 
activities, financial leverage and executives’ financial compensation incentives. Section 3.4 
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provides a summary analysis of the descriptive statistics for the compensation variables. The 
section also shows the trends in compensation packages of the UK FTSE 350 top three 
executives (chief executive, chief financial officer and chief operating officer) and, finally, 
section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 Data availability 
This section outlines the sample collection techniques and procedures involved in the data 
selection process. In line with the aim and the nature of this investigation, the study utilises 
multiple data sources. First, the accounting and financial data for the UK FTSE 350 firms are 
obtained from the Compustat and Bloomberg databases. Second, the data on the values of 
executives’ financial compensation incentives, managerial ownership and other corporate 
governance variables (e.g. block-shareholding and non-executive directors’ ownership) were 
mainly hand-collected from the sampled firms’ annual reports, combined with some electronic 
supplementary data from MorningStar database. In fact, such a labour-intensive activity (see 
Ntim et al., 2013) involved in manual collection does not only enhance the rich data sampling 
needed for this study; the process is crucially important for the study’s originality purposes. 
 
3.2.1 The available datasets 
The first part of the data collection procedure pertains to identifying all UK publicly traded 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and assimilates those firms in the FTSE 350 
index. The data utilised in this study are obtained from multiple sources. We use the Compustat 
and Bloomberg databases to collect firm-specific annual accounting and financial data for the 
sample period 2006–2015 inclusive, whereas information on executives’ compensation, 
ownership stakes, age, large ownership and non-executive ownership were manually collected. 
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We merge the manually collected data with the electronic datasets and, where there is missing 
compensation data for the executives, we de-select that firm-year observation. In addition, 
consistent with prior research and ensuring the observed cross-sectional relation between 
executives’ pay and risk-taking decisions is robust, the firm’s minimum information coverage 
over a four-year period is required (Ozkan, 2007, 2011; Ntim et al., 2016). For accounting data, 
we obtained comprehensive data on fixed assets expenditure (e.g. plant, property and 
equipment and other fixed assets) and intangibles (e.g. research and development, fixed 
intangibles) and the book leverage over the study’s period (2006–2015) from Compustat. The 
resource availability enhances our rich dataset and enables the study to establish and answer 
the research questions relating to the links between the executives’ compensation incentives 
and investment activities on one hand and the financial leverage and compensation incentives 
on the other hand.  
In fact, despite the improvement in the managerial compensation information following the 
Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) reports, the compensation data are still unavailable in 
electronic form, hence the researcher’s mundane attempt to hand-collect compensation data 
from the firms’ annual reports. Mainly, the following considerations underpinned the study’s 
usage of the firms’ annual reports as the source of information. First, the annual report is the 
only statutorily required piece of information that provides a detailed record of the 
organisation’s overall activities for a specified period, which shareholders and other 
stakeholders often rely on particularly in assessing what has transpired in the business. 
Second, the annual report is usually prepared to meet a certain prescribed standard and that 
standard of preparation makes it easy and even more suitable for an independent auditor to 
authenticate the information supplied in it. This important feature associated with a company’s 
annual proxy statement demystifies the long-standing debate on the substance of the annual 
report as a credible and substantive source of corporate information. This, notwithstanding that 
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the company annual report is often fraught with problems and other deficiencies as a potential 
business information sources, means that it remains the most popular, least error prone and 
most reliable instrument of communication in the modern corporate environment (Holland and 
Foo, 2003; Davison, 2002). Therefore, given the annual report’s easy accessibility and quality 
in terms of the authenticity of the information contained in it, the study utilises such readily 
available datasets. This primary source provides comprehensive information on management 
including remuneration packages, ownership stakes, ages, large shareholdings and non-
executive holdings during the financial year. This rich dataset for the listed FTSE 350 firms 
enables the study to conduct the empirical investigation. 
Moreover, with regard to the study data coverage time frame (2006 – 2015), the thesis was 
motivated by two reasons. First, the sample start period (i.e. 2006) is chosen to minimise 
missing data for the executives’ financial compensation incentives. For instance, it was 
observed that a significant number of firms had missing data on managerial compensation prior 
to 2006. Again, even though our chosen timeframe also coincided with these time periods, 
before, during and after economic crisis, it is expected that the study results will not be affected 
by the market abnormalities resulting from the financial crisis because the time-specific effects 
(e.g., stagflation, inflation rates, economic shocks) which are common to all firms and can 
change through time are modelled in our analysis. This is consistent with prior studies (e.g. 
Nguyen, 2018; Petzmas and Croci, 2015; Kini and Williams, 2012). Finally, the cut-off 
financial year is pegged at 2015 and shows the last period for which data were available at the 
time of collecting this sample data. Our data seek to provide a fresh impetus into the topic area. 
The initial firm-specific information is obtained from these respective databases: Compustat 
and Bloomberg, for financial accounting statements and stock price information, whilst 
manager-specific data and other governance information were manually collected from the 
companies’ annual reports. Specifically, the values of executives’ compensation incentives data 
 101 
(base salary, cash bonuses, share options, equity-based rewards (performance shares and 
restricted or deferred shares – LTIPs) and the executives’ inside ownership and other 
governance variables such as large ownership stakes and non-executive ownership for the 
sampled firms were mainly hand-collected, with some further cross-checking from the 
MorningStar database.  
Through each firm’s annual report, we identify three top executives – Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Chief Operating Officer (COO) – and collect annual 
data on their incentives packages and ownership stake. Consistent with other empirical studies 
(e.g. Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Coles et al., 2006; Ozkan, 2007; Ntim et al., 2016; Nguyen, 
2018), we eliminate all firms operating in the financial and utilities sectors. The study performs 
this exercise for three reasons: first, these firms often have a different capital structure, which 
could affect the leverage variable estimation (Ozkan, 2007, 2011; Coles et al., 2006). Second, 
firms operating in these sectors are heavily regulated and their managers have less discretion 
over investment decisions compared to unregulated ones (Smith, 1986; Guest, 2009; Ntim et 
al., 2016). Lastly, they are eliminated in order to facilitate comparisons with prior studies (e.g. 
Coles et al., 2006; Xue, 2007; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010), which also excluded financial 
and utilities companies from their analyses. Additionally, firms with no reported data on 
executives’ compensation incentives for a minimum of four years are automatically discounted, 
consistent with Ozkan (2007).  
The research employed this filter and obtained a final sample consisting of 213 UK publicly 
traded companies with a total of 1,900 firm-year observations spanning 2006 – 2015, across 
the nine (9) main industries (see Table 3.1). These industries are: mining and quarrying 
(10.8%), oil and gas (3.9%), healthcare (10.5%), consumer defensive (5.5%), 
manufacturing/industrials (25.3%), consumer cyclical (26.1%), real estate (8.5%), technology 
(5.6%) and communication services (1.5%). The final sample size of 1,900 covers all the nine 
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industries from the FTSE 350 index and can be seen as the maximum number of observations 
to be utilised in our unbalanced panel data analysis. In fact, it is worth mentioning that the 
sample is highly representative of the entire UK population of large companies. The sample 
involves firms distributed across the UK and operating in various industries and market sectors. 
Therefore, the overall sample of 213 firms (excluding financial and utilities firms) can be 
termed as highly representative of the sample population. 
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Table 3. 1 Year and Industry Distribution of Sample Firms 
Data details                                                                            Number of firms    Number of observations 
FTSE 350 Index companies                                                              350                                             3500 
Financial companies (banks and insurance & other trust)         73                                               730 
Utilities companies (excluded)                                                        12                                               120 
Missing data                                                                                       52                                               750                    
Final sample                                                                                       213                                            1900 
 
Distribution by year                                                                 Percentage         Number of observations 
2006                                                                                                 8.9 %                                           164 
2007                                                                                                 9.1%                                            168 
2008                                                                                                 9.4%                                            175 
2009                                                                                                 9.7%                                            184 
2010                                                                                                 10.1%                                         189 
2011                                                                                                10.2%                                           191 
2012                                                                                                10.4%                                           197 
2013                                                                                               10.7%                                           206 
2014                                                                                                10.8%                                          211 
2015                                                                                                10.8%                                          214 
Total                                                                                                100%                                          1900 
 
Distribution by industry  
Mining and Quarrying                                                                10.8%                                          208 
Oil and Gas                                                                                   3.9%                                            77 
Consumer                                                                                     10.5%                                          204 
Healthcare                                                                                    5.5%                                            107 
Manufacturing/Industrials                                                        25.3%                                          494 
Real estate                                                                                   8.5%                                            168 
Technology                                                                                   5.6%                                            103 
Communication services                                                            1.5%                                            30 
Consumer cyclical                                                                       26.1%                                         509 
Total                                                                                             100%                                          1900 
  This table presents the number of firms in each of the sample years distributed according to industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104 
3.4 The empirical estimation strategy 
As postulated in Chapter 2, examining the causal effect of managerial compensation on the 
firm’s value-critical risk-taking (investment and/or leverage) policies is a daunting task for 
researchers. This is because the two corporate variables are interrelated and so the research 
needs to adopt the appropriate processes, procedures and techniques to isolate the effect of 
compensation on investment and/or leverage policy. Specifically, it was observed in the 
reviewed investment literature (see Chapter 2) that not only does executive compensation affect 
a firm’s risk-taking activity, but also how much they (executives) are paid is determined by the 
specific characteristics of the firm such as growth opportunities, size, risk-taking activities (e.g. 
R&D, property, plant and equipment, leverage), etc., as well as the presence of other 
governance mechanisms (block-shareholdings, institutional shareholdings, non-executive 
ownership), suggesting that a two-sided relationship exists between these variables (Coles et 
al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012). The bi-directional effect raises a major concern for the 
study particularly in our attempt to establish a direct causal relation between 
investment/leverage and executive compensation, in that the two corporate variables are part 
of a simultaneous process to determine corporate value. The resulting simultaneity bias is one 
of the primitive causes of endogeneity, which occurs when two variables simultaneously affect 
each other. This can lead to inconsistent estimates when an inappropriate estimation technique 
(OLS) is adopted (Antonakis et al., 2010, 2014; Kennedy, 2003; Wooldrige, 2002).  
Endogeneity may also occur when the estimated model directly or indirectly omits important 
variable(s) (i.e. unobserved heterogeneity). The unmodelled variable may be correlated with 
the dependent variable and the independent variable(s) and/or the random error term, which 
can affect the coefficient estimates. For instance, as shown earlier, our key independent 
variables (e.g. cash bonus, stock options and LTIPs) are not explicitly exogenous; it is possible 
that the expected causal impact on the dependent (investment) variable could be instigated by 
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other variable(s) external to the main investment model. This means that an unmodelled source 
of variance (error term) is likely to correlate with the independent variables (i.e. compensation 
components) creating a possible endogeneity problem, thereby producing inconsistent 
parameters when OLS is applied (Kennedy, 2003). This is problematic, and the study needs to 
deal with this troublesome factor by removing the supposed effect that is correlated with the 
independent variable(s). For example, executive managers’ characteristics – age, private 
wealth, ownership, gender – and/or other governance indicators – large ownership, non-
executive directors’ ownership, board size – are likely to correlate with the compensation 
(independent) variables (see Nguyen, 2018; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Mehran, 1995; Core et 
al., 1999), to affect managerial investment choice. Therefore, in order to ascertain “true 
estimates” (causal effect of the independent variables – cash bonus, stock options, LTIPs – on 
the dependent variable) and prevent spurious inferences, we need to adopt an efficient and 
robust estimator that can purge the unwanted association on the incentives’ variable(s).  
Furthermore, another way that endogeneity can occur is through measurement error. This 
happens when the key variable is wrongly measured. It can occur either by poor reporting of 
the executive’s compensation incentives in the firm’s annual report (our main information 
source for managers’ compensation). In fact, because our key variables were manually 
collected and some of this issue may not be observed directly by the study, applying a robust 
technique to deal with this unfathomed or unexpected event is necessary and much needed.  
Clearly, the issues discussed above encapsulate the fact that endogeneity can stem from a 
plethora of situations wherein a regressor (independent variable) correlates with the dependent 
variable and/or the model’s error term, thereby violating the underlying assumptions of 
ordinary least squares (OLS). (Appendix 1 mathematically shows how these numerated 
econometric problems – i.e. simultaneity bias, omitted variable bias and unobserved 
heterogeneity – are illustrated and the extent to which our adopted method removes possible 
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endogeneity bias). The presence of endogeneity may potentially threaten the validity of the 
research findings (i.e. causal effect of managerial compensation on investment and/or leverage 
in Chapter 5) if appropriate research modelling and the right estimation techniques are not 
employed (Antonakis et al., 2014). In line with this view, Murphy (1997, p. 4), argues that the 
chosen research methods should be appropriate enough to answer the anticipated research 
question and the inferences drawn should be consistent with the intended consequences. With 
this, it is clear that the choice of research design and its applied method is of utmost importance 
in providing consistent estimates capable of delivering informed policies and changing 
practices.  
To deal with these aforementioned econometric challenges, we develop system of equations 
and apply three-stage least squares (3SLS) as the study’s workhorse method to analyse the 
quantitative data (see Coles et al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012; Croci and Petmezas, 2015; 
Nguyen, 2018). It allows for efficient estimation of simultaneous equations with endogenous 
predictors (compensation variables, investment and/or leverage). By applying the 3SLS 
estimator to the structural models, the study is able to provide efficient estimates by removing 
the endogeneity effect associated with the endogenous explanatory regressor. More 
specifically, the 3SLS method efficiently and robustly deals with endogeneity resulting from 
omitted variables, measurement error and simultaneity (Antonakis et al., 2014; Greene, 2008; 
Coles et al., 2006; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Kennedy, 2003).  
The systems of equations method (i.e. 2SLS) made its way into the literature in the 1950s via 
Henri Theil and Robert Basmann (Gujarati, 2009 p. 719) purposely to deal with regressors that 
are simultaneously determined. The underlying idea is that some regressors may endogenously 
be related to either the dependent, other regressors and/or stochastic error term, which makes 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates biased and inconsistent. Due to this, early scholars 
Theil (1953) and Basmann (1957) independently developed the 2SLS method to estimate 
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equations riddled with endogenous problems. Theoretically, the method provides a consistent 
estimate by “purifying” the endogenous regressor through system of equations to get rid of the 
unwanted component of the regressor in order to obtain the correct estimate. Thus, unlike 
conventional single equation modelling, the system of equations model has the advantage of 
allowing simultaneous interdependence among endogenous variables, which in turn makes the 
2SLS (or 3SLS) estimator a more convenient and consistent estimation method. 
Conventionally, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage least squares (3SLS) serve 
the same purposes, thus both allow for consistent estimation of simultaneous equations with 
endogenous predictors. However, the later method (3SLS), which was developed in the early 
1960s by Zellner and Theil (1962), improves the efficiency of the parameter estimates. It uses 
the two-stage least squares estimated moment matrix of the systems stochastic disturbances to 
estimate the coefficients of the entire system simultaneously. One potential advantage of the 
3SLS method over two-stage least squares (2SLS) is that it provides efficient coefficient 
estimates even in cases where the selected instruments weakly predict the endogenous 
regressor. Thus, estimation by 2SLS can be imprecise if the chosen instruments is weakly 
correlated with the endogenous variable (Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995; Antonakis et al., 
2014 p. 32). With this, it is therefore not surprising why the 3SLS method is known as the most 
potent and versatile technique in treating endogeneity (Antonakis et al., 2014) and this 
undoubtedly explains why the method is extensively used in finance, economics and 
management studies (Rajpoyal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012; 
Ntim et al.., 2013; Croci and Petmezas, 2015, Nguyen, 2018). 
For instance, Ntim et al. (2013) argue that the reported non-existent, extremely weak 
correlation between executive compensation and performance could partly be attributed to 
estimating the conventional single equation model and suggest the need to control for possible 
simultaneous interdependencies among the two corporate variables. The authors made this 
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concluding remark when they found a strong association after estimating simultaneous 
equations with the 3SLS method, which allows for possible interdependence among the 
dependent and independent variables. Similarly, and of direct relevance to the present study, 
Coles et al. (2006) concede that firm’s risk-taking activities and executive compensation are 
interdependent and that an appropriate estimation method (3SLS) should be used to reduce the 
likelihood of drawing spurious inferences from the OLS results analysis. 
Moreover, in spite of the benefits of using the 3SLS method, the method is scarcely used in 
other social sciences, with a few exception (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Foster and 
McLanahan, 1996; Gennetian, et al., 2008). For instance, Gennetian, et al. (2008) advanced the 
literature on developmental science after employing a system of equations strategy (2SLS) to 
analyse the causal association between children’s environmental factors and developmental 
outcomes. The authors further recommended the need for future research in developmental 
science to adopt an analytic strategy (2SLS) that allows identification of the precise nature and 
direction of the expected association among dependent and independent variables. 
Motivated by its (3SLS) efficient estimates (Zellner and Theil, 1962; Wooldridge, 2002; 
Antonakis et al., 2014) and the popular usage in the management literature, the present study 
adopts a system of equations and utilises the 3SLS method as the study workhorse. This 
estimation approach will be given further attention in the respective chapters.  
More explicitly, the study shows the estimation process including mathematical demonstration 
involved in the 3SLS method. It shows the step-by-step processes involved in the estimation 
process to aid the reader’s understanding. Here, the study utilises an investment measure for 
demonstration purposes. 
Essentially, two steps are involved in the 3SLS estimation approach having identified the key 
endogenous variables (i.e. investment measures and pay components – LTIPs, stock options 
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and cash bonus) and stating the system of equations to be estimated. The first step serves to 
estimate the moment matrix of the reduced form disturbances term in the first-stage regression 
where the endogenous independent regressor, in this case pay component (i.e. either LTIPs, 
stock options, cash bonus), is regressed on all the determinants including instruments to obtain 
a clean portion (predicted values) of the incentive component.  
The second step estimates the original (e.g. investment) model to obtain the parameters of 
interest (coefficients for LTIPs, stock option, cash bonus) after its jointly dependent 
compensation variable(s) are “purified” in the first-stage regression model. Thus, the predicted 
values obtained from each of the pay components are included in the second-stage (investment) 
equation and the estimates derived for the predicted pay component(s) in the investment model 
are interpreted as the causal effect on investment. The estimated coefficients are interpreted to 
show the magnitude and significance of the investment-executive compensation relation. It is 
worth mentioning that the computation processes are done simultaneously. 
Computationally, these four systems of equations are estimated simultaneously using a 3SLS 
estimator readily available in programs akin to a statistical tool (STATA). In STATA, the 
structural equations models are set up as one equation each for the three incentive components 
and each equation for the policy measures (CAPEX, R&D and fixed intangible and/or leverage) 
and then apply the three-stage stage least squares estimator to run the regression analysis based 
on the test hypothesis.  
In the following stage, we present both structural and mathematical demonstrations of how the 
systems of equations are set up and estimated akin to STATA. This is intended to provide the 
reader with a further explanation on how the chosen technique performs the estimation, and it 
shows this in two ways. The first one shows the easy part where four equations are structurally 
set up and apply 3SLS estimator command to run the regressions in STATA. Lastly, the study 
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typically shows the cumbersome processes involved in the estimation (mathematical).  
For example, the risk policy (i.e. investment and or leverage) structural equation model is stated 
below: 
Risk policy (investment/ leverage) equation 
𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑠'(	=		𝛽++𝛽,𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦'( +	𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'(+ 𝛽;𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡'( + ∈'(…………………….....…....… (1) 
𝐸𝑆𝑂'(	=		𝛽++𝛽,𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦'( +	𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'(+𝛽;𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡'( + ∈'(…………………………..….....… (2) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐵'(	=		𝛽++𝛽,𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦'( +	𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'(+ 𝛽;𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡'( + ∈'(……………………..…....… (3) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘	𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦'(		=	𝛼++𝛼,𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑠'( + 𝛼6𝐸𝑆𝑂'( +	𝛼;𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐵'( +	𝛼J𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'(+ 	∈'(…..………..… (4) 
Where endogenous dependent variables: LTIPs, ESO and CashB represent long-term incentive 
plans, executive stock options and cash bonus respectively (i.e. first stage models: 1, 2 and 3), 
Risk policy indicates either investment or leverage (endogenous variable), controls are firm 
size, market-to-book, cash flow, stock return, salary, executive ownership, non-executive 
ownership, large ownership, industry and year effects and instruments are executives’ average 
age, dividend pay-out and stock return volatility (i.e. the proxy choice is specific to incentive 
component) and∈'( is the random error term. We also include each incentive component in the 
compensation equation e.g. LTIPs and stock options are included in the cash bonus model to 
conform to the underlying intuition that the pay components are simultaneously selected. 
In Eq. (4), Risk policy is the dependent variable (either investment or leverage) in the second 
stage model, LTIPs, ESO and CashB represent predicted incentive components and controls 
are risk policy determinants that have been found in the literature.  
In fact, although the structural equation model shown above is quite straightforward and 
intuitive, we further demonstrate mathematically the step-by-step processes involved in the 
estimation, where the unwanted effect is purged from the endogenous variable in the first-stage 
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regression. 
As already stated, risk policy (investment or leverage) and pay components are endogenously 
determined, implying that the endogeneity effect has to be removed in the first-stage regression 
model. We estimate the individual pay component to derive the predicted values for the said 
pay component. We show this estimation procedure by specifying the model.  
Here, we estimate each compensation component (first-stage) to obtain the predicted values to 
be utilised in the second-stage regression.  
LTIPs incentive model 
𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑠'(	=		𝛽++𝛽,𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦'( +	𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'(+ 𝛽;𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡'( + ∈'(……………..….…...…....… (1) 
LTIPs = ƛ,I + ƛ6K + u……………………………………………..….……..………….....(1.1) 
Where, LTIPs = long-term incentive plans, Risk policy is the endogenous investment and 
leverage variable, K is the exogenous variable(s) of LTIPs determinants (firm size, market-to-
book, stock return, cash flow, salary, executives ownership, large ownership, non-executive 
ownership, industry and year fixed effects and instruments – executive average age, dividend 
pay-out, u = error term. We also include stock options and cash bonus in the LTIPs model 
because of the simultaneous determination. We simplify the reduced form using nth 
explanatory variable in vector notation: 
LTIPsQ = 	KπQ + ƐQ ……………………………………………………………………..(1.2) 
Where, LTIPsQ, KπQ = all instruments including investment, exogenous factors of LTIPs 
incentive and the relevant instruments, and ƐQ = error term. We then apply an OLS estimator 
to equation (1iii), and then obtain the predicted values of long-term incentive (𝐿Ť𝐼𝑃𝑠W) to be 
included in the original investment model.   
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𝐿Ť𝐼𝑃𝑠W = K (𝐾Y	𝐾)[,𝐾′𝐿Ť𝐼𝑃𝑠W.  
Where 𝐿Ť𝐼𝑃𝑠W = 𝐿Ť𝐼𝑃𝑠W if K is in a column vector. 
 
 The predicted value of LTIPs (represented by hat sign) is included in the second-stage risk 
policy model (investment or leverage).   
Stock options model 
𝐸𝑆𝑂'(	=		𝛽++𝛽,𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦'( +	𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'(+ 𝛽;𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡'( + ∈'(……………..…..……...…....… (2) 
ESO = þ,R + þ6K + u ……………………………………..……………..……...………(2.1) 
Where, ESO = stock options, R= Risk policy is the endogenous investment and leverage 
variable, K is the exogenous variable(s) of ESO determinants (firm size, market-to-book, stock 
return, cash flow, salary, executives ownership, large ownership, non-executive ownership, 
industry and year fixed effects and instruments – executive average age, dividend pay-out and 
stock return volatility and u = error term. Again, LTIPs and cash bonus are also included in the 
model to account for the joint effects.  
We simplify the reduced form using kth explanatory variable in vector notation: 
ESOa = 	Kπa + Ɛa …………………………………..……………………………………..(2.2) 
Where,ESOa = 	stock	options, Kπa = all instruments including risk policy variable (investment 
and or leverage), exogenous factors of ESO determinants and the relevant instruments, andƐa= 
error term. We then apply an OLS estimator to eq. (2ii) and then obtain the predicted values of 
stock option (EŜ𝐎)to be included in the original Risk policy model.   
𝐸ŜO' = K (𝐾Y	𝐾)[,𝐾′ŜOa.  
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Where, EŜO' = ŜOa if K is in a column vector.  
Cash bonus model 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐵'(	=		𝛽++𝛽,𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦'( +	𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'(+ 𝛽;𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡'( + ∈'(……………..……..…....… (3) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐵'(	 = þ,R + þ6K + u ……………………………………..…….…………..……..………(3.1) 
Where, CashB = cash bonus, R= Risk policy is the endogenous investment and leverage 
variable, K is the exogenous variable(s) of CashB determinants: firm size, market-to-book, 
cash flow, salary, executives ownership, large ownership, non-executive ownership, industry 
and year fixed effects and instruments – executive average age and dividend pay-out and u = 
error term. Also, LTIPs and stock options are included in the model to account for the joint 
effects. We simplify the first-stage regression using kth explanatory variable in vector notation. 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐵k = 	𝑍𝜋k + 𝜇k …………………………………………..…………………….…………..(3.2) 
Where, CashBs, Zπs = all instruments including investment and leverage, exogenous factors 
of cash bonus determinants and the relevant instruments, and 𝜇k= error term. We then apply 
OLS estimator to equation (3ii), and obtain the predicted values of Ĉ𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐵v 
Ĉ𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐵v = Z (𝑍Y	𝑍)[,𝑍′CashBw.  
Where, ĈashBv = CashBs if Z is in a column vector. 
Thus, the predicted values of LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus (in the first stage) are 
included in the risk policy model (investment or leverage – second-stage) together with other 
control variables to obtain the coefficient estimates. The estimates for LTIPs, ESO and CashB 
obtain from the second-stage regression show the effects on the risk policy (Eq. 4).  
Risk	policya{ = 	β+ +	β,𝐿Ť𝐼𝑃𝑠'( +	 	β6𝐸ŜO'( + β,ĈashB'(+	βJXa{+εa{,.. ………………..(4)  
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It is worth mentioning that the key idea behind adopting a simultaneous system of equations 
(3SLS) removes the portion of variance in the independent variable that correlates with either 
the dependent variable or error term by including instruments in the first-stage estimation to 
obtain the predicted values of the endogenous independent regressors (i.e. assumed to be 
uncorrelated with error term), and that the (predicted) values are used in the original (second) 
stage to predict the dependent variable (Kennedy, 2003; Antonakis et al., 2010; Antonakis et 
al., 2014). In essence, the instruments help purge the endogenous (independent or dependent) 
regressor from variance that overlaps with the error term. However, the inclusion of 
instruments (i.e. the study over-identifying restrictions) in the structural equation modelling 
(SEM) makes R-square an inappropriate goodness of fit measure. Thus, such models can 
produce extremely low or even negative R-squares (Antonakis et al., 2014 p.34). That is, 
because SEM models include additional variables as instruments, the residual sum squares 
(RSS) is no longer constrained to be smaller than the total sum squares (TSS) and so RSS can 
exceed the TSS, leading to negative model sum squares (MSS), hence a negative R-square. 
Thus, over-identifying restrictions make R-square invalid and so researchers often do not report 
it (see Coles et al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012). Due to this, researchers commonly use the 
Sargan chi-square statistic or Hansen-Sargan statistic (Hansen, 1982; Sargan, 1958) test as a 
model’s goodness of fit in structural equation modelling (Antonakis et al., 2014 p.35). 
Specifically, the Sargan chi-square statistic examines whether the residuals of the original 
dependent model correlate with the instruments in the first-stage model, and the Sargan chi-
square statistic is simply calculated as the sample size multiplied by the R-square from the 
regression model (i.e. N*R2). Therefore, similar to Antonakis et al. (2014 p.35), the study 
reports the Sargan chi-square statistic to show if indeed the model is properly specified.   
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3.5 Descriptive statistics for executives’ compensation 
As suggested by Wooldridge (2005), the frequency distribution tests are the initial step for 
analysing a population sample. The tests show the differences and similarities between the 
distributions through the measures of central tendency (mean, median and mode) and the 
measures of variability (standard deviation, variance, the minimum and maximum variables). 
Table (3.2) provides primary descriptive statistics of the study’s key explanatory variables. It 
covers the base sample of 1,899 firm-year observations for the compensation variables: salary, 
cash bonus, share options and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The statistics show 10-year 
averages computed from the information on the variables covering the study period between 
2006 and 2015 inclusive.  
The executives’ cash-based compensation shows these statistics: base salary has a mean 
(median) of £1,414,200 (£1,227,500) with a maximum pay of £9,160,000 whilst cash bonus 
shows an average of £1,105,100 (£836,000), and the total cash compensation has an average 
of £2,519,300 (£2,077,000) with the maximum pay of £16,890,000 and the standard deviation 
of 1703.7. For the stock-based incentives, the average value of stock options granted is 
£324,800 (median £0) with a maximum bonus of £29,233,000, which suggests that options 
compensation is skewed to the right side of the distribution. The mean (median) values for 
restricted stock and performance stock are £934,200 (263,500) and £2,089,700 (£1,327,500) 
respectively, whilst the mean of long-term incentives plans (LTIPs) is £3,024,000 (£1,715,500) 
with a maximum pay of £61,547,000 and the standard deviation of 4190.7. It is clear that the 
stock-based components exhibit high variability across the sample period. The total 
compensation shows an average of £5,868,000 (£4,141,500) and a maximum value of 
£63,296,000. The provided statistics show a snap analysis of the individual compensation 
variable behaviour. 
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Moreover, Figure 3.1 shows the pie chart constructed using the average trends of the four main 
components of compensation: cash bonus, LTIPs (sum of restricted stock and performance 
stock pay), stock options and salary (used as control variable in the model). Specifically, the 
percentage components are presented as follows; LTIPs (50%), cash bonus (20%), stock 
options (6%) and salary (24%) and are shown in the pie chart. The section also utilises the 
average values of the executives’ compensation components (main independent variables) to 
provide bar charts and plots to further explain the incentives data and this is shown in Figure 
3.2.    
 
Table 3. 2 Descriptive Statistics for Compensation Variables 
                                                                                              Obs.       Mean          Standard dev.            min         p50                 Max                 
Executives Compensation (£’000) 
Salary                                                                        1899        1414           59.7                    120         1227            9160          
Cash Bonus                                                              1899        1105           1201.1                  0            836            15586       
Total Cash pay                                                        1899         2519          1703.7                120          2077         16890         
 Stock Options                                                        1899          325.          1288.5                  0              0              29233          
Deferred Stock                                                       1899         934           2142.4                   0             263           35564 
Performance Stock                                                1899.        2089        3010.6                    0            1327         49425         
 LTIPs                                                                        1899          3024         4190.7                  0            1715         61547     
Total compensation                                              1899          5868         5473.5                 120         4141         63296       
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Figure 1 - Bar Chart of Average Executives Pay Components from 2006 – 2015 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Average Trends of Executives’ Pay Components 
 
  Figure 3. 1 Pie chart for executives’ average pay components 2006 - 2015 
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 Figure 3. 2 Trends in executives’ compensation across 2006 - 2015 
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            Figure 3. 3 Average trends of executives (5) pay components from 2006 - 2015 
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           Figure 3. 4 Average trends in total executives’ pay components 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the study has outlined the sample selection process, the definition of key 
compensation variables and the adopted research strategy to examine the causal relation 
between risk-taking and managerial compensation. First, the study obtained the datasets from 
multiple sources: Compustat database for the firms’ financial accounting data and the annual 
reports for the executives’ compensation and other governance variables. Second, it has 
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provided descriptive statistics for the main independent variable (pay components) and also 
displayed trends in the compensation variables across the sample period.  
The chapter has also established the rationale for the empirical research strategy chosen to 
analyse the study. In achieving the study’s goals, (specifically risk-taking–compensation 
relationship), we adopt an appropriate structural specification (simultaneous equation 
modelling) and estimation technique (3SLS) to analyse whether managerial compensation has 
a causal effect on the firm’s risk-taking activities by considering the extent to which the latter 
(risk-taking) and other firm-related characteristics determine the amount paid to executives. 
The detailed discussion above also sets out appropriate variables to be utilised in examining 
the interrelationship between the executive compensation and risk-taking activities. 
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                                                        Chapter 4 
 
4.0 The Relationship between Managerial Compensation and Investment 
Activities – Hypotheses, Proxies, Empirical Strategy, Analyses, Results and 
Discussions 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Having considered the related literature on investment and compensation in the preceding 
chapter, this chapter proceeds to empirically examine the causal relationship between the two 
variables. Accordingly, in order to achieve the research objective, it is important to clearly 
develop testable hypotheses, and identify and define variables of interests before we proceed 
to provide an analysis of the descriptive statistics and empirical results and a discussion of the 
key findings. In fact, it is worth stating that the significant innovation of the study is the 
adoption of appropriate empirical models and statistical techniques to answer the question of 
whether managerial compensation has a greater influence on the firm’s investment activities 
by accounting for the feedback effect of investment and other factors on the level and structure 
of managerial compensation. More specifically, as already stated, the study develops 
simultaneous equation modelling and employs a 3SLS estimator to analyse the compensation 
and investment linkage.  
The chapter is organised as follows: the first section develops the hypotheses and defines and 
measures the variables to be utilised in the empirical investigation. It also provides summary 
statistics of the key and other variables of interest. The second section performs correlation 
analyses to detect the value and direction among the utilised variables, and also to detect if 
these variables suffer autocorrelation problems. The third section presents the results and 
 123 
discussions after estimating the system of equations using a 3SLS estimator based on the 
hypotheses establishing the compensation and investment relationship. The fourth section 
concentrates on the robustness checks and or alternative testing, and the final section provides 
an overall conclusion relating to the supplied statistical results and analyses.  
 
4.2 Framework to analyse the effect of managerial compensation on risk-
taking activities 
 
In Chapter 2, the study synthesised a detailed review of the relevant literature on executive 
compensation and risk-taking investment decisions (i.e. financial leverage chapter 2b). More 
specifically, as indicated earlier, managerial compensation and investment activities are related 
through agency theory. That is, through optimal contracting theory (OCT), managers are 
influenced to make value-critical investment decisions (Kini and Williams, 2012; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010; Coles et al., 2006). One major way shareholders consider is to use 
appropriate pay incentives which have different distinctive features, risk-motivated incentive 
(stock-based) and risk-avoiding incentive (cash-based), to induce managers operational policy 
choices (Coles et al., 2006; Nguyen, 2018). Relatedly, other literature makes risk-related 
investment classifications: where intangibles are seen to be more risky than tangible capital 
activity (Holmstrom, 1989; Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Kothari et al., 2001), while other fixed 
assets (patents acquisition) expenditure is also described as a low-risk activity (Amihud and 
Levi, 1981; May 1995; Tufano, 1996). Following this investment-related classification, a 
growing strand of literature has considered a link between stock-based incentive (risk-taking 
incentive) and the riskiness nature of the firm’s investment activities. Specifically, as argued 
by studies that concentrate on risk-motivated incentives (e.g. Rajgoyal and Shevlin, 2002; 
Coles et al., 2006; Xue, 2007; Kini and Williams, 2012; Cassell et al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2012; 
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Chen et al., 2017; Nguyen, 2018), risk-averse managers are rewarded with stock-based (cash-
based) compensation to encourage more (less) intangibles (i.e. R&D, innovative activity). 
More specifically, Coles et al. (2006) find that stock-based incentives encourage more R&D 
but discourage capital expenditure, whereas a cash-based component induces more capital 
expenditure but less R&D activity.  
Moreover, as indicated by the Greenbury Report (1995), the board of directors (BOD) is 
advised to substitute stock options with LTIPs and bonuses to prevent managerial excessive 
risk-taking activities, implying a link between compensation and managerial operational risk-
taking activities in the UK context. Like the prior literature (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Xue, 2007; 
Cassell et al., 2012; Kini and Williams, 2012; Hayes et al., 2012; Nguyen, 2018), we expect a 
connection between the different types of firm investment activities and the level and 
composition of managerial compensation incentives. 
Accordingly, the discussion below shows the extent to which different managerial 
compensation components affect the kinds of firm investment. We will be guided by this in our 
hypotheses development.  
 
4.2.1 Hypotheses development 
As pointed out above, through agency theory, compensation incentives may partly influence 
managerial investment decisions (Coles et al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012; Nguyen, 2018). 
Here, we provide specific testable hypotheses to show how investment and compensation 
incentives are linked. Accordingly, we provide reasons for why different components of 
managerial compensation relate differently to the types of investment activities. Specifically, 
these subsections, 1a, 1b, 1c; 2a, 2b, 2c etc. delineate the different hypotheses utilised by the 
study. The developed hypotheses are tested in a later section.   
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4.2.1.1 Capital expenditure and executives’ compensation 
In theory, managers’ allocation of resources into real asset investment exhibits the nature of 
growth investment opportunity sets available. Such hard asset investment results in observable 
performance indicators (e.g. expansion in production line, inventory turnover, product 
differentiations, and increase in supply chain) and it is easily monitored. This makes such 
activity inherently low risk compared to intangibles (Amihud and Levi, 1981; Coles et al., 
2006; Xue, 2007). Further, risk-avoiding incentive (cash bonuses) is linked to accounting-
based measure (Zakaria, 2012; Liu and Stark, 2008). Because such tangible activity is treated 
in the accounting books as capital expenditure (Xue, 2007) and its impact is directly 
observable, shareholders are more likely to use cash bonuses (accounting profit measure) to 
reward such low risk-taking activity, suggesting an increasing relationship. In contrast, 
managers with more equity-based compensation (LTIPs – performance stock, 
restricted/deferred stock and stock options) are likely to lower tangible capital investment. This 
is because stock reward managers often gain extra value to their stock portfolio wealth when 
they embark on risky activities (Holmstrom, 1989; Lambert, 1986). More explicitly, Hayes et 
al. (2012) and Coles et al. (2006), based on a risk-motivated argument, posit an inverse relation 
between stock options and capital expenditure. Based on this intuitive argument, we make a 
natural prediction to suggest that cash bonus, LTIPs and stock options affect capital expenditure 
differently. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H1a. There is a positive relation between capital expenditure and the executives cash bonus 
incentives. 
H1b: Capital expenditure and equity-based (LTIPs) incentives are negatively related.  
H1c: There is a strong negative link between capital expenditure and stock options incentive.    
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4.2.1.2 Intangibles investment and executives’ compensation incentives 
As such capital expenditure activity, corporate managers make further essential decision 
regarding resources allocation into intangible activities. Managerial incentives to forgo 
intangibles (e.g. intangible, R&D) arise due to the high-risk nature of such activities (Fama, 
1980; Lambert, 1986; Holmstrom, 1989; Bhagat and Welch, 1995). Managers are inherently 
risk averse because their human capital is inalienable and difficult to diversify. In contrast, 
shareholders can hold different investment portfolios to minimise their wealth exposure, 
causing them (shareholders) to be less risk conscious compared to managers. Consistent with 
this premise, the extant literature (e.g. Rajpogal and Shelvlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006; Kini 
and Williams, 2012) argue that offering managers stock-based compensation motivates them 
to reduce their risk aversion and increase intangibles expenditure. For instance, risk-motivated 
incentive literature (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Manso, 2011; Kini and Williams, 2012; Nguyen, 
2018) shows that the convex payoff of stock options incentives makes the stock options 
package a powerful incentive tool to encourage risk-averse agents to accept relatively more 
long-term riskier projects (e.g. research and development, innovation activity). Conversely, 
Xue (2007) argues that, because research and development naturally increase a firm’s 
idiosyncratic risks and are usually expensed in the accounting books, shareholders are less 
likely to use a short-term accounting-based measure (cash bonuses) to reward managers. Thus, 
shareholders use a more (less) risk-motivated incentive (risk-avoiding incentive) to encourage 
relatively more risky investment.   
Overall, under intangible activities (fixed intangible and R&D expenditure), we propose a 
relatively similar conjecture for these two types of intangibles. The underlying motive is to 
specifically observe managerial risk-behaviour regarding these two risk-taking activities with 
relatively different resource allocation. In line with the above argument, we develop six testable 
hypotheses to detect how managers’ compensation components relate to intangible activities 
 127 
(fixed intangible, R&D). We first state the hypotheses for research and development before we 
move on to the fixed intangible. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 H2a. Research and development expenditure and equity-based (LTIPs) incentives are 
positively linked. 
H2b. There is a strong positive relation between research and development expenditure and 
stock options incentives. 
H2c. Research and Development expenditure and cash incentives are negatively related. 
 
Our second propositions relate to fixed intangibles and compensation incentives: 
H3a. Fixed intangible expenditure and equity-based (LTIPs) incentives are positively linked. 
H3b. There is a positive link between fixed intangible expenditure and stock options incentives. 
H3c. Fixed intangible and cash bonus incentives are negatively related. 
 
4.2.1.3 Other fixed assets expenditure and compensation incentives 
As existing studies argue, managers use diversification (e.g. other fixed assets expenditure or 
acquisition) for risk-reduction motives (e.g. Amihud and Levi, 1981; May 1995; Tufano, 1996; 
Comment and Jarrell, 1995). In contrast, Datta et al. (2001) contend that acquisition activities 
(either whole or partly stripping another firm’s assets) are an uncertain net present value (NPV) 
project, because such activity alters the firm’s risk profile. Again, the unpredictability of such 
an activity could expose managers to a certain degree of risk, which could even cause them 
(managers) to be fired if such activity fails (Lehn and Zhao, 2006; Mitchell and Lehn, 1990). 
Based on risk-motivated reasons, shareholders are more likely to use a stock-based incentive 
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to encourage other fixed assets activity. For instance, Croci and Petmezas (2015) posit that the 
convexity feature of stock options (measured as vega) induces managers to increase 
expenditure on acquisitions activity. Guay (1999) also observes a similar correlation. More so, 
if Croci and Petmezas’s (2015) risk-increasing argument for acquisition activity is correct, then 
we would expect a decreasing effect on risk-avoiding incentive (cash bonuses). Therefore, 
based on the risk-related assumption, we predict that stock-based (cash-based) incentives 
encourage more (less) other fixed assets activity. More specifically, three main hypotheses are 
developed and tested:  
H4a. There is a positive relation between other fixed assets (patents acquisition) expenditure 
and LTIPs incentives. 
H4b. There is positive link between other fixed assets expenditure and stock options incentive. 
H4c. There is a negative relationship between other fixed assets expenditure and cash bonus 
incentive.  
 
4.2.2 Investment theoretical model 
Based on the stated hypotheses, this subsection states the investment theoretical model 
underpinning the study. It shows that, through agency-motivated reasons, managerial 
compensation is likely to be related to the firm’s risk-taking (investment) policy. 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡'( = 𝛽,𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠'(+	𝜀'(……..…………………………...…….(5) 
Where, investment is the different investment activities (e.g. research and development (R&D), 
fixed intangible (FINTANG) and capital expenditure (CAPEX) (PPE plus other fixed assets), 
Other fixed assets (CAPEX2), Incentives represent managerial compensation incentives (value 
of stock options grants, LTIPs grants and cash bonus) and the random error term	𝜀'(.  More 
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specifically, we state the investment model using specific investment measures (i.e. CAPEX, 
FINTANG and R&D).  
CAPEXa{		=	α++		α,LTIPsa{ + α6ESOa{ +	α;CashBa{+ 	∈a{……………………………………………………....…… (5.1) 
FINTANGa{		=	α++		α,LTIPsa{ + α6ESOa{ +	α;CashBa{+ 	∈a{………………………………………………....…… (5.2) 
R&𝐷a{		=	α++		α,LTIPsa{ + α6ESOa{ +	α;CashBa{+ 	∈a{………………………………………………………....…… (5.3) 
 
4.3 Variable descriptions 
In fact, at the heart of this empirical study is to present evidence on how the level and the 
composition of executives’ compensation influences firm-level contemporaneous risk-taking 
investment activities. To achieve this expectation, the study identifies appropriate proxies to 
represent the variables of interest: dependent variables – firm investment activities such as 
property, plant and equipment, other fixed assets, R&D and fixed intangible – and the 
independent variables – executives’ pay components (LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus). 
The subsections below define and measure the dependent variable (investment activities) 
before moving on to construct compensation independent variables. We also describe and 
measure other control variables to be utilised in the investment regression estimation. The 
section will also construct and measure control variables to be included in the compensation 
model (first-stage regression model). 
     
4.3.1 Measurement of investment activities variables 
This subsection turns our attention to the definition and measurement of investment variables. 
Corporate investment activities are major management strategic decisions which involve a 
substantial outflow of corporate resources. Such risk-taking activities include property, plant 
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and equipment, other fixed assets (patents acquisitions), fixed intangibles, and research and 
development expenditure, all of which increases a firm’s idiosyncratic risks (Datta et al., 2001). 
Under this section, we classify investment into two activities: tangible capital investment and 
intangibles investment. The study’s unique datasets obtained from the Compustat database 
allows us to extend the scope on investment activities and compensation nexus. More 
specifically, one novel contribution of this research is our extensive investment datasets 
coverage, which allows us to explore a complete picture on investment – compensation linkage 
– and can be seen as an extension of prior works (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Croci and Petmezas, 
2015; Nguyen, 2018). Here, our tests consider four measures of investment; specifically, two 
measures for capital expenditure (CAPEX, CAPEX2) and two variable measures for 
intangibles activities (e.g. fixed intangible and research & development – R&D). The 
variables are defined and measured below. 
 
4.3.1.1 Capital expenditure investment 
Unlike Coles et al. (2006), our first measure of capital expenditure (CAPEX) is simply net 
capital expenditure (property, plant and equipment) plus other fixed assets scaled by total value 
of firm assets for the year. This variable includes a firm’s spending on the other fixed assets 
(acquisitions) expenditure, consistent with Lewellen and Lewellen (2016) and Guay (1999). 
Our second measure of capital expenditure (CAPEX2) is defined as other fixed assets 
(acquisitions) expenditure divided by the total value of firm assets. We use this measure to test 
the extent to which managerial compensation relates to such activity. With this measurement 
approach, we are able to provide a more comprehensive coverage of a firm’s capital 
expenditure activities.  
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4.3.1.2 Intangibles investment 
Under this measurement, we capture all risk-taking intangibles. Two main measures are 
utilised. First, R&D expense ratio is measured by dividing R&D expenditure by the firm’s total 
assets (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Hayes et al., 2012). The second variable is fixed intangible 
expenditure and it is estimated by using total firm assets as the denominator.  
 
4.3.2 Managerial compensation variable measurement 
Under this section, we briefly state and define managerial compensation components to be 
utilised in the analysis. These include LTIPs (value of performance stock plus 
deferred/restricted stock), stock options, salary and cash bonus. Extensive discussions of the 
compensation components can be found in Chapter 2. 
 
4.3.2.1 Salary compensation 
This component of compensation shows the total amount of base salary of the three executives 
during the year. This component represents managerial risk aversion. As highlighted by 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005), the top executives’ salary component has a minimal influence on 
managerial risk behaviour. We measure total salary ratio as a fraction of the total compensation 
(i.e. total compensation is defined as the total value of LTIPs, stock options, salary and cash 
bonus). However, Coles et al. (2006) use cash-based compensation (measured as salary plus 
cash bonus) as a control variable for risk aversion. Indifferent to Coles et al., the study argues 
that cash bonus may induce managerial risk-taking behaviour and so only salary is used as a 
control proxy for risk aversion.  
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4.3.2.2 Cash bonus  
This compensation component is traditionally linked to executives meeting sets of accounting 
performance threshold (e.g. cash flow, profits, etc.). However, in some circumstance corporate 
firms reward top management with a cash bonus regardless of these accounting indicators (e.g. 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). We also try to adjust the annual bonus if the bonus for one year is 
reported in the subsequent year. For instance, bonuses for the year 2009 are reported in the 
following year’s (2010) proxy statement. Such incentive or bonus is rightfully added to those 
in 2009. Again, we measure cash bonus ratio as the total of the executives’ cash bonus divided 
by total compensation pay.  
 
4.3.2.3 Long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) grants 
The LTIPs compensation incentives are the sum of performance stock value and deferred stock 
value. Specifically, each component is valued using the face value of the restricted stock and/or 
performance stock at the grant date (e.g. Mehran, 1995; Core et al., 1999). It is calculated (i.e. 
face value) as the number of the respective stocks (restricted or performance) multiplied by the 
share price on the grant date. The LTIPs ratio is measured as the total value of LTIPs grants 
scaled by the total compensation. 
 
4.3.2.4 Executive stock options compensation (ESO) 
This component of executive compensation is relatively sophisticated to measure compared to 
other components (e.g. LTIPs) as it involves the inclusion of microeconomic and 
macroeconomic factors in its computation. Different valuation methods have been suggested 
in the literature. For example, Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model (Mehran, 1995; 
Ozkan, 2007; Conyon et al., 2009), binomial valuation technique and Monte Carlo valuation. 
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Similar to Mehran (1995), we adopt the Black-Scholes option valuation method due to its 
popularity in the literature. Again, to avoid further complication in valuing stock options, we 
use executive stock options at grants (e.g. Mehran, 1995; Brick et al., 2006; Ozkan, 2007a). 
Thus, we value the stock options granted to the executives for the fiscal year using the modified 
Black-Scholes (1973) options valuation technique. We construct the annual stock options ratio 
grant parameter by dividing total annual stock options value to the total compensation. The fair 
value of the stock options award granted is calculated below: 
            Award Value = N [ S𝑒[ϕ (𝑍) – X 𝑒[	ϕ (Z – σ √𝑇 )] 
Where; 
                            Z= [ ln (S / X) + T (r – d + 6  )] / √𝑇  
  N = number of share options granted to executives 
   S = stock price on the grant date (proxy statement, Bloomberg) 
    X = exercise price (proxy statement) 
     T = time to expiration (proxy statement) 
      r = risk – free interest rate  
      d = dividend yield (Compustat database) 
σ = stock return volatility over the option life (we use historical volatility) 
      ϕ = cumulative standard normal distribution function 
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4.3.3 Other control variables for investment 
The selection of the control variables is based on prior theoretical and empirical literature on 
investment and shows the extent to which these primitive characteristics are related to the 
firm’s investment decisions. Mainly, these control variables in the investment model are based 
upon the investment literature. Overall, eight (8) other control variables are included in the 
model. Following investment literature, we include leverage, firm size, market-to-book, cash 
flow, sales growth, stock return, industry dummy and year dummy (Coles et al., 2006; Borisova 
and Brown, 2012; Hayes et al., 2012; Eisdorfer et al., 2013; Nguyen, 2018).   
In the next subsection, we provide a brief discussion of these control variables and how they 
relate to investment. 
 
a) Leverage 
Myers (1977) posits that highly levered firms are more likely to suffer investment distortions. 
This is because, with limited access to external debt (i.e. over-leveraged) and high asymmetry 
costs of issuing equity (Myers and Madjluf, 1984), the firm may have to forgo such investment 
opportunities. On the other hand, firms with high capacity to borrow (e.g. under-leveraged 
ones) can easily access the debt market to sponsor their investment projects, all things being 
equal. This shows that debt may influence the level of corporate investment activities. 
Therefore, to control for the effect of firm debt ratio in the model, we include the ratio of the 
sum of long-term debt and short-term debt to the book value of the firm’s total assets. This 
measure is less noisy compared to the market perspective measure. Again, because the model 
also controls for market-to-book, which accounts for the market expectation of the firm and is 
similar to market leverage intuitive reasoning, the study applies book leverage proxy. This is 
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similar to prior studies (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010).  
 
b) Firm size 
Large firms, compared with small ones, are usually less exposed to agency conflicts, because 
they often have access to a wider variety of financing sources and tend to enjoy a better 
reputation in the bond markets (Diamond, 1993). Moreover, with a relatively large tangible 
assets base, large firms are easily attracted to the financial markets (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Therefore, such financial flexibility makes large firms more likely 
to invest intensely and less likely to encounter bankruptcy risks (Hovakimian et al., 2001). 
Firm size is proxied by the natural logarithm of sales or natural log total assets. 
 
c) Cash surplus/cash flow 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis suggests that corporate firms with surplus internal 
funds are more susceptible to using the excess funds (resources) on low investment activity. 
With this, it is conceivable that firms with high free cash flow are more likely to undertake 
more investment activities (Travlos, 1987). Accordingly, we account for this impact, by 
measuring cash surplus as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the total assets (see 
Richardson, 2002). 
 
d) Annual stock return 
We include in our investment model the firm’s stock return over the fiscal year. Specifically, 
the inclusion accounts for performance effects as suggested by Manne (1965). Thus, firms with 
a high stock return can be seen as better-performing firms and are often more likely to 
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undertake further investment projects. Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) mis-valuation 
hypothesis also highlights managers’ motivation to sponsor new investment activities with their 
overvalued stocks (Morck et al., 1990; Stein, 1996). 
 
e) Growth opportunities 
Corporate firms with substantial growth potentials tend to carry out more investment activities 
(Hayashi, 1982; Hall, 1992). Thus, investment opportunity sets are highly correlated with firm 
observed investments which ultimately impact corporate value (Lach and Schankerman, 1989). 
However, firms with more investment opportunities are likely to face investment-related 
agency conflicts (Smith and Watts, 1992). Consistent with Coles et al. (2006), we include the 
market-to-book value ratio in our regression model to proxy for growth opportunities.  
 
 f) Sales growth    
Firm sales growth may pose a potential effect on investment activities. High sales growth firms 
are more likely to embark on expansion projects (e.g. PPE, R&D, acquisitions) to maintain the 
market power (Stigler, 1964). Like Coles et al. (2006), we measure the effect of sales growth 
as the logarithm of the ratio of sales in the current year to the sales in the previous year. 
 
g) Industry concentration 
Corporate firms’ investment activities could also be affected by the extent of the industry 
concentration. Firms operating in a more homogenous industry may have less operational 
flexibility to create expansion within such a restricted industry. On the other hand, firms in a 
heterogeneous industry may enjoy wider investment opportunities. In essence, operating firms 
in highly concentrated industries may be influenced by the investment level. We therefore 
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include the industry Herfindahl index in the regression to effectively capture the extent of 
industry homogeneity. Consistent with Nguyen (2018), we use a two-digit SIC code to proxy 
industry concentration. 
  
h) Time dummies 
It is conceivable that a country’s macroeconomic conditions could fluctuate over time and such 
changes can affect a firm’s risk-taking (investment) behaviour. In order to account for and 
capture the effects including interest rates and inflation rates which occur within and across 
different years, we include a year dummy in the model for the sample period, consistent with 
prior studies (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Croci and Petmezas, 
2015). Moreover, to minimise the perfect collinearity problem in our regression analysis, we 
exclude the base year 2006 dummy from the regression. It is worth stating that, for brevity 
purposes, the coefficients estimates are not reported in our presentation and analyses of the 
results. 
 
4.3.4 Other independent governance variables 
As noted in the literature, executive compensation is one of the most important tools 
shareholders use to influence managerial corporate decisions. Other studies have also shown 
that firm governance attributes are used in tandem to affect managers corporate policies 
(Ozkan, 2007). The following governance mechanisms: large ownership, non-executive 
ownership, executives ownership and executives age, are selected from prior literature (e.g. 
Core et al., 1999; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Ozkan, 2007; Amoako-Adu et al., 2011; Nguyen, 
2018).  
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Large investors’ ownership: large shareholdings by institutional investors, block-holders, have 
become dominant in the capital markets and with their huge stake they are able to exert greater 
influence on corporate issues including how much executives are paid. For instance, consistent 
with the monitoring hypothesis, agency expenditure is reduced as the large shareholders’ stake 
increase, postulating a negative relation (Ozkan, 2007; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Mehran, 
1995). Accordingly, we measure this variable by dividing total number of large shareholdings 
(defined as stakes above 3%) by the total number of the firm’s year common shares.  
Non-executive directors’ ownership: another governance mechanism is the role played by non-
executive directors to align owners-managers’ interests. This means that, with increased 
ownership, non-executive directors are more likely to step up their monitoring responsibilities, 
which may in turn reduce incentive alignment packages and, also influence corporate policies 
(Ozkan, 2007). Thus, we proxy non-executive ownership as the ratio of total share holdings of 
non-executives including the board chair divided by the overall number of the firm’s year 
common shares.  
Executives’ (insiders) ownership: agency conflict is reduced via managerial stock ownership 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Coles et al., 2006). The idea is that, as managers’ shareholdings 
increase, they (managers) tend to share a common interest with shareholders, thereby 
minimising the incentive risk problem. We use total executives’ (CEO, CFO and COO) 
ownership stakes scaled by total overall firm shareholdings.   
Executives’ age: executive compensation literature suggests the possibility that both oldest and 
youngest executives are more likely to concentrate on short-term suboptimal decisions. For 
example, young executives (CEOs) are likely to select short horizon projects for reputational 
purposes (Hirshleifer, 1993), whilst old ones may tend to accept projects that pay off before 
retirement (Gibbons and Murphy, 1993; Dechow and Sloan, 1991). Such managerial myopic 
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behaviour resulting from executive age can affect the quality of corporate decisions, and that 
one way to control this is through compensation incentives (Kole, 1997). Thus, by offering 
more stock-based incentives and fewer cash incentives to both young and old executives, the 
managerial incentive problem is reduced. With this, a convex relation is expected between 
equity-based incentives and executive age while a concave link is expected between cash 
incentives and executive age. We account for the executive age as an additional independent 
factor.  
 
4.3.4.1 Instruments  
Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Nguyen, 2018; Coles et al., 2006), all the above described 
variables (controls and other independent) are potential instruments for compensation 
incentives in our attempt to robustly deal with endogeneity issue. The following additional 
instruments: executive average age, dividend pay-out and stock return volatility are accounted 
for in the first-stage (compensation) model and that our selection is based on economic 
intuition. An important feature for a valid instrument is that it should affect the second-stage 
variable (i.e. risk policy) only through its effect on the first-stage endogenous variable (i.e. 
compensation) (Antonakis et al., 2014; Roberts and Whited, 2011).         
Executive average age: extant literature suggests that both young and old managers operational 
policies are likely to be affected by their personal characteristics (Gibbons and Murphy, 1993; 
Hirshleifer, 1993; Yim, 2013; Sainani, 2018). Hence, awarding appropriate compensation 
incentives to managers minimize such investment related behavioural imbalance (Kole, 1997; 
Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). With this, our first chosen instrument is executive average age and 
it is measured as the average of CEOs and CFOs age. We contend that executive average age 
only has indirect effect on investment through its direct impact on compensation design.   
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Dividend pay-out: agency theory argues that one way to reduce the over-investment problem 
is to pay a surplus cash balance to shareholders in the form of a cash dividend pay-out (Jensen, 
1986; Stulz, 1990). With this, it can be argued that, through efficient compensation scheme 
corporate managers are likely to pay excess cash to shareholders in the form dividend to 
minimize over-investment problem. In such circumstance, for instance, Chang (1993) argues 
that shareholders are likely to substitute equity-based incentives with cash bonuses particularly 
when the firm has no prospective investment opportunity. Hence, we expect a negative relation 
between dividend pay-out and stock-based incentives, whilst cash bonus and dividend pay-out 
are expected to be positively connected. We proxy a dividend pay-out as a dummy variable of 
one (1) when firms pay a dividend, otherwise zero (0). This constitutes our second instrument.  
Stock return volatility: Risk averse managers are likely to embark on low risk policies. 
Therefore, by providing executives stock options limit their downside risk, causing them to 
make efficient policy choices. Yermack (1995) suggests a positive relation between executive 
stock options and stock volatility. Based on this, we argue that through stock options incentive 
managers make investment and financing decisions to affect firm’s stock volatility. Therefore, 
the only way stock volatility relates to firm’s risk policy is through stock options incentive. We 
measure stock return volatility as the natural logarithm of the variance of daily stock returns. 
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Table 4. 1 Description of Variables 
Dependent Variables Description Literature 
Capital expenditure (CAPEX) 
Capital expenditure (property, plant 
and equipment plus other fixed 
assets scaled by total assets 
Lewellen and Lewellen (2014; 2016) 
Fixed intangible (FINTANG) Fixed intangible expenditure divided by total assets  
Research & Development (R&D) R&D expense divided by total assets Coles et al. 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012 
Other fixed expenditure (CAPEX2) Other fixed assets expenditure scaled by total assets Lewellen and Lewellen (2014; 2016) 
Independent compensation variables 
Long-term incentive plan (LTIPs) Total value: performance stock plus 
deferred stock scaled by total 
compensation 
Kabir et al. 2013 
Performance stock (PS) 
Sum of performance share awards, 
share matching plan scaled by total 
compensation 
Kabir et al. 2013 
Deferred / restricted stock (DS) 
Total face value: deferred 
shares/stock scaled by total 
compensation.  
Kabir et al. 2013; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001 
Cash bonus (CashB) Total annual cash bonus scaled by total compensation   Kabir et al. 2013; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001 
Executive stock options (ESO) 
Total share options value (using 
Black and Scholes,1973). Share 
options value divided by total 
compensation 
Kabir et al. 2013; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001 
Total compensation  Sum value: salary, cash bonus, share options and LTIPs.  Kabir et al. 2013 
 
Control variables 
Salary (SAL) 
Total of base salary, allowances, 
benefits (monitory value) divided by 
total compensation 
Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist, 2010; Chen et 
al. 2016.  
Leverage (LEV) Defined as total debt divided by book value of assets Coles et al. 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012 
Firm size (Size) Natural logarithm of total sales Coles et al. 2006 
Market-to-book (MKTB) Defined as market value of assets divided by their book value.  
Floarackis et al. 2009; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010 
Annual stock return (STKR) Annual stock return (12-months)  Coles et al. 2006 
Cash flow (CF) Cash flow scaled by total assets. Coles et al. 2006; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001 
Sales growth (SGR.) 
Log ratio of sales in the current year 
to the sales in the previous year Coles et al. (2006) 
Industry & Year fixed effect Dummy variable of 1 otherwise 0 Coles et al. (2006) 
 
Other independent variables 
Large Ownership (%) (Large Own) 
Shareholdings of owners above 3% 
scaled by the total common 
shareholdings 
Florackis et al. 2009; Ryan and Wiggins, 
2001; Core et al. 1999 
Non-executives ownership (%) 
(NonE.Own) 
 
Annual shareholdings of non-
executives divided by the firm’s 
total common shareholding.  
Mehran, 1995 
Executives Ownership (%) (E.Own) 
Annual executives shareholdings 
scaled by common shareholdings. 
Florackis et al. 2009; Ryan and Wiggins, 
2001; Core et al. 1999 
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Table 4. 2 Compensation Determinants and their Predicted Signs 
 
Variables:                        Predicted signs 
Stock options       LTIPs           Cash bonus 
 
CAPEX 
 
FINTANG 
positive                positive            negative                
 
positive               positive.             negative 
 R&D positive                positive            negative 
 LEV negative               negative.          uncertain 
STKRV  positive                .    -                       - 
Size positive                positive            uncertain 
MTKB positive                positive.           negative  
STKR Positive                positive                - 
CF negative               negative            positive 
Large Own negative               negative            negative 
NonE.Own negative               negative            negative 
CEO age  Convex                convex              concave 
CFO age convex                 convex              concave 
E.Own negative               negative            negative 
E.Av Age Convex                convex              concave 
DPO negative               negative            positive 
Predicted relation may be positive, negative, concave, convex, uncertain or none. Concave or convex shows a 
curvilinear relation. Uncertain can be positive or negative based on theoretical argument. (e.g. similar to Ryan and 
Wiggins, 2001).     
 
4.3.5 Investment empirical specification 
To analyse the effect of managerial compensation on investment, we adopt structural equation 
modelling. As indicated in Chapter 2, our key variables (investment and compensation 
variables) are jointly determined, which, in turn, can affect our parameter estimates when an 
OLS estimator is employed. To reduce possible endogeneity concerns, we use a system of 
equations similar in structure to the specification used in Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and 
Croci and Petmezas (2015), and they are specifically stated below. It shows how each 
investment measure is estimated akin to 3SLS in STATA.     
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Investment model 
LTIPsa{	=		β++β,Investmenta{ +	β6Controlsa{+ β;Instrumenta{ + ∈a{……………..……..……….…....… (1) 
ESOa{	=		β++β,Investmenta{ +	β6Controlsa{+ β;Instrumenta{ + ∈a{……………………..……...…….....… (2) 
CashBa{	=		β++β,Investmenta{ +	β6Controlsa{+ β;Instrumenta{ + ∈a{………………..……….….…....… (3) 
Investmenta{		=	α++α,LTIPsa{ + α6ESOa{ +	α;CashBa{ +	αJControlsa{+ 	∈a{…………..……..…… (5) 
Where, in Eq.(5), investment represents each investment measure (CAPEX, CAPEX2, 
FINTANG, R&D), incentive is each endogenous pay component values (LTIPs, ESO and 
CashB) predicted from the first-stage model and control variables are firm size, market-to-
book, cash flow, sales growth, stock return, leverage and industry and year effects. Equations 
(1, 2, and 3) for incentive components (LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) have been defined 
above. It is worth indicating here that, each investment equation (e.g. CAPEX, FINTANG, 
R&D and CAPEX2) will be numbered chronologically as 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. 
     
4.4 Simultaneous equations modelling (SEM)– 3SLS method 
In order to test the stated investment hypotheses developed above (H1a – H4c), two steps are 
involved in our estimation approach having identified the key endogenous variables (i.e. 
investment measures and pay components – LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) and stating 
the systems of equations to be estimated.  
The first step serves to estimate the moment matrix of the reduced form disturbances term in 
the first-stage regression where the endogenous independent regressor, in this case pay 
component (s) (i.e. LTIPs, stock options, cash bonus – one equation each for each component), 
is regressed on all the determinants to obtain a clean portion of the incentive component (see 
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Kennedy, 2003; Kini and Williams, 2012). These determinants include endogenous investment 
measures, leverage, growth opportunities, firm size, firm risk, cash holdings, executive 
ownership, large ownership, non-executive ownership and other instruments (executive 
average age, dividend pay-out). We draw these determinants from prior literature (e.g. Core 
and Guay, 1999; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Adu-Amoako et al., 2011; Humphery-Jenner et al., 
2016).  
As stated by Antonakis et al. (2014), it is consequently desirable to include all available 
exogenous variables (determinants) as instruments to help improve the overall coefficient 
estimates. In fact, the implication is that, by including all the predictors in the endogenous 
compensation regressor model, any “foreign” connection which could otherwise instigate the 
investment–compensation relation is avoided (Balgati, 2002). This makes our adopted 
approach slightly different from Coles et al. (2006) and Croci and Petmezas (2015) but 
consistent with others (Nguyen, 2018; Core and Guay, 1999). For instance, Coles et al. (2006) 
apply “just” identifying restriction, whereas the current study employs “over”-identifying 
restriction and so our adopted estimation method (3SLS) improves coefficient estimates 
(Antonakis et al., 2010, 2014).  
The second step estimates the original investment model to obtain the parameters of interest 
(coefficients for LTIPs, stock options, cash bonus) after its jointly dependent compensation 
variable(s) are “purified” in the first-stage regression model. In other words, the predicted 
values obtained for each of the pay components are included in the second-stage (investment) 
equation and the estimates derived for the predicted value pay component(s) in the investment 
model are interpreted as the causal effect on investment. Thus, the estimated coefficients are 
interpreted to show the magnitude and significance of the investment– executive compensation 
relation. It is worth mentioning that the computation processes are performed simultaneously. 
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More specifically, the specifications above show how each of the equations in the structural 
systems is estimated using the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method. In fact, for each 
investment measure (CAPEX, research and development and fixed intangible), we develop 
four systems of equations consisting of one equation for the respective investment measure and 
one equation for each of the executives’ compensation variables (key independent variables 
LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) in the first-stage regression. In the first-stage equation, 
the unwanted effect on each of the compensation components is removed or purged, thereby 
replacing the “purified” compensation component values (fitted values) in the investment 
model and then estimating it. Computationally, these four systems of equations are estimated 
simultaneously using a 3SLS estimator readily available in programs akin to the statistical tool 
(STATA). In STATA, the structural equations models are set up as one equation each for the 
three pay components and each equation for the investment measures (CAPEX, R&D and fixed 
intangible) and then the three-stage least squares estimation technique is applied to achieve the 
stated purposes.  
Essentially, one underlying reasoning for using the simultaneous equations model (3SLS) is 
that it applies contemporaneous values of the endogenous variables rather than lagged values, 
hence the study’s adopted approach tends to follow static model analysis. In fact, because static 
models do not often account for spill-over effects of a shock across the time periods, the 
original model (second-stage) estimates are likely to be affected by a serial correlation problem. 
This is because the 3SLS technique employs OLS or fixed-effects (FE) estimators in the 
second-stage estimation. The study reduces the effect of serial correlation on the coefficient 
estimates by employing robust standard errors to account for possible correlations between 
residuals for observations of a firm (Wooldridge, 2002). It is worth mentioning that, although 
this approach (3SLS) intuitively addressed the research aims (i.e. overcoming the simultaneity 
concern and producing efficient estimates), other researchers tend to employ dynamic model 
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analysis, where the lags of the dependent variable contain the entire time path of the 
independent variables. This approach is briefly highlighted.   
 Conventionally, dynamic models use internal lags as instruments and, as the lagged dependent 
variable moves toward zero (0), the influence of the independent variable increases 
exponentially. Thus, the economic intuition is that there are spill-over effects of a shock across 
time and that the dependent variable (Y) is not only influenced by the current value of the 
independent variable (Xt) but also the value of the independent variable in the past periods 
(Xt_1, Xt_2, Xt_3, etc.). One potential advantage of a dynamic model is that it is able to 
distinguish both short-run and long-run effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable.  
Statistically, instrumental variable (IV) and generalised methods of moments (GMM) 
estimators are often used to estimate dynamic models (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). The IV method involves transforming the dynamic equations by first 
differencing them to eliminate the individual effects and their potential correlation with the 
lagged values of the dependent variables (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Dang 2011 p.234). The 
GMM technique, on the other hand, further exploits all linear restrictions under the assumption 
of no serial correlation. It involves first-differencing the dynamic equations as employed by IV 
and then creating a matrix of instrumental variables by using the orthogonality conditions 
between the lagged values of the dependent variable and the error term. For example, the study 
shows structural settings of the dynamic model using, e.g., investment as the dependent 
variable.  
𝐼𝑁𝑉'( = β+ + β,INV'(_,+β6ĈashB'(_, + β;EŜO'(_, + βJ𝐿Ť𝑃'(_,+	βINVXa{_,+za + εa{,…...(6)  
𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑠'( = γ+ +	γ,LTIPs'(_, + γ6INV'(+	γ;LTIPsXa{ + πa + ϵa{,…….............................. .(6.1)  
𝐸𝑆𝑂'( = b+ +	b,ESO'(_, + b6INV'(+	b;ESOXa{ + sa + µa{,…….................................... ...(6.2)  
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𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐵'( = a+ +	a,CashB'(_, + a6INV'( +	a;CashBXa{ + za + wa{,……......................... .(6.3)  
Where, in equation (4), INV = investment, INV'(_, lagged investment,ĈashB'(, EŜO'( and 𝐿Ť𝐼𝑃𝑠'( are the predicted compensation values for cash bonus, stock options and long-term 
incentives,INVXa{	 is the control variables for investment, za unobservable fixed effects and εa{ 
is the error term. Equations (6.1 – 6.3) show the predicted models of the respective 
compensation variables, namely cash bonus, stock option and long-term incentive plans.  
Thus, for example, when IV or GMM estimators are applied to equation (4), the dynamic 
equation is transformed by first differencing so that the individual effects and their potential 
correlations with the lagged values of the dependent variables are removed. Hence, applying 
the first IV technique to the proposed model yields this transformed equation.  
∆𝐼𝑁𝑉'( = β,∆INV'(_,+β6∆ĈashB'(_, + β;∆EŜO'(_, +	βJ∆𝐿Ť𝐼𝑃'(_,+	β∆INVXa{_, + ∆ωa{..(6)  
Additionally, one advantage of the GMM estimator is that it employs more internal lagged 
instruments (e.g. INV'(_6, INV'(_;, INV'(_J, etc.), and this in turn improves the coefficient 
estimates with the passage of time. 
 
  
4.5 Data analyses and discussion of investment results 
This section provides analyses and discussion of the descriptive statistics as well as the study’s 
regressions results from the estimated investment equation. It starts with the descriptive 
statistics, followed by the investment regression results. The investment regression results are 
presented in four columns (1, 2, 3 and 4) and are discussed accordingly.  
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4.5.1 Descriptive statistics for the selected variables 
This section starts the empirical analyses by providing summary statistics for the sampled 
datasets. The tests assess the differences and similarities between the distributions through the 
measures of central tendency (mean, median and mode) and the measures of variability 
(standard deviation, variance, the minimum and maximum variables). The descriptive statistics 
of the investment measures, executives’ compensation components and the underlying control 
variables for the examination period are discussed below.  
Table (4.3) provides the detailed descriptive statistics of the study’s dependent, independent 
and control variables for the 213 sampled firms from the FTSE 350 companies. Panel A 
summarises the average (standard deviation) executives’ compensation components and other 
characteristics. The average total cash compensation is £2,519,000 (1703.7) with a median of 
£2,077,000. With this, an average component for salary (SAL) is £1,414,000 (759.7) with a 
median of £1,227,000, whilst the average cash bonus (CashB) is £1,105,000 (1201.1) and a 
median of £836,000. Further, the average value of stock options (ESO) granted is £324,000 
(1288.5) with a median of zero (£0), which shows that options are skewed to the right side of 
the distribution. The average values for deferred/restricted stock (DS) and performance stock 
(PS) are £934,000 (2142.4) with a median of £263,000 and £2,089,000 (3010.1) with a 
£1,327,000 median respectively. The mean of long-term incentives plans (LTIPs) value shows 
£3,024,000 (4190.6) with a median of £1,715,000, whilst the overall total compensation shows 
an average of £5,868,000 (5473.5) with a £4,141,000 median value. Again, on the other 
characteristics we observe that the mean ages for the CEOs and CFOs are 52 years old (6.13) 
and 50 years old (5.67) with an average age of the two executives of 51 years (4.75). 
Additionally, it also shows the executives’ ownership stake of 4.7% (0.223).  
On the governance variables, panel B shows the average of non-executive directors’ ownership 
(NonE.Own) of 2.1% (0.127) with a median of 0.03%, whilst the block-shareholder ownership 
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(Large Own) mean is 39.3% (18.9) and has a median of 37.6%. Moreover, panel C also show 
the statistics of the measures of corporate policy proxies. For example, capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) has a mean (median) of 0.394 (0.317), fixed intangible (FINTANG) average is 0.257 
(0.225), and research and development (R&D) are 0.006 (0) with the following respective 
standard deviations: 0.291, 0.211 and 0.031. Largely, our sampled firms spend substantial 
resources on both tangible capital assets and fixed intangible.   
The other control variables listed in panel D also present these statistics. The average (standard 
deviation) firm has a leverage (LEV) of 0.3583 (0.246), sales growth (SGR) of 0.014 (0.342), 
stock return (STKR) of 0.066 (0.510), a market-to-book (MKTB) of 9.189 (77.74), a cash flow 
(CF) of 0.120 (0.195) and a firm size (Size) of 9.014 (0.859). In fact, the control variables 
display wide variations, except market-to-book ratio. 
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Table 4. 3 Descriptive Statistics for Investment, Compensation and Control Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Median  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables         
CAPEX 1,888 0.394 0.317 0.291 0.001 0.990 
FINTANG 1,642 0.257 0.225 0.211 -0.000 0.877 
R&D 1,888 0.006 0.00 0.031 -0.304 0.413 
CAPEX2 1,791 0.172 0.049 0.292 0.000 0.989 
Compensation variables        
SAL (£’000) 1,899 1414 1227 759.8 120 9160 
CashB (£’000) 1,899 1105 836 1201.5 0 15586 
ESO (£’000) 1,899 324 0 1288.1 0 29233 
DS (£’000) 1,899 934 263 2142.7 0 35564 
PS (£’000) 1,899 2089 1327 3010.0 0 49425 
LTIPs (£’000) 1,899 3024 1715 4190.3 0 61547 
Total compensation (£’000)  1,899 5868 4144 5471.5 120 63296 
 Firm characteristics       
LEV 1899 0.3585 0.3581 0.2468 -0.0712 4.6917 
Size 1,829 9.014 9.002 0.859 0 11.507 
MKTB 1,894 9.189 1.445 77.742 0.000 15.684 
CF 1,803 0.120 0.106 0.195 -4.154 0.556 
SGR 1,807 0.014 0.024 0.342 -3.288 5.543 
STKR 1,828 0.066 0.095 0.510 -5.456 6.896 
 Gov. proxies&instruments       
E. Own (%) 1,869 4.7 0.22 0.223 0 6.1 
Non.E. Own (%) 1,843 2.1 0.03 0.127 0 3.5 
Large Own (%) 1,854 39.3 37.6 18.9 0 85.07 
CEO age 1,557 52 52 6.363 36 73 
CFO age 1,438 49 50 5.816 32 65 
Ex.Av. Age 1,402 50 51 5.311 34 65 
STKRV 1828 0.335 0.253 0.592 -0.255 13.086 
DPO 1,852 0.617 1 0.489 0 1 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the data used for the study. The sample comprises 213 UK FTSE 
350 firms over the period 2006 to 2015. The variable descriptions are provided in Table 4.1 above. 
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4.5.1.1 Correlation matrix coefficients 
Table (4.4) presents the correlation matrix results among the independent variables. We 
perform this test to check for the presence of multicollinearity, which could affect the study’s 
findings. Consistent with this view, Gujarati (2003) posits that the efficiency of the regression 
results is likely to be distorted if the degree of correlation exceeds the 80% threshold. In 
general, the results indicate relatively very low correlation among the explanatory variables. 
The highest value is 0.535 (53.5%), which is a reported correlation between firm size and 
equity (LTIPs) incentive. This is not surprising, given that large firms are likely to be more 
exposed to agency conflicts and that more equity-based incentive is needed to align both 
shareholders’ and managers’ interests (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). In fact, the low reported 
correlation coefficients among the regressors are quite comforting, because our findings are 
less likely to be distorted by the problem of multicollinearity. 
 
Table 4. 4 Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables 
(1)     (2)     (3)    (4)     (5)    (6)     (7)     (8)     (9).    (10)      (11).    (12)   (13).   (14).   (15)    
  
1. SAL              1.00  
2. CashB          -0.172 1.000  
3. ESO             -0.046   -0.125 1.000  
4. LTIPs           -0.496 -0.234 -0.118 1.000  
5. LEV             -0.082 -0.046 -0.063 0.038 1.000  
6. SGR.            0.003 -0.031 -0.024 0.038 0.023 1.000  
7. STKR           -0.076 0.092 0.054 -0.124 -0.027 0.035 1.000  
8. MKTB          -0.083 -0.003 -0.004 0.117 -0.094 -0.003 0.003 1.000  
9. CF                -0.001 0.063 -0.028 -0.007 -0.142 -0.002 0.085 -0.034 1.000  
10. E.Own           0.333 0.013 0.009 -0.134 -0.165 0.023 0.010 -0.028 0.042 1.000  
11. Large Own     0.331 0.165 -0.003 -0.343 -0.067 0.001 -0.024 -0.055 0.052 0.436 1.000  
12. NonE.Own     0.187 -0.029 -0.049 -0.116 -0.004 0.017 -0.015 -0.015 0.005 -0.033 0.214  1  
         13. CEO age          -0.004 -0.011 0.008 0.088 0.009 0.049 -0.009 0.109 -0.041 -0.068 0.006 0.031      1   
         14. CFO age         0.014 -0.028 -0.049 0.024 -0.005 -0.008 0.017 -0.027 -0.042 0.134 0.047 -0.003.  0.317   1   
        15.   Size              -0.327 -0.232 -0.075 0.535 0.175 0.074 -0.059 -0.161 -0.102 -0.204 -0.357 -0.054 0.016 0.016    1   
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4.5.2 Discussions of investment empirical results 
This section generates and discusses empirical results obtained from the two-way relationship 
between the remuneration components measure and risk-taking investment activities using a 
simultaneous equation estimation technique. The analytical findings are grouped and discussed 
under the respective investment measure. The discussion is structured as follows: it first 
discusses investment results, followed by control variables, and finally the executive 
compensation determinants’ results.  
 
4.5.2.1 Discussions of empirical results on capital expenditure 
The results presented in Table (4.5) report the findings for capital expenditure (henceforth 
CAPEX) using the three-stage least squares regression. First, LTIPs incentive is positive and 
statistically significant at 5% confidence level. In particular, the coefficient on the LTIPs 
variable is 0.1248 (t-statistics 2.36) and it is both economically and statistically significant. The 
empirical result postulates that LTIPs (equity)-incentivised managers are likely to increase 
investment into capital expenditure. In other words, LTIPs incentivised managers are more 
motivated to channel investment resources into observable capital activities. This is consistent 
with the Greenbury Report (1995) recommendation and the prior research (e.g. Guay, 1999; 
Feitu-Ruiz and Renneboog, 2017). The Greenbury Report (1995) recommends that the firm’s 
board of directors (BOD) should use more LTIPs to minimise managerial excessive risk-taking 
activity. However, the finding is inconsistent with the risk-motivated hypothesis (H1b). A 
possible interpretation is that managers may tend to become less diversified as their LTIPs 
incentives increase, and one way to limit their portfolio risk exposure is to divert funds away 
from relatively high-risk intangible activities (Bhagat and Welch, 1995) to low-risk capital 
expenditure. The re-allocation of investment funds could pose severe consequence to the firm’s 
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prospects or value particularly if the firm’s investment opportunity sets are directly related to 
intangible activities. Away from the risk-motivated explanation, shareholders could also use 
the LTIPs (equity) incentive for alignment motives, suggesting a positive relation among LTIPs 
and capital expenditure activity.  
Moreover, the managerial stock options incentive is also positive and both statistically and 
economically significant. With the estimated coefficient of 0.3547 (t-statistics 4.17), the result 
shows that an increase in share options incentives, on average, induces managers to allocate 
more resources into capital expenditure, ceteris paribus. In other words, executives with more 
risk-taking incentives are more likely to undertake observable capital expenditure activities, 
contrarily to the study’s central hypothesis. The result is in line with Agrawal and Mandelker 
(1987), Croci and Petmezas (2015) and Guay (1999), who observe a similar relation between 
stock options compensation and capital expenditure. In the spirit of Croci and Petmezas (2015), 
the study argues that capital expenditure (defined as net PPE plus other fixed assets/patents 
acquisition expenditure) can be seen by British shareholders as risky and that they award stock 
options to induce managers to invest in such activity. This is plausible because the payoff of 
capital expenditure activity is often uncertain and can alter a firm’s status quo (Datta et al., 
2001), as well as causing the firm to become a potential takeover target if such huge capital 
extensive activity fails (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990). This, in essence, can inhabit a manager’s 
decision to undertake such a project and so awarding managers more share options could 
potentially influence their decision to divert corporate resources into such an activity. This, 
however, is in contrast with other studies (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012). 
The authors find a negative relation and interpret their evidence based on risk theory to suggest 
managers’ disapproval or disinclination to invest in capital expenditure. Again, to further 
enhance our understanding on whether stock options explicitly induce other fixed assets 
acquisition activity (which is included in our capital expenditure definition) as specifically 
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argued by Croci and Petmezas (2015), we will attend to this issue in a later section.  
Furthermore, the coefficient on the cash bonus variable is negative and both statistically and 
economically significant at 1% confidence level. More specifically, the parameter estimates of 
-0.7296 (t-statistics -12.85) in the CAPEX model, imply that cash bonus partly influences 
managers to disinvest in real assets activities. This is inconsistent with hypothesis (H1a), which 
suggests that rewarding managers with more cash bonus incentives induces them to engage in 
more lower risk-taking capital expenditure activities (Kim and Knofsinger, 2007; Xue, 2007; 
Coles et al., 2006). In fact, the negative association could be explained by the fact that managers 
may sponsor capital expenditure activities with either internal resources (cash flow) or debt 
finance. In such a case, the firm’s cash balance depletes, causing managers to lose out on any 
supposed cash bonus because there would be no sufficient or adequate cash reserves to sponsor 
managerial cash bonuses, leading to the negative relation. Alternatively, capital expenditure-
intensive firms are likely to hold more debt (because they often tend to have observable tangible 
assets which makes them easily attracted to the debt markets), which could deplete cash balance 
reserves via interest payments. Cash-motivated managers are likely to forgo capital expenditure 
projects in order to meet their accounting performance target (e.g. surplus cash flow or profits). 
In other words, because cash bonuses are based on accounting performance measures, 
sponsoring capital expenditure activity via internal resources or debt finance is likely to cause 
executives to miss out on meeting the performance threshold. This view is partly supported by 
the study’s datasets and our measurement of capital expenditure which encapsulates property, 
plant and equipment plus other fixed assets. Thus, other fixed assets expenditure includes 
patents bought (acquisitions) from other firms which are often cash-sponsored items (Lewellen 
and Lewellen, 2016, p.9), suggesting a potential implication on the firm’s cash balance reserve 
and its ultimate cash bonus behaviour. In another vein, managers disinvesting in capital 
expenditure could partly signal an entrenchment problem. As argued in the literature, capital 
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expenditure activities easily gain the bond market’s attention (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
However, cash-incentivised managers disregard of the use of debt finance to sponsor such an 
activity could be interpreted to show their intention to avoid an external lenders’ monitoring 
role which can prevent managers expropriating shareholders. 
In general, the reported findings on the capital expenditure and compensation incentives 
linkage are so far largely consistent with the literature on optimal contracting incentives. More 
explicitly, stock-based compensation (stock options and LTIPs) motivates managers to 
increase capital expenditure projects (Feitu-Ruiz and Renneboog, 2017; Croci and Petmezas, 
2015; Guay, 1999; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987), whilst cash bonus induces lower capital 
expenditure activity, inconsistent with prior studies (see Coles et al., 2006; Xue, 2007; Kim 
and Knofsinger, 2007).  
As indicated, the reported positive relationship among share options incentives and capital 
expenditure could possibly be attributed to our CAPEX measure, which encapsulates both 
tangible capital expenditure (Eisdorfer et al., 2013) and other fixed assets expenditure item in 
Compustat database. Our definition is consistent with Guay (1999) and Lewellen and Lewellen, 
(2016). These two related investment activities have different risk profiles (Datta et al., 2001; 
Coles et al., 2006; Croci and Petmezas, 2015). For instance, based on a risk-motivated 
explanation, Coles et al. (2006) suggest that corporate managers lower capital expenditure 
(measured as a ratio of net capital expenditure to total assets) when they are rewarded with 
option-based incentives (defined as vega). In contrast, Guay (1999) finds a positive relation 
between capital expenditure (measured as net PPE plus other fixed assets/acquisition) and share 
options and interprets it to support incentive alignment.    
In fact, it is worth mentioning that the choice of capital expenditure measure might also 
contribute to explaining CAPEX and the stock-based (stock options, LTIPs) and cash bonus 
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relationship. In line with this view, hypotheses H4a – H4c specifically measure other fixed 
assets (CAPEX2) activity (similar to Croci and Petmezas, 2015) and we show how managers’ 
compensation components relate to such project in a later section.  
 
4.5.2.1.1 Control variables for capital expenditure  
This section highlights analyses of the important control variables utilised by previous studies 
(e.g. Coles et al., 2006; O’Connor et al., 2013; Eisdorfer et al., 2013). We provide a brief 
discussion of the following selected control variables: salary, book leverage, firm size, market-
to-book, cash flow, sales growth and stock return, which have been found to determine capital 
expenditure.  
Specifically, the leverage coefficient is negative (-0.0180 t-statistics -0.48), implying that 
highly leveraged firms are likely to suffer when undertaking capital expenditure activities. 
Thus, given the huge resources involved in sponsoring capital expenditure, high-debt firms are 
less likely to undertake such capital investment projects (Uysal, 2011). However, the 
coefficient is insignificant.  
In addition, the coefficients on firm size and market-to-book are negative and significant. For 
instance, the estimates for firm size (-0.0554 and t-statistics -3.96) and market-to-book 
coefficient (-0.0063 and t-statistics -3.03) imply that that small and growth firms invest more 
in CAPEX than large and mature firms with relatively fewer growth opportunities. Again, stock 
return is negative and insignificant. In contrast, cash flow has a positive effect on CAPEX, 
which resonates with the assertion that firms with substantial cash reserves are more tempted 
to spend more on CAPEX. Also, the coefficient for sales growth (0.0062) is positive but 
insignificant. Moreover, executives’ salary is positively and significantly related to capital 
expenditure (CAPEX). As expected, executives with a substantial salary incentives component 
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are seen as risk averse and are more inclined to devote large resources to relatively low-risk 
CAPEX projects.  
 
4.5.2.1.2 Discussion of the compensation components results 
The results reported in the CAPEX table columns 2, 3 and 4 show the results of the main 
components (LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) of executive compensation determinants, 
which include firm-related characteristics, governance factors and other executives’ 
characteristics.   
In the LTIPs equation (column 2), the estimated coefficient on salary (-0.4538) is negative and 
it is both statistically and economically significant at 1% confidence level. This implies that 
the board of directors uses the base salary component as a close substitute for equity 
compensation, which is consistent with Coles et al.’s (2006) substitution explanation. In other 
words, the board’s annual adjustment in salary incentive leads to a decrease in the amount of 
LTIPs grants handed to managers. Again, the result also tends to confirm Conyon and 
Murphy’s (2000) assertion that British executives (CEOs) receive a considerably large 
component of compensation in their base salary relative to the other compensation components. 
Similarly, the coefficients on stock options (-0.1614 t-statistics -14.65) suggests a substitution 
effect, whilst cash bonus (0.1205 t-statistics 16.68) is positive and significant, implying 
simultaneous usage of pay incentives (Coles et al., 2006). The results show that corporate 
boards of directors simultaneously choose to use either LTIPs or share options and/or cash 
bonus to reward managers. 
Further, the other firm-related characteristics show a positive correlation with LTIPs incentive: 
firm size, market-to-book, capital expenditure, fixed intangible, R&D, leverage, cash flow, 
non-executive ownership, executive average age and dividend pay-out. The coefficient 
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estimates for firm size, market-to-book, CAPEX, R&D, fixed intangible and cash flow are 
0.2203, 0.0285, 2.9295, 0.5579, 1.2074 and 1.2415 respectively, and are all statistically and 
economically significant. For instance, large and high-growth firms use more of the LTIPs 
component to reward their executives, which is consistent with the view that, as a firm expands 
(either organically or inorganically), managerial operational activities become more complex, 
which can lead to possible agency conflicts of interest. Therefore, to mitigate this possible 
conflict, the board tends to use more of the LTIPs component to align both shareholders’ and 
managers’ common interests. Large firms are likely to use more LTIPs to attract and retain 
high-quality managerial talents (Core et al., 1999; Basu et al., 2007; Amoako-Adu et al., 2011). 
Additionally, it shows that shareholders use LTIPs to encourage growth expansion in 
investment activities (Guay, 1999; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Coles et al., 2006; Humphery-
Jenner et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017). The reported positive coefficients on the selected 
instruments, executive average age (0.0089) and dividend pay-out (0.0238), suggest that 
shareholders of firms with older managers tend to use more LTIPs incentive and that such firms 
experience high dividend pay-out. This is plausible given that older managers are often risk 
averse, which in turn may constraint their risk-taking policies (Gibbons and Murphy, 1993; 
Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Yim, 2013). Therefore, incentivising older managers with the LTIPs 
incentive mitigates the managerial risk incentive problem (Kole, 1997; Gibbons and Murphy, 
1993).  
In contrast, other characteristics such as stock return, large ownership and executive ownership 
are negatively related to LTIPs awards. Thus, the large ownership coefficient estimate is -
0.0013 and it is significant at 10% confidence level. It tends to imply that the effective presence 
of large ownership reduces the managerial incentive problem, hence less LTIPs incentive is 
needed to motivate managers (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Amoako Adu et al., 2011).   
For the share options model (3), we find that salary (-0.0463) and LTIPs (-0.0803) are negative, 
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which confirms the substitution effect, whilst cash bonus (0.0219) suggests simultaneous 
determination. 
Moreover, the coefficients for other determinants including firm size (0.0393), market-to-book 
(0.0078), CAPEX (0.5110), fixed intangible (0.2722), stock return volatility (0.0092), cash 
flow (0.3753), non-executive ownership (0.0033) and executive average age (0.0024) show 
positive signs. Significantly, large and high-growth firms use more stock options to induce 
managers to make appropriate decisions. Again, the results suggest that shareholders strongly 
consider investment projects, cash flow and executives’ age when awarding a share options 
incentive. However, other characteristics such as leverage, R&D, large ownership, executive 
ownership and dividend pay-out are all negatively related to the share options incentive. An 
economic intuition is that shareholders of high-debt firms use less of the share options incentive 
and, as monitoring improves via concentrated (large) ownership, shareholders tend to use a 
lower stock option incentive.   
Furthermore, for the cash bonus equation (4), it shows positive coefficients on salary, LTIPs 
and stock options incentives, implying that the incentives are simultaneously determined. The 
coefficient on large ownership is positive, postulating shareholders’ usage of managerial cash 
bonus in a well-monitored firm. In contrast, others including firm size, market-to-book, book 
leverage, CAPEX, R&D, fixed intangible, cash flow, executive ownership, non-executive 
ownership, dividend pay-out and executive average age all show negative signs. In particular, 
large and high-growth firms tend to lower cash bonuses. This can possibly be due to the fact 
that such firms reserve an internal cash surplus to sponsor future growth expansion, thereby 
lowering cash bonuses. This confirms the reported negative relation between cash bonus and 
investment activities (CAPEX, R&D, fixed intangible). 
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Table 4. 5 Capital Expenditure Regression Results 
         (1)       (2)              (3)              (4)  
               CAPEX                LTIPs             ES0            CashB  
      
LTIPs            0.1248**            -0.0803***      0.0570***  
       (2.36)             (-14.43) (10.27)  
ESO               0.3547***             -0.1614***.               0.0667***  
       (4.17)          (-14.65)  (9.94)  
CashB              -0.7296***            0.1205***   0.0219***   
 
SAL 
          (-12.85) 
             0.1343*** 
        (3.51)                     
        (16.68)     
             -0.4538*** 
               (-4.37) 
           (4.82) 
          -0.0463 
          (-1.54) 
 
            0.1566** 
            (2.50) 
 
LEV          -0.0180       0.0092           -0.0457**            -0.0126  
          (-0.48)        (0.12)            (-2.28)             (-0.27)  
Size              -0.0554***             0.2203***           0.0393***           -0.1044***  
        (-3.96)        (6.92)            (3.84)             (-5.21)  
MKTB            -0.0063***            0.0285***           0.0078***           -0.0142***  
        (-3.03)        (5.15)            (4.71)             (-4.11)  
CF         0.0409           1.2415***    0.3753***   -0.4492**  
        (0.63)       (3.79)            (3.29)  (-2.22)  
SGR         0.0062     
         (0.44)     
STKR          -0.0003        -0.0059 0.0091   
 
 
        (-0.04) 
 
 
 
 
 
      (-0.55)            (1.38)   
CAPEX                   2.9295***              0.5110***            -1.641***  
                   (6.79)              (3.40)             (-6.02)  
R & D                   0.5579*            -0.0157            -0.2065  
                  (1.64)              (-0.13)             (-1.08)  
FINTANG.                  1.2074***              0.2722**            -0.4642**  
                   (3.80)              (2.44)             (-2.32)  
STKRV                0.0092   
 
Large Own 
 
  
                -0.0013* 
                 (-1.79) 
             (1.25) 
             -0.0008*** 
             (-3.38) 
 
 
             0.0010** 
              (2.44)  
 
E. Own                  -0.0441            -0.0982***             -0.0146  
                   (-0.48)              (-3.12)              (-0.29)  
Non E.Own                   0.1664             0.0033             -0.1315  
                   (0.96)             (0.05)              (-1.37)  
E.Av.Age                   0.0089***             0.0024**             -0.0035*  
 
DPO 
                  (2.64) 
                 0.0238 
                 (0.78) 
            (2.15) 
           -0.0118 
            (-1.12) 
             (-1.75) 
            -0.0034 
             (-0.20) 
 
 
Constant           0.5835***                -2.2650***            -0.3083**                  1.3749***  
 
Industry & Year  
       (4.85) 
      YES 
           (-5.36) 
         YES 
             (-2.08) 
             YES 
             (5.19) 
              YES 
 
 
N       1102           1102              1102               1102  
Chi-square        758.04           960.96              982.21              401.47  
Simultaneous system of equations (3SLS) regression of CAPEX and LTIPs, ESO and CashB results. The predicted sign for 
the variable of interest are shown in the CAPEX model. The models included fixed effects in all estimations. The reported t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors are within parentheses. Compensation models include investment, controls and 
instruments (i.e. E.Av.Age, DPO and STKRV).  Variable definitions are described in Table 4.1 *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.5.2.2 Discussions of empirical results on fixed intangible expenditure 
Table (4.6) shows the results for the three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression analyses. Our 
system of equations model (estimated using 3SLS estimator) accounts for several endogenous 
and exogenous variables in the specifications. The underlying objective is to look at how the 
level and the composition of executives’ compensation relates to fixed intangible expenditure. 
The lack of empirical evidence relating to the issue underlines our central motivation.  
Specifically, the findings presented in Table (4.6) are discussed below. Column (1) presents 
the regression results for fixed intangible. In particular, we find that the relationship between 
LTIPs (equity) incentive and fixed intangible is positive and significant at 1% level of 
confidence. The coefficient estimate (0.4577, t-statistics 8.78) show that managers are more 
likely to increase fixed intangible spending when their residual interest in the form of LTIPs 
incentive increases. A likely interpretation of the result is that firms with intensive fixed 
intangible activities tend to apply more equity rewards to influence managers to allocate more 
resources into intangibles. Another possible alternative explanation is that, because intangibles 
are uncertain, risky and long term (Holmstrom, 1989; Lambert, 1986; Manso, 2011) and are 
often less attractive to the capital market, managers may become unwilling to devote the firm’s 
resources into such activity. Therefore, one way shareholders motivate managers to invest more 
in fixed intangible activity is to offer them (managers) more equity incentives. This view is 
consistent with the risk-motivated explanation, in that shareholders want the executives to 
invest in all risky intangible activities (Manso, 2011).  
On the stock options incentive, the coefficient estimate (0.6213 t-stats 9.82) is positive and 
statistically and economically significant. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis (H3b), 
which suggests that corporate executives gain extra incentive by spending more on fixed 
intangible (which increases the firm’s idiosyncratic risks) when share options incentives are 
handed to them. To be more precise, the convex nature of stock options payoff partly induces 
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executives to increase investment in fixed intangible or knowledge-based expenditure (Manso, 
2011; Nguyen, 2018). Thus, in line with risk-related explanation, shareholders offer managers 
share options to encourage them to undertake riskier intangible activity so that both 
shareholder(s) and agent(s) can share long-term economic benefits together.    
Furthermore, a similar result is reported for the cash bonus compensation. The finding shows 
that cash bonus is positively and significantly associated with fixed intangible, which is 
inconsistent with our natural prediction (H3c). The result supports the fact that executives who 
receive cash bonuses may prefer to channel more corporate resources (funds) into fixed 
intangible spending. In fact, one possible direct inference from this evidence is that 
shareholders rather use cash bonus compensation to motivate managers to invest more into 
fixed intangible activity. This is because, fixed intangible is uncertain and risky (Lambert 1986; 
Holmstrom, 1989; Bhagat and Welch, 1995), which makes risk-averse managers more likely 
to cut down expenditure on such activity in order to reduce the firm’s idiosyncratic risks. Again, 
firms may encounter difficulties raising debt to sponsor intangibles, making it likely for 
managers to disinvest in such activity particularly when internal cash flow is insufficient, even 
if the future payoff could improve overall firm value. Therefore, UK shareholders through the 
board of directors (BOD) reward executives with a cash bonus to induce them to allocate more 
resources into fixed intangible.   
In short, the evidence provided so far in this section suggests that the pay components (LTIPs, 
stock options and cash bonus) and fixed intangible are likely to be explained by both risk-
motivated incentive and alignment argument. 
Clearly, all the incentive components are positively and significantly related to fixed intangible, 
which seems to imply that corporate owners with substantial growth opportunities in fixed 
intangible activity use any of the components to induce managers to allocate more resources 
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into such activity.  
 
4.5.2.2.1 Control variables for fixed intangible expenditure  
This subsection provides a snap discussion of the control variables in the fixed intangible 
model. The coefficient estimates on salary, leverage, stock return and sales growth are positive, 
whilst firm size, market-to-book, and cash flow are negatively related to fixed intangible 
expenditure. Firstly, the positive coefficient on salary connotes managerial risk aversion and 
that managers with heavy salary remuneration are likely to increase fixed intangible. Secondly, 
leverage is also positive and significant, implying that firm managers may use debt capital to 
fund fixed intangible, which is inconsistent with the assumption that bond markets are unlikely 
to sponsor intangible activity. Thirdly, sales growth is supportive of fixed intangible. On the 
other hand, firm size, market-to-book and cash flow are negative and statistically significant. 
For instance, large and high-growth firms are less supportive of fixed intangible activity. In 
other words, larger and higher-growth firms are unlikely to expand their operational activities 
via increasing fixed intangible activity. The cash flow is negative, which suggests that well 
performing firms are less likely to sponsor fixed intangible from internal cash surplus.  
 
4.5.2.2.2 Discussion of the compensation components results  
Columns 2, 3 and 4 of the fixed intangible table show the results of the determinants of 
managerial compensation.  
Specifically, the LTIPs model (column 2) shows that stock options and cash bonus are all 
negative, postulating a substitution effect (Coles et al., 2006). Further, the following 
characteristics show positive signs: firm size, market-to-book, stock return, CAPEX, R&D, 
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fixed intangible, cash flow, executive ownership, non-executive ownership, dividend pay-out 
and executive average age. As indicated, large and high-growth firms apply more LTIPs 
incentive and shareholders consider activities such as CAPEX, R&D and fixed intangible when 
determining the LTIPs incentive. Moreover, executive ownership is positively related to LTIPs 
reward, inconsistent with Ryan and Wiggins (2001), whilst non-executive directors’ ownership 
shows support for the shareholders’ usage of the LTIPs incentive. However, other factors 
including leverage and large ownership are all negatively related to the LTIPs incentive. As 
argued by Jensen (1986) and Harford (1999), leverage mitigates shareholder-manager agency 
conflicts, which makes it an effective tool for high-leverage firms to use fewer LTIPs to reward 
managers. The effective presence of large ownership leads to lower LTIPs incentive rewards.  
Similarly, column (3 – stock options) reports negative and statistically significant coefficients 
for LTIPs and cash bonus. Firm size, market-to-book, CAPEX, R&D, fixed intangible, cash 
flow, stock return, executive ownership, non-executive ownership, executive age and dividend 
pay-out are all positive. In contrast, leverage, stock return volatility and large ownership are all 
inversely related to the stock options incentive.  
The cash bonus equation in column (4), shows that LTIPs and stock options are negatively 
linked to cash bonus. Further, leverage and large ownership both show negative signs. On the 
other hand, firm size, market-to-book, CAPEX, R&D, fixed intangible, cash flow, executive 
ownership, non-executive ownership, dividend pay-out and executive age are all positive and 
statistically significant. For instance, one possible explanation is that the firm’s board of 
directors may use cash compensation incentives as a substitute for equity packages particularly 
when the firm has a huge unused cash balance in their books (Core and Guay, 1999; 
Amstrongand Vashistha 2012), and may also make higher cash dividend payments to 
shareholders when the firm has no immediate growth opportunities. 
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Table 4. 6 Fixed Intangible Regression Results 
      (1)      (2)              (3)               (4)  
            FINTANG              LTIPs              ESO            CashB  
      
LTIPs        0.4577***           -0.1578***      -0.1157***  
     (8.78)             (-12.53) (-10.02)  
ESO         0.6213***          -0.1286***.               -0.0598***  
     (9.82)      (-26.99)  (-14.58)  
CashB          0.7028***          -0.2400***     -0.1618***   
 
SAL 
    (12.81) 
              0.0311 
              (0.90) 
     (-22.01)     
            0.0691 
             (0.54) 
           (-18.52) 
           0.0915 
             (0.88)                
 
            0.0024 
           (0.04) 
 
LEV       0.0887***        -0.3641***          -0.3254***           -0.1963***  
    (2.64)      (-3.07)             (-3.33)             (-3.26)  
Size       -0.0493***        0.3017***           0.1987***            0.1176***  
     (-3.88)     (6.01)             (4.38)              (3.89)  
MKTB       -0.0078***         0.0468***           0.0362***            0.0223***  
     (-4.18)       (5.57)             (4.84)              (4.93)  
CF       -0.1335***        1.9003***  1.6506***  1.3117***  
     (-2.71)      (3.74)             (3.41)            (4.22)  
SGR    0.0068     
     (0.50)     
STKR    0.0005      0.0234            0.0150   
 
 
 
 
    (0.06)     (1.33)            (1.06)   
CAPEX               1.8511***            1.4549***           0.9586***  
                (4.43)             (3.64)             (3.62)  
R & D                1.2634**            0.9860**            0.8101***  
                 (2.56)              (2.31)              (2.96)  
FINTANG               5.5452***            4.4139***           2.8819***  
                 (7.50)              (6.23)             (6.15)  
STKRV             -0.0046   
 
Large Own 
 
  
            -0.0018** 
              (-1.96) 
            (-0.42) 
          -0.0016** 
            (-2.08) 
 
 
          -0.0004 
           (-0.74)  
 
E. Own               0.4944***           0.3880***           0.2562***  
                 (3.02)              (2.74)             (2.80)  
NonE. Own              1.7499***           1.3889***           0.8573***  
                 (4.17)             (3.54)             (3.34)  
E.Av. Age                0.0068*           0.0056*           0.0043**  
 
DPO 
                (1.91) 
              0.0856* 
               (1.88) 
            (1.85) 
          0.0728* 
            (1.86) 
           (2.22) 
         0.0868*** 
           (3.51) 
 
 
Constant           0.1137             -3.7527***          -2.6427***              -1.5408***  
 
Industry & Year  
       (1.04) 
      YES 
           (-5.62) 
         YES 
           (-4.18) 
            YES 
          (-3.66) 
           YES 
 
 
N       1102        1102             1102            1102  
Chi-Square    434.49      1784.99             1073.89            762.03  
Simultaneous system of equations (3SLS) regression of FINTANG and LTIPs, ESO and CashB results. The predicted sign for 
the variable of interest are shown in the CAPEX model. The models included fixed effects in all estimations. The reported t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors are within parentheses. Compensation models include investment, controls and 
instruments (i.e. E.Av.Age, DPO and STKRV).  Variable definitions are described in Table 4.1 *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.5.2.3 Discussions of empirical results on research and development 
expenditure 
 
The results from the three-stages least squares (3SLS) estimates are presented in Table (4.7). 
Column (R&D – 1) reports the results for the research and development expenditure. We find 
a significant negative relationship between research and development and LTIPs (equity) 
incentive. Specifically, the estimated coefficient on equity is negative (-0.0133 t-statistics -
2.32) and significant at 5% confidence level. This shows that an increase in executives’ equity 
compensation (LTIPs) cause managers to lower investment in innovative activity (R&D) 
expenditure. In other words, managers are more likely to under-invest in R&D activity 
particularly if large component of their residual interest is in the form of LTIPs incentive. This 
is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Cassell et al., 2012; O’Connor, Rafferty and Sheikh, 2013) 
that find an inverse relation between equity-based incentives and R&D expenditure. One 
possible interpretation is that, because knowledge based-asset investments are hard for the 
capital markets to value due to their long development cycles and are often more uncertain in 
terms of the pay-out prospects (Bange and DeBondt, 1998), managers become hesitant to 
commit more resources to finance such projects especially as their equity stakes increase. Thus, 
the high level of informational asymmetries associated with R&D expenses could cause 
managers to relatively invest less pounds sterling in innovation activity when a substantial 
component of their compensation is in the form of equity. This is, however, inconsistent with 
the underlying intuition of managerial risk-motivated incentive argument. LTIPs-incentivised 
managers are expected to allocate more resources to relatively risky but positive net present 
value (R&D) activities (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Clinch, 1991; Smith and Watts, 1992; Chen, 
Chen, Yang, 2017). 
Similarly, the finding on stock options is also negative and statistically significant. With the 
estimated coefficient estimates of -0.0219 (t-statistics -2.64), the result appears to support the 
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view that managers tend to become less responsive to R&D activity when their residual interest 
in the share options incentives is large. It suggests that an increase in share options incentives, 
on average, is associated with a 2.2% decrease in R&D investment, all things being equal. This 
direct evidence is in contrast with the popular assertion that managerial risk aversion is 
significantly reduced when managers receive large share options incentives. A possible 
explanation can be linked to the fact that, because R&D activity is relatively more risky, 
managers become more wary when their share options are in-the-money and may tend to lower 
R&D expenses to prevent further stock price volatility associated with increased R&D 
innovative activity (Lewellen, 2006). Alternatively, it could possibly suggest that the firm’s 
board of directors uses stock options to satisfy other specific purposes such as attracting more 
talented managers and for cash flow constraints (substitution motives) (Core and Guay, 1999). 
The finding supports prior studies (e.g. Lewellen, 2006; Hayes et al. 2012; O’Connor, Rafferty 
and Sheikh, 2013) but is inconsistent with other literature (see e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Chava 
and Purnanandam, 2010; Kini and Williams, 2012; Nguyen, 2018) that reports an increasing 
relation. For instance, using vega to represent the sensitivity of CEOs’ (stock-based) portfolio 
wealth to stock return volatility, Coles et al. (2006) find a positive association between vega 
and research and development expenditure, and interpret the finding to suggest that the risk-
taking incentive (vega) induces more risk-motivated activity (R&D) of managers.   
Moreover, the finding on cash bonus (coefficient 0.0350 t-statistics 11.41) is positive and 
statistically significant. This tends to indicate that cash-motivated managers are likely to 
allocate more resources into riskier R&D activity. This is inconsistent with the study’s 
hypothesis. One possible explanation that can be drawn from the regression result is that 
shareholders use a cash bonus to ameliorate the earnings management problem. Thus, because 
managerial cash bonus is often dependent on accounting performance measures (e.g. cash 
balance, profits, etc.), managers are more likely to lower R&D expenditure or discretionary 
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activities in order to meet the performance threshold. In an attempt to alleviate this, the board 
of directors on behalf of the shareholders may award managers cash bonus incentives after 
satisfying a required investment into R&D activity, suggesting a positive linkage between 
them. This is particularly important for high-growth R&D firms to induce managers with cash 
incentives so that they (managers) can allocate more corporate resources into R&D activity. 
The finding is consistent with Hayes et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2017) but contrary to other 
prior studies (see Coles et al., 2006; Xue, 2007). For example, Hayes et al. (2012) find a 
positive and statistically significant relation between cash compensation and research and 
development expenditure in their panel fixed effect cross-sectional examination. 
Collectively, the findings on stock-based incentives (LTIPs and share options) seem to indicate 
that managers tend to disinvest in R&D activity as their residual interest in the form of stock 
incentive increases. This raises further concern on the shareholders’ intention to use stock-
based compensation to influence managerial risk-taking attitude (more R&D spending) and to 
align their interests with managers. This is because shareholders want risk-averse managers to 
invest more in inherently risky activity (R&D), thereby offering managers risk-motivated 
incentive packages to motivate them. Thus, stock-based compensation does not reduce 
managerial risk-related incentive problem. In contrast, cash bonus compensation posits 
otherwise. Cash bonus encourages more investment allocation into innovative (R&D) activity. 
 
 4.5.2.3.1 Control variables for research and development expenditure 
The study also provides results for the control variables. We find the following predetermined 
variables to be positively related to research and development expenditure: firm size 
(coefficient 0.0015), market-to-book (coefficient 0.0001) and sales growth (coefficient 
0.0033). For instance, high-growth firms are likely to spend more on research and development 
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activity for new discovery and expansion purposes. Again, because large and mature firms 
often operate in a concentrated business environment and the only way to create further 
expansion could be through research into a new market, human and product development, 
consumer expectation, etc., in that sense large firms are more likely to increase R&D expenses. 
Also, firms with high sales growth are likely to increase spending on R&D activity. In contrast, 
others including leverage (coefficient -0.0036), cash flow (coefficient -0.0038), stock return 
(coefficient -0.0009) and salary (-0.0017) are negatively related. Specifically, leverage shows 
the unwillingness of the bond market to sponsor R&D. Again, the negative coefficients on cash 
flow and stock return signal that firms do not follow a pecking order and that they are less 
likely to sponsor R&D activity with internal cash surplus or common stock issue. Moreover, 
the negative coefficient on salary shows that risk-averse managers are likely to lower relatively 
risky R&D investment. In other words, managers are reluctant to increase R&D expenditure 
when salary constitutes a large component of their compensation package. However, one 
caveat of the results is that the coefficient estimates are largely insignificant.    
 
4.5.2.3.2 Discussion of the compensation components results 
In the R&D model, column (2 – LTIPs/equity) shows salary and stock options are negatively 
associated but cash bonus is significantly positive. Others including firm size, market-to-book, 
dividend pay-out, cash flow, and executive average age all show positive signs with only 
dividend pay-out and executive average age that are statistically significant. For instance, 
shareholders use more LTIPs to reward managers as they become older whilst dividend pay-
out firms use more LTIPs to incentivise managers to ameliorate investment related agency 
problem such as empire-building especially when there is no growth investment opportunity 
(Fenn and Liang, 2001; Bates et al., 2009). However, leverage, CAPEX, R&D, fixed 
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intangible, large ownership, non-executive ownership and executive ownership all suggest an 
inverse association with LTIPs.  
Relatedly, column (3) stock options incentive shows salary and LTIPs are all negative whilst 
cash bonus is positive. Also, market-to-book, stock return volatility, cash flow, dividend pay-
out and executive average age are all positive. In contrast, firm size, leverage, CAPEX, R&D, 
fixed intangible, large ownership, executive ownership and non-executive ownership are all 
negatively associated with share/stock options.  
Moreover, cash bonus (4) column reports positive coefficients on salary, LTIPs and stock 
options incentives, suggesting a jointly determined impact on cash bonus incentive. Also, 
leverage, CAPEX, R&D, fixed intangible, large ownership, cash flow, executive ownership 
and non-executive ownership are all positive. However, firm size, market-to-book, dividend 
pay-out and executive average age all show negative signs with only dividend pay-out and 
executive average age (instruments) that are statistically significant.   
In summary, the reported findings suggest the interdependence of managerial compensation 
incentives and other firm-related characteristics, implying that shareholders consider other 
factors when determining managers’ pay. Generally, the reported results are largely consistent 
with prior studies (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Guay, 1999; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Amoako-Adu 
et al., 2011; Humphery-Jenner et al., 2016), although some proxies lack statistical significance 
in other specifications. 
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Table 4. 7 Research & Development Regression Results 
     (1)      (2)              (3)                 (4)  
             R & D              LTIPs             ESO            CashB  
      
LTIPs      -0.0133**            -0.1482***      0.0548***  
     (-2.32)            (-23.08) (9.19)  
ESO         -0.0219***          -0.1368***.               0.0430***  
   (-2.64)      (-23.68)  (10.06)  
CashB       0.0350***          0.1520***  0.1435***   
 
SAL 
    (11.41) 
           -0.0020 
             (-0.34) 
    (18.19)     
             -0.3536 
              (-1.32) 
           (21.60) 
         -0.2367 
           (-1.19) 
 
           0.0970 
            (0.70) 
 
LEV            -0.0036     -0.1479         -0.1418            0.0752  
     (-0.65)      (-0.64)           (-0.83)             (0.63)  
Size    0.0015      0.0338         -0.0208           -0.0113  
     (0.72)      (0.37)            (-0.30)             (-0.22)  
MKTB    0.0001       0.0001           0.0002           -0.0007  
     (0.25)       (0.03)            (0.02)             (-0.09)  
CF    -0.0038    -0.0979           0.0051           0.2274*  
     (-1.55)     (-0.40)            (0.03)             (1.74)  
SGR     0.0033*     
     (1.69)     
STKR            -0.0009      -0.0131 -0.0105   
 
 
 
 
     (-1.21) 
 
     (-0.93) 
 
            (-0.94)   
CAPEX              -0.4455            -0.3999*             0.2628*  
                (-1.57)             (-1.88)             (1.77)  
R & D               -66.3753***          -50.5034***           36.6966***  
                (-4.27)            (-4.35)             (4.52)  
FINTANG.               -0.4277           -0.4115           0.3588**  
                (-1.23)            (-1.58)             (1.97)  
STKRV              0.0048   
 
Large Own 
 
  
             -0.0028 
              (-1.30) 
           (0.62) 
         -0.0024 
          (-1.48) 
 
 
          0.0023** 
           (2.03)  
 
E. Own              -0.1848          -0.1596           0.0669  
                (-1.27)            (-1.46)            (0.85)  
NonE.Own              -1.2216*          -0.9925*           0.6664*  
               (-1.78)            (-1.93)            (1.84)  
E.Av.Age               0.0085*           0.0067*          -0.0046*  
 
DPO 
                (1.80) 
             0.1148*** 
               (2.82) 
            (1.91) 
          0.0916*** 
            (3.00) 
           (-1.82) 
         -0.0518** 
          (-2.28) 
 
 
Constant          -0.0029             1.1247          1.2784          -0.4941  
 
Industry & Year  
       (-0.16) 
      YES 
     (0.98) 
      YES 
          (1.50) 
           YES 
          (-0.83) 
          YES 
 
 
N       1,102        1,102            1,102           1,102  
Chi-Square       421.08        1720.17            1686.14           745.68  
Simultaneous system of equations (3SLS) regression of R&D and LTIPs, ESO and CashB results. The predicted sign for the 
variable of interest are shown in the R&D model. The models included fixed effects in all estimations. The reported t-statistics 
are based on robust standard errors are within parentheses. Compensation models include investment, controls and instruments 
(i.e. E.Av.Age, DPO and STKRV).  Variable definitions are described in Table 4.1 *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.5.2.4 Discussions of empirical findings on other fixed assets expenditure 
As indicated earlier, our capital expenditure measurement encapsulates both net tangible 
capital expenditure and other fixed assets expenditure which represents other assets acquired 
in the Compustat database (Lewellen and Lewellen, 2014; 2016). However, because these 
activities carry different risk profiles and value implications for shareholders as well as the 
managers, it is possible that the managers’ choice is likely to be influenced by the relative 
riskiness of the two major corporate activities (property, plant and equipment and other fixed 
assets). In furtherance to this, we attempt to establish the extent to which the nature and the 
level of managerial compensation packages influence managers’ selection of other fixed assets 
(CAPEX2) investment type. We perform tests for the stated hypotheses (H4a, H4b and H4c).  
The first column in Table (4.8) presents the results of other fixed assets (CAPEX2) expenditure. 
Specifically, the LTIPs incentive is negative and significant at 1% level. This is inconsistent 
with hypothesis (H4a), which suggests that LTIPs incentive grants influence managers to 
increase other fixed assets investment. To be specific, the coefficient estimates of -0.1894 (t-
statistics -6.00) imply that managers that receive LTIPs (equity) grants are less likely to carry 
out firm expansion through other fixed activity. This is contrary to both incentive alignment 
and risk-motivated expectations. In other words, shareholders want managers to invest in all 
valued other fixed acquired activities. One interpretation could be that, because such activity 
is often large and uncertain as well as a capital-intensive project, risk-averse managers with 
huge equity compensation are more likely to forgo such projects as their residual interest in 
LTIPs in their managed firm increases.   
Relatedly, the stock options incentive is also negative and significant at the 1% confidence 
level. With the estimated coefficient of -0.3020, the finding indicates that an increase in the 
managerial share options package, on average, leads to a 30.2% decrease in other fixed 
projects, all things being equal. This is contrary to other scholarly works (e.g. Croci and 
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Petmezas, 2015; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987). In line with the risk-taking incentive 
explanation, Croci and Petmezas (2015) argue that acquisition (inorganic acquired fixed assets) 
activity increases the firm’s idiosyncratic risk and may expose managers to job security risks, 
particularly when it turns out to be value deteriorating. Due to this, shareholders may tend to 
apply stock options to motivate managers to undertake more other fixed assets activity. 
Although this argument is intuitively appealing, we find opposite evidence. A possible 
interpretation could be that, because most of the stock options compensation is often in the 
money at the point of grants (Lewellen, 2006), a risk-averse executive would be less inclined 
to allocate more resources to such risky activity (other fixed assets), given that he or she could 
be fired (Lehn and Zhao, 2006) or their firm may become a potential takeover target if the said 
activity fails (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990). 
The cash bonus compensation is negatively and significantly related to other fixed assets 
investment. The coefficient estimate is -0.3587 (t-statistics -9.48), implying that cash-
motivated managers are likely to reduce spending on other fixed acquisition activity, consistent 
with hypothesis (H4c). As suggested by Lewellen and Lewellen (2014), other fixed assets 
bought (reported in the Compustat database) from other firms are often cash sponsored 
(internal cash or debt finance). Sponsoring such activities involves a huge cash outflow, which 
can constrain the cash balance or reserve at the end of the financial year. Further, because cash 
bonus is largely dependent on accounting performance measures, risk-averse managers are 
likely to lower such cash-financed projects in order to reserve enough cash balance to enable 
them to meet their annual cash bonus incentive. Thus, earnings management to some extent is 
likely to prevail.  
In short, the empirical findings on LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus imply that managerial 
financial compensation incentives partly explain other fixed assets investment behaviour. An 
important implication of the results is that the LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus incentives 
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are all less likely to encourage managers to invest more in other fixed activity. Significantly, 
the presented evidence seems to suggest that British corporate managers’ compensation 
packages are less likely to positively influence capital-intensive activity like other fixed assets.  
 
4.5.2.4.1 Control variables for other fixed assets expenditure  
Importantly, the determinants of other fixed investment were also controlled in the second-
stage model. These are factors that the prior literature has found to explain investment 
behaviour. For instance, we find that the following coefficients estimates – leverage, firm size 
and market-to-book, cash flow and sales growth – are all negative, with only firm size and cash 
flow being significant. More explicitly, the leverage shows that high-debt firms are likely to 
forgo such activity, whilst large-size firms are less likely to embark on expansion via other 
fixed investment. Also, growth firms do not use such expansion activity. In addition, firms with 
a substantial cash reserve do not sponsor acquisition with internally generated resources, 
inconsistent with the pecking order hypothesis. 
In contrast, others including salary and stock return are positive. To be precise, salary is used 
to proxy for executives’ risk aversion and shows support for acquisition of other fixed assets, 
implying that risk-averse managers are likely to spend more on other fixed assets activity. Also, 
firms with good-performing stocks, proxied by stock return, are likely to use equity source to 
sponsor such activity. However, the coefficient on stock return is insignificant. 
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Table 4. 8 Other Fixed Assets Expenditure (CAPEX2) Regression Results  
     (1)      (2)              (3)                 (4)  
           CAPEX2              LTIPs             ESO             CashB  
      
LTIPs         -0.1894***            -0.0787***      0.0216***  
     (-6.00)            (-18.79) (4.51)  
ESO         -0.3020***       -0.0835***.                0.0090***  
     (-6.63)       (-20.42)  (2.67)  
CashB         -0.3587***      0.0111**    0.0145***   
 
SAL  
    (-9.48) 
            0.1990*** 
             (10.48) 
    (2.02)     
           -0.0076 
             (-0.25) 
           (3.65) 
          0.0244 
            (1.13) 
 
            0.0502** 
           (2.13) 
 
LEV     -0.0147    0.0251          -0.0499***           -0.0092  
    (-0.78)      (0.93)            (-2.68)             (-0.42)  
Size          -0.0431***         0.1179***           0.0158**           -0.0432***  
     (-5.95)       (12.22)            (2.28)              (-5.55)  
MKTB    -0.0009         0.0062***           0.0039***           -0.0001  
    (-0.89)      (4.11)             (3.74)              (-0.08)  
CF       -0.0773**     -0.0202 0.0632*     0.0213**  
      (-2.12)      (-0.36)            (1.64) (1.97)  
SGR     -0.0066     
      (-0.50)     
STKR    0.0019       0.0121   0.0114*   
 
 
 
 
    (0.28) 
 
 
    (1.31) 
 
 
 
           (1.72)   
CAPEX                 0.0802***            -0.0380*            -0.1056***  
                  (2.81)             (-1.92)             (-4.75)  
R & D                  -0.2433*            -0.2205**             0.2054*  
                  (-1.84)             (-2.32)              (1.92)  
FINTANG.                  0.1195***            -0.0313             0.0628**  
                   (3.72)             (-1.40)              (2.50)  
STKRV               0.0056   
 
Large Own 
 
  
               -0.0016*** 
                (-5.08) 
             (0.77) 
          -0.0008*** 
            (-3.82) 
 
 
            0.0014*** 
             (5.97)  
 
E.Own                -0.1970***           -0.1324***            -0.0584*  
                  (-4.71)             (-4.57)              (-1.79)  
NonE.Own                 0.1401*           -0.0190            -0.0621  
                   (1.76)              (-0.35)             (-1.00)  
E.Av. Age                 0.0003           -0.0003            -0.0027  
 
DPO 
                  (0.28) 
              -0.0199 
                (-1.38) 
           (-0.38) 
          -0.0177* 
           (-1.76) 
            (-0.23) 
           0.0453*** 
             (4.05) 
 
 
Constant       0.0490                         -0.6506***            0.1302*                  0.3662***  
 
Industry & Year  
       (0.76) 
      YES 
           (-5.65) 
        YES 
           (1.68) 
            YES 
             (4.03) 
             YES 
 
 
N       1063        1063            1063               1063  
Chi-Square       2744.80        1162.11            501.14               313.95  
Simultaneous system of equations (3SLS) regression of CAPEX2 and LTIPs, ESO and CashB results. The predicted sign for 
the variable of interest are shown in the CAPEX2 model. The models included fixed effects in all estimations. The reported t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors are within parentheses. Compensation models include investment, controls and 
instruments (i.e. E.Av.Age, DPO and STKRV).  Variable definitions are described in Table 4.1 *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.6 Robustness check  
 
The results from the three-stage least squares (3SLS) technique provide support for the 
empirical implications of Croci and Petmezas (2015), Hayes et al., (2012) and Guay (1999) but 
are inconsistent with other prior studies (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Xue, 2007; Kini and Williams, 
2012) regarding the risk-motivated effects of managerial compensation on investment 
activities. In this section, we perform several tests to examine if the preceding findings in 
Tables (4.5, 4.6, 4.7 & 4.8) are robust to other additional independent variables including 
managerial characteristics (ownership and ages), governance factors as well as alternative 
model specifications. Thus, the study tests the sensitivity of the main findings to corporate 
governance mechanisms that may independently impact management corporate policies such 
as large ownership and non-executive ownership. More specifically, we characterise these 
additional factors into two sub-headings: managerial characteristics and corporate governance 
factors.  
In the interests of brevity, the current analyses are restricted to the behaviour of our key 
explanatory variables, LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus, on the investment activities.  
 
4.6.1 Managerial characteristics 
Broadly, prior literature on corporate governance (e.g. Mehran, 1996) suggests that 
shareholders design incentive compensation to minimise the agency problem. However, in 
cases where managers have substantial shareholdings in the firm, shareholders are likely to 
reduce managerial incentive alignment packages (Mehran, 1996; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; 
Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). Contrarily, others suggest that concentrated (large) executive 
ownership leads to entrenchment and possible extraction of rents via higher salaries and 
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bonuses (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Cheung et al., 2005). Due to this, shareholders tend 
to consider managerial ownership when designing executive compensation because the 
different level of ownership induces a managerial control mechanism which in turn could affect 
managerial policy behaviour (Nguyen, 2018; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). The estimated 
investment model failed to account for executive ownership, and we included this variable in 
our extended investment model.  
Additionally, managerial personal characteristics including age, educations, skills and 
experience are likely to affect managers’ risk-taking behaviour relating to investment (Yim, 
2013; Hirshleifer, 1993; Gibbons and Murphy, 1993). For instance, Gibbons and Murphy 
(1993) and Dechow and Sloan (1991) argue that older managers are likely to subscribe to 
investment policies that pay off before retirement. Relatedly, Hirshleifer (1993) observes that 
young executives are more likely to engage in short-term projects to boost their career 
reputations; whilst Yim (2013) empirically demonstrates that younger CEOs are more likely to 
engage in acquisition activity. In line with the above discussion, we also include executives 
age in the investment model to see the extent to which this proxy affects investment behaviour. 
 
4.6.2 Governance mechanisms 
Throughout the empirical analyses, shareholders via the BODs are assumed to apply different 
types and levels of managerial compensation (LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) to 
ameliorate or alleviate the investment-related agency problem. In fact, the incentive 
compensation is one of the important monitoring mechanisms often used in tandem with other 
governance mechanisms to reduce the agency problem (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Ryan and 
Wiggins, 2001; Mehran, 1995). For instance, Mehran (1995) suggests that the presence of 
effective external monitoring systems (i.e. proxied by block shareholder ownership) reduces 
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managerial incentive compensation. In addition, with their large stakes (Jafarinejad et al., 2015) 
coupled with rich knowledge and skills (Ntim et al., 2016), institutional or large owners may 
have an incentive to constantly monitor managerial corporate activities (Smith, 1996) as well 
as the power (i.e. in theory) to influence executive pay packages through the board. Relatedly, 
however, managers might have influence over the setting of their pay incentives especially in 
a poor governance environment (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Weisbach, 2007). In addition, the 
effective presence of non-executive members helps monitor managerial activity and minimise 
rent extraction (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Mehran, 1995). For robustness purposes, the 
investment specifications account for these additional variables. 
In fact, consistent with investment-compensation nexus literature (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Xue, 
2007; Croci and Petmezas, 2015; Nguyen, 2018), our base specifications exclude other 
monitoring governance factors which could possibly affect the nature and selection of 
investment activity. In other words, the reported (Tables 4.5 – 4.8) association between 
executives’ incentive compensation and investment decisions could be sensitive to other 
governance indicators. This subsection tests the extent to which governance mechanisms 
significantly impact a firm’s investment behaviour. The analysis is necessary because the 
inclusion of governance proxies (i.e. block-shareholder ownership and non-executive 
shareholdings) in the investment models would further aid our understanding on how these 
factors affect investment, and, more importantly, to check if indeed our results still remain 
robust. Thus, the study extends the second-stage model (e.g. investment equation – e.g. 
CAPEX, R&D and fixed intangible) by including these additional factors. We present the 
results of the extended specifications in Tables (4.9, 4.10, 4.11 & 4.12). We start with capital 
expenditure, then fixed intangible and research and development expenditure.  
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4.6.2.1 Capital expenditure robustness test 
As displayed in columns (1) to (4) of Table (4.9) CAPEX models, the additional managerial 
and governance variables do not change our key findings. Specifically, the coefficient on 
executives ownership is positive and significant. It suggests that managers are more likely to 
allocate more resources into CAPEX activity as their executive ownership increases. The 
CEO’s age is negatively related to CAPEX activity, implying that, as an executive gets older 
his/her appetite for such activity decreases. This is consistent with Yim’s (2013) argument that 
young CEOs are likely to undertake capital-intensive projects.  
Furthermore, the board of directors who are non-executive directors provide internal assurance 
and institute various schemes to protect shareholders from managerial expropriation. With this 
fiduciary responsibility, the independent board is likely to affect – either directly or indirectly 
– executives’ corporate activities. We account for this effect by including the number of 
shareholdings of non-executive directors. Again, non-executives’ ownership and CAPEX is 
positive and it is both statistically and economically significant across the specifications. It 
tends to imply the non-executive directors’ approval for capital expenditure projects.  
Lastly, large (block) ownership is positively and significantly related to CAPEX activity. This 
appears to suggest that large shareholders (measured as either individuals or institutions with 
stakes above 3% of the firm’s total shareholdings as reported in the annual account) support 
management allocation of more resources to CAPEX investment. This evidence, however, 
could pose serious implications for minority shareholders. For instance, Conyon and He (2011) 
argue that block shareholders can connive with executives to select activities that maximises 
their immediate interests. 
In short, our key compensation components (LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) coefficients 
qualitatively remain unchanged after the inclusion of both managerial and governance 
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characteristics in the CAPEX model. In essence, our earlier reported findings are insensitive to 
these independent factors. 
 
Table 4. 9 Capital Expenditure Robustness Test  
       (1)     (2)     (3)    (4) 
  CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX 
SAL  0.1461*** 0.1985*** 0.2150*** 0.2188*** 
  (3.76) (4.89) (5.30) (5.39) 
LTIPs  0.1514*** 0.1964*** 0.2057*** 0.2047*** 
  (2.72) (3.53)  (3.73) (3.73) 
CashB  -0.7094*** -0.7239*** -0.7068*** -0.7037*** 
  (-12.41) (-12.79) (-12.57) (-12.56) 
ESO  0.4035*** 0.4739*** 0.5051*** 0.5071*** 
  (4.60) (5.41) (5.82) (5.86) 
LEV  -0.0013 -0.0121 -0.0216 -0.0211 
  (-0.04) (-0.32) (-0.58) (-0.56) 
CF  0.0616 0.0785 0.0852 0.0712 
  (0.99) (1.22) (1.30) (1.12) 
SGR  0.0059 0.0049 0.0012 0.0034 
  (0.43) (0.37) (0.15) (0.26) 
Size  -0.0560*** -0.0552*** -0.0576*** -0.0578*** 
   (-4.00) (-3.94) (-4.14) (-4.16) 
STKR  -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0009 
  (-0.15) (-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.12) 
MKTB  -0.0074*** -0.0067*** -0.0073*** -0.0072*** 
  (-3.57) (-3.26) (-3.54) (-3.50) 
E. Own  0.0935* 0.0149 0.0437 0.0377 
  (1.70) (0.26) (0.75) (0.65) 
Large Own   0.0019*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 
   (4.40) (4.02) (4.05) 
Non.E.Own    0.3671*** 0.3501*** 
    (3.46) (3.29) 
CEO age     -0.0014 
     (-1.61) 
Constant  0.5051***  (4.14) 
0.2480* 
(1.84) 
0.2107 
(1.57) 
0.2729* 
(1.95) 
      
N  1102 1102 1102 1101 
Chi-square  763.71 793.91 823.45 823.78 
Simultaneous system of equations (3SLS) regression of CAPEX and LTIPs, ESO and CashB results. The predicted sign for 
the variable of interests are shown in the CAPEX (second-stage) model and we report only the results in the second-stage 
regression by accounting for additional independent variables. Thus, *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.6.2.2 Fixed intangible expenditure robustness test 
On the fixed intangible expenditure (Table 4.10), the coefficient on executives’ ownership is 
negative, whilst CEOs’ age is positive, but both lack statistical significance. It suggests older 
CEOs are likely to support fixed intangibles. This is unsurprising given that fixed intangibles 
are not known to be a too risky activity.  
Similarly, non-executive shareholding is negative and statistically significant. With the 
coefficients ranging from -0.5522 to –0.5753, it tends to suggest outside directors’ disapproval 
for fixed intangibles. Large ownership is also negatively related. A possible implication is that, 
because fixed intangibles are unobservable and often less predictable in terms of the pay-out 
outcome (Holmstrom, 1989), block shareholders are more unlikely to support such intangible 
activities. 
Importantly, the implications of these findings on the fixed intangibles–compensation nexus 
show that the study results are unaffected by the inclusion of both managerial features, internal 
and external governance mechanisms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 182 
Table 4. 10 Fixed Intangible Expenditure Robustness Test 
     (1) 
FINTANG. 
    (2) 
FINTANG 
   (3) 
FINTANG 
 (4) 
FINTANG 
     
SAL 0.0256 0.0075 -0.0175 -0.0221 
 (0.73) (0.21) (-0.49) (-0.61) 
LTIPs 0.4614*** 0.4513*** 0.4421*** 0.4720*** 
 (8.20) (7.99) (8.04) (8.64) 
CashB 0.7348*** 0.7409*** 0.7101*** 0.7900*** 
 (13.04) (13.19) (12.99) (14.18) 
ESO 0.6384*** 0.6284***  0.6061*** 0.6831*** 
 (9.65) (9.48)  (9.48) (10.59) 
LEV 0.0858** 0.0883*** 0.1045*** 0.1119*** 
 (2.55) (2.62) (3.17) (3.35) 
CF -0.1317*** -0.1354*** -0.1398*** -0.1472*** 
 (-2.67)  (-2.74)  (-2.96)  (-3.12) 
SGR 0.0083 0.0082 0.0133 0.0125 
 (0.61) (0.63) (1.03) (0.97) 
Size -0.0480*** -0.0487*** -0.0454*** -0.0452*** 
 (-3.76) (-3.83)  (-3.65) (-3.62) 
STKR 0.0006 0.0000 0.0005 0.0014 
 (0.08) (0.01) (0.06) (0.18) 
MKTB -0.0074*** -0.0075*** -0.0076*** -0.0081*** 
 
E.Own 
(-3.98) 
-0.0329 
(-0.66) 
(-4.03) 
-0.0037 
(-0.07) 
(-4.18) 
-0.0474 
(-0.91) 
(-4.44) 
-0.0268 
(-0.51) 
Large Own   -0.0006* -0.0004 -0.0004 
  (1.70)  (-1.01) (-1.14) 
NonE. Own    -0.5753*** -0.5522*** 
    (-6.11) (-5.83) 
CEO age     0.0009 
    (1.08) 
Constant 0.1534 0.2420** 0.2975** 0.2265* 
 
Industry & Year 
(1.39) 
YES 
(1.98) 
YES 
(2.49) 
YES 
(1.80) 
YES 
N 1102 1102 1102 1101 
Chi-square 439.83 503.03 505.17 548.54 
Simultaneous system of equations (3SLS) regression of FINTANG and LTIPs, ESO and CashB results. The predicted sign for 
the variable of interest are shown in the FINTANG (second-stage) model and we report only the results in the second-stage 
regression by including additional independent variables. Thus,  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.6.2.3 Research and development expenditure robustness test 
As shown in Table (4.11) our modified research and development specification (including 
managerial and governance proxies) does not qualitatively alter our main results. In particular, 
executives’ shareholding is negative but insignificant, reluctantly suggesting executives’ 
disapproval of allocating more funds into research and development. This is plausible given 
the fact that the payoff of R&D activity is uncertain, and often has a long-term horizon period. 
Therefore, executives with concentrated ownership are likely to reduce the firm’s risk exposure 
by disinvesting in such activity. Similarly, CEOs’ age is also negative, postulating executives’ 
unwillingness to increase innovative spending as they grow older.  
Moreover, both the non-executives’ ownership and block ownership are inversely and 
significantly associated with R&D activity. It shows that non-executive directors and large 
ownership holders are unlikely to support R&D activity.    
More importantly, our key results remain qualitatively unchanged in the robustness 
specifications. 
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Table 4. 11 Research and Development Expenditure Robustness Test 
           (1)     (2)    (3)    (4) 
        R&D  R&D  R&D  R&D 
              
SAL       -0.0033  -0.0091  -0.0108*  -0.0107* 
       (-0.54)  (-1.45)  (-1.70)  (-1.69) 
LTIPs       -0.0203***  -0.0226***  -0.0220***  -0.0224*** 
       (-3.31)  (-3.78)  (-3.74)  (-3.85) 
CashB       0.0310***   0.0314***  0.0313***  0.0312*** 
       (10.56)  (11.93)  (12.46)  (12.74) 
ESO       -0.0316***  -0.0350***  -0.0342***  -0.0347*** 
       (-3.57)  (-4.04)  (-4.02)  (-4.11) 
LEV       -0.0045  -0.0037  -0.0025  -0.0029 
       (-0.79)  (-0.64)  (-0.44)  (-0.50) 
CF       -0.0028  -0.0021  -0.0024  -0.0023 
       (-1.14)  (-0.19)  (-1.18)  (-1.19) 
SGR       0.0017  0.0008  0.0012  0.0010 
       (0.83)  (0.43)  (0.60)  (0.55) 
Size       0.0020  0.0024  0.0019  0.0019 
       (0.95)  (1.14)  (0.87)  (0.91) 
STKR       -0.0002  0.0000  0.0001  0.0003 
       (-0.24)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.43) 
MTKB       0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
       (0.41)  (0.35)  (0.30)  (0.32) 
E.Own       -0.0124  -0.0026  -0.0049  -0.0050 
       (-1.49)  (-0.29)  (-0.56)  (-0.56) 
Large Own         -0.0002***  -0.0002***  -0.0002*** 
         (-3.23)  (-2.95)  (-2.96) 
NonE.Own           -0.0373***  -0.0370** 
           (-2.26)  (-2.24) 
CEO age              -0.0000 
             (-0.08) 
Constant       0.0008  0.0303  0.0332  0.0325 
       (0.05)  (1.46)  (1.60)  (1.57) 
N       1102  1102  1102  1101 
Chi-square       469.38  564.43  732.54  783.02 
Simultaneous system of equations (3SLS) regression of R&D and LTIPs, ESO and CashB results. The predicted sign for the 
variable of interest are shown in the R&D (second-stage) model and we report only the results in the second-stage regression 
by including additional variables. Thus,  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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4.6.2.4 Other fixed assets expenditure robustness test 
On the other fixed assets expenditure robustness testing (Table 4.12), the study continues to 
use executive ownership, CEOs’ age, non-executive shareholdings and large ownership as our 
additional independent variables. Significantly, executives’ ownership is positively correlated 
with other fixed assets expenditure, whilst CEOs’ age is negative and significant. Thus, older 
managers are less likely to support other fixed activity (patents acquisitions).  
Large ownership is positive, indicating support for such projects. The non-executives’ 
shareholdings also support other fixed assets expenditure. The results on incentive 
compensation (i.e. LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) are robust to all the alternative model 
modifications. 
Collectively, across all our investment specifications, the inclusion of managerial 
characteristics and internal and/or external monitoring mechanisms does not change our 
reported findings. In other words, our results are insensitive to these factors.  
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Table 4.12 Other Fixed Assets Expenditure (CAPEX2) Robustness Test  
        (1)       (2)      (3)      (4) 
  CAPEX2 CAPEX2 CAPEX2 CAPEX2 
      
Salary   0.2052*** 0.2046***  0.2052*** 0.2086*** 
  (10.80) (10.26) (10.23) (10.39) 
      
LTIPs  -0.1139*** -0.1156*** -0.1160*** -0.1146*** 
  (-3.36) (-3.38) (-3.39) (-3.35) 
      
CashB  -0.3157*** -0.3150*** -0.3124*** -0.3104*** 
  (-8.18) (-8.13) (-8.03) (-7.99) 
      
ESO  -0.2053*** -0.2075*** -0.2065*** -0.2017*** 
  (-4.32) (-4.33) (-4.31) (-4.20) 
      
 LEV  -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0088 -0.0064 
  (-0.46) (-0.46) (-0.47) (-0.34) 
      
CF  -0.0793** -0.0794** -0.0788** -0.0815** 
  (-2.18) (-2.18) (-2.16) (-2.24) 
      
SGR  -0.0082 -0.0082 -0.0082 -0.0073 
  (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.56) 
      
Size  -0.0480*** -0.0479*** -0.0479*** -0.0481*** 
  (-6.70)  (-6.68) (-6.67) (-6.71) 
      
STKR  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0006 
  (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.09) 
      
MKTB  -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0014 
  (-1.49) (-1.44) (-1.48) (-1.40) 
      
E. Own  0.0756*** 0.0762** 0.0775*** 0.0729** 
  (2.69)  (2.59)  (2.61) (2.45) 
      
Large Own   -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
   (-0.10) (-0.15) (-0.07) 
      
NonE. Own    0.0166 0.0006 
    (0.31) (0.01) 
      
CEO age      -0.0012** 
     (-2.13) 
      
Constant  0.0168 0.0190 0.0163 0.0672 
  (0.26) (0.27) (0.23) (0.90) 
N  1063 1063 1063 1062 
Chi-square  2810.71 2812.28 2811.86 2827.60 
Simultaneous system of equations (3SLS) regression of CAPEX2 and LTIPs, ESO and CashB results. The 
predicted sign for the variable of interest are shown in the CAPEX2 (second-stage) model and we report only the 
results in the second-stage regression by including additional variables. Thus,  *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.6.3 Alternative specification – ordinary least squares (OLS) method  
Throughout the empirical analyses conducted so far, the study employed a 3SLS technique to 
the system of equations. Here, the OLS method is applied separately to the investment 
measures (CAPEX, fixed intangible and R&D) to check if the earlier produced results are 
robust to alternative specification.  
Table (4.6.5) shows the OLS regression results of the investment measures. It reports the 
estimates from regressing capital expenditure (column a), fixed intangible (column b) and 
R&D (column c) on lagged compensation values (LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) and 
other control variables defined in Table (4.1). It is worth stating that the focus is on the 
coefficients estimate of the primary explanatory variables: LTIPs, stock options and cash 
bonus. The reported t-statistics and p-values are based on standard errors clustered at the firm 
level.  
Column (a) of the capital expenditure (CAPEX) shows that both stock options and LTIPs are 
positive, whilst the cash bonus coefficient sign is negative, which is consistent with the study’s 
earlier findings. However, the estimate for stock options is insignificant. The weak correlation 
can partly be attributed to the endogeneity issue.  
Furthermore, the fixed intangible (column b) model shows positive coefficients estimates for 
LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus, similar to the earlier reported positive signs, whereas 
research and development (column c) shows a negative relation among the selected pay 
components: LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus. However, one caveat of the reported results 
is that the estimates are largely insignificant, and such low correlation can be a result of the 
endogeneity problem. This is consistent with Antonakis et al. (2014), who argued that the 
endogeneity presence among variables can lead to weak and spurious correlations estimates. 
Overall, the reported results from the ordinary least squares (OLS) specification are similar to 
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the earlier presented evidence, except that most of the estimates from the conventional single 
equation are insignificant.   
 
Table 4.6 1 Alternative Specification (OLS) Robustness Test 
  (a) (b) (c) 
  CAPEX FINTANG  R&D 
SAL   0.253*** -0.188** 0.00464 
  (3.56) (-2.88) (0.39) 
     
CashB  -0.163** 0.162* -0.0113 
  (-2.05) (1.83) (-1.21) 
     
ESO  0.00364 0.0166 -0.0192 
  (0.05) (0.21) (-1.49) 
     
LTIPs   0.123** 0.0514 -0.0108 
  (2.17) (0.83) (-0.99) 
     
LEV  -0.0760 0.0248 -0.0046 
  (-1.34) (0.39) (-1.33) 
     
Size  0.0087 -0.0223 -0.0006 
  (0.31) (-1.01) (-0.50) 
     
MKTB  -0.0010 -0.00513*** -0.00013** 
  (-1.47) (-3.97) (-2.62) 
     
CF  0.159** -0.156* -0.00824* 
  (3.04) (-2.57) (-2.31) 
     
SGR  0.0184 0.0298* -0.00111 
  (1.18) (1.96) (-0.64) 
     
STKR  -0.0065 -0.00345 0.00046 
  (-0.70) (-0.37) (0.64) 
     
E.Own  0.0203 -0.153* -0.0009 
  (0.22) (-1.69) (-0.08) 
     
NonE. Own  0.310 -0.550*** -0.0313*** 
  (1.07) (-2.93) (-2.61) 
     
Large Own  0.00053 -0.00034 -0.0001 
  (0.59) (-0.45) (-1.41) 
     
Constant  0.190 0.456** 0.0229* 
 
Industry & Year 
 (0.68) 
YES 
(2.15) 
YES 
(1.74) 
YES 
N  1477 1346 1477 
R2  0.446 0.265 0.072 
 The table shows the OLS estimation results of the effects of LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus on investment 
(CAPEX, FINTANG and R&D). All variable definitions are described in Table 4.1 and *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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4.6.4 Alternative measure of independent (compensation) variable.  
As indicated earlier, our key independent (raw values of LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) 
variable is measured as a fraction of total compensation. This section measures the independent 
variable as a logarithmic value of LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus rather than the raw 
values and apply OLS technique to the investment measures (CAPEX, fixed intangible and 
R&D).  
Specifically, Table (4.6.2) shows the results of the OLS regression by regressing capital 
expenditure (column d), fixed intangible (column e) and R&D (column f) on lagged natural 
log of compensation values and other control variables. For brevity, our focus is on key 
independent measure estimates (log of LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus).  
Column (d) of the capital expenditure (CAPEX) shows that LTIPs is positive, whilst both share 
options and cash bonus coefficient is negative with only cash bonus that shows statistical 
significance. This is consistent with the study’s earlier findings. However, the estimate for 
LTIPs depicts right sign but it is insignificant.  
Furthermore, the fixed intangible (column e) model shows positive coefficients estimates for 
LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus, similar to the earlier reported positive signs, whereas 
research and development (column f) shows a negative relation among the pay components: 
LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus. However, one caveat of the reported results is that the 
CAPEX and R&D model estimates are largely insignificant, and such weak correlation can 
partly be attributed to the endogeneity problem.   
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Table 4.6 2 Alternative Compensation Measure Robustness Test 
       (d)     (e)    (f) 
   CAPEX FINTANG R&D 
     
LTIPs  0.0055 0.0198*** -0.0008 
  (0.83) (2.66) (-1.22) 
     
ESO  -0.0079 0.0117** -0.0009** 
  (-1.55) (2.26) (-2.17) 
     
CashB  -0.0304*** 0.0167** -0.0009 
 
 
SAL 
 (-3.87) 
 
0.184*** 
 (4.25) 
(2.33) 
 
-0.0351 
 (-0.99) 
(-1.25) 
 
-0.0023 
 (-0.48) 
 
 CF  0.185*** -0.130*** -0.0065** 
  (7.74) (-3.53) (-2.01) 
     
LEV  -0.078** 0.0094 -0.0044** 
  (-2.46) (0.33) (-2.27) 
     
Size  -0.0038 -0.0182 -0.0013* 
  (-0.26) (-1.62) (-1.81) 
     
STKR  -0.0101 -0.0005 0.0022* 
  (-0.94) (-0.01) (1.91) 
     
SGR  -0.0709* 0.112** -0.0044 
  (-1.70) (2.14) (-0.92) 
     
MKTB  -0.0014*** -0.0046*** -0.0001*** 
  (-4.04) (-4.92) (-4.15) 
     
E. Own  0.0407 -0.189*** 0.0017 
  (1.00) (-4.00) (0.36) 
     
NonE. Own.  0.360*** -0.577*** -0.0267*** 
  (3.37) (-7.29) (-4.76) 
     
Large Own  0.0011*** -0.0005 -0.0001*** 
  (2.82) (-1.26) (-2.82) 
     
Constant  -0.121 0.418*** 0.0362*** 
 
Industry &Year  
 (-1.06) 
YES 
(3.94) 
YES 
(2.70) 
YES 
N  1477 1346 1477 
R2  0.428 0.249 0.075 
The table shows the OLS estimation results of the effects of log values of LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus on 
investment. All variable definitions are described in Table 4.1. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 191 
4.7 Conclusions and implications 
This chapter contributes to the body of research that links managerial compensation incentives 
to investment decisions by employing simultaneous equation modelling to extract the intricate 
relationship between the different compensation components, LTIPs, stock options and cash 
bonus, and investment types. The findings also suggest that treating cash bonus compensation 
as a control variable (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Croci and Petmezas, 2015) may underestimate the 
causal relationship between cash-related incentive and investment activities. In particular, 
Coles et al.’s (2006) and Croci and Petmezas’s (2015) empirical models underestimate cash 
compensation and managerial policy linkage when they limit the sensitivity of their 
investigation to only stock-based incentives.   
We find that the LTIPs motivate managers to divert more investment funds away from R&D 
activity into capital expenditure (CAPEX). This is consistent with prior literature (Chen et al., 
2017; Croci and Petmezas, 2015) but inconsistent with Coles et al. (2006) and Kini and 
Williams (2012). For example, Croci and Petmezas (2015) argue that stock incentive 
(measured as delta) induces more capital-intensive activity. Also, LTIPs encourages more fixed 
intangible but discourages R&D investment.  
Furthermore, the risk-motivated stock options incentive influences managers to support 
relatively more CAPEX and fixed intangible activities but decreases R&D spending. This is 
consistent with prior studies (e.g. Croci and Petzemas, 2015; Hayes et al., 2012; Guay, 1999) 
but contrary to others e.g. Kini and Williams (2012), Xue (20007), Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2006) and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002). The finding postulates that, because fixed intangibles 
are uncertain, risky and long horizon (Pisano, 1989; Holmstrom, 1989), managers are likely to 
lower investment into such activity. Therefore, shareholders use stock options incentives to 
mitigate the under-investment incentive associated with such relatively riskier activity. Again, 
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similar to Croci and Petzemas’s (2015) explanation, capital intensive expenditure involves 
some sort of inherent risk which can increase the firm’s idiosyncratic risks as well as cause 
executives their jobs when such huge investment fails (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990). This, in turn, 
can inhabit managers’ decision to spend the firm’s resources on such (CAPEX) projects. 
Therefore, by awarding the stock options incentive, managers are induced to allocate more 
spending into capital expenditure activity, inconsistent with Coles et al.’s (2006) risk-related 
explanation.  
Moreover, a cash bonus package also encourages more corporate spending on intangibles 
investment – R&D and fixed intangible (Chen et al., 2017) – but discourages capital 
expenditure activity. Specifically, the evidence tends to imply that shareholders through the 
board of directors utilise a managerial cash bonus (accounting-based measure) to influence 
managers to undertake more intangibles. In other words, shareholders apply a cash bonus to 
reduce managerial earnings incentive. Thus, shareholders use cash compensation to minimise 
potential under-investment incentive associated with intangibles (Hayes et al., 2012), which is 
incompatible with Coles et al.’s (2006) risk-related explanation.   
Contrary to the managerial risk aversion assumption, however, cash bonus shows a decreasing 
effect on capital expenditure. The key implication is that UK firms do not use a cash bonus 
incentive to motivate relatively low-risk capital expenditure.  
Furthermore, as indicated, the relative riskiness of the two defining components of capital 
expenditure (i.e. other fixed assets and net property, plant and equipment) provides the needed 
impetus to separate these investment expenditures and relate them to the different 
compensation components. Significantly, LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus show a 
reduction in other fixed assets expenditure. 
Overall, after controlling for executives’ pay-performance sensitivity, and applying modelling 
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and econometric techniques (3SLS) that allow for the endogenous feedback effects of 
investment activities on the structure of managerial compensation incentives, our results show 
that higher risk-motivated incentives (LTIPs and stock options) implement more low-risk 
investments including capital expenditure (Guay, 1999; Croci and Petmezas, 2015) and fixed 
intangible, and less in research and development, whilst a lower risk-motivated incentive (cash 
bonus) induces more research and development (Hayes et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2017) and 
fixed intangible, and less capital expenditure. Largely, the evidence complements some 
existing literature (e.g. Hayes et al., 2012; Croci and Petmezas, 2015; Chen et al., 2017) but is 
inconsistent with others including Coles et al. (2006) and Kini and Williams (2012). One key 
concern of the reported results is that the fixed intangible activity is positively related to both 
the risk-avoiding incentive (cash bonus) and risk-motivated incentive (LTIPs and stock 
options), which makes its risk status unclear. However, a possible explanation could be that 
shareholders apply these pay components with minimal intention of influencing managerial 
risk level. 
In fact, the reported findings on the nature and the level of managerial compensation 
components are assumed to show the intentional or permanent effects on investment policies. 
However, what remains unclear is whether our compensation data are typically explained by 
either optimal contracting theory or managerial power hypothesis/theory. For instance, prior 
studies including Coles et al. (2006) looked at similar issues (e.g. managerial compensation 
incentives and risk-taking policy) and attributed their evidence in support of optimal 
contracting theory. However, in their discussion, the authors make an interesting observation 
relating to executive (CEO) excessive pay which is synonymous with or suggestive of a 
managerial power assumption. While we partly admit that the authors’ US data may be 
conceptually explained by the optimal compensation theory, we are unclear if indeed the firms’ 
boards intentionally deviate from optimal compensation level to alter investment policy and so 
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we cannot confidently conclude that the UK data would give a similar conclusion. 
More specifically, the authors (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006) put forward two important 
issues which warrant further attention. First, they argue that managerial discretionary power 
unwinds the stock-based incentives in their compensation plans, and/or, second, the boards 
may purposefully attempt to offer CEOs excessive stock-based incentives to encourage more 
investment activity. This tends to suggest that managers are more likely to be overly 
compensated in order to create investment distortion, which is consistent with Strobl’s (2014) 
theoretical assertion. For instance, Strobl (2014) theoretically demonstrated that the 
shareholders can offer more stock-based incentive to managers to motivate them to commit 
investment (over-investment) distortions. This theoretical assumption calls for further 
investigation to find out if indeed overly (lowly) compensated managers are likely to over-
invest (under-invest) or create investment distortions. In addition, investigating this issue will 
further enhance our understanding on the extent to which the optimal compensation theory 
explains our UK firms’ datasets. To this end, we seek to provide a useful addition to the 
literature on managerial compensation and investment activities. 
Accordingly, the next section focuses on the optimal compensation deviation within the context 
of investment-related decisions. Prior to undertaking this analysis in the proceeding subsection, 
the study first points out the key issues that provide the needed motivation to further examine 
the extent to which excess compensation influences investment distortions. It is also worth 
mentioning here that the distortion in investment is not as a result of managerial aberrant or 
opportunistic behaviour as suggested by empire-building, short-termism and entrenchment 
motives (e.g. Jensen, 1986; Stein, 2003). In contrast, investment distortion is a result of 
shareholders’ attempting to induce managers via compensation settings. The next subsection 
deals with this subject issue. 
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     4.8 Managerial Compensation Deviation and Investment Distortion 
 
4.8.1 Introduction 
The main findings in the previous part is that managerial financial compensation incentives 
partly influence optimal investment activities. Moreover, it is argued in the literature that 
shareholders can design compensation incentives to induce investment distortion (Strobl, 2014; 
Eisdorfer et al., 2013). For instance, Eisdorfer et al. (2013) show that top executives with more 
stock-based (stocks and options) compensation tend to over-invest in capital expenditure, 
whilst those with more inside debt compensation (e.g. pensions, restricted stock) under-invest 
in such activity. This seems to suggest that corporate top managers are more likely to invest 
above or below the expected level depending on the level and the composition of their 
compensation incentives. In other words, shareholders reward executives with excess 
compensation incentives to create investment distortions.  
In fact, given that the excesses in managerial pay could either be as a result of shareholders’ 
intention or managerial discretionary power (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Weisbach, 2007), it is 
quite unclear if indeed the pay excesses are meant to encourage investment (over) distortions 
as described by Strobl (2014). This section seeks to specifically explore the extent to which 
excesses in managerial compensation influence investment distortions (over- or under-
investment). More specifically, the section’s exploratory analysis extends the existing literature 
on the link between managerial compensation incentives and corporate investment by 
investigating the following essential issues: 
1. Is the deviation from the optimal stock-based (LTIPs) compensation level related to 
investment distortions? 
2. Are the excesses in share options compensation related to investment distortions? and 
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finally 
3. Are the excesses in cash bonus compensation linked to investment distortions? 
The key contributions of this part are mainly related to answering the above indicated 
questions. Broadly, the analyses contained in the current section make a novel contribution to 
the existing literature by being the first study to empirically explore how excess stock-based 
and cash-based compensations are related to investment distortions. In this way, it directly 
contributes to the theories of managerial compensation incentives. More explicitly, it shows if 
indeed the investment–managerial compensation nexus is particularly explained by the optimal 
compensation theory. In other words, this examination further aids us to better enhance our 
conceptual understanding or knowledge on whether shareholders generously apply 
compensation incentives for the purposes of inducing the over- or under-investment incentive 
of managers.  
In short, the study tests whether managerial excessive pay (compensation excesses) is as a 
consequence of shareholders’ optimistic intention to cause investment distortions.  
The rest of the section is structured as follows. Subsection 4.8.2 briefly provides a review of 
the relevant literature, develops hypotheses to be tested and also states the empirical 
specification. Subsection 4.8.3 measures the main subsamples and control variables. 
Subsection 4.8.4 considers the analytical procedure (the choice of probit model), while 
subsection 4.8.5 discusses the empirical findings and, finally, subsection 4.8.6 concludes the 
chapter and also draws attention to the implications of the key findings on the theory of 
managerial compensation and the theory of firm investment. 
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4.8.2 The key related literature and hypotheses development 
The primary aim of this section is to build on the limited literature that has explored investment 
distortions and the managerial compensation excesses. We later formulate the testable 
hypotheses based on this direct material evidence.  
As pointed out by Jensen (1986 p. 327) and Stein (2003 p. 121), managers’ incentive to control 
more assets (empire-building incentive) causes them to invest the firm’s surplus cash flow on 
unprofitable projects, leading to an over-investment problem. Different from Jensen’s free cash 
flow assumption, others including Strobl (2014) and Eisdorfer et al. (2013) posit that the 
amount of stock-based compensation can also induce managers to commit investment 
distortions. This tends to imply that the over-investment incentive of managers is not only 
limited to the firm’s ability to have excess cash flow, but shareholders can intentionally or 
purposefully use compensation incentives to induce managers to over-invest in some kinds of 
firm activities. 
For instance, based on the optimal contracting theory, Strobl (2014) theoretically demonstrated 
that shareholders (via the board) may tend to design managers’ compensation incentives to 
influence managers to over-invest in corporate activity. The author conjectured this from his 
theoretical model which considers managerial stock-based compensation and investment 
distortion (over-investment) in the presence of stock price information production. He asserts 
from the finding that managers tend to accept both positive and negative projects (causative 
elements of over-investment) when they receive higher compensation incentives from the 
shareholders, implying that managerial pay excess is not only as a result of managerial rent 
extraction purposes. According to him, shareholders see over-investment as an incentive to 
induce information production which in turn increases the firm’s stock price volatility and its 
terminal cash flow uncertainty, and that, through compensation design, shareholders are able 
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to influence managers to commit to over-investment. In essence, over-investment is not linked 
to enhancing managers’ private incentives such as empire building, entrenchment or short-
termism motives; rather, it is in the best interests of shareholders.  
In support of this view, Eisdorfer et al. (2013) provide strong empirical evidence on managerial 
compensation excesses and investment distortion linkage. Applying a sample of US firms 
during 2000–2009, Eisdorfer, Giaccotto and White (2013) examine the extent to which top 
executives’ compensation incentives affect the quality of investment decisions. Their 
examination reveals that managers with more inside debt-like compensation (i.e. measured as 
the present value of pensions and deferred compensation) tend to under-invest whereas 
managers that receive more equity-based (stocks and stock options) incentives over-invest in 
tangible capital activities. Employing two estimators – ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-
stage least squares (2SLS) – to the US data, the researchers report some interesting results after 
accounting for other control variables in their excess investment specification. First, they find 
that higher equity compensation and capital expenditure distortion are positively related. 
Second, they also show a positive relation between capital expenditure distortion and 
compensation leverage gap. The authors interpret the findings to suggest that managers with 
more equity compensation (inside debt like-compensation ratio) invest more (less) in capital 
expenditure activity. 
More specifically, the authors measure the dependent variable (i.e. investment distortion) as 
the difference between actual investment and the industry median investment, whilst the 
independent variable is measured as the number of shares multiplied by the share price. Also, 
stock options value was estimated using a modified Black and Scholes valuation approach. 
Each estimated compensation component is scaled by the total compensation. Again, in 
measuring executive compensation leverage gap ratio, they use the present value of managerial 
pension funds and express it as a fraction of the total compensation. Based on this estimate, 
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they measure leverage gap as the difference between compensation leverage ratio and firm 
leverage ratio. With this, the authors confirm their findings by relating equity compensation to 
excess investment (distortion), which signals the inducement effect of managerial equity on 
tangible capital expenditure distortion policy. It implies that managers tend to spend more 
(over-invest or invest above the expected level) on tangible capital activities as they receive 
higher equity incentive increases. In addition, on the role of compensation leverage gap, their 
evidence shows that managers tend to possibly under-invest in capital expenditure activity 
(investment distortion) when they are overly compensated in the form of deferred stocks and 
pension scheme. The average marginal effect of compensation leverage gap on investment 
distortion is positive and statistically significant. In economic terms, a one standard deviation 
increase in the absolute difference between compensation leverage ratio and firm leverage ratio 
increases the extent of the investment distortion by 0.004 – 0.006, accounting for 17% – 24% 
of the unconditional average of investment distortion (under-investment). A plausible 
implication of the result is that, as executives’ inside debt portfolio increases, they become 
more susceptible to deviate from optimal investment (i.e. possibly commit to an under-
investment incentive in order to safeguard their residual interests). Alternatively, shareholders 
may tend to apply more debt-like compensation component to induce managers to under-invest 
in real assets projects.   
In conclusion, the study by Eisdorfer et al.’s (2013) contributes to the literature by providing 
evidence to suggest that managers with more inside debt compensation relative to the firm 
leverage are likely to commit investment distortion whilst those with more stocks and options 
compensation spend more on capital expenditure projects (overinvestment). 
Moreover, relatively more recent evidence is provided by Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog (2017), 
who consider these two important issues: 1) the extent to which top executives’ excess equity 
compensation influences acquisition decisions; and 2) the extent to which equity-based 
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incentives induce shareholders’ value maximisation via takeover activity. The authors base 
their analyses on a sample of 216 acquisition cases from both Continental Europe and the UK 
spanning the period 2002 to 2007. They measure the key variables: dependent variable is the 
bidder’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the takeover announcement date, using 
the market model based on the two-day window before and after the announcement date and 
the equity compensation as the natural logarithm of one (1) plus the total CEO equity 
compensation (stock options and restricted stock) scaled by the total compensation (salary, 
bonuses, restricted stock and stock options) as the independent variable. In their multivariate 
regression analysis, they regress cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on equity compensation 
together with other control variables (such as size, growth, cash flow, governance indicators 
and the CEOs’ characteristics) using ordinary least squares (OLS) technique. They find a 
positive association between equity incentives and bidders’ takeover abnormal returns 
supporting alignment hypothesis. Also, their additional test reveals that the positive linkage 
between CEOs’ equity and takeover abnormal returns is eroded in the presence of block-
shareholdings, suggesting the substitution effects of concentrated ownership particularly 
among the Continental European firms. 
Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog (2017) provide further documentary evidence to show if indeed 
managers that enjoy excessive equity-based pay actually improve shareholder value. They 
define excess equity incentives as the difference between the actual (real equity-based value 
ratio) and the expected equity (based on the equity compensation model estimation). Thus, they 
subtract expected equity compensation (derived from the equity compensation model) from the 
actual equity incentives ratio to derive the excess equity compensation. In the multivariate 
regression, they relate equity excess pay to how the takeover decisions are received by the 
market. The evidence demonstrates that managerial excess compensation is negatively related 
to acquisition abnormal returns, postulating a negative market sentiment of the bidder firm’s 
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stock valuation of the takeover announcement (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Weisbach, 2007). A 
major implication of the finding suggests that powerful CEOs are able to influence their pay 
packages, which in turn affects the quality of the takeover (investment) projects they undertake. 
Simply put, top executive managers are more likely to reward themselves excessively, which 
can consequently affect the efficiency of their investment decisions. 
In short, one of the key relevances of Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog’s work to the present part is 
the fact that deviation from optimal compensation level can lead to inefficient managerial 
investment decision.  
In conclusion, the brief review conducted above shows that managerial compensation deviation 
affects firms’ investment efficiency, posturing that there is a need for firms to keep to the 
optimal compensation levels. Again, shareholders deviate from the optimal compensation to 
distort investment policy (Coles et al., 2006; Eisdorfer et al., 2013; Strobl, 2014). Likewise, 
investment distortion can be as a result of managers’ influential power to extract rent from 
shareholders by paying themselves hefty compensation (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Therefore, 
this part of the thesis seeks to explain further if indeed managerial compensation deviation is 
due to the shareholders’ willingness to purposefully influence managers to engage in 
investment distortions. This, in essence, seeks to empirically test the validity of the underlying 
assumption of the two competing theories of managerial compensation: optimal compensation 
theory and managerial power hypothesis. 
 
4.8.2.1 Hypotheses development 
The briefly reviewed literature suggests a connection among managerial compensation 
excesses and investment distortions. This part specifically highlights the underlying reasons 
why these two corporate variables are linked together.  
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4.8.2.1a Excess compensation and corporate investment distortions 
Consistent with optimal contracting theory, Strobl (2014) argues that shareholders may 
intentionally award executives more (above optimal level) stock-based compensation to 
influence them (managers) to overinvest in some corporate activities. The underlying idea is 
that awarding top executives more (overly) stock-based (e.g. LTIPs, stock options) 
compensation would induce them to heavily spend corporate resources on both positive and 
negative investment projects, resulting in overinvestment. Overinvestment (albeit investment 
in profitable and unprofitable projects) increases a firm’s information production, which in turn 
increase its stock price volatility or terminal cash flow uncertainty as informed investors 
consume the available information. Consequently, the firm’s overall value is enhanced as the 
stock price volatility surges on (Dow et al., 2011) In essence, the resultant overinvestment is in 
the best interests of shareholders. 
Supporting this view, Coles et al. (2006) and Eisdorfer et al. (2013) share a similar sentiment 
by arguing that shareholders may purposefully deviate from the managerial optimal 
compensation to distort investment policy.  
Contrarily to the Strobl (2014) explanation, others including Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004) argue that managers are able to award themselves excessively 
through their own influence, which in turn may affect the quality of their corporate policies 
including investment. Thus, in such a circumstance, highly (excessively) compensated 
managers are likely to either under- or over-invest in corporate investment activities.  
In fact, whatever the stated reasons (either shareholders’ intentional purposes or managerial 
influential power), compensation excesses are likely to cause investment inefficiencies 
(distortions). In this sense, this subsection investigates whether the deviation from the optimal 
compensation (LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) levels is associated with the probability 
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of managers committing investment distortions. 
Therefore, our general natural prediction is that optimal compensation deviation increases the 
likelihood of the firm’s investment distortion, all else equal.   
In line with Strobl (2014) and Eisdorfer et al. (2013), the section provides a more specific 
characterisation of the relation between investment distortion and excess compensation 
incentives. In simple terms, paying executives higher (lower) compensation induces 
overinvestment (under-investment) in corporate investment. More specifically, it suggests that 
managers receiving higher (lower) LTIPs/stock options increases (decreases) the probability to 
overinvest (under-invest) or commit investment distortion probability. We test the following 
natural hypotheses:  
H5a: Higher (lower) excess LTIPs compensation increases (decreases) investment distortion 
probability, all else equal.  
H5b: Higher (lower) excess stock options compensation increases (decreases) investment 
distortion probability, all else equal.  
Furthermore, consistent with the assertion that overinvestment ultimately increases the 
uncertainty associated with the firm’s terminal cash flow (Strobl, 2014; Dow et al., 2011), it is 
expected that managers who receive higher cash bonus compensation are more likely to 
overinvest in the firm’s activities. We make a natural prediction that: 
H5c: Higher (lower) excess cash bonus compensation increases (decreases) investment 
distortion probability, all else equal. 
In order to test these hypotheses (H5a – H5c), the study requires a research modelling and 
estimation technique different from the previous hypotheses (H1a – H4c). Specifically, this 
part adopts a probability model technique to test these new hypotheses (H5a – H5c).  
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In the next subsection, we state our empirical model and provide the analytical procedure to 
estimate the hypotheses.   
 
4.8.2.2 Investment distortion probability model 
 𝑃'((𝑖𝑛𝑣. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝛾++𝛾,𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.'([,+𝛾6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'([,+	𝜀'(.………………..….(7) 
𝑃'((𝑖𝑛𝑣. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =1 i.e. investment distortion) is the probability of a manager (𝑖) engaging 
in overinvestment (positive investment 𝑗 = 1). The 𝑌𝑜	represents the intercept, 
(𝛾,)	𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝. 𝐷𝑒𝑣.'([, is over-compensated dummy of one (1) if the managers’ compensation 
component is classified as over-compensated and zero otherwise, and, under-compensated 
dummy of one (1) if the managers’ compensation component is classified as under-
compensated and zero otherwise, and 𝑌6 for control variables. These firm-specific 
characteristics have already been discussed in the previous section (see Table 4.1). Finally, 	𝜀'( 
is the random error term assumed to be serially uncorrelated and homoscedastic.  
 
In order to test the stated (H5a – H5c) hypotheses, which consider managerial compensation 
deviation and the probability of engaging in investment distortion, we adopt a probability 
model empirical strategy. In fact, the estimation of the cross-sectional probit regression model 
naturally calls for the measurement of key variables. 
The next subsection, 4.8.3, considers the measurement of the main and subsamples and other 
control variables. We first measure the investment distortion variable before moving on to the 
excess compensation variables. It is worth stating here that the investment distortion variable 
is for the respective investment measures (i.e. CAPEX, fixed intangible and R&D).  
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4.8.3 Measurement of the main subsamples 
In measuring the key subsamples to be utilised in the investment distortion probability model, 
we specifically rely on investment and compensation information to construct investment 
distortion and excess compensation variables. This section describes the process involved in 
constructing these key variables. We start with the definition of investment distortion 
(dependent) variable before we move on to the main independent variable (excess 
compensation variables).  
 
4.8.3.1 The measurement of the investment distortion variable 
As proposed by Eisdorfer et al. (2013) and Richardson (2006), among others, investment 
distortion shows the extent to which a firm deviates from its optimal investment policy. It is 
measured as the difference between actual and expected investment. By this definition, the 
investment distortion variable shows continuous values with both positive and negative 
distortion, representing over- and under-investment respectively. From our accounting and 
financial data, we estimate actual investment. However, because the expected investment 
component is often unobservable and needs to be estimated, finance researchers often disagree 
on the standard measure for the expected investment proxy. For example, some frequently 
applied proxies include industry median investment ratio (e.g. Eisdorfer et al., 2013; Eisdorfer, 
2011), fitted value from industry-year cross sectional regression of a firm’s investment on 
growth opportunities, measured by the market-to-book ratio (Eisdorfer et al., 2013), and the 
predicted value from a pooled regression of a firm’s actual investment conditioned on a set of 
control variables that determine the firm’s investment activity (Fazzari et al., 1988; Lang et al., 
1996; Eisdorfer et al., 2013).  
Specifically, the present study applies the latter estimation method (i.e. predicted value 
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approach) to estimate the expected investment ratio. Also, as such its dominance (Fazzari et al. 
1988; Lang et al., 1996; Eisdorfer, 2011; Eisdorfer et al., 2013), our choice is influenced by 
the fact that the method controls for a number of firm-specific factors, as well as industry and 
other secular elements that explain firm investment, unlike the industry median approach, 
which concentrates on a single industry in a given year without accounting for other 
determinants. By this design, the fitted value approach recognises the differences across firms 
with a wider reflection of macroeconomic characteristics. It must be indicated that by adopting 
this approach, however, the current study acknowledges the limitations and criticisms of other 
published work in this area Therefore, we compute the expected investment value by regressing 
the raw actual investment ratio on a set of control factors.  
In order to ensure that our results are robust to other specifications and measurements, in a later 
section we employ an alternative proxy for the expected investment ratio. 
As earlier suggested, we employ a pooled regression estimation method to estimate the 
expected investment value. Specifically, we state the estimated model as follows: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡'( = 𝛼++ ∅,𝑋'([,+	𝜀'(………………………………………………..……. (7.1) 
Where 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡'( represents different measures of a firm’s investment activities (i.e. capital 
expenditure, research and development and fixed intangible activity) and is regressed on 
several firm-specific proxies, 𝑋'([, ,𝛼+ is a constant term and 	𝜀'( is the error term assumed to 
be homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated.   
 
a) The determinants of the expected investment level 
This part briefly states the potential explanatory variables included in the expected investment 
model. Consistent with prior studies, the selected explanatory variables include firm size, 
growth opportunities, leverage, cash flow, stock return, industry dummy and year dummy (e.g. 
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Lang et al., 1996; Richardson, 2006; Eisdorfer et al., 2013). The variables are lagged one year 
(t – 1) to increase the likelihood of causality among the dependent and the independent 
variables as well as to minimise the reverse causality problem (e.g. Eisdorfer et al., 2013). The 
definition of these variables is provided in Table 4.1. 
  
b) The fitted investment regression results  
Table 4.7.1 presents the pooled regression results of the fitted investment for our investment 
measures. The estimated coefficients for column (a) CAPEX are largely consistent with 
expectations and prior studies. For instance, we report that CAPEX decreases with leverage 
(Lang et al., 1996), whilst free cash flow (Lang et al., 1996; Myers, 1984), stock return, growth 
opportunities (Eisdorfer et al., 2013; Lang et al., 1996) and firm size (Diamonds, 1993; Lang 
et al., 1996) are positively related to the capital expenditure. 
The R&D column shows negative coefficients of leverage, firm size, market-to-book and cash 
flow, whilst stock return is positive. However, the coefficients are statistically insignificant.  
On the fixed intangible, we find that it increased with leverage, size and stock return but 
decreased with market-to-book and cash flow. With their statistical significance, large firms 
tend to reallocate more resources into fixed intangibles; however, the firm’s growth 
opportunities do not support fixed intangible activity.  
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Table 4.7 1 Predicted Investment OLS Regression Results 
       (a)      (b)        (c) 
   CAPEX  R & D    FINTANG 
LEV   -0.000  -0.005    0.016 
    (-0.00)  (-1.50)    (0.75) 
         
Size   0.025***  -0.001    0.035*** 
   (2.73)  (-0.58)    (4.84) 
         
MKTB   0.000  -0.000    -0.001*** 
   (0.14)  (-1.38)    (-5.78) 
         
CF   0.028  -0.009*    -0.021 
   (0.76)  (-1.90)    (-0.71) 
         
STKR   0.008  0.000    0.003 
   (0.61)  (0.20)    (0.25) 
         
Constant   0.118  0.0152    -0.133* 
 
 
Industry & Year effects 
  (1.32) 
 
YES 
 (1.34) 
 
YES 
   (-1.88) 
 
YES 
N   1668  1668    1668 
R2   0.314  0.050    0.226 
 
t statistics in parentheses *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. Here, we regress investment on lagged cash flow, lagged 
stock return, lagged leverage and size and market-to-book are all clustered at the firm level. We utilised this to 
obtain the excess investment figure for the main investment model.) Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
 
c) Estimation of the excess investment (distortion) variable 
Having estimated the predicted (fitted) investment values for each of the sampled firms from 
the specified equation (7.1), we apply this proxy to obtain the continuous values of investment 
(excess) distortion by subtracting predicted investment from the actual investment (Eisdorfer 
et al., 2013; Richardson, 2006; Lang et al., 1996). In other words, the continuous distortion 
values represent the residuals from the expected investment model. We categorise excess 
(distortion) investment into two groups: positive excess (over-) investment (i.e. those 
investment above the expected median level), likewise negative excess (under-) investment 
(i.e. investment below the expected median level). We define 𝑃'((𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1 
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or 0) as the probability of manager (𝑖) engaging in over-investment (positive investment 𝑗 = 1) 
and zero (0) otherwise, or the probability of engaging in under-investment (negative investment 𝑗 = 1) and 0 otherwise. More specifically, we define our dependent investment variable for 
positive (over-) investment distortion as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for over-
investment and 0 otherwise, and negative distortion value is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for under-investment and 0 (zero) otherwise.  
Furthermore, in an attempt to achieve the stated objective, thus examining the role of excess 
compensation on investment distortions, we need to define the excess compensation variable. 
The following subsection measures this variable. 
 
4.8.3.2 Measurement of excess compensation variable 
This part highlights the procedure involved in measuring the excess compensation variable. 
Having defined the investment distortion variable, the next measure is the compensation excess 
variable. Specifically, we apply a model predictive regression model similar to Coles et al.’s 
(2006) and Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog’s (2017) technique to measure managerial pay excesses. 
The technique compares the model predicted (fitted) compensation level with the actual raw 
unadjusted values and the difference is the pay excess. By this definition, our continuous 
variable (pay excess proxy) shows both positive and negative values to be utilised in the 
investment model. 
In fact, although the pay excesses variable definition seems fairly straight-forward, its 
measurement can be very challenging or problematic because of the unobserved nature of the 
predicted level. While the actual compensation raw values are readily available and computed, 
the predicted compensation values need to be estimated. The estimation procedures are 
discussed below.  
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i) Estimation of the predicted (fitted) compensation level 
Due to the relative scanty literature on what the term “expected (fitted) compensation level” 
implies, some researchers have attempted to adopt a model predictive method to estimate the 
fitted compensation level (see Coles et al., 2006; Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog, 2017). Since there 
is no alternative approach for estimating the expected compensation variable vis-à-vis he 
predictive approach dominance, the present study follows the prior studies and estimates the 
expected level using the predictive value specification. Again, its popularity or wide usage may 
be due to the fact that this method controls for a number of firm-specific factors, as well as 
industry and other secular elements that significantly affect the determination of managerial 
compensation.  
Consistent with this view, we compute the fitted compensation by predicting shareholders’ 
expected compensation incentives conditioned on a set of determinants. Specifically, our 
adopted specification estimates the expected compensation level by applying a single 
regression that pools all the firms for the entire sample period (2006–2015) together. With this, 
it is worth stating that the present study duly acknowledges the limitations and criticisms of 
this approach. Therefore, with no appropriate alternative approach, it is hoped that any 
anticipated criticism does not seriously undermine the conclusions of the current study. Similar 
to Coles et al. (2006) and Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog (2017), the predicted compensation levels 
for our sample firms are estimated using equation (5) below: 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠'([, = 𝚋++𝚋	,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'( + 𝛹'(………………..……………………..…..….. (8) 
Where 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠.'([,represents compensation incentives (e.g. value of stock options grants, 
LTIP grants and cash bonus), 	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'(includes the selected exogenous variables. These are: 
research and development, fixed intangible assets, capital expenditure, market-to-book, firm 
size, book leverage, firm risk, cash flow, large ownership, outside directors’ ownership, 
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executives’ ownership, executives’ average age and dividend pay-out, industry and year effects, 
and the random error term 𝛹'(. These characteristics are based on prior compensation literature 
(Nguyen, 2018; Feito-Ruiz and Renneboog, 2017; Coles et al., 2006; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; 
Baber, Janakiraman and Kang, 1996). 
More specifically, we state each component of compensation equation (8a – 8c) used to derive 
the predicted (fitted) values. This is specified as follows: 
LTIPsa{[,	=		β+ +	β,Controlsa{ + ∈a{……………..……..……………………………….……………………………………...…....… (8a) 
ESOa{[,	=		β+ +	β,Controlsa{ +  ∈a{……………………………………………………….……………………..…..………..…….....… (8b) 
CashBa{[,	=		β+ +	β,Controlsa{ + ∈a{………………………………………………………….…………………..……….…..…....… (8c) 
One important contribution of the study is the empirical technique it employs to allow for the 
possibility that cash bonus is endogenously determined and that our chosen approach also 
allows us to test for the over-identifying restrictions in the model.  
This strategy is consistent with O’Connor et al. (2013) and be seen as an extension to Coles et 
al. (2006) and Xue (2007), who empirically examine similar issues, but they only use cash 
incentive as a control variable. These selected explanatory variables are defined in Table (4.1). 
 
ii) The predicted compensation value regression results 
Table 4.7.1b presents the result of the pooled regression. Columns (a), (b) and (c) show the 
findings of the compensation components: LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus respectively. 
As we have already exhausted the discussion on compensation determinants in the earlier 
section based on the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method, this part pays less attention to 
this discussion. Again, the key idea of this part is to estimate the excess compensation variable. 
In fact, as indicated earlier, the primary motive is to find out the extent to which managerial 
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pay excesses induce investment decision-making. The next subsection estimates the pay 
excesses. 
Table 4.7 2 Predicted Incentives Regression Results  
     (a)    (b)    (c) 
  L.LTIPs  ESO CashB 
 
CAPEX  0.136*** -0.034  -0.086*** 
  (3.21) (-1.03)  (-2.80) 
R&D  0.014 -0.184** -0.065 
  (0.09) (-2.15) (-0.76) 
FINTANG  0.075 -0.027 0.023 
  (1.22) (-0.71) (0.45) 
LEV  0.084** -0.043 -0.053** 
  (2.26) (-1.35) (-2.20) 
Size  0.079*** -0.016* -0.024*** 
  (6.81) (-1.63) (-3.20) 
MKTB  0.002*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
  (4.88) (-1.16) (-3.87) 
STKR  0.021** 0.007  
  (2.18) (0.97)  
Large Own  -0.001*** 0.000  0.001* 
  (-2.87) (0.06) (1.81) 
E. Own  -0.086*** 0.010 -0.002 
  (-3.18) (0.49) (-0.09) 
Non-E.Own  -0.054 -0.053 0.012 
  (-0.36) (-0.97) (0.19) 
CF  0.003 -0.032* 0.058 
  (0.08) (-1.65) (1.30) 
DPO  0.027 -0.026 0.024* 
  (1.18) (-1.51) (1.80) 
E.Av.Age  0.001* -0.001 0.000 
  (1.67) (-1.29) (0.57) 
Constant  -0.377*** 0.300***  0.515*** 
 
Industry& year 
 (-2.87) 
  YES 
(2.88) 
YES 
(6.48) 
YES 
N  1262 1262 1262 
R2  0.344 0.062 0.107 
t statistics in parentheses*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. We use robust standard errors. 
Predicted lagged incentives (used for excess compensation and investment probability model). We regress lagged 
incentives on the selected determinants. 
 
iii) Excess compensation dummy variables 
As stated earlier, our main task is to look at the extent to which managerial compensation 
excesses affect the probability of managers engaging in investment distortions. Having defined 
the investment distortion variable above, our next proxy of interest is the excess compensation 
proxy. In fact, as indicated the excess compensation is a continuous variable, which shows the 
gap between actual compensation values (i.e. raw values) and the predicted values estimated 
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from the first-stage compensation model. Therefore, to enhance our understanding on how 
deviation from the optimal compensation level induces investment distortion probability, we 
segregate the “derivative excess compensation” variable in to four quartile sub-groups: 
extremely under-compensated (Q1), moderately under-compensated (Q2), moderately over-
compensated (Q3) and extremely over-compensated (Q4). 
 More specifically, these subsamples (based on the excess compensation values) are formed 
and sorted in ascending order. The sorted observation is then divided into four quartiles. Based 
on our classifications, we construct and represent the subsample observations with dummies: 
first quartile (Q1) – extremely undercompensated, shows large negative excess values; second 
quartile (Q2) – moderately undercompensated, indicates small negative excess values; third 
quartile (Q3) – moderately over-compensated subsample shows small positive excess values; 
and the fourth quartile (Q4) – extremely over-compensated observations indicate the large 
positive excess compensation values. 
As outlined above, shareholders could substantially deviate from the managerial optimal 
compensation level to constrain investment efficiency (see Strobl, 2014). Accordingly, 
substantial deviation from the optimal compensation ratio can be represented in one of two 
ways: a) rewarding managers far above the optimal level (extremely over-compensated), and 
b) rewarding managers far below the optimal level (extremely under-compensated). In tune 
with this, and for the purposes of this chapter, we use the extreme compensation deviation 
values (over-compensated and under-compensated variables) to represent the main 
independent variables in the investment distortion probability model. Unless otherwise stated, 
over-compensated (4th quantile) and under-compensated (1st quantile) are used to imply 
extreme deviations from the optimal level. The following underlying reasons motivate this 
selection. 
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It is anticipated that both over- and under-compensated are an indication of shareholders’ 
intention to influence managerial suboptimal investment decisions. Thus, as a means of 
improving information flow regarding the firm’s performance, r-compensated managers are 
more likely to over-invest by undertaking both positive and negative NPV investment projects 
in order to increase the probability distribution of the firm’s cash flow and stock returns (see 
e.g. Strobl, 2014). However, under-compensated incentives (managers) can be attributed to 
some of these reasons: it could signal a firm’s lack of investment opportunities (Ryan and 
Wiggins, 2001). Thus, firms with insufficient growth potentials (which are often represented 
by the resource allocation into CAPEX, R&D and fixed intangible) are easily monitored by the 
board, and shareholders may have an incentive to lower the compensation level. Also, firms 
with a strong governance system are able to minimise managerial incentive behaviour, leading 
to lower compensation incentives. In other words, the presence and the effectiveness of 
monitoring mechanisms including institutional ownership, block-shareholding, non-
executives’ ownership, board size, etc., can potentially influence managers to concentrate on 
value-maximising activities without necessary increasing their pay packages (Mehran, 1995). 
Given that the study controls some of these mechanisms in the compensation model, it is 
possible to attribute extreme under-compensated incentives to minimal investment 
expenditure.  
In contrast, however, moderately under-compensated and over-compensated incentives could 
presumably be attributed to these reasons. First, the board’s inability to perfectly or efficiently 
track managerial compensation hand-outs. Second, the board mis-judging growth expectations 
and compensation incentives (moderately over- or under-compensated). Third, moderately 
over-/under-compensated may not continuously sustain such deviation over a long period of 
time (Coles et al., 2006). 
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Based on the underlying motive of this part of the thesis (i.e. whether extreme over- and/or 
under-compensated induce the probability of investment distortions), it is, however, possible 
that moderately over- or under-compensated incentives would not explicitly explain the 
likelihood of UK managers committing investment distortions. Therefore, the study view is 
that investment distortions (over- or under-investment) is as a result of extreme under-
compensated or over-compensated incentives. In this way, we are able to provide specific 
evidence to support the managerial compensation theory.  
In fact, to satisfy the assumption of the probability model, we use indicator variables for over-
compensated (i.e. extreme positive excess compensation) or under-compensated (extreme 
negative excess compensation) incentives. Specifically, over-compensated incentive is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for those managers classified as extreme earners (i.e. 
those whose compensation is above optimal level), and 0 otherwise, and under-compensated 
incentive is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for those sampled managers classified 
as extremely under-compensated, and otherwise 0. 
 
4.8.3.3 Other control variables 
This subsection turns attention to other explanatory variables that have been found to be related 
to the firm’s decision to undertake investment included in equation (7). The selection of control 
variables in the model is based upon the extant theoretical and empirical literature on 
investment discussed in Chapter 3. In all, eight (8) other control variables are included in the 
investment distortion probability model. Having already discussed these control variables in 
the previous subsection, they are stated: leverage, firm size, market-to-book, cash flow, sales 
growth, stock return, industry dummy and year dummy (see Coles et al., 2006; Eisdorfer et al., 
2013) to save time and space.  
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4.8.4 Analytical procedure 
As indicated earlier, we assert that different levels of compensation deviation (e.g. LTIPs, stock 
options and cash bonus) are more likely to encourage investment distortion. In order to test 
these hypotheses (H5a–H5c), we choose a probit regression model to examine if indeed 
shareholders deviate from the optimal compensation level to encourage investment distortions.  
 
4.8.4.1 Probability model justifications 
The preference for a probability model over other binary probability models such as the logit 
model or the linear probability model (LPM) is stated below. The probit model estimates the 
coefficients of the model using maximum likelihood (ML) (see Dougherty, 2007), whereas 
LPMs are based on ordinary least squares regression. This implies that the ML property helps 
provide valid standard errors as well as the t-statistics, particularly when the sample is large. 
In other words, ML produces results that are more asymptotic. In addition, probit models are 
often insensitive to model misspecifications, because they allow for robust standard errors in 
their estimation.  
Another important reason for using probit models over LPMs is that their predicted 
probabilities of outcome are bounded between zero (0) and one (1), which makes them 
intuitively easy to interpret. However, LPMs can produce probabilities greater than one (1) or 
even less than zero (0) when the independent variables contain extreme values (Wooldridge, 
2009).  
Comparatively, probit models and logit models are both powerful estimation techniques in their 
application. The only difference lies in their functional specifications. Specifically, a probit 
model assumes the standard normal distribution of error term under the cumulative distribution 
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function whilst a logit model applies a logistic function. With these, our choice of probit model 
over logit model is purely driven by the research preference.  
 
4.8.5 Discussion of investment distortion and compensation deviation results 
This section provides the results and discussion of the investment distortion probability 
regression model. Specifically, it shows the analyses of the different investment measures used 
in this empirical investigation: capital expenditure, research and development, and fixed 
intangible. Accordingly, this part discusses the results for each respective investment distortion 
regression. The discussion only concentrates on the key independent (compensation) variables.      
 
4.8.5.1 Capital expenditure distortion regression results 
In this section, we perform our regression analysis by regressing CAPEX distortion on the 
over- and under-compensated incentives together with other control variables. Here, four (4) 
specifications are estimated: baseline model (1) and the remaining models (2), (3) and (4) 
which account for other additional variables are for further robustness purposes.  
The findings reported in column OVCAPEX of Table (4.8.1) provide interesting evidence. The 
result suggests that extremely over-compensated (under-compensated) managers increase 
(decreases) the likelihood of committing CAPEX over-investment. Specifically, the positive 
coefficient on over-compensated (over-equity/LTIPs) equity is 0.244 and it is statistically 
significant at 5% level of significance. The finding tends to imply that over-compensated 
LTIPs, on average, are associated with a 24.4% increased probability of over-investing in 
capital expenditure (CAPEX) activities. However, the dummy variable for under-
compensated (under-equity) equity coefficient (-0.0745) is negative but insignificant. The 
findings seem to be consistent with the view that the board of directors on behalf of 
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shareholders may strategically over-compensate (using LTIPs) managers to induce a 
managerial over-investment (CAPEX) incentive. The results still remain statistically similar 
when we account for executive ownership and other governance mechanisms.   
Furthermore, the estimated coefficient on over-compensated (over-options) stock options is 
positive, suggesting that the over-compensated stock options increase the chances of managers 
over-investing in CAPEX, while the under-compensated dummy reduces the likelihood of 
CAPEX over-investment. To be specific, the negative coefficient estimate is -0.0392 and 
insignificant. For the over-compensated stock options, the coefficient is 0.261 (t-statistics 2.32) 
and it is both economically and statistically significant. Again, our robustness test results in 
models 2, 3 and 4 remain statistically and qualitatively the same.  
For cash bonus incentive, the dummy variable for over-compensated (over-cash) cash bonus 
is positively and significantly related to the probability of CAPEX over-investment, but the 
under-compensated dummy variable is negative and insignificant. More specifically, the 
underlying implication of this finding is that managers with over-compensated cash bonus are 
about 23.7% more likely to commit over-investment in CAPEX projects. In other words, 
extremely over-compensated cash incentive managers have an increased tendency to commit 
managerial investment distortion (CAPEX over-investment). This is not surprising, given that 
firms with substantial cash reserves are likely to face an over-investment problem (Jensen, 
1986; Stulz, 1990) and that the shareholders tend to use more cash incentive rather than stocks 
(Core and Guay, 1999). 
Collectively, the observed results of extreme over-compensated (under-compensated) on 
CAPEX over-investment probability seem to be consistent with the explanation that the boards 
strategically apply extreme over-compensated incentives to encourage over-investment – 
CAPEX (Coles et al., 2006; Strobl, 2014). Thus, our evidence tends to further suggest that 
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over-compensated earners are encouraged to spend more corporate funds on CAPEX (over-
investment) by accepting both positive and negative net present value capital expenditure 
(NPV) projects. 
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Table 4.8 1 Excess Pay and Capital Expenditure Distortion Test 
           (1)     (2)     (3)      (4) 
       OVCAPEX  OVCAPEX  OVCAPEX  OVCAPEX 
              
LTIPs75       0.244**  0.243**  0.245**  0.238** 
       (2.11)  (2.09)  (2.10)  (2.04) 
              
LTIPs25       -0.0745  -0.0752  -0.0525  -0.0553 
       (-0.64)  (-0.64)  (-0.45)  (-0.47) 
              
ESO25       -0.0392  -0.0382  -0.00655  -0.0190 
       (-0.33)  (-0.32)  (-0.05)  (-0.16) 
              
ESO75       0.261**  0.261**  0.252**  0.245** 
       (2.32)  (2.32)  (2.25)  (2.18) 
              
CashB25       -0.163  -0.163  -0.152  -0.152 
       (-1.51)  (-1.51)  (-1.41)  (-1.41) 
              
CashB75       0.237**  0.236**  0.241**  0.240** 
       (2.14)  (2.13)  (2.17)  (2.17) 
              
SAL       1.489***  1.478***  1.442***  1.422*** 
       (4.55)  (4.37)  (4.25)  (4.18) 
              
LEV       0.836***  0.840***  0.828***  0.808*** 
       (3.58)  (3.57)  (3.51)  (3.40) 
              
Size       -0.0584  -0.0575  -0.0479  -0.0348 
       (-0.82)  (-0.81)  (-0.67)  (-0.47) 
              
MKTB       -0.0321  -0.0321  -0.0314  -0.0301 
       (-1.19)  (-1.20)  (-1.18)  (-1.14) 
              
CF       1.525**  1.521**  1.572**  1.569** 
       (3.07)  (3.07)  (3.17)  (3.15) 
              
SGR       0.0777  0.0770  0.0698  0.0664 
       (0.53)  (0.52)  (0.47)  (0.45) 
              
STKR       0.0126  0.0129  0.0194  0.0236 
       (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.23)  (0.28) 
              
E. Own         0.0449  0.116  0.00438 
         (0.13)  (0.34)  (0.01) 
              
NonE.Own           1.759**  1.671** 
           (2.40)  (2.26) 
              
Large Own             0.00205 
             (0.77) 
Constant       -0.640  -0.650  -0.789  -0.956 
 
Industry&Year 
      (-0.88) 
  YES 
 (-0.89) 
 YES 
 (-1.09) 
 YES 
 (-1.25) 
 YES 
N         987     987     987     987 
Pseudo R2 
Wald Chiz 
      0.077 
102.93 
 0.077 
103.13 
 0.082 
112.86 
 0.082 
112.78 
The table presents the probit regression results for the OVCAPEX (distortion) models 1, 2, 3 & 4 and include incentives 
excesses together with controls and fixed effects in all estimations. Variables are described in Table 4.1. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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4.8.5.2 Research and development distortion regression results 
Table (4.8.2) on research and development expenditure (R&D) shows the extent to which 
extreme over-compensated (under-compensated) managers are likely to commit R&D 
investment distortions. Significantly, the dummy variables estimate for over-compensated 
(under-compensated) stock-based incentives provide some interesting findings. More 
specifically, the coefficient estimates for the highly over-compensated (under-compensated) 
equity (LTIPs) dummy are -0.0836 t-statistics -0.61 (0.344 t-statistics 2.60) respectively. 
Thus, the positive coefficient estimate for under-compensated LTIPs is statistically and 
economically significant, whilst the over-compensated coefficient is negative but insignificant. 
The finding tends to imply that extremely under-compensated equity managers have an 
increased probability to commit to R&D over-investment whilst over-compensated managers 
are less likely to over-invest in R&D above optimal level. However, one caveat is that the over-
compensated LTIPs coefficient lacks statistical significance.  
On the stock options, the over-compensated (over-options) dummy is negatively and 
significantly related to the probability of R&D over-investment. For instance, the coefficient 
estimates of -0.463 (t-statistics -3.61) show the decreased likelihood of over-compensated 
(options) managers to over-invest in the R&D activity. The result further suggests that 
shareholders do not overly use stock options to induce managers to commit to investment 
distortion in R&D, noting that over-investment is in the best interests of shareholders. 
However, the under-compensated options dummy is positive but insignificant. 
The over-compensated (under-compensated) cash bonus dummy variable is negative 
(positive) but statistically insignificant at the conventional levels. Specifically, the coefficient 
estimate for over-compensated (under-compensated) is -0.134 t-statistics -1.06 (0.114 t-
statistics 0.92) respectively. 
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Table 4.8 2 Excess Pay and R&D Distortion Test 
        (1)          (2)      (3)     (4) 
  OVR&D     OVR&D OVR&D OVR&D 
      
LTIPs75  -0.0836      -0.127 -0.121 -0.125 
  (-0.61)      (-0.93) (-0.88) (-0.90) 
      
LTIPs25  0.344***      0.334** 0.383*** 0.382*** 
  (2.60)      (2.51) (2.86) (2.85) 
      
ESO25  0.0197     0.0472 0.0641 0.0594 
  (0.14)     (0.34) (0.46) (0.42) 
      
ESO75  -0.463***     -0.475*** -0.526*** -0.529*** 
  (-3.61)     (-3.70) (-4.05) (-4.06) 
      
CashB25  0.114      0.134 0.159 0.159 
  (0.92)      (1.06) (1.25) (1.25) 
      
CashB75  -0.134     -0.159 -0.177 -0.177 
  (-1.06)     (-1.26) (-1.40) (-1.40) 
      
SAL  -0.920***     -1.156*** -1.234*** -1.2401*** 
  (-2.73)      (-3.13) (-3.25) (-3.25) 
      
LEV  0.390      0.476* 0.452 0.438 
  (1.44)      (1.74) (1.63) (1.56) 
      
Size  0.108      0.122 0.141 0.150 
  (1.37)      (1.55) (1.76) (1.73) 
      
MKTB  0.0012     -0.0004 0.0009 0.0014 
  (0.09)     (-0.03) (0.07) (0.11) 
      
CF  1.613**    1.5900*** 1.690*** 1.6920*** 
  (2.88)     (2.79) (3.01) (3.01) 
      
SGR  0.0424     0.0407 0.0099 0.0079 
  (0.27)     (0.25) (0.06) (0.05) 
      
STKR  -0.118     -0.105 -0.0842 -0.0814 
  (-0.95)     (-0.83) (-0.68) (-0.65) 
      
E.Own       0.9581** 1.052** 0.989* 
       (1.94) (2.14) (1.89) 
      
NonE.Own    3.551*** 3.505** 
    (2.78) (2.77) 
      
Large Own     0.001 
     (0.32) 
Constant  0.141   0.0018 -0.199 -0.301 
  (0.18)   (0.00) (-0.24) (-0.34) 
N  945    945 945 945 
Pseudo R2 
Wald Chiz 
 0.10 
94.39 
  0.103 
  96.64 
0.113 
102.19 
0.113 
102.36 
The table presents the probit regression results for the OVR&D (distortion) models 1, 2, 3 & 4 and include 
incentives excesses together with controls and fixed effects in all estimations. Variable definitions are described 
in Table 4.1. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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4.8.5.3 Fixed intangible distortion regression results 
The result for the fixed intangible is presented in Table (4.8.3). Both over-compensated and 
under-compensated stock-based decreased the likelihood of fixed intangible distortion (over-
investment). The dummy variables for extremely over-compensated and under-compensated 
LTIPs (equity) dummy are negative and statistically insignificant. The coefficient estimate 
dummy for over-compensated is -0.0668 (t-stats -0.59) and under-compensated -0.0425 (t-
stats -0.37), reluctantly postulating a decreased probability of committing fixed intangible 
over-investment.  
In addition, similar results were observed for both extremely over-compensated and under-
compensated stock options dummies. Explicitly, the coefficient estimates for both over-
compensated (-0.408 t-stats 3.63) and under-compensated (-0.886 t-stats 7.39) all show 
negative signs and are statistically significant. The results tend to imply that extremely over- 
and under-compensated managers are less likely to over-invest in fixed intangible over-
investment. This can possibly be attributed to the fact that shareholders’ deviation from the 
optimal stock options incentive may not be motivated by fixed intangible over-investment.    
Moreover, the coefficient dummies for over-compensated (under-compensated) cash bonus 
are negative (positive) respectively. However, the estimates lack statistical significance. 
Specifically, the coefficient estimates for over-compensated cash bonus is -0.117 (t-stats -
1.06), whilst under-compensated is 0.103 (t-stats 0.98) both insignificant. The result suggests 
that both over-compensated (under-compensated) cash bonus is unlikely to induce fixed 
intangible over-investment distortion.  
Moreover, for robustness checks (models 2, 3 and 4), the main results remain statistically 
unchanged after accounting for these independent variables – executives’ ownership, non-
executive ownership and large ownership – in the investment distortion probability models.   
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In sum, the evidence shows that extreme compensation deviation for stock options (over-
compensated and under-compensated) decreased the probability of fixed intangible distortion.  
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Table 4.8 3 Excess Pay and Fixed Intangible Distortion Test  
        (1)      (2)      (3)      (4) 
  OVFINTANG OVFINTANG OVFINTANG OVFINTANG 
      
LTIPs75  -0.0668 -0.0403 -0.0401 -0.0438 
  (-0.59) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.38) 
      
LTIPs25  -0.0425 -0.0316 -0.0872 -0.0884 
  (-0.37) (-0.27) (-0.74) (-0.75) 
      
ESO25  -0.886*** -0.921*** -0.996*** -1.002*** 
  (-7.39) (-7.68) (-8.28) (-8.29) 
      
ESO75  -0.408*** -0.418*** -0.391*** -0.394*** 
  (-3.63) (-3.72) (-3.38) (-3.39) 
      
CashB25  0.103 0.101 0.0766 0.0765 
  (0.98) (0.96) (0.72) (0.72) 
      
CashB75  -0.117 -0.0997 -0.109 -0.109 
  (-1.06) (-0.90) (-0.97) (-0.97) 
      
SAL   -1.121*** -0.912*** -0.814** -0.825** 
  (-3.58) (-2.79) (-2.48) (-2.51) 
      
LEV  0.0687 -0.0065 0.0433 0.0321 
  (0.29) (-0.03) (0.18) (0.13) 
      
Size  -0.299*** -0.324*** -0.346*** -0.340*** 
  (-4.08) (-4.40) (-4.65) (-4.47) 
      
MKTB  -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0008 
  (-0.04) (0.05) (-0.08) (-0.05) 
      
CF  0.263 0.306 0.242 0.240 
  (0.58) (0.67) (0.51) (0.51) 
      
SGR  0.0648 0.0771 0.117 0.116 
  (0.42) (0.49) (0.71) (0.70) 
      
STKR  -0.0459 -0.0493 -0.0618 -0.0600 
  (-0.54) (-0.58) (-0.75) (-0.72) 
      
E. Own   -1.037*** -1.184*** -1.234*** 
   (-2.87) (-3.24) (-3.09) 
NonE. Own    -4.794*** -4.836*** 
    (-6.02) (-6.02) 
Large Own     0.0009 
     (0.34) 
Constant  3.215*** 3.465*** 3.770*** 3.694*** 
  (4.35) (4.64) (4.97) (4.71) 
N  986 986 984 984 
Pseudo R2 
Wald Chiz 
 0.077 
106.52 
0.084 
114.35 
0.110 
144.25 
 
0.110 
144.43 
The table presents the probit regression results for the OVFINTANG (distortion) models 1, 2, 3 & 4 and include 
incentives excesses together with controls and fixed effects in all estimations. Variables are described in Table 
4.1. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels and the t-statistics are reported in 
robust standard error.  
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4.9 Conclusions and implications 
The chapter contributes to the body of research that links managerial compensation scheme to 
investment decisions by explicitly showing that shareholders’ deviations from the expected 
compensation level, specifically extremely over-compensated managers, increase the 
probability of managers committing capital expenditure investment distortions. In fact, our 
results also tend to indicate that underestimating the possibility of shareholders intentionally 
(in a long period of time) making adjustments to the managerial compensation scheme to 
induce investment distortion leaves a gap in our understanding of the investment–managerial 
compensation nexus.  
The chapter provides direct evidence to suggest that the board of directors efficiently deviates 
from the normal compensation level to encourage managerial incentive to over-invest, 
particularly in capital expenditure activity (Strobl, 2014). The evidence partly tends to suggest 
that the UK executives’ compensation data are more likely to be explained by optimal 
compensation theory. 
Specifically, we find that over-compensated (under-compensated) incentives - stock options, 
equity and cash bonus increase (decrease) the tendency of over-investment in CAPEX, but a 
different outcome for intangibles (R&D and fixed intangible). Specifically, over-compensated 
managers tend to have a reduced possibility of over-investing in intangibles (R&D and fixed 
intangible).  
Substantially, the findings collectively support the assertion that the board of directors (on the 
shareholders’ behalf) may thoughtfully deviate from the optimal compensation level to 
encourage (discourage) over-investment probability.  
An important implication of the results on the theories of managerial compensation is the 
relevance of optimal compensation theory to managerial investment efficiency decisions 
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(Coles et al., 2006; Strobl, 2014).  
The evidence partly confirms that the firm’s board of directors can generously (over-
compensated) compensate managers to induce radical changes in managerial decisions relating 
to capital expenditure investment. This complements Strobl’s (2014) observed demonstration 
on compensation deviation and investment distortions.    
In addition, the evidence in the current section also enhances our understanding of the theory 
of investment. Clearly, it seems to imply that the over-compensated (under-compensated) 
managers are more (less) likely to over-invest in capital expenditure projects over a long period 
of time, different from Coles et al.’s (2006) explanation.  
In general, our key finding on capital expenditure tends to show that the optimal contracting 
theory provides a potential explanation as to why the firm’s board purposefully over-
compensates managers using both stock-based and cash-based incentives to induce managerial 
investment distortions. 
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                                                       Chapter 5 
 
5.0 The Relationship between Managerial Compensation and Leverage – 
Hypotheses, Proxies, Analytical Strategy, Analyses, Results and Discussions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a direct causal relationship between executives’ 
compensation and the firm’s observed leverage level. As reviewed in Chapter 2b, managerial 
compensation and financial leverage are related through agency theory. A detailed material 
discussion of the leverage–compensation relationship provides the study with the needed 
impetus to develop and later test the hypotheses to achieve the chapter’s research aim. In 
particular, the chapter is sectioned along this line. Section 5.2 develops the hypotheses, whilst 
section 5.3 identifies and defines appropriate proxies that are needed to facilitate the empirical 
investigation. Section 5.4 briefly discusses the analytical strategy and provides descriptive 
statistics analysis. Section 5.5 is devoted to empirical results and discussions. Section 5.6 
contains the robustness testing, whilst 5.7 provides the conclusion regarding the findings. 
In fact, it is worth stating that the significant innovation of the study is the adoption of 
appropriate empirical models and statistical technique to answer the question of whether 
managerial compensation has a greater influence on the firm’s observed leverage ratio by 
accounting for the feedback effect of leverage on the level and structure of managerial 
compensation. More specifically, as already stated, the study develops simultaneous equation 
modelling and employs a 3SLS estimator to analyse compensation and leverage linkage.      
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5.2 Hypotheses development 
As indicated in Chapter 2b, through agency theory, managerial incentives and financial 
leverage are linked together (Coles et al., 2006; Berkovitch et al., 2000). This subsection 
provides the following specific testable hypotheses to show the extent to which managerial 
compensation incentives and financial leverage are related. More specifically, it states reasons 
why the different components of executive compensation affect a firm’s observed debt level. 
This is because each compensation component possesses a distinctive risk-related feature to 
managers and this in turn affects how they (managers) use debt to sponsor corporate activities. 
Therefore, based on our main selected compensation components (LTIPs, stock options and 
cash bonus), we develop the following testable hypotheses on how each pay component relates 
to firm leverage.   
 
5.2.1 Cash bonus and leverage  
Cash bonus compensation is usually related to managers achieving an accounting performance 
target (e.g. cash flow, profits), which ensures that the firm remains solvent. One possible way 
to maintain a firm’s solvency is to lower leverage ratio while generating positive and stable 
cash flows. This is because high debt level increases bankruptcy risk (Grossman and Hart, 
1982) and reduces cash flows via interest payment (Jensen, 1986), which in turn could affect 
managers meeting the cash flow or profits performance threshold, causing them to lose out on 
their cash bonus incentive. This suggests a negative link between cash bonus and leverage 
(Coles et al., 2006). Therefore, we propose that executives with a high cash bonus may prefer 
to keep a low leverage ratio.   
H6a: Leverage and executives’ cash bonuses are negatively related.  
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5.2.2 Stock options and leverage   
The convex payoff of stock options influences executives to increase risk-taking activities. 
Black and Scholes’ (1973) “option model” argued that risk is a major determinant of stock 
price behaviour and that the convex payoff feature (i.e. expected payoff is only when share 
price exceeds the exercise price) associated with stock options provides managers with an 
incentive to increase risky activities such as borrowing more to sponsor corporate activities 
(Coles et al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Kini and Williams, 2012). As the firm’s 
risk policies increase, uncertainty about the firm’s cash flow, stock price volatility ensues, as 
investors continue to engage in constant trading. Consequently, due to high stock price 
volatility albeit the market abnormality, the value of the firm’s stock goes up, benefiting both 
shareholders and the executives. With this, we expect that stock options will create strong 
managerial incentives for risk-taking activities. Our natural prediction is that:     
H6b: There is a positive relationship between leverage and executives’ stock options incentives.  
 
5.2.3 Long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) compensation 
Following the Greenbury Report’s (1995) recommendation, publicly listed companies in the 
UK apply this type of incentive package to align shareholder-manager interests. The LTIPs 
(defined as performance stock plus deferred stock) compensation induces more risk-taking 
behaviour. This is because managers only benefit by achieving the set targets (e.g. earnings per 
share (EPS) increase, total stakeholders’ return), which in turn increases managers’ incentive 
to borrow more to undertake all valuable projects, particularly in cases where the firm’s cash 
flows are insufficient. We therefore formulate our next hypothesis as follows: 
H6c: There is a positive relation between leverage and LTIPs incentives. 
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5.2.4 Deferred/restricted stock 
For instance, in the UK, executives with restricted shares are required to meet certain 
performance thresholds before vesting. One of them may include an executive remaining at the 
firm for a stipulated time limit. In cases where this prevails, the executive may become wary 
of increasing firm risk as his/her residual interests in the form of restricted stock increase. This 
can cause him/her to shy away from risky activities. For instance, Cassell et al. (2012) argue 
that, because deferred stock compensation (i.e. executives’ inside debt) is generally unsecured 
and unfunded by the firm, executives with a large proportion of inside debt compensation will 
display a lower level of risky behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), especially if the vesting 
conditions are linked to their period of stay at the firm. Similarly, John and John (1993) argue 
that a highly levered firm can apply low pay-performance sensitivity (e.g. deferred stock) to 
reduce managerial risk-behaviour, which in turn may reduce the firm’s future cost of 
borrowing. In line with this intuition, the study proposes that executives with large deferred 
stock compensation may tend to decrease corporate risk-taking policies (i.e. low leverage). Our 
last natural prediction is that: 
 H6d: Leverage and deferred share compensation are negatively linked. 
 
Overall, the basic implication taking to the data is that, if executives’ compensation packages 
are designed in part to mitigate shareholder-manager interests’ divergence (thus, in a way to 
affect managerial risk-taking incentive), then we expect the anticipated prediction to exist 
between managerial compensation incentives and leverage. These developed hypotheses will 
be tested in the later section.   
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5.2b Leverage theoretical model 
As argued above, managerial incentives are likely to affect a firm’s observed leverage level 
through agency-motivated reasons. Our theoretical model is stated below:    
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒'(	 = 𝛽,𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠'( + ∈a{……………..……………….………………………………………………………………….…....… (9) 
Where, Leverage is the firm’s book leverage (long-term debt plus short term-debt), Incentives 
represent managerial compensation components (value of stock options grants, LTIPs grants 
and cash bonus) and the random error term is ∈a{ . 
 
5.3 The data and variable descriptions 
The section handles data collection and the measurement of the study variables: dependent 
variable (i.e. financial leverage), key independent variables and other control variables for the 
leverage. In fact, because the data collection procedure has been discussed in Chapter 3, we 
proceed to define our key variables in the next subsection. We first start with the dependent 
variable, then independent variables and, finally, control variables.   
 
5.3.1 Financial leverage variable  
One of the key variables at the heart of this examination is financial leverage and how it 
associates with compensation incentives. This, in essence, calls for the definition and 
measurement of our financial leverage variable. In fact, corporate finance literature on capital 
structure often tends to disagree on how financial leverage should be measured: book leverage 
vs market leverage. Before we move on to measure this variable, we first define the term 
“financial leverage” and state the key reasons underlying our choice of financial leverage 
measure.  
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5.3.1.1 The measurement of financial leverage 
Corporate financial leverage simply shows the relationship between two competing items, debt 
and equity, in terms of the overall value of the firm (Borio, 1990). With this definition, two 
major issues arise which make leverage measurement a daunting task in the corporate finance 
research. First, whether financial leverage (hereafter, leverage) should be considered from the 
financial market perspectives (market leverage) or from the internal accounting record 
standpoint (i.e. book leverage), and, secondly, whether the leverage should be measured in 
terms of book value of total assets or total capital of the firm. For instance, the literature 
measures leverage as follows: market leverage is defined as the book value of debt scaled by 
the market value of the firm, whilst the book leverage is measured as the book value of debt 
divided by the accounting value of total assets.  
The present study chooses book leverage over the market leverage based on the following 
reasons. First, book leverage is less “noisy” than market leverage. That is, in a volatile market 
condition, a firm’s stock price can experience abnormality which can cause fluctuation in 
market leverage ratio even when actual debt level remains unchanged. The book leverage 
measure reduces such mechanical changes.  
Second, book leverage ratio is more suitable to analyse managerial incentive to increase firm 
risk (through borrowing) giving compensation incentives. Again, book leverage values make 
it more preferable to estimate the leverage deviation variable (trade-off theory). Finally, 
adopting the book leverage measure makes the study result easily comparable with the prior 
studies (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010). 
However, although some researchers advance reasons in favour of market leverage, including 
being forward looking and less subject to management manipulation (e.g. Welch, 2006; 
Erickson and Wang, 1999), this study adopts book leverage based on the stated motives. Unless 
 234 
otherwise indicated, book leverage (the term leverage is used throughout the study) is preferred 
over market leverage for the purpose of this analysis. 
Accordingly, we state both measures, book leverage measure and market leverage (for 
comparative purposes). We define the two main measures as follows: 
 
Book Leverage =   «(¬­	®¯°(		«(¬­	®¯°(		±		²««v	³¬­´¯	«µ	¶·´'(¸ ……………………………………….(9.1) 
Where, total debt is defined as long-term debt plus short-term debt, book value of equity is the 
accounting value of common shareholders’ equity (source: Compustat).   
 
Market Leverage = «(¬­	®¯°(		«(¬­	®¯°(		±		¹¬v¯(		³¬­´¯	«µ	¶·´'(¸ …………………………………….(9.2) 
Where, total debt is defined as long-term debt plus short-term debt, market value of equity is 
the stock price at the end of the fiscal year multiplied by the number of common shareholdings 
available. These financial data were sorted from the Compustat database.  
In the next section, we describe the key independent variables (i.e. LTIPs and stock options 
and cash bonus) incentives as well as other control variables.  
 
5.3.2 The key independent variables 
Central to the study’s aim is to provide evidence on the relation between financial leverage and 
executives’ compensation incentives. To achieve this, the study utilised manually collected 
compensation components’ variables – cash bonus, value of stock options, LTIPs (deferred 
stock value plus performance stock value) – from the sampled companies’ annual reports 
spanning 2006 to 2015. Following the Greenbury Report (1995) and Hampel (1998) report, 
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publicly listed companies on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) are mandated to provide 
detailed information on executives compensation packages. The collected data are based on a 
time series of firm years (2006–2015) which in effect allows the contemporary data information 
to accommodate both political and economic changes that have occurred within the stipulated 
sample period. Also, to enable the study to perform a more rigorous econometric analysis, we 
construct our data in a panel data setting. With this design, we are able to reduce survivorship 
bias. The detailed information on sample collections and processes have been discussed in 
chapter 3 (data sample section).   
In fact, as stated earlier, the study applies these different compensation components: cash 
bonus, value of share options, value of LTIPs (performance share value and deferred share 
value) and salary (as control variable). This is because each component has its own distinctive 
feature, and that tends to pose different effects on leverage. The sum of the components 
constitutes the total executives’ compensation.  
As indicated earlier, our key explanatory variables – cash bonus, stock options and LTIPs – 
have already been discussed and defined (in Chapter 2) and so, due to space constraints, we 
only state the measurement of these variables.  
Under this section, we briefly state and define managerial compensation components to be 
utilised in our analysis. These are cash bonus, LTIPs (value of performance shares plus 
restricted shares) stock options and salary (used as control variable). 
5.3.2.1 Cash bonus  
We measure cash bonus ratio as the total of executives’ cash bonus divided by the total 
executives’ compensation.  
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5.3.2.2 Stock options compensation 
This shows the value of share options granted to the executives during the financial year. We 
compute this value using the modified Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation technique. We 
construct the annual stock options grant parameter by dividing total annual stock options value 
to the total compensation. 
5.3.2. 3 Long-term incentive plans (LTIPS) grants 
The LTIPs compensation incentive is the sum of performance shares value and deferred shares 
value. It is measured as the total value of LTIPs grants scaled by the total compensation. 
5.3.2.4 Deferred stock incentive  
This component of compensation is measured as the total value of deferred stock grants scaled 
by the total compensation. 
5.3.2.5 Salary compensation 
This component of compensation shows the total base salary of the executives. This component 
represents managerial risk aversion and it is used as a control variable. As highlighted by 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003), top executives’ salary component has a minimal influence on 
managerial risk behaviour. We measure total salary ratio as a fraction of the total compensation.  
The next subsection proceeds to discuss other control variables that have been found to affect 
financial leverage level.  
 
5.3.3 Other control variables for leverage 
This section provides an explanation for a set of control variables that extant literature on 
corporate leverage shows are linked. Motivated by studies such as Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Frank and Goyal (2004), Coles, Naveen and Daniel (2006), Kini and Williams (2012) among 
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others, we include the following proxies: market-to-book (growth opportunities), firm size, 
return on asset (profitability), net PPE (tangibility), research and development (R&D), Z-score 
(bankruptcy risk), industry effects and year effects. Overall, these control variables are included 
in the leverage model. 
We now provide a brief discussion of these control variables and how they relate to leverage.   
i) Firm size: large firms, compared with small ones, are usually less exposed to agency 
conflicts, because they often have access to a wider variety of financing sources and tend to 
enjoy a better reputation in the bond markets (Diamond, 1993). Moreover, with a relatively 
large tangible assets base, large firms are easily attracted to the financial markets (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Therefore, such financial flexibility makes large 
firms less likely to encounter bankruptcy risks (Hovakimian et al., 2001) and, also they keep 
huge debt in their books. Firm size is proxied by the natural logarithm of sales or log of total 
assets. 
 
ii). Profitability/return on asset (ROA): corporate firms with substantial profits are likely to 
sponsor activities with internal funds instead of external debt (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 
1984). Thus, pecking order theory posits a firm is more likely to use external sources of 
financing only if its internal funds are insufficient (Myers, 1984). Therefore, to the extent that 
internal funds are built from earnings (profits), it is most likely that high-profit firms may use 
less debt (Flanner and Rangan, 2006). Consistent with Coles et al. (2006), we account for this 
effect and compute the firm’s profitability as the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) scaled by total assets.  
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iii). Asset tangibility: as argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
firms with huge tangible assets are more likely to borrow more because they can use their large 
pool of hard assets as collateral security. Also, firms with such substantial assets in place are 
seen by the financial markets as large, and that they are less likely to run into bankruptcy 
(Hovakimian et al., 2001). We control for this effect by including ratio of tangible assets to 
total assets in the model.  
 
iv). Growth opportunities: corporate firms with substantial growth potentials are expected to 
carry out more investment activities (Hayashi, 1982; Hall, 1992). With this, Myers (1977) 
argues that firms with huge growth potentials should decrease their leverage ratio to minimise 
the problem of forgoing positive net present projects (NPV) (i.e. under-investment problem). 
Consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Coles et al. (2006), market-to-book ratio is 
included in our regression model to proxy for growth opportunities. 
      
  v). Research and development expenditure: high-growth opportunity firms tend to spend more 
on research and development. Building on this notion, Uysal (2011) posits that such firms are 
more likely keep a lower debt level in their books. In a relatively different vein, Titman (1984) 
states that such firms may often face a high cost of bankruptcy because they tend to have low 
tangible assets in the overall firm value compositions. Like Coles et al. (2006), we include the 
ratio of research and development expense to total assets in the model. 
 
vi). Financial distress (Z-score): we apply a modified Altman Z-score (proposed by Mackie-
Mason, 1990) to measure the expected bankruptcy of the firm. This tends to suggest that firms 
with a high bankruptcy risk are likely to avoid further debt finance in order to reduce their 
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bankruptcy exposure (Titman, 1984; Harford et al., 2009). Consistent with Chava and 
Purnanandam (2010) and Coles et al. (2006), we measure the firm’s financial health using the 
modified Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1977) measure. We define it as follows: [3.3 (EBIT/Total 
Assets) + 1.0 (Sales/Total Assets) + 1.4 (Retained Profits/Total Assets) + 1.2 (Working 
Capital/Total Assets)].   
 
vii). Stock returns: market timing theory of capital structure posits that firms tend to use equity 
financing particularly when their shares are over-valued by the market. Such strategic financing 
decisions may lead to less debt usage (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Therefore, leverage ratio and 
stock return are predicted to be negatively related. We use 12-month average monthly stock 
return as a proxy for stock return. 
 
 viii). Industry fixed effect: we control for the industry homogenous and heterogeneous effect 
in our leverage model. Specifically, a dummy variable is included in the model to account for 
all nine (9) industries. This is because firms operating in such a category may have some 
common characteristics. Consistent with Coles et al. (2006), we use a two-digit SIC code to 
proxy industry concentration. For brevity purposes, we do not report the industry coefficient 
estimates in our presentation and analyses.  
 
ix). Time dummies: it is conceivable that a country’s macroeconomic conditions could fluctuate 
over time and such changes can affect a firm’s borrowing behaviour. In order to account for 
and capture the effects including interest rates and inflation rates which occur within and across 
different years, we include a year dummy in the model for the sample period (2006-2015). To 
be specific, Hardford (2005) argues that the interest rate spread which to some extent represents 
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a general liquidity indicator in the economy partly influences corporate debt level. Moreover, 
to minimise the perfect collinearity problem in our regression analysis, we exclude the base 
year (2006) dummy from the regression. For brevity purposes, the coefficients estimates are 
not reported in our presentations and analyses of the results.  In summary, this section has 
clearly exhausted the variables (e.g. dependent, key explanatory and controls) to be utilised to 
conduct our empirical analysis in Table 5.3.1. 
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Table 5.3 1 Definition of Dependent, Independent and Control Variables 
 
Dependent Variables Description Literature 
Book leverage  
Total debt = long-term debt plus 
short-term debt scaled by Total 
Assets  
Coles et al. 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012 
Market leverage  Total Debt divided by the (Equity book value + Equity Market value) Coles et al. 2006 
Independent compensation variables 
Long-term incentive plan (LTIPs) Total value: performance stock plus 
deferred stock scaled by total 
compensation 
Kabir et al. 2013  
Performance stock (PS) 
Sum of performance share awards, 
share matching plan scaled by total 
compensation 
Kabir et al. 2013 
Deferred / restricted stock (DS) 
Total face value: deferred 
shares/stock scaled by total 
compensation.  
Kabir et al. 2013; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001 
Cash bonus (CashB) Total annual cash bonus scaled by total compensation   Kabir et al. 2013; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001 
Executive share options (ESO) 
Total share options value (using 
Black and Scholes,1973). Share 
options value divided by total 
compensation 
Kabir et al. 2013; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001 
Total compensation  Sum value: salary, cash bonus, share options and LTIPs.  Kabir et al. 2013 
 
Control variables 
Salary (SAL) 
Total of base salary, allowances, 
benefits (monitory value) divided by 
total compensation 
Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist, 2010; Chen et 
al. 2016.  
Firm Size (Size) Natural logarithm of total sales Coles et al. 2006 
Market-to-book (MKTB) Defined as market value of assets divided by their book value.  
Floarackis et al. 2009; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010 
Return on assets (ROA) EBITDA/Total Assets Coles et al. 2006 
Annual stock return (STKR) Annual stock return (12-months)  Coles et al. 2006 
Tangibility (net PPE) Net Property, Plant and Equipment/ Total Assets Coles et al. 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012 
Research & Development (R&D) R & D Expense / Total Asset Coles et al. (2006) 
Bankruptcy risk (Z-score) 
[ 3.3 (EBIT / Total Assets) + 1.0 
(Sales/Total Assets) + 1.4 (Retained 
Profits/Total Assets) + 1.2 (Working 
Capital/Total Assets)] 
Coles et al. (2006) 
Industry & Year fixed effect Dummy variable of 1 otherwise 0 Coles et al. (2006) 
 
Other independent variables 
Large Ownership (%) (Large Own) 
Shareholdings of owners above 3% 
scaled by the total common 
shareholdings 
Florackis et al. 2009; Ryan and Wiggins, 
2001; Core et al. 1999 
Non-executives ownership (%) (Non 
E.Own) 
 
Annual shareholdings of non-
executives divided by the firm’s 
total common shareholding.  
Mehran, 1995 
Executives Ownership (%) (E.Own) 
Annual executives shareholdings 
scaled by common shareholdings. 
Florackis et al. 2009; Ryan and Wiggins, 
2001; Core et al. 1999 
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5.3.4 Empirical leverage specification 
As stated, the two key variables (dependent and independent variables) are likely to be 
interdependent, which may affect the study’s findings when a conventional single equation 
model is employed. In dealing with this inherent interdependence among these variables, the 
study adopts a system of equations model approach. Specifically, the structural specification 
develops four (4) equations, one each for the three independent variables (LTIPs, stock options 
and cash bonus) and one for the respective leverage measure. 
Structurally, the specification employed is stated as follows. Thus, the four simultaneous 
equations used to test the developed hypotheses (in Chapter 2) are specified below: 
 
𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑠'(	=		𝛽++𝛽,𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒'( +	𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'(+ 𝛽;𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡'( + ∈'(……………..…...…....…....… (1) 
𝐸𝑆𝑂'(	=		𝛽++𝛽,𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒'( +	𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'(+ 𝛽;𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡'( + ∈'(………….….………...…….....… (2) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐵'(	=		𝛽++𝛽,𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒'( +	𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'(+ 𝛽;𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡'( + ∈'(…………………..….…....… (3) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒'(		=	𝛼++𝛼,𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑠'( + 𝛼6𝐸𝑆𝑂'( +	𝛼;𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐵'( +	𝛼J𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'(+ 	∈'(…………..…… (9) 
where, in Eq. (9), 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒'(		 is the firm leverage (i.e. book leverage measure), incentive 
components (LTIPs, ESO and CashB) are predicted values from the first-stage model, where 
each pay component (Eq. 1, 2, and 3) is regressed on the determinants (e.g. leverage, 
investment, firm size, growth etc. defined above) to obtain the equilibrium compensation value, 
which is used in the second-stage leverage model, controls are other factors that affect firm’s 
leverage: firm size, market-to-book, stock return, return on assets, Z-score, net PPE, R&D 
expense, industry effects and year effects.  
Detailed explanations of the firm’s observable characteristics (controls) are provided in Table 
(5.3.1). Also, it is important to state that we are interested in the sign, magnitude and 
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significance of		𝑎,, 𝑎6 and 𝑎; as they show the extent of association between managerial 
financial compensation and leverage.  
 
5.4 Analytical procedure 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the causal relationship between a firm’s observed 
leverage ratio and its managerial compensation packages. In an attempt to achieve this aim, we 
adopt an empirical strategy similar to Coles et al. (2006) and Kini and Williams (2012) but also 
make a further extension to their approach. Specifically, the study employs a system of 
equations approach to analyse our unbalanced pooled dataset to statistically examine the effects 
of executive compensation incentives on leverage ratio. More specifically, we employ a three-
stage least squares (3SLS) identification strategy to our panel data.  
As noted, the empirical studies on executive compensation and leverage often highlight 
endogeneity concerns (Kini and Williams, 2012; Coles et al., 2006). For instance, Kini and 
Williams (2012) argue that executive compensation, leverage and other characteristics are all 
ultimately part of a simultaneous system to determine corporate value. Such interdependence 
among these corporate variables makes it a daunting task to establish a causal association 
because of the endogeneity problem. As already indicated, endogeneity occurs when an 
unmodelled variable is correlated with the dependent variable and the explanatory variable(s) 
and/or the random error term. Therefore, noting the study’s primary aim (i.e. establish a causal 
link between executive compensation and leverage), it is expected that the estimated coefficient 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) would be biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2002; 
Gujurati and Porter, 2009 p.711; Antonakis et al., 2014). This, in turn, can lead to the wrong 
causal inference among dependent (leverage) and independent (compensation incentives) 
variables (Wooldridge, 2002; Antonakis et al., 2014). 
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As noted by previous research (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012), the 
simultaneous system of equations technique makes it possible for models with endogenous 
regressors to be consistently and robustly estimated. Consistent with Coles et al. (2006), we 
apply a three-stage least squares (3SLS) method to generate efficient parameter estimates by 
removing the portion of variance connected to the explanatory variable(s) and the dependent 
variable or the error term.    
In fact, two key steps are involved in our estimation: first, in the first-stage regression, we 
regress the endogenous regressor (e.g. value of component of incentive grants: LTIPs, stock 
options and cash bonus) on all instruments including book leverage, relevant instrumental 
variables and other exogenous, i.e. control variables for compensation variables to obtain 
predicted compensation values; and, secondly, we replace predicted compensation values in 
the right-hand side as our key explanatory variable in the original leverage model together with 
other control factors that affect leverage level. It is worth mentioning that we use a 
contemporaneous value of the compensation components (LTIPs, stock options and cash 
bonus) to conform to the basic reasoning underlying simultaneous equations. This is consistent 
with existing studies (see Kini and Williams, 2012; Coles et al., 2006). And, finally, we regress 
leverage on the predicted compensation values and other control variables. The coefficient 
estimate for the predicted compensation values is our parameter of interest.   
Specifically, we show the procedures involved in the use of the three-stages least squares 
(3SLS) estimator by stating both the leverage model and the endogenous regressor equations. 
More specifically, as stated above (leverage model), the four equations consisting of one 
equation for leverage and one equation for each of the executives’ compensation variable 
(LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) to derive the predicted values for the pay component to 
be used in the original leverage model. The chosen system is similar in structure to the prior 
literature (e.g. Coles et al., 2006) specification with slight modifications. For example, our 
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incentive model tests for over-identifying restrictions instead of just-identifying strategy 
employed by the previous researcher. By this, we are able to account for a large number of 
control variables and instruments that have been found to explain executive compensation, 
which in turn improves the efficiency of the parameter estimates.  
The study’s chosen statistical tool (STATA) is used to analyse the panel dataset. In STATA, the 
structural modelling is set up as demonstrated above, where there is one equation each for the 
three incentive components and one equation for the leverage and then a three-stage least 
squares estimator is applied to run the regression analysis. Before we proceed to the three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) regression, the next section shows primary data analyses.  
 
 
5.5 Data analysis 
 
This part provides the analysis of the sampled datasets. It shows the descriptive statistics, 
correlation matrix and the univariate analyses.  
 
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table (5.3.2) shows the descriptive statistics of the study’s main sample and subsamples. The 
dependent variable, leverage shows a wide variation, which ranges from -0.0712 to 4.69, with 
an average (standard deviation) of 0.3585 (0.246), which implies that our sample firms display 
some variation in their leverage. Salary (SAL) ranges from £120,000 to £9,160,000 with an 
average (standard deviation) of £1,414,000 (759.85), cash bonus (CashB) from £0 to 
£15,586,000 and shows an average (standard deviation) of £1,105,000 (1204.5), stock options 
(ESO) from £0.00 to £29,233,000 with an average (standard deviation) of £324,000 (1286.1), 
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whilst LTIPs ranges from £0.00 to £61,547,000 with an average (standard deviation) of 
£3,024,000 (4190.2). Overall, with the high standard deviation, our compensation components 
data show a significant variation. Furthermore, for other characteristics: R&D shows this range, 
-0.3044 to 0.412, with an average (standard deviation) of 0.006 (0.031), tangibility (net PPE) 
ranges from 0 to 0.935, with an average (standard deviation) of 0.238 (0.227), return on asset 
(ROA) has an average (standard deviation) of 0.099 (0.181), annual stock return (STKR) an 
average (standard deviation) of 0.096 (0.512), market-to-book (MKTB) also has an average 
(standard deviation) of 4.10 (1.411), whilst firm size (Size) and Z-score averages are 9.01 
(0.859) and 1.53 (1.22) respectively. Regarding governance variables: executive ownership 
(E.Owen), non-executive ownership (NonE.Own) and large ownership (Large Own) averages 
(standard deviation) are 4.7% (0.223), 2.05% (0.127) and 39.3% (18.89) respectively. The 
reported findings show that our data composition is widely varied.   
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Table 5.3 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Median  Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Dependent variables   
      
Book leverage 1,899 0.3585 0.3581 0.2468 -0.0712 4.6917 
Market leverage 1,899 0.2458 0.2401 0.2974 -0.0658 1.0006 
 
Compensation variables    
    
SAL (£’000) 1,899 1414 1227 759.8 120 9160 
CashB (£’000) 1,899 1105 836 1201.5 0 15586 
ESO (£’000) 1,899 324 0 1288.1 0 29233 
DS (£’000) 1,899 934 263 2142.7 0 35564 
PS (£’000) 1,899 2089 1327 3010.0 0 49425 
LTIPs (£’000) 1,899 3024 1715 4190.3 0 61547 
Total compensation (£’000)  1,899 5868 4144 5471.5 120 63296 
 Firm characteristics       
R & D 1,887 0.0064 0 0.0308 -0.3044 0.4127 
Net PPE 1,820 0.2402 0.1709 0.2283 0 0.9354 
ROA 1,871 0.0992 0.0904 0.1818 -3.9170 2.8286 
STKR 1,877 0.0603 0.0961 0.5124 -5.4563 6.8998 
MKTB 1,894 9.1892 1.4453 77.7421 0.000 15.684 
Z-Score 1,899 1.5391 1.4933 1.2246 -13.6644 16.9188 
Size 1,829 9.0146 9.0022 0.8598 0 11.5067 
 Gov. proxy &instruments       
E.Own (%) 1,869 4.78 0.22 0.2233 0 6.063 
Non.EOwn (%) 1,843 2.06 0.03 0.1268 0 3.508 
Large Own (%) 1,854 39.28 37.64 18.8988 0 85.07 
CEO age 1,557 52 52 6.3634 36 73 
CFO age 1,438 49 50 5.8161 32 65 
Ex.Av. Age 1,402 50 51 5.3114 34 65 
DPO 1,852 0.6165 1 0.4893 0 1 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the entire data used for the study. The sample comprises 213 UK 
FTSE 350 firms over the period 2006 to 2015. Instruments are Ex.Av.Age, STKRV and DPO are included in the 
first-stage model (incentive model). The variable descriptions are provided in Table 5.3.1. 
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Table 5.3 3 Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13   14   15     16   
1 SAL 1.000              
2 cashB -0.171 1.000             
3 ESO -0.048 -0.128 1.000            
4 LTIPs -0.495 -0.234 -0.119 1.000           
5 STKR -0.077 0.095 0.049 -0.121 1.000          
6 MKTB -0.083 -0.003 -0.004 0.117 0.003 1.000         
7 ROA 0.002 0.062 -0.002 -0.035 0.197 -0.032 1.000        
8 Net PPE 0.125 -0.156 -0.054 0.056 -0.029 -0.072 0.060 1.000       
9 R&D 0.042 0.057 -0.030 -0.059 0.026 -0.007 0.039 -0.077 1.000      
10 Z-Score 0.051 0.026 -0.007 -0.098 0.096 0.033 0.599 0.020 0.056 1.000     
11 Size -0.319 -0.226 -0.091 0.530 -0.054 -0.156 0.039 0.180 -0.042 0.198 1.000    
12 E.Own 0.328 0.012 0.015 -0.135 -0.011 -0.028 0.049 0.002 0.013 -0.012 -0.207 1.000   
13 Large Own 0.326 0.165 0.008 -0.343 -0.032 -0.056 -0.010 0.072 -0.041 0.053 -0.364 0.440 1.000  
14 Non Own 0.185 -0.025 -0.051 -0.117 -0.015 -0.017 0.056 0.098 -0.049 0.059 -0.049 -0.028 0.214 1.000 
15 CEO age -0.003 -0.009 0.003 0.090 0.003 0.109 -0.036 -0.052 0.039 -0.072 0.021 -0.074 0.002 0.036    1  
16 CFO age 0.017 -0.028 -0.062 0.027 0.020 -0.026 0.032 -0.113 0.050 0.026 0.128 0.123 0.040 -0.007 0.315  1 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the sample data. The sample and variable definitions are as described 
in Table 5.3.1.  
 
Table 5.3.3 shows the correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables included in the 
second stage of the book leverage model. The table reported a highest correlation value of 
0.599 (59.9%) between bankruptcy risk (Z-score) and return on asset (ROA). The relatively 
low correlation among these independent variables is very important for the efficiency of our 
findings.  
The next subsection provides further analysis (univariate) of how the executives’ compensation 
and firm characteristics behave across the different levels of firm leverage. We first conduct 
this univariate analysis before we move on to discuss the three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
estimator results.  
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5.5.2 Univariate analysis 
 
Table (5.4.1) shows univariate mean and standard deviation comparisons of firm- and manager-
specific characteristics by leverage quartiles. In order to perform this, we segregate firms into 
quartiles based on their leverage level and test whether the firm- and manager-related 
characteristics differ across low leverage (1st quartile) and high leverage (4th quartile). For the 
compensation components, it shows that the mean cash-based incentive (salary and cash bonus) 
in low-leverage firms is higher than that in high-leverage firms. In particular, the mean 
differences for salary and cash bonus are significant at 5% and 1% respectively. This is 
plausible, because low-leverage firms spend less on interest payment, which in turn will give 
them a leeway to store enough cash balance and can motivate managers receiving more cash 
bonus or upward annual salary adjustment than high-leverage ones. Further, executives’ stock 
options in low-leverage firms has a mean value of 6.5% compared to 4.9% for high-leverage 
firms, which posits that shareholders of highly leveraged firms lower stock options to minimise 
further risk-taking incentive. Shareholders in high-leverage firms use more LTIPs relative to 
low-leverage ones, and the mean difference is economically significant at 1% level.  
Moreover, the findings on other firm characteristics are largely consistent with most of the 
extant literature. For instance, it shows that low-leverage firms are normally smaller, have 
lower tangible assets, higher performance (return on assets and stock return) as well as higher 
market-to-book ratio than high-leverage firms and they have significant differences in means. 
It is also observed that low-leverage firms usually have larger R&D spending than the high-
leverage ones.  
The table further reveals that the executives ownership in low-leverage firms has a mean value 
of 7.4%, compares to 3% for high-leverage firms, suggesting over 100% higher in mean 
differences than that of high-leverage ones. The significantly different executives ownership 
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levels seem to be consistent with the managerial entrenchment argument, which suggests that 
executive managers become entrenched after a specific level of executives ownership, and may 
choose to have a level of leverage that is lower than the optimal level to prevent further 
monitoring activities from the debtholders (Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). The analysis also 
shows that the mean large ownership in low-leverage firms is higher than that in high-leverage 
firms, and the difference is economically and statistically significant. It tends to imply that 
large shareholders become cautious of the firm’s risk level and may prefer to lower their 
holdings as the firm’s leverage reaches an extreme level. However, the level of non-executives 
ownership does not seem to differ significantly across both the first and fourth quartiles. 
Similar findings were also observed for both CEO and CFO age.  
In brief, the univariate analysis provides evidence to show how compensation incentives, 
monitoring mechanism (non-executives ownership, large ownership) and other firm 
characteristics behave across different leverage levels (1st and 4th quartiles). However, one 
caveat of this result is that the analysis does not effectively account for other control variables, 
and that the reported existing relations may be instigated by some unaccounted factors. The 
next section performs the 3SLS analysis by accounting for the control variables in the 
regression analyses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 251 
Table 5.4 1 Managerial and Firm Characteristics by Leverage Quartiles 
            Quartile 1  Quartile 4       t-test  
    
SAL   0.348 0.326       2.12** 
             [0.17]             [0.15]  
CashB             0.211 0.184       3.32*** 
             [0.13]             [0.11]  
ESO             0.065 0.049       1.81* 
             [0.15]             [0.12]  
LTIPs              0.375             0.440      -4.69*** 
             [0.22]                        [0.20]  
MKTB             21.699           10.472       1.60 
             [148.30]             [39.00]  
Size             8.662 9.079       -7.24*** 
             [0.68] [0.98]  
ROA             0.126             0.080       2.90*** 
             [0.12]             [0.32]  
STKR             0.106             0.034        2.05** 
             [0.48]             [0.56]   
Z-Score              1.459 1.539       -0.84 
   [0.96] [1.81]  
Net PPE             0.215             0.242      -1.80* 
             [0.23]              [0.23]  
R & D 0.008 0.003       4.39*** 
             [0.02]             [0.01]  
E.Own              0.074             0.030       3.46*** 
  [0.16]             [0.22]  
NonE.Own             0.016             0.023     -0.82 
  [0.067]             [0.17]  
Large Own             43.085             37.473      4.48*** 
             [20.54]             [17.45]  
CEO age   51.438             51.235       0.81 
  [7.43]             [6.61]  
CFO age              49.418             49.350       0.15 
 [6.11]             [5.62]  
The table above provides univariate mean comparisons of both firm-specific and managers incentives 
characteristics by leverage (dependent variable) quartiles (normal font) and standard deviation (in square 
brackets). The t-statistics show the difference of means from the first (1st) to the fourth (4th) quartiles. The column 
(4) shows t-tests of whether the means of quartiles 1 and 4 differ statistically (Ho: mean (1) − mean (4) = 0; H1 : 
the diff 6=0). Definitions for all the variables are shown in table 5.3.1. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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5.6 Empirical results and discussions – Three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
In fact, the univariate regression analysis shows a significant relation between leverage and 
executives’ compensation. However, the specification (univariate) fails to account for several 
important factors that may affect leverage behaviour. Our chosen system of equations accounts 
for the additional control variables and estimates them using a 3SLS technique.  
As indicated earlier, the estimation follows two important procedures. First, in the first-stage 
regression analysis, we estimate each compensation component incentive as the dependent 
variable on a set of control and instrumental variables to obtain the predicted incentive values. 
In the second-stage regression, our dependent variable is firm book leverage (i.e. unless 
otherwise stated) regressed on the fitted or predicted incentive value (which is the parameter 
of interest: LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus), salary and other control variables that are 
relevant in determining corporate leverage. Our base estimated model is like Coles et al. (2006) 
and Kini and Williams (2012) but with some modifications. For instance, the present study 
treats cash bonus as endogenously determined, different from Coles et al. (2006), who included 
cash-related compensation as a control for managerial risk aversion. Our stated reason is that 
shareholders consider other factors before awarding executives cash bonuses (Ryan and 
Wiggins, 2001; Humphery-Jenner et al., 2016) and that failing to accommodate these in the 
modelling design could biased the estimates. However, we only include salary in the leverage 
model to represent managerial risk aversion. 
More specifically, the presented result in Table (5.4.2) shows four specifications (leverage, 
LTIPs stock options and cash bonus) and their coefficient estimates of the respective model. 
Accordingly, our discussion is organised in this order: leverage analysis, control variables and, 
finally, the pay component regression.   
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5.6.1 Discussion of financial leverage findings 
 
In Table (5.4.2), the leverage column presents the regression results for our second-stage 
specification. Specifically, we find that the coefficient on LTIPs (0.3480 t-statistics 7.74) 
incentive is positive and statistically significant at 1% significance level. A one standard 
deviation change in LTIPs incentives is, on average, associated with a 34.8% increase in book 
leverage. In other words, a firm’s debt ratio increases with the managerial LTIPs incentive. 
The result suggests that shareholders tend to use the managerial LTIPs component of 
compensation to induce executive managers to increase firm idiosyncratic risk by contracting 
more corporate debt to sponsor all positive net present value projects. Therefore, the effect of 
LTIPs compensation on the corporate debt increase may be an outcome of shareholders’ value-
maximisation motives, particularly when managers are risk averse (e.g. Harris and Raviv, 
1988; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). This, in turn, supports the popular view that shareholders 
in a high-levered firm can expropriate wealth from debtholders (bondholders or other creditors) 
by inducing managers to increase debt level, which in turn increase the firm’s stock price value 
but decrease bond value (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One implication, however, is that 
such a risk-shifting incentive can lead to agency cost of debt finance, in which shareholders 
would ultimately bear the full costs (John and John, 1993; Ortiz-Molina, 2007). More 
specifically, it suggests that, as a firm’s leverage ratio goes up, rational lenders, institutional 
creditors and other debtholders may become wary of possible financial distress or bankruptcy 
risk (Grossman and Hart, 1982), which in part may influence them to demand a high cost of 
capital before they lend to such firms, or perhaps they may even enter into a restrictive covenant 
with the firm on future loan acquisition if the loan agreement is already in place. 
On the other hand, the stock options incentive shows an inverse relation with leverage. Thus, 
the estimated coefficient on share options is -0.5269 (t-statistics -9.06) and it is both 
economically and statistically significant at 1% conventional level. The finding suggests that, 
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as managers receive more stock option-based incentives, their risk appetite or preference 
decreases, causing them to lower corporate debt level, which is constant with Hayes et al. 
(2012) but inconsistent with the fundamental intuition regarding the stock options incentive 
package (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Kini and Williams, 2012). 
Although the coefficient is directly opposite the risk-motivated story of the stock options 
incentive, the following could constitute a possible explanation of the negative relationship. 
One reason could be linked to the fact that managers with high-powered stock options may 
tend to develop a risk-aversion incentive particularly when their stock options value is in the 
money and may decide to avoid further increase in overall risk profile of the firm, thereby 
decreasing the corporate debt ratio (Lewellen, 2003, 2006). This raises a serious concern to 
shareholders whose primary intention is to significantly influence managers to borrow more to 
invest in all positive net present projects via stock options compensation. This is because, as 
managers’ residual interest reaches the optimal point (thus, once managers share options are in 
the money), their risk appetite to use more debt finance reduces, which increases the likelihood 
of managers forgoing some positive investment projects particularly when internally generated 
funds are insufficient to sponsor such activities. Another alternative explanation of the result 
could be suggestive of Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Weisbach’s (2007) managerial rent 
extraction motive, because executive managers often have discretionary power to make 
adjustments to their share options portfolio (Coles et al., 2006) especially when their firm’s 
stock price takes a tumble and falls below their share options exercised price. Given the 
monitoring power of debtholders, entrenched managers are less likely to positively respond to 
the convexity nature of the stock options incentive.  
Similarly, we also document a negative relationship between cash compensation and firm 
financial leverage. To be specific, the coefficient estimate on cash bonus is -0.1719 (t-stats -
2.81) and significant at 1% conventional level. This is consistent with the stated hypothesis. 
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The result can be interpreted to suggest that managers of non-financially constrained (low-
leverage) firms tend to receive more cash bonuses, which is consistent with the prior research 
(e.g. Core and Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006). This is plausible, given that managers of low-
leverage firms are able to store up substantial cash reserves via high earnings and lower interest 
payments, which in turn makes it more probable for executives to meet the required accounting 
performance threshold (e.g. earnings, cash surplus performance measure) set by the 
shareholders. However, a major implication of the finding is that, by using accounting 
performance measure, managers may be more inclined to decrease firm debt ratio particularly 
in a low corporate governance environment.  
Overall, it is worth mentioning that the reported coefficient estimate on cash bonus provides a 
strong support to our hypothesis that more managerial cash bonus partly leads to lower firm 
leverage ratio. In other words, with more cash bonus compensation, managerial idiosyncratic 
risk-taking regarding the firm’s debt level is significantly reduced, providing further support 
to our earlier stated inference. 
 
5.6.1.1 Control variables 
The results for the control variables in the leverage model are largely consistent with prior 
findings (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Coles et al., 2006; Dang, 2011), 
with little modification. Specifically, our control proxies include salary, return on assets, firm 
size, market-to-book, Z-score, annual stock return, net PPE, and R&D expense, and their 
reported coefficient signs are shown in column (1) of the leverage equation.  
First, consistent with the expectation, managerial risk-aversion proxy, salary is negative and 
statistically significant on leverage. With the coefficient estimates (-0.1225 t-statistics -3.89), 
it implies that higher salary earners are often risk averse and may tend to hold a low leverage 
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ratio on the firm’s balance sheets. 
Second, the coefficient estimate on return on assets (-0.1406 t-statistics -1.91) is found to be 
negatively and significantly related to the book leverage. This is in line with the view that 
managers of firms with high internal funds (through profits and cash surplus) tend to only use 
debt finance after they have exhausted their internal funds. It suggests that firms follow a 
pecking order pattern when faced with financing decisions (see Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2006).  
Third, the estimate on firm size is positive 0.0336 (t-stats 2.08) and significant. It suggests that 
larger firms are more likely to have a high debt ratio in their books (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2006). This is because such firms often enjoy these characteristics: stable 
cash flow and more diversified in operations (Hovakimian et al., 2001), and they easily attract 
the attention of the capital markets (Rajan and Zingales, 1995), which in turn allows them the 
leeway to borrow more from the debt market.  
Fourth, we report that the market-to-book, which proxies for growth opportunity, is positive 
and significant at 1% conventional level, implying that high-growth firms tend to have a high 
debt ratio level. This is consistent with Kester (1986) but inconsistent with Myers (1977) and 
Titman and Wessels (1988). For instance, Myers (1977) vehemently argues that high-growth 
firms should keep a low leverage ratio to prevent future under-investment problems.    
Fifth, as expected, the Z-score shows a positive sign and significant. This seems to suggest that 
firm’s bankruptcy risk and high debt level move in tandem, which implies that a high Z-score 
increases a firm’s financial distress and possible bankruptcy risk (Titman, 1984; Harford et al., 
2009).   
Sixth, stock return is negatively related to leverage, which suggests that firms experiencing 
abnormal share price appreciation tend to use stocks to finance investment activities instead of 
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borrowing. This is consistent with the market timing hypothesis (e.g. Lucas and McDonald, 
1990; Uysal, 2011). However, with its low significance level, our inference should be taken 
with this caveat in mind.  
Also, net PPE is negative and statistically significant. It shows that firms with large collateral 
assets are likely to acquire less debt finance, which is inconsistent with prior findings (e.g. 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Finally, on the R&D investment, we find a negative effect of R&D expenditure on book 
leverage. This follows a simple argument that, because high R&D firms tend to enjoy greater 
growth opportunities, they tend to hold low leverage in their books (Uysal, 2011). Another 
alternative explanation is that, because such R&D firms often have low assets tangibility, a 
long investment horizon and are largely invested in people and product development, they are 
less likely to attract the confidence of the debt markets, hence there is a low leverage status for 
high R&D firms. However, our reported coefficient estimate is insignificant.   
 
5.6.1.2 Discussion of results for LTIPs/Equity determinants 
The results reported in Table (5.4.2) column (LTIPs) show the component of LTIP 
determinants, which includes firm-related characteristics, governance factors and other 
executives’ characteristics.   
Specifically, the estimated coefficients on salary (0.0495) and cash bonus (0.0248) are both 
positive, suggesting a simultaneous usage of cash-based and LTIPs. It further implies that the 
board of directors jointly utilize cash-based and LTIPs incentives to motivate managers, which 
is inconsistent with Coles et al.’s (2006) substitution explanation.  
 In contrast, the coefficient on stock options (-0.0386 t-statistics -8.16) is negative and 
significant, consistent with substitution effect hypothesis (Coles et al., 2006). The results show 
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that corporate boards of directors simultaneously choose to use these components: LTIPs, stock 
options and cash bonus incentives. 
Further, these firm-related characteristics show a positive correlation on LTIPs incentive: firm 
size, capital expenditure, fixed intangible, cash flow, stock return and leverage. For instance, 
the statistically significant coefficient (0.0551) on firm size shows that larger firms use a 
greater LTIPs component to reward their executives. It is also consistent with the view that, as 
a firm grows or expands (either organically or inorganically), managerial operational activities 
become more complex, which can lead to possible agency conflicts of interest. Therefore, to 
mitigate this possible conflict, the board may tend to use a greater LTIPs component to align 
both shareholder and manager common interests. Again, it can also be argued that, because 
larger firms often seek to attract and retain high-quality managerial talents, they are more likely 
to reward executives generously with LTIPs incentive (Core et al., 1999; Basu et al., 2007; 
Amoako-Adu et al., 2011). Regarding investment opportunities such as capital expenditure and 
fixed intangible, we find a positive effect on LTIPs incentive and the estimated coefficients are 
0.0912 (t-statistics 3.15) and 0.0883 (t-statistics 2.63) respectively. It supports the argument 
that shareholders use more LTIPs rewards to control the managerial incentive problem and 
encourage them to allocate resources into these growth activities (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; 
Humphery-Jenner et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017). Additionally, LTIPs is positively dependant 
on leverage, which suggests an incentive alignment proposition. It tends to imply that 
shareholders use equity (LTIPs) to minimise managers’ aversion to risk. This finding is 
inconsistent with Ryan and Wiggins (2001). However, market-to-book and R&D are negatives 
but lack of statistical significance.  
In addition, others including executives ownership, large ownership, executive average age, 
and dividend pay-out are negatively related to managerial LTIPs awards. To be specific, the 
coefficient estimates for executives ownership (-0.1109), large ownership (-0.0012), executive 
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age (-0.0002), and dividend pay-out (-0.0130). Thus, executives ownership result is consistent 
with the shareholders’ intention to reduce the managerial entrenchment effect (Ryan and 
Wiggins, 2001), whilst large ownership implies that the block-owners provide an extra 
monitoring role on managerial activities, hence less LTIPs incentive is needed to motivate 
managers (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Amoako Adu et al., 2011). The non-executives’ 
ownership is positive but lacks statistical significance. 
The dividend pay-out and executive average age show a negative sign on LTIPs incentive and 
are both statistically insignificant. For instance, the finding implies that through LTIPs 
incentive, risk-averse managers tend to reduce cash hoarding and make appropriate dividend 
pay-out especially when firms have no investment opportunities (Fenn and Liang (2001; Bates 
et al., 2009). Also, the reported negative coefficient on executive average age tends to suggest 
the board’s intention to lower LTIPs awards as executives become older, which is consistent 
with Yermack (1995) but inconsistent with the managerial horizon hypothesis (Kole, 1997; 
Gibbons and Murphy, 1993).  
In fact, it is worth indicating that the introduction of these instruments in our model helps to 
improve our coefficient estimates. One significant structural model change of this study is that 
we employ over-identifying restrictions, different from the previous works’ just-identifying 
approach (see Coles et al., 2006). The Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 
shows that our model is properly specified, and it does not suffer misspecification problem.  
 
5.6.1.3 Discussion of results for the stock options determinants 
Column (ESO) of Table (5.4.2) reports stock options results in the first-stage regression 
analysis. As expected, salary is both significantly and negatively related to stock options, which 
supports the substitution assumption (Coles et al., 2006; Guay, 1999). The result means that 
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shareholders’ upward adjustment of executives salary leaves a cut in stock options rewards. 
Similarly, supporting the substitution effect, LTIPs and cash bonus estimates all show negative 
signs with LTIPs statistically significant at 1% levels.    
The other firm-related determinants such as R&D, capital expenditure, fixed intangible, 
leverage, cash flow, and dividend payment dummy all show negative coefficient estimates. In 
particular, R&D decreases with stock options, which is inconsistent with the prior studies 
(Humphery-Jenner et al., 2016; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001) but consistent with Bizjak et al. 
(1993). The highly significant coefficient estimates on capital expenditure (CAPEX) and fixed 
intangible could imply shareholders’ intention to disincentivise managers using the share 
options reward. Thus, firms with high CAPEX and fixed intangible activity use fewer share 
options to reward managers. Likewise, firms experiencing high cash flow utilise fewer share 
options incentives to compensate top executives.  
The leverage is negatively related to stock options, implying that shareholders of highly levered 
firms tend to lower high-powered stock options rewards (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Humphery-
Jenner et al., 2016;). This can be due to the fact that the extra monitoring role played by 
debtholders or lenders forcefully induces managers to act in the best interest of the owners, 
hence there is no added incentive to use a share options incentive (Jensen, 1986; Williamson, 
1988). In fact, this issue will be given special attention in the second-stage leverage regression 
analysis section.    
In contrast, firm size, stock return, market-to-book and stock return Volatility are positive and 
statistically significant except stock return volatility. A simple explanation is that high-growth 
and large-size firms tend to apply more share options to motivate managers, consistent with 
prior findings (see e.g. Kole, 1991; Bizjak et al., 1993; Humphery-Jenner et al., 2016). It also 
suggests that, because high-growth and large firms are often confronted with much bigger 
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agency issues, shareholders of these firms apply more share options to align both shareholders’ 
and agents’ common interests.  
Among the monitoring proxies, large ownership is negative and significant at 1% confidence 
level, whilst non-executive ownership is also negative but lacks statistical explanatory power. 
Collectively, the findings support the monitoring hypothesis (Amoako-Adu et al., 2011; Basu 
et al., 2007; Mehran, 1995). It tends to suggest that the presence and effective monitoring by 
large shareholders and outside board of directors help minimise interest divergence among 
managers–shareholders, leading to a lower share options incentive alignment package. In a 
similar vein, executives’ ownership is negative, which is consistent with the assumption that 
executives with a high ownership stake require fewer stock options in their compensation 
package. In other words, shareholders reduce managerial share options awards to prevent a 
managerial entrenchment incentive (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). 
The coefficient estimates on instruments: executive average age and dividend pay-out are 
negative with only dividend pay-out that shows statistical significance. Thus, the low usage of 
share options by high dividend pay-out firms could be attributed to the fact that these 
unconstrained firms with high available cash flow are likely to motivate managers using cash 
compensation and also make further pay-out to shareholders (Lambert et al., 1989; Core et al., 
1999; Fenn and Liang, 2001). 
 
5.6.1.4 Discussion of results for the cash bonus determinants 
Column (CashB) of Table (5.4.2) provides evidence on cash compensation determinants. The 
coefficient estimates on salary (0.0106), LTIPs (0.0244) are all positive, implying simultaneous 
determination of the executives’ pay package. However, stock options (-0.0060) is negative 
and significant.  
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The firm-specific characteristics including firm size, leverage and capital expenditure are all 
negatively associated with cash bonus. More explicitly, large firms pay less cash bonus to top 
executives. This could possibly mean that, because larger businesses constantly engage in 
expansion activities and are often attractive to the debt markets, they are likely to keep high 
debts (over-leveraged) in their books. Consequently, the firm’s regular annual debt payment 
depletes the free cash flow available, hence there is a lower cash bonus reward.  
Similarly, the capital expenditure estimate is -0.0652 and statistically significant, postulating 
shareholders’ intention to use less cash bonus whenever the firm has a huge growth investment 
opportunity in capital expenditure.  
On the other hand, for the other firm-related proxies: fixed intangible, R&D, market-to-book, 
and cash flow are all positive. In particular, the results on market-to-book, R&D and fixed 
intangible show shareholders’ willingness to motivate managers with cash bonus to spend more 
on these items, inconsistent with the literature (e.g. Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Humphery-Jenner 
et al., 2016). In addition, cash flow shows an intuitive relationship with cash bonus incentive. 
Thus, the positive coefficient estimates on cash flow (0.2679 t-statistics 6.12) suggests that 
financially unconstrained firms are likely to reward executives with cash bonus compensation 
(Guay, 1999).  
Furthermore, for the monitoring effectiveness variables large ownership is positive and 
significant, whilst non-executive directors’ ownership is negative but insignificant. For 
instance, the higher the block ownership the greater the cash bonus, which is inconsistent with 
a substitute association but consistent with Ryan and Wiggins (2001). This could also possibly 
suggest that large owners are comfortable to increase their holdings as firm managers generate 
more cash flow or profits (i.e. to meet accounting-based measure), which, in turn, makes it 
more likely for them to approve managerial cash incentives. Further, executives ownership is 
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also negative and significant, implying that as managers ownership stake increases 
shareholders become less concern of alignment problem and tend to lower cash bonus rewards. 
The results on managerial ownership and outside directors’ ownership should be interpreted 
with care, because the estimates are not significantly related to cash bonus rewards.  
The estimates on dividend pay-out and executive average age are positive. For instance, 
because dividend pay-out firms are financially unconstrained (e.g. resulting from lower 
leverage), they are likely to reward more cash bonus to managers. Inconsistent with horizon 
problem, executive average age and cash bonus show an increasing relation. One caveat here 
is that the coefficient estimate on executive average age is statistically insignificant.   
In summary, the simultaneous modelling of managerial compensation incentives and firm 
financial leverage provide some further new evidence on the determinants of incentive 
compensation structure. The supplied findings show the statistical and economical relevance 
of the firm- and manager-specific characteristics in the executive managers’ pay determination. 
Generally, the reported results are largely consistent with prior studies (e.g. Core et al., 1999; 
Guay, 1999; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Adomako-Adu et al., 2011; Humphery-Jenner et al., 
2016), although some proxies lack statistical significance in other specifications. The 
coefficients signs on the selected instruments in the compensation models are generally 
consistent with our predictions. For instance, dividend pay-out shows a significant explanatory 
power in the compensation contract design models. Therefore, failure to account for these firm-
specific exogenous factors when dealing with compensation incentives and their effect on firm 
leverage may potentially underestimate the relationship between financial leverage and 
managerial incentives.  
In short, the section reports a strong association between managerial compensation incentives 
and firm leverage by relying on the expectation that shareholders design appropriate 
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compensation incentives to enhance the quality of managerial financing decisions. More 
specifically, LTIPs induces more borrowings, whilst share options and cash bonus show a 
decreasing effect on firm leverage. This presented evidence provides mixed support for the 
risk-motivated story. In particular, the result shows that the convexity inherent in the stock 
options incentive is ineffective to reduce managerial risk-related agency problem (Hayes et al., 
2012), which is inconsistent with the risk-motivated explanation, whilst the cash bonus finding 
is consistent with the risk-reduction argument. However, consistent with expectation, 
shareholders use rather more LTIPs incentive to minimise the managerial risk-related incentive 
problem. This is interesting, because the Greenbury Report (1995) recommended that the 
remuneration committee should substitute stock options with LTIPs to prevent managerial 
excessive risk-taking, implying that with LTIPs managers are able to make efficient leverage 
decisions. 
In fact, before we make an overall conclusion on this issue, we further test whether our key 
findings are sensitive to other independent factors (thus corporate governance indicators and 
other executives’ characteristics) as well as other alternative specifications. 
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Table 5.4 2 Leverage Regression Result  
          Leverage           LTIPs         ESO         CashB  
      
LTIPs                0.3480***  -0.0247***      0.0244***  
           (7.74)           (-4.58)            (5.14)  
ESO              -0.5269***     -0.0386***             -0.0060*  
          (-9.06)  (-8.16)             (-1.70)  
CashB           -0.1719***     0.0248***           -0.0029   
 
SAL 
          (-2.81) 
             -0.1225*** 
               (-3.89) 
 (4.22) 
           0.0495 
           (1.32) 
          (-0.58) 
           -0.0707** 
            (-2.32) 
 
 
          0.0106 
          (0.40) 
 
ROA         -0.1406*     
           (-1.91)     
Size              0.0336***         0.0551***            0.0551***            -0.0181  
          (2.84)     (3.09)             (3.99)             (-1.45)  
MKTB            0.0121***      -0.0044*            0.0107***             0.0040**  
          (7.41)    (-1.68)             (5.25)              (2.21)  
Z-Score         0.0109*     
       (1.64)     
STKR        -0.0042    0.0116 0.0035   
        (-0.40)  (1.13) (0.40)   
Net PPE          -0.0402*     
 
R&D 
 
 
LEV 
        (-1.79) 
        -0.0464 
       (-0.31)        
 
 
 
 
            -0.1780 
             (-1.18)        
 
             0.7393***                
              (4.70)   
 
          -0.2001* 
           (-1.63) 
 
   -0.6783***                  
           (-5.46) 
 
  0.1712 
 (1.60) 
 
             -0.2911*** 
            (-2.62) 
 
CAPEX              0.0912***           -0.0408*             -0.0652***  
               (3.15)            (-1.82)             (-2.99)  
FINTANG               0.0883***           -0.0215             0.0741***  
               (2.63)            (-0.83)              (2.83)  
STKRV               0.0062   
 
Large Own 
 
  
            -0.0012*** 
             (-4.22) 
           (0.83) 
          -0.0005** 
           (-2.24) 
 
 
            0.0013*** 
             (5.42)  
 
E. Own               -0.1109**           -0.1154***            -0.0828**  
                 (-2.44)            (-3.44)              (-2.29)  
Non.E.Own                0.0101           -0.0199            -0.0114  
                (0.12)            (-0.37)             (-0.17)  
Ex.Av. Age               -0.0002           -0.0001             0.0006  
 
CF 
 
DPO 
               (-0.24) 
              0.0124 
              (0.23) 
              -0.0130 
           (-0.02) 
          -0.0341 
           (-0.85) 
          -0.0295** 
            (0.74) 
            0.2679*** 
            (6.12) 
            0.0364*** 
 
 
                (-0.85)             (-2.58)              (2.94)  
Constant             0.6542***               -0.7898***            0.3310***                 0.4045***  
 
Industry & Year  
       (6.71) 
      YES 
        (-6.80) 
        YES 
            (3.57) 
            YES 
            (4.60) 
             YES 
 
 
N       1108        1108            1108             1108  
Chi-square        787.88        748.14            153.34             285.66  
Simultaneous system of equations (3SLS) regression of leverage and LTIPs, ESO and CashB results. The 
predicted sign for the variable of interest are shown in the leverage (second-stage) model and we report only the 
results in the second-stage regression. Thus, *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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5.7 Robustness testing 
The results presented in Table (5.4.2) leverage column (1), show that there is a link between 
managerial compensation incentives and the firm’s financial debt policy. Primarily, this section 
tests the sensitivity of the reported findings by applying several other independent factors (e.g. 
monitoring mechanisms: large ownership, non-executives ownership, as well as other 
managerial characteristics: executives ownership, CEO age and CFO age) in the specification. 
Specifically, these independent variables have been shown to have an effect on corporate 
management policies (see Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; Yim, 2013; 
Pasternack et al., 2017). In addition, the study also applies an alternative specification (ordinary 
least squares (OLS) to find out if indeed our result is robust to OLS technique.  
For the purpose of brevity, this current analysis is restricted to the key explanatory variables: 
LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus, and the tested independent variables’ behaviour on 
leverage. 
 
5.7.1 Managerial characteristics 
Thus, so far in the study, we have largely examined the impacts of managerial financial 
compensation incentives on leverage level. Apart from the main compensation variables, other 
managerial characteristics can also influence managerial risk-preference or risk-avoidance 
decisions and they are worth considering. For instance, some prior studies highlight these 
factors: executive ownership, executive age and tenure (e.g. Berger, Ofek, and Yermack 1997; 
Coles et al., 2006; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Yim, 2013). 
Motivated by this, and coupled with our rich datasets, we are able to explicitly account for the 
following managerial characteristics (executives’ ownership as well as CEO and CFO ages) in 
the leverage model. For the purposes of analysis, we section into sub-groups managerial 
 267 
ownership and governance characteristics, and then other managerial characteristics.   
 
5.7.1.1 Managerial inside ownership  
It is suggested that, as executives own more shareholdings, their interests become more aligned 
with shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), hence there is less need for shareholders to 
use more incentive compensation. Taking note of this assertion, it is quite clear that managerial 
compensation is likely to be affected if executives hold more ownership stakes. We account 
for this possibility in the second-stage leverage specification.    
Firstly, column (1) of Table (5.4.3), shows that the executives’ (insiders’) ownership 
coefficient is negative (-0.1279 t-stats -2.93) and statistically significant, implying the effect of 
managerial entrenchment (Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). The finding tends to support the view 
that, when managers have large stakes in the firm, they become unwilling to increase the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risks (thus increase leverage ratio). This is because, by increasing leverage, 
managerial decisions are likely to be monitored and scrutinised by debtholders, which can 
constrain management power to manage the firm to suit their own interests. Interestingly, the 
coefficient and the significance on LTIPs remain qualitatively similar across all specifications. 
Again, the results on share options and cash bonus remain qualitatively the same. 
 
5.7.1.2 Monitoring governance variables 
While the influence of these key compensation components is seen to be strong in leverage 
determination, other firm governance-related factors including block-ownership or 
concentrated ownership, and non-executive ownership (e.g. Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Mehran, 
1995; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009) are likely to indirectly affect the compensation–leverage 
nexus. In particular, Florackis and Ozkan (2009) argue that the firm’s effective external 
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monitoring system affects leverage level. The authors further indicate that, with strong 
governance practices, firms are able to use fewer managerial incentives to align manager–
shareholder resolution, which is consistent with Mehran’s (1995) observation.  
Moreover, because many large stakeholders are institutional investors, pension funds and other 
organised agencies, they often have the expertise to strenuously scrutinise the financial position 
of their invested firms (Ntim et al., 2015) and constantly monitor their corporate activities 
(Smith, 1996). In contrast, managers of firms operating in a weak corporate governance 
environment can extract rent from the shareholders and may have the leeway to take decisions 
including pursuing a low-leverage policy (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Weisbach, 2007; 
Florackis, 2009).    
In due recognition of the fact that governance factors are likely to impact firm leverage 
behaviour but were excluded in our earlier leverage model, like prior research (e.g. Coles et 
al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010), we extend this analysis by including governance 
proxies in a modified leverage equation. Thus, the inclusion of the monitoring mechanisms in 
the second-stage leverage model will further aid understanding on the leverage–compensation 
incentives linkage. Specifically, the results of the extended specifications where we include 
large (block-shareholders) ownership and non-executives’ ownership are presented in Table 
(5.4.3), column (2). 
As shown in column (2) of Table (5.4.3), the additional governance proxies reveal some 
interesting findings, although our key results still remain quite robust. Specifically, column (2) 
shows that the coefficient on non-executive ownership is positively related to leverage. This 
result shows support for leverage increase, implying the fact that managers of well-governed 
firms are less likely to extract rent or expropriate wealth from shareholders by pursing 
inefficient leverage policy (e.g. Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). Thus, non-executives ownership 
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is likely to influence firm leverage on average, ceteris paribus. More interestingly, however, 
the coefficients on LTIPs (equity), share options and cash bonus incentives still remain 
qualitatively unchanged. It further suggests our results are robust in spite of the extra 
monitoring role of outside executive directors. In other words, our results are not affected by 
the substitution effect, because the effective presence of non-executive directors does not 
change the significance of the key findings. This is reasonable, given the fact that members of 
the outside executive directors are very knowledgeable, skilful and experienced, so their 
increased stakes signal that they will cautiously monitor managerial activities including 
financial leverage policy. However, the low coefficient significance on non-executives 
ownership calls for this interpretation to be taken with this caveat in mind.    
Furthermore, the large ownership proxy is also positive, suggesting that a well-monitored firm 
forces its managers to increase firm leverage. Similarly, our compensation proxies still remain 
similar, implying that our findings are still robust to the monitoring role of large stakeholders 
in reducing agency conflict.  
 
5.7.1.3 Other managerial characteristics 
More specifically, Chava and Purnanandam (2010) argue that, in order to fully understand 
managerial financial risk decision-making, we need to pay special attention to the personal 
characteristics of the managers that run the firm. Further, the authors contend that the CFO’s 
risk-attitude plays a significant role (even more than that of the CEOs) in explaining finer 
aspects of a firm’s financial decisions. In the face of this revelation, in our robustness testing, 
we include CEO and CFO age in the leverage model to see the extent to which this proxy 
affects financial leverage. We start first with the CEO age and then move on to CFO age 
analysis. 
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Table (5.4.3), column (3) shows that the coefficient on CEO age (0.0021 t-statistics 2.57) is 
positive and statistically significant at 5% significance. This implies that older executives 
(CEOs) are more likely to hold a higher leverage ratio in their firm’s books. This could possibly 
be attributed to the fact that older executives are much more experienced, knowledgeable, 
skilful and confident, which may influence their high risk-taking decisions including leverage 
(Yim, 2103). Alternatively, however, the CEO age supportive of leverage may possibly depict 
an explicit lack of depth in financing because CEOs often concentrate on broad corporate 
decisions (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010). With this inclusion, the coefficients on LTIPs and 
stock options remain qualitatively unchanged. However, the cash bonus compensation 
coefficient is marginally reduced in significance, although statistically significant. This could 
be explained partly by the fact CEO age supportive of debt ratio increase is likely to decrease 
cash bonus rewards as firms devote more resources to debt payment.  
In column (4), the CFO age coefficient is negative (-0.0003). It suggests that older CFOs are 
more likely to decrease firm leverage. However, the result is quite unsurprisingly, given the 
fact that decisions involving more specialised judgement such as debt financing and accrual 
management are within the CFO’s domain. Thus, the CFO acts as a finer point of the firm’s 
financial decisions (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010). One caveat of this result is that the 
coefficient on CFO age lacks statistical significance. 
Collectively, the implication of the reported results on the managerial factors (characteristics) 
significantly affects firm leverage determination. Whilst the CEO age is positively related, 
CFO age is negatively associated with leverage. This seems to confirm Chava and 
Purnanandam’s (2010) explanation that CEOs mainly pay special attention to the firm’s broad 
corporate decisions and often delegate the finer aspects of financing decisions to CFOs. Again, 
although executive managers take into consideration their inside ownership, our story on 
managerial compensation effects on leverage decisions still remains unchanged.  
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Taken together, our main reported findings in Table (5.4.2) still remain robust.  
In short, the implication of these findings partly suggests that effective corporate governance 
practices play a role in determining the firm’s leverage decision. It also seems to imply that the 
impact of managerial compensation incentives on corporate leverage, in particular the 
alignment effect of managerial stock-based incentives and cash bonus, is independent of the 
firm’s corporate governance practices. This means that the presence of external monitoring 
mechanisms compliments managerial financial decisions. In all, our results still confirm the 
importance of managerial compensation incentives in determining firm debt capital policy 
(reported in Table 5.4.2). 
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Table 5.4 3 Leverage Robustness Test 
 (1) (2) (3)      (4) 
  Leverage        Leverage       Leverage   Leverage 
     
LTIPs 0.2393*** 0.2475*** 0.1916***      0.2335*** 
 (4.90) (5.10) (3.75)       (4.66) 
     
ESO -0.6407*** -0.6238*** -0.6018***     -0.6035*** 
 (-10.88) (-10.60) (-9.39)        (-9.68) 
     
CashB -0.2143*** -0.2304***            -0.1503**     -0.1755*** 
 (-3.41)            (-3.64) (-2.36)      (-2.73) 
     
SAL -0.1363*** -0.1092*** -0.1111***     -0.1129*** 
 (-4.29) (-3.30) (-3.37)       (-3.40) 
     
MKTB 0.0127*** 0.0128*** 0.0124***      0.0128*** 
 (7.82) (8.06) (7.75)        (7.83) 
     
Size 0.0423*** 0.0576*** 0.0513***     0.0475*** 
 (3.58) (5.13) (4.32)     (3.97) 
     
ROA -0.1303* -0.0965 -0.1996***    -0.1486** 
 (-1.78) (-1.31) (-2.88)     (-2.05) 
     
STKR -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0005     -0.0012 
 (-0.23) (-0.17) (-0.06)      (-0.15) 
     
Z-Score 0.0082 0.0054 0.0092       0.0073 
 (1.26) (0.82) (1.32)      (1.09) 
     
Net PPE -0.0476** -0.0549** -0.0556**      -0.0551** 
 (-2.12) (-2.44) (-2.34)       (-2.31) 
     
R&D -0.0865 -0.0349 -0.0793    -0.0454 
 (-0.58) (-0.23) (-0.53)     (-0.30) 
     
E.Own -0.1279*** -0.1603*** -0.1440***     -0.1508*** 
 (-2.93) (-3.41) (-3.07)       (-3.19) 
     
Non E.Own  0.1196 0.1619**      0.1286 
  (1.43) (1.95)      (1.54) 
     
Large Own  0.0008** 0.0006      0.0007** 
  (2.34) (1.61)      (1.98) 
     
 CEO age   0.0021**  
   (2.57)  
     
 CFO age         -0.0003 
          (-0.40) 
Constant 0.6821*** 0.5553*** 0.0476       0.5442*** 
 
Industry & Year 
(6.82) 
YES 
(5.04) 
YES 
(0.25) 
YES 
       (4.68) 
       YES 
N 1108 1108 1107      1106 
Chi-square 798.70 808.33 694.56      740.22 
Simultaneous system of equations (3SLS) regression of leverage and LTIPs, ESO and CashB results. The predicted sign for 
the variable of interest are shown in the leverage model and we report only the results in the second-stage regression. Thus, *, 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 273 
5.7.1.4 Alternative specification (ordinary least squares – OLS approach) 
Lastly, we examine the sensitivity of the results using an alternative approach. Throughout the 
empirical analyses (results in Table 5.4.2), we have used a three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
technique to explore the causal relationship between managerial compensation incentives and 
financial leverage decision. We based our analysis on the conventional thinking of 
simultaneous system of equations, where both leverage and compensation incentives measures 
are contemporaneous, and jointly determined. We now apply an OLS technique to see if our 
earlier findings are sensitive to a different specification.  
Similar to Coles et al. (2006), our chosen specification allows us to regress leverage on lagged 
compensation incentives values (i.e. LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus), control variables 
including industry and year effects and other independent variables (CEO age, executives 
ownership, non-executives ownership and large ownership). The reported results are based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to reduce heterogeneity.  
It is worth mentioning that our primary focus is on the key explanatory variables (LTIPs/equity, 
stock options and cash bonus). The reported results on test (key compensation) variables in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table (5.4.4) are qualitatively consistent with our previous results 
reported in Table (5.4.2). More specifically, LTIPs compensation is positive, whilst share 
options and cash bonus are negatively related to leverage. However, a few exceptions exist. In 
column (1), the coefficient on LTIPs incentives loses its significance, whilst the share options 
coefficient is significant at 10% conventional level. Also, cash bonus still remains negative but 
insignificant. Column (2) shows similar signs but LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus all lose 
their significance when we include CFO age. The low explanatory power, to some extent, could 
partly be blamed on the endogeneity presence.  
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Table 5.4 4 Leverage OLS Alternative Test  
    (1) (2) 
    Leverage          Leverage 
LTIPs   0.0522 0.0694 
  (1.25) (1.48) 
    
ESO  -0.101* -0.0258 
  (-1.63) (-0.38) 
    
CashB  -0.0106 -0.0070 
  (-0.22) (-0.13) 
    
SAL  -0.0647* -0.0651* 
  (-1.78) (-1.77) 
    
ROA  -0.524*** -0.573*** 
  (-6.09) (-6.38) 
    
Net PPE  -0.0118 -0.0299 
  (-0.43) (-1.07) 
    
R&D  0.0079 0.0002 
  (0.60) (0.01) 
    
STKR  -0.0034 -0.0052 
  (-0.36) (-0.45) 
    
MKTB     -0.0031***   -0.0025*** 
  (-4.61) (-2.77) 
    
Z-Score  0.0192** 0.0235*** 
  (2.32) (2.78) 
    
Size     0.0453***   0.0388*** 
  (3.45) (2.97) 
    
E. Own  -0.0884* -0.0589 
  (-1.84) (-1.13) 
    
Non E.Own  0.0943 0.147* 
  (1.08) (1.70) 
    
Large Own  0.0001 -0.0003 
  (0.13) (-0.69) 
    
CEO age  0.0018*  
  (1.84)  
    
CFO age   0.0007 
   (0.59) 
    
Constant  0.543*** 0.656*** 
 
Industry & Year 
 (2.69) 
YES 
(3.03) 
YES 
N  1211 1136 
R2  0.245 0.230 
The table shows the OLS estimation results of the effects of LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus on leverage. All 
variable definitions are described in Table 5.3.1.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
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5.7.1.5 Alternative measure of independent (compensation) variable 
This section provides additional results by using alternative measure for independent (LTIPs, 
stock options and cash bonus) variable. Thus, we measure the independent variable as a natural 
logarithm of LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus value and utilise OLS technique to estimate 
leverage model.   
Table (5.4.5) shows the OLS results by regressing leverage on lagged natural log of 
compensation values and other control variables. The coefficient on LTIPs is positive, whilst 
stock options and cash bonus coefficient is negative with only LTIPs that is statistically 
significant.  
In short, the reported results show similar signs to the earlier findings (Table 5.4.2), however, 
the estimates: share options and cash bonus are statistically insignificant. The low correlation 
may partly be explained by the existing endogeneity problem.  
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Table 5.4 5 Alternative Measure Robustness Test - Log values of LTIPs, ESO &cashB.  
     (1)    (2) 
  Leverage Leverage 
    
LTIPs  0.0244*** 0.0226** 
  (2.81) (2.45) 
    
ESO  -0.0002 0.0032 
  (-0.03) (0.54) 
    
CashB  -0.0042 -0.0063 
 
 
SAL 
 
 (-0.66) 
 
-0.0736** 
  (-2.09) 
(-1.00) 
 
-0.0674* 
  (-1.84) 
ROA  -0.527*** -0.561*** 
  (-6.26) (-6.36) 
    
Size  0.0492*** 0.0441*** 
  (3.92) (3.48) 
    
STKR  -0.0019 -0.0037 
  (-0.18) (-0.33) 
    
Z-Score  0.0194** 0.0272*** 
  (2.35) (3.34) 
    
MKTB  -0.0030*** -0.0025*** 
  (-4.62) (-3.36) 
    
R&D  -0.0735 -0.114 
  (-0.76) (-1.19) 
    
Net PPE  -0.0141 -0.0185 
  (-0.52) (-0.69) 
    
E. Own  -0.101** -0.0846 
  (-2.03) (-1.59) 
    
Non-E. Own  0.104 0.132 
  (1.25) (1.63) 
    
Large Own  0.0005 0.0001 
  (1.38) (0.26) 
CEO Age  0.0019*  
  (1.92)  
    
CFO Age   0.0012 
   (1.03) 
Constant  0.275** 0.350*** 
 
Industry & Year  
 (2.16) 
YES 
(2.64) 
YES 
N  1211 1136 
R2  0.249 0.235 
The table shows the OLS estimation results of the effects of LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus on leverage. 
Here, we use log values of LTIPs, ESO and CashB. All variable definitions are described in Table 5.3.1.  *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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5.7.2 Section conclusion 
Overall, this section establishes a statistically and significant relation between managerial 
compensation incentives and financial leverage by relying on the expectation that shareholders 
design appropriate compensation incentives to enhance the quality of managerial financing 
decisions. More specifically, leverage ratio is positively dependent on LTIPs, suggesting 
shareholders’ willingness to use the LTIPs incentive to influence managers to finance projects 
with debt. In contrast, stock options and cash bonus show a decreasing relationship with firm 
leverage. Largely, the reported evidence seems to provide mixed support for a risk-motivated 
story or argument. In particular, the convexity inherent in the stock options incentive is 
ineffective in reducing managerial risk incentive problem (Hayes et al., 2012; Lewellen, 2006). 
However, consistent with expectation, shareholders use rather more LTIPs incentive to 
minimise managerial risk-related incentive problems. This is interesting, because the 
Greenbury Report (1995) recommended the use of LTIPs in lieu of stock options to minimize 
managerial excessive risk-taking, suggesting that UK shareholders popular usage of LTIPs 
influence managers to increase leverage level. The cash bonus finding is consistent with risk-
reduction expectations.  
 
5.8.1 Supplementary evidence on deferred or restricted stock compensation 
Through their asset substitution hypothesis (risk-shifting problem), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) made an early observation that one way to minimise agency cost of debt is to structure 
executive compensation to include both debt-like (pension and deferred compensation 
incentives) and equity-like (performance shares) compensation in the same ratio as they appear 
in the firm capital structure. This means that rewarding managers’ compensation leverage (e.g. 
deferred shares/stock) similar to the firm’s leverage ratio induces managers to concentrate on 
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firm value maximisation and not the value of total assets. Consistent with this view, John and 
John (1993) formulate a theoretical model to predict a positive relation between firm leverage 
and managers’ compensation leverage (such as pensions, deferred stock). In contrast, 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) reveal that managers prefer to adopt a more conservative 
management style aimed to reduce default risk when a large component of their incentives is 
in the form of restricted stock or pensions. Relatedly, Cassell et al.’s (2012) empirical evidence 
suggests that managers with large inside debt incentives are likely to reduce the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk. Taking note of the above discussion, it seems to indicate that the deferred/ 
restricted stock component may have different effects on managerial risk behaviour. In line 
with this assertion, we decompose the LTIPs compensation (which is defined as the values of 
deferred stock plus performance stock) and perform an analysis by including each 
compensation component – values of restricted stock, performance stock, stock options and 
cash bonus – in the three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation model. In other words, we 
disaggregate LTIPs into deferred and performance stock incentives and apply simultaneous 
system of equations model. The system design is similar to our earlier approach.    
The results of this analysis are presented in Table (5.5.1), where we report only the second-
stage leverage regression results in the leverage columns 1, 2, 3 and 4. For instance, column 
(1) provides results for the base specification, whilst (2), (3) and (4) include other independent 
variables for robustness purposes. A brief discussion of the results is devoted to the key 
compensation variables. 
First, the presented results show that deferred/restricted stock and leverage are both negatively 
and significantly related. The coefficients for restricted stock incentive range from -0.2198 
to -0.3195 across models (columns) 1, 2,3 and 4, and are all highly statistically significant. The 
finding tends to imply that an increase in deferred stock (debt-like) incentive influences 
executive managers to lower firm risk level by lowering leverage ratio. This is consistent with 
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the prior literature (e.g. Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Anantharaman et al., 2010; Cassell et 
al., 2012; Freund et al., 2017) but inconsistent with Bryan et al. (2000) and Ortiz-Molina 
(2004). A possible explanation of this result could be that, because restricted or deferred stock 
is only vested upon achieving the required performance conditions such as sustaining total 
shareholders’ return for a certain period of time (e.g. three to five years) or sometimes to tie 
executives to their managed firm for some specified years, such a motivation package induces 
them to adopt a more conservative management style thereby keeping a low debt ratio in the 
firm’s balance sheet to minimise default risk. In addition, as managers lower the firm’s debt as 
their residual interests in the form of deferred stock compensation increase, debtholders or 
bondholders’ confidence in the firm goes up, and this can ultimately lead to lower costs of 
borrowing. One of the effective implications of this pay component is that shareholders of high-
leverage firms may tend to use more deferred stock to minimise the risk-shifting problem and 
lower agency cost of debt, thereby reducing the conflicts of interest between shareholder and 
bondholder (Jensen and Meckling, 1979; John and John, 1993).  
Contrary, the performance stock is positive and statistically significant, implying managers’ 
incentive to increase leverage level as their performance stock increases. This is not surprising, 
given that shareholders want managers to undertake all positive net present value projects and, 
by rewarding them with more performance stocks, increase their risk appetite to finance growth 
opportunity investment with debts especially when internal funds are insufficient. One 
implication of the finding is that bondholders and other creditors may become more sensitive 
to the firm’s borrowings, which in turn can the cause them (debtholders) to demand a higher 
lending rate (Kabir et al., 2013).  
The results on stock options and cash bonus incentives are all negative and qualitatively similar 
to the earlier findings (see Table 5.5.1). Again, our control variables and other independent 
variables for robustness purposes all remain qualitatively similar to the earlier reported 
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findings.  
In summary, the empirical findings in this section shows that debt-like compensation (i.e. 
deferred or restricted stock) provides a risk-avoiding incentive for managers. Thus, 
shareholders use this component to reduce the risk-shifting incentive problem, hence aligning 
both shareholders’ and bondholders’ interests. However, the performance stock induces a 
managerial risk-taking incentive, whilst stock options and cash bonus encourage lower risk-
taking, as reported earlier. Clearly, the presented evidence indicates that UK shareholders use 
a mixture of risk-avoiding and risk-taking incentives to induce managerial risk behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 281 
Table 5.5 1 Leverage and Deferred or Restricted Stock Regression   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Leverage         Leverage        Leverage          Leverage 
     
DS    -0.2198***    -0.3195***  -0.3151***            -0.2718*** 
 (-5.17)             (-7.36) (-7.26) (-5.96) 
     
PS 0.2130*** 0.1164*** 0.1207*** 0.1531*** 
 (6.18) (3.27) (3.40) (4.00) 
     
ESO -0.6093*** -0.7270*** -0.7121*** -0.6147** 
 (-10.58) (-12.60) (-12.32) (-10.16) 
     
CashB           -0.0614 -0.1758*** -0.1791*** -0.0818 
 (-0.99) (-2.78) (-2.81) (-1.28) 
     
SAL -0.0974*** -0.1225*** -0.1053*** -0.1031*** 
 (-3.12) (-3.89) (-3.21) (-3.16) 
     
MKTB 0.0133*** 0.0140*** 0.0141*** 0.0132*** 
 (8.22) (8.68) (8.73) (8.25) 
     
Size 0.0694*** 0.0724*** 0.0728*** 0.0691*** 
 (6.27) (6.59) (6.59) (6.28) 
     
ROA -0.1025 -0.0618 -0.0436 -0.1906*** 
 (-1.47) (-0.89) (-0.62) (-2.94) 
     
STKR -0.0005   -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0005 
 (-0.09) (-0.07) (-0.05) (0.07) 
     
Z-Score 0.0081 0.0049 0.0045 0.0115* 
 (1.39) (0.85) (0.60) (1.86) 
     
Net PPE -0.0418** -0.0538*** -0.0577*** -0.0516** 
 (-2.02) (-2.64) (-2.83) (-2.32) 
     
R&D -0.1588 -0.1929 -0.1577 -0.1763 
 (-1.06) (-1.29) (-1.05) (-1.19) 
     
E.Own  -0.2075*** -0.2199*** -0.1787*** 
  (-4.85) (-4.72) (-3.85) 
     
Non E.Own   0.1212 0.1592* 
   (1.45) (1.92) 
     
Large Own   0.0004 0.0002 
   (1.15) (0.59) 
     
CEO age    0.0024*** 
    (3.10) 
Constant 0.3167*** 0.4467*** 0.3713*** 0.2443** 
 (3.35) (3.80) (3.40) (2.19) 
Industry & Year  YES YES YES YES 
N 1108 1108 1108 1107 
R2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.073 
Simultaneous system of equations (3SLS) regression of leverage and DS, PS, ESO and CashB results. The 
predicted sign of interests: Deferred stock (DS).and performance stock (PS) in the leverage model and we report 
only the results in the second-stage regression. Thus, *, ** and *** show significance10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
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5.8.2 Firm leverage and executives’ compensation: the role of growth 
opportunities 
 
The empirical findings shown above (Table 5.4.2) suggest an increasing relationship between 
LTIPs incentive and firm leverage, while share options and cash bonus show a negative effect 
on leverage. It is acknowledged in the literature that high-growth firms are difficult to monitor 
and often tend to have higher information asymmetry than low-growth firms (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984), which is due to the inherent unpredictability associated with the nature of their 
growth investment opportunities (Core, 2001; MacLaughlin et al., 1996). In line with this view, 
Myers (1977) argues that high-growth firms should keep in place higher contracting costs to 
minimise under-investment and risk-shifting incentive. In other words, high-growth firms 
should have a decent compensation contract in place to motivate the manager. With this, it is 
expected that shareholders of high-growth firms should use more (less) stock-based (cash 
bonus) incentives to compensate their managers. 
Furthermore, it is also argued that high-growth firms, compared to low-growth ones, tend to 
have a high need for external finance (preferably debt) (e.g. Core, 2001) and often tend to keep 
leverage at a low level to avoid forgoing future growth opportunity. In tune with this argument, 
it is reasonable to suggest that different levels of firms’ growth opportunities may influence 
leverage–executive compensation linkage. That is, while low-growth firms may choose to 
reward managers with more cash bonuses and fewer stock incentives, high-growth firms may 
tend to use more stock incentive and fewer cash bonuses to induce managers operational 
decisions.  
Based on this, we further extend our knowledge on leverage–executive compensation linkage 
by examining how the relationship is influenced by the firm’s growth opportunities.  
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In fact, before we start to conduct this analysis, we need an appropriate proxy for growth 
opportunities. Some research studies (e.g. Lewellen et al., 1987) use market-to-book equity, 
R&D intensity (e.g. Gaver and Gaver, 1995) or market-to-book assets (e.g. Smith and Watts, 
1992; Bizjak et al., 1993). Consistent with these studies (Smith and Watts, 1992; Bizjak et al., 
1993; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001), we proxy growth opportunities as the market value of equity 
plus the book value of debt scaled by the book value of assets. More specifically, to measure 
high and low growth, we split the sample into low-growth firms (those below the median) and 
high-growth firms (those above the median) to examine if indeed different growth level affects 
the leverage–compensation relationship. We estimate the newly formulated model using 
ordinary least squares (OLS), where leverage is regressed on the lagged values of compensation 
variables and other control variables defined in Table (5.3.1). The reported t-statistics use 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  
The results presented in Table (5.6.1) (low-growth) and (5.6.2) (high-growth), show some 
interesting findings after controlling for other determinants of leverage. Specifically, in Table 
(5.6.1) (low-growth firms), cash bonus is negatively and significantly related to leverage. The 
coefficient estimate is -0.269 (t-statistics -3.68), suggesting that cash-motivated managers at 
low-growth firms lower firm’s leverage ratio. This is plausible, given that managers of low-
growth firms tend to have no potential growth opportunities and often tend to have excess cash 
surplus via lower debt ratio, cash-motivated managers are able to meet their accounting 
performance measure leading to higher cash bonus rewards. In addition, at low-growth level, 
the risk-motivated incentives (LTIPs and stock options) induce lower managerial risk-taking 
appetite (low debt) particularly when the firm has low investment prospects. This is reasonable 
because managers at low-growth firms can pursue a low-leverage policy as there is no obvious 
investment opportunity to finance with borrowings, especially when they are compensated with 
a stock-based incentive. Thus, the reported results (across all models) tend to suggest that both 
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stock-motivated and cash-motivated managers display lower risk-taking incentive or attitude 
in low-growth firms.  
For the control variables, we also observe that salary, net PPE, R&D, market-to-book and Z-
score, executive ownership, non-executive ownership, large ownership and CEOs age are all 
positives, whilst firm size, stock return and return on asset show negative signs on leverage.  
Furthermore, the results for high-growth (Table 5.6.2) firms suggest that cash bonus is 
positively related to firm leverage. With the estimated coefficient of 0.144 (t-statistics 1.98), 
cash-incentivised managers tend to increase the firm’s debt ratio at the high-growth firms. 
Although, the positive sign on cash bonus is contrary to expectations, a possible interpretation 
can be that managers of high-growth firms tend to meet their accounting performance measure 
(profits, cash balance) as they borrow more to finance investment activity. Similarly, share 
options and LTIPs show a positive and significant effect on leverage, postulating managers’ 
incentive to increase firm risk (via high borrowing) as they receive more stock-based incentive. 
This is consistent with both alignment hypothesis (Holmstrom, 1979; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990) and risk-motivated incentive argument (Coles et al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012). 
The finding on share options shows that the risk-motivated incentive element inherent in 
share/stock options is limited to managers of high-growth firms. 
The control variables including return on asset, tangibility, R&D, Z-score and firm size are 
positively linked to leverage ratio. However, stock return and market-to-book show negative 
coefficients.  
In summary, this section provides evidence to suggests that a firm’s growth opportunity 
interacts with executive compensation to influence leverage level. The reported findings show 
that shareholders of high-growth (low-growth) firms award executives more stock-based 
incentive and cash bonus to encourage (discourage) managerial risk-taking, i.e. increase debt 
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ratio. Interestingly, the share options incentive induces more borrowing in high-growth firms, 
which is consistent with the risk-motivated incentive argument (Coles et al., 2006; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010; Kini and Williams, 2012). This indicates that the positive association is 
limited to only high-growth opportunity firms. One surprising finding is that cash-motivated 
managers increase firm’s debt level in high-growth firms, which is inconsistent with risk-
reduction hypothesis.  
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Table 5.6 1 Leverage –Pay Incentives for Low-Growth Firms Regression   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          Leverage.          Leverage.         Leverage.         Leverage. 
LTIPs  -0.183*** -0.177*** -0.142** -0.177** 
 (-3.23) (-2.98) (-2.21) (-2.55) 
     
ESO -0.357*** -0.347*** -0.325*** -0.427*** 
 (-4.79) (-4.53) (-4.02) (-4.68) 
     
CashB -0.269*** -0.265*** -0.226*** -0.234*** 
 (-3.68) (-3.60) (-2.81) (-2.90) 
     
SAL 0.030 0.023 0.041 0.027 
 (0.69) (0.51) (0.75) (0.50) 
     
ROA -0.711*** -0.739*** -0.737*** -0.729*** 
 (-4.44)             (-4.55) (-4.53) (-4.42) 
     
Net PPE 0.062 0.061 0.0594 0.047 
 (1.46) (1.42) (1.35) (0.91) 
     
 R&D 0.019 0.016 0.0243 0.141 
 (1.21) (0.92) (1.37) (1.11) 
     
STKR -0.0081 -0.007 -0.0092 -0.010 
 (-0.72) (-0.64) (-0.79) (-0.86) 
     
MKTB 0.154*** 0.182*** 0.195*** 0.209*** 
 (4.63) (4.51) (4.65) (5.14) 
     
Z-Score 0.045** 0.049** 0.050*** 0.024 
 (2.43) (2.54)              (2.61) (1.16) 
     
Size 0.008 0.009 -0.0027 0.015 
 (0.42) (0.46) (-0.12) (0.71) 
     
E. Own  0.021 0.097 0.083 
  (0.95) (1.26) (1.00) 
     
Non. E.Own   0.212 0.394** 
               (1.43) (2.17) 
     
Large Own   0.001 0.001 
   (0.87) (0.69) 
     
CEO age    0.003* 
    (1.90) 
     
Constant 0.375* 0.402* 0.180 0.189 
 
Industry & Year  
(1.79) 
YES 
(1.89) 
YES 
(0.67) 
YES 
(0.67) 
YES 
N 615 599 586 488 
R2 0.309 0.309 0.323 0.375 
The table presents the OLS lagged estimation results for the interaction effects of incentives (LTIPs, ESO and CashB) and 
low-growth opportunities on leverage. Models 1, 2 3 and 4 include firm fixed effect. The reported t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors. All variable definitions are described in Table 5.3.1. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5.6 2 Leverage – Pay Incentives for High-Growth Firms Regression  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         Leverage         Leverage         Leverage         Leverage 
LTIPs      0.200*** 0.145** 0.160** 0.159** 
 (3.28) (2.24) (2.28) (2.18) 
     
ESO    0.156** 0.119* 0.132* 0.130 
 (2.14) (1.63) (1.69) (1.43) 
     
CashB    0.144** 0.081 0.093 0.135 
 (1.98) (1.06) (1.16) (1.60) 
     
SAL -0.047 -0.064 -0.048 -0.109** 
 (-1.00) (-1.36) (-0.97) (-1.98) 
     
ROA 0.023 -0.003 -0.0053 -0.827*** 
 (0.23) (-0.04) (-0.05) (-5.38) 
     
Net PPE 0.015 0.026 0.025 0.014 
 (0.34) (0.61) (0.58) (0.33) 
     
R&D -0.334* -0.011 0.012 -0.162 
 (-1.86) (0.57) (0.62) (-0.75) 
     
STKR -0.037 -0.028 -0.027 0.008 
 (-1.18) (-0.96) (-0.91) (0.27) 
     
MKTB -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** 
 (-1.71) (-1.53) (-1.53) (-4.94) 
     
Z-Score 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.014 
 (0.71) (1.10) (1.11) (1.18) 
     
Size   0.118*** 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 
 (6.69) (6.85) (6.93) (6.43) 
     
E.Own  -0.212*** -0.255*** -0.255*** 
  (-3.91) (-3.86) (-3.46) 
     
Non E.Own   -0.018 0.098 
   (-0.14) (0.73) 
     
Large Own   0.001 0.001 
   (1.62) (1.29) 
     
CEO age    0.001 
    (0.86) 
     
Constant -0.254 -0.135 -0.310 0.187 
 
Industry & Year 
(-1.08) 
YES 
(-0.53) 
YES 
(-1.09) 
YES 
(0.65) 
YES 
N 638 637 634 529 
R2 0.263 0.274 0.275 0.378 
The table presents the OLS lagged estimation results for the interaction effects of incentives (LTIPs, ESO and CashB) and 
high-growth opportunities on leverage. Models 1, 2 3 and 4 include firm fixed effect. The reported t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors. All variable definitions are described in Table 5.3.1. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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5.8.3 Firm leverage and executives’ compensation: the role of corporate 
governance 
 
As suggested by prior studies, executive managers can easily extract rent from shareholders in 
poor corporate governance settings (see e.g. Ntim et al., 2016; Weibach, 2007; Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003, 2004). In such an environment, managers often have a leeway to pursue policies 
that suit their own interests including lowering the leverage ratio. For instance, Florackis and 
Ozkan (2009) document that entrenched managers are more likely to lower firm leverage ratio. 
Similarly, others including Berkovitch and Israel (1996) and Klock et al. (2004) show that the 
firm’s corporate governance structure significantly affects its capital structure. The literature 
further argues that the presence of large shareholdings by institutional owners, outside board 
of directors, is seen to signal the quality of corporate governance (via monitoring) by 
bondholders and other lenders. In essence, firms with good monitoring mechanisms or 
governance attributes (e.g. large owners, outside directors’ stakes, etc.) in place are likely to 
affect managerial discretion through pay settings and corporate policies.  
In line with the concerns raised, we further extend our knowledge on the leverage-
compensation incentives linkage by examining how the relationship is shaped by the 
effectiveness of the firm’s monitoring mechanisms. In fact, finding an appropriate measure to 
proxy good corporate governance is a major task for the study. However, we are guided by the 
UK Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2003), Hampel Report (1998) and Cadbury 
Report (1992), which highlight the important role played by large outside shareholders: using 
their substantial voting power to influence managers’ pay as well as corporate policies, and 
also having the needed expertise and skills to constructively evaluate managerial decisions 
(Ntim et al., 2016). As a noisy proxy, the study utilises the shareholdings stake of large 
shareholders to construct the firm’s governance variable, relatively different from the principal 
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component analysis approach employed Florackis and Ozkan (2009). Consistent with the views 
espoused by the Cadbury (1992) and Hampel (1998) reports and the UK Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance (2003), we argue strongly that managers of firms with high 
concentrated ownership (large outside shareholders) are likely to be actively monitored by 
these owners, thereby forcing managers to act in the best interests of the shareholders. 
Therefore, in order to provide evidence on the role of corporate monitoring system within the 
context of leverage and compensation nexus, we split our sample firms into two sub-groups 
(by arranging the large ownership stakes proxy in ascending order). Those above the median 
are considered to have effective governance in place, indicated as high-governance (high-
monitored) firms, and those below the median are low-governance (low-monitored) ones.  
Table (5.7.2), columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) show the OLS regression results for the low-
monitored (governed) firms. Largely, the findings suggest a negative relation between leverage 
and compensation incentives at low-monitored firms. For example, the estimated coefficient 
on cash bonus (ranges from -0.084 to -0.108) is negative but statistically insignificant. This can 
be interpreted to suggest that cash-motivated managers operating in a low-monitored 
environment are likely to hoard more cash surplus, leading to lower leverage and higher cash 
bonus compensation. This result is very interesting, given that managers operating in poorly 
monitored firms are more likely to be entrenched and can consequently expropriate wealth 
from the shareholders by pursuing a low leverage policy. Similarly, managers of high-
monitored (governed) firms (see Table 5.7.3) lower the leverage level as they (managers) 
receive more cash bonus. The observed coefficient estimates range from -0.029 to -0.053, but 
the coefficient has a low explanatory power. The presented results seem to suggest that cash-
motivated executives in both high-monitored and low-monitored firms use debt more 
cautiously or conservatively in an attempt to meet the required cash bonus performance 
threshold.  
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Furthermore, the share options incentive is negative and statistically significant in low-
monitored firms, suggesting management’s reluctance to increase the leverage ratio when a 
large component of their incentives package is in the form of share options, ceteris paribus. 
With the reported parameter estimate (ranges from -0.141 to -0.164), it tends to indicate that 
managers of poorly (low) monitored firms with a greater share options incentive pursue a low-
leverage policy, signalling an entrenchment effect. In the high-monitored firms (Table 5.7.3), 
the stock options incentive (coefficient -0.146 to -0.167) is still negative and statistically 
significant. This is quite worrisome to shareholders as they want managers to sponsor corporate 
activities via more borrowings. The high statistical significance confirms our earlier established 
negative relationship between stock options and leverage (Table 5.4.2) and that the reported 
result is not limited to either low- or high-monitored firms.  
Moreover, the LTIPs incentive is negative (positive) in low- (high-) monitored firms. In the 
low- (high-) monitored firms, the estimates range from -0.126 to -0.132 (0.054 to 0.084) and 
they are all statistically significant. The resultant findings imply that the pressure exerted by 
well-monitored systems afford managers less opportunity to expropriate wealth from 
shareholders by pursuing a low-leverage policy. In other words, because debt acquisition is 
often acknowledged by the market as positive news (e.g. Harris and Raviv, 1990; Stulz, 1990), 
among others, executive mangers are forced in high-monitored firms via the LTIPs incentive 
to increase their firm’s idiosyncratic risk, hence more borrowing. Another possible explanation 
could be that, because high-monitored firms enjoy lower borrowing costs, ceteris paribus, 
LTIPs-incentivised managers become aligned to shareholders’ aspirations, thereby contracting 
more debt to sponsor firm activities. In fact, the opposite is true for poorly (low)- monitored 
firms, where entrenched managers pursue a low leverage policy as their residual interest in the 
form of LTIPs increases.  
In short, low-monitored firms are likely to be punished by lenders demanding high borrowing 
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rates, which in turn can influence entrenched managers to lower the leverage ratio as they 
receive more stock and cash-based incentives. Again, the finding is consistent with and 
complementary to the main results (Table 5.4.2) that LTIPs incentives and the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk (i.e. leverage) are positively related in high-monitored firms. 
 
5.8.3.1 Other control variables 
Largely, the control variables tend to behave differently at each governance level. At low-
monitored firms, net PPE, R&D expense, market-to-book and Z-score are negative, with stock 
return showing a positive sign. In contrast, at high-monitored firms, net PPE, R&D, market-to-
book and Z-score are positive, with stock return showing a negative sign. However, return on 
assets and firm size maintain their effect on leverage in both governance systems. Essentially, 
the relative effects of the control variables on leverage may partly be attributed to the different 
governance levels.  
In sum, the evidence obtained so far in this section suggests the interaction of corporate 
governance and managerial compensation incentives in influencing corporate capital structure 
(leverage). We find that the negative effects of managerial cash bonus and share options 
components are largely pronounced in a weak corporate governance environment (low-
monitored), suggesting an indirect effect of corporate governance practices on firm leverage 
level. In fact, the supplied results seem to suggest the presence of a managerial entrenchment 
effect and that such an effect is motivated by managers’ risk-aversion, particularly in the low-
monitored firms. Moreover, complementary to the main findings (Table 5.4.2), the reported 
positive effect on LTIPs incentive is partly explained by the effective prevalence of the 
corporate governance system indicated by high-monitored system. This finding seems to 
provide support for the incentive alignment argument rather than the risk-motivated story under 
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the high-monitored firms. Again, one should consume this information with low sample 
observation in mind.  
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Table 5.7 1 Leverage – Pay Incentives  for Low-Governance Firms Regression  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Leverage Leverage Leverage  Leverage 
LTIPs -0.132** -0.132* -0.129* -0.126** 
 (-1.94) (-1.90) (-1.87) (-1.83) 
     
ESO -0.141* -0.150 -0.149* -0.164* 
 (-1.63) (-1.62) (-1.64) (-1.81) 
     
CashB -0.109 -0.115 -0.093 -0.082 
 (-1.34) (-1.39) (-1.11) (-0.99) 
     
SAL -0.107** -0.097* -0.096* -0.073 
 (-2.08) (-1.88) (-1.87) (-1.29) 
     
MKTB -0.002** -0.002** -0.001** -0.002** 
 (-2.47) (-2.41) (-2.27) (-2.24) 
     
Size  0.089*** 0.093*** 0.098*** 0.101*** 
 (5.68) (5.93) (6.01) (6.32) 
     
ROA -0.039 -0.031 -0.022 0.002 
 (-0.24) (-0.19) (-0.14) (0.01) 
     
STKR -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (-0.40) (-0.13) (-0.06) (0.11) 
     
Z-Score 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.21) (-0.11) (-0.16) (-0.52) 
     
Net PPE -0.043 -0.039 -0.047 -0.051 
 (-1.22) (-1.11) (-1.33) (-1.45) 
     
R & D -0.163 -0.159 -0.149 -0.153 
 (-1.26) (-1.19) (-1.15) (-1.18) 
     
E. Own  0.707*** 0.700*** 0.689*** 
  (4.12) (4.04) (3.86) 
     
Non E.Own   0.331 0.286 
   (1.15) (0.97) 
     
Large Own    0.002* 
    (1.66) 
     
Constant 0.493** 0.413* 0.352 0.176 
 
Industry & Year effects 
(1.97) 
YES 
(1.64) 
YES 
(0.44) 
YES 
(0.60) 
YES 
N 585 585 581 581 
R2 0.240 0.251 0.25 0.259 
The table presents the OLS lagged estimation results for the interaction effects of incentives (LTIPs, ESO and 
CashB) and low-monitored or governed firms on leverage. Models 1, 2 3 and 4 include firm fixed effect. The 
reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. All variable definitions are described in Table 5.3.1. *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5.7 2 Leverage–Pay Incentives for High-Governance Firms Regression   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         Leverage         Leverage         Leverage         Leverage 
LTIPs 0.084* 0.076* 0.060 0.054 
 (1.75) (1.63) (1.20) (1.05) 
     
ESO -0.146** -0.151** -0.159** -0.167** 
 (-2.22) (-2.28) (-2.39) (-2.48) 
     
CashB -0.029 -0.034 -0.053 -0.053 
 (-0.50) (-0.59) (-0.89) (-0.88) 
     
SAL -0.031 -0.031 -0.065 -0.065 
 (-0.72) (-0.73) (-1.56) (-1.56) 
     
MKTB 0.0017 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.19) (0.18) 
     
Size 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.008 
 (0.64) (0.66) (0.45) (0.42) 
     
ROA -0.316*** -0.314*** -0.319*** -0.316*** 
 (-4.09) (-4.07) (-4.24) (-4.24) 
     
STKR -0.016            -0.017 -0.015 -0.015 
 (-0.78) (-0.83) (-0.67) (-0.68) 
     
Z-Score   0.042***  0.042***   0.044*** 0.044*** 
 (3.04)             (3.04) (3.17) (3.15) 
     
Net PPE 0.095** 0.096** 0.071 0.075 
 (2.13) (2.14) (1.54) (1.62) 
     
R & D -0.499* -0.488** -0.344 -0.347* 
 (-2.20) (-2.16) (-1.62) (-1.64) 
     
E.Own  -0.022 -0.141*** -0.125** 
  (-0.82) (-3.23) (-2.53) 
     
Non. E.Own   -0.012 -0.001 
   (-0.14) (-0.01) 
     
Large Own    -0.001 
    (-0.74) 
     
Constant 0.601*** 0.603*** 0.838*** 0.905*** 
 
Industry&Year 
effects 
(2.37) 
YES 
(2.38) 
YES 
(3.27) 
YES 
(3.45) 
YES 
N 665 665 650 650 
R2 0.291 0.293 0.306 0.307 
The table presents the OLS lagged estimation results for the interaction effects of incentives (LTIPs, ESO and 
CashB) and high-monitored or governed firms on leverage. Models 1, 2 3 and 4 include firm fixed effect. The 
reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. All variable definitions are described in Table 5.3.1. *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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5.9 Chapter overall conclusions 
 
The chapter establishes a strong relation between the level and composition of managerial 
compensation and financial leverage based on the assumption that shareholders’ efficient 
design of compensation influences the quality of managerial financial leverage decisions. More 
specifically, leverage ratio is positively dependent on LTIPs, suggesting shareholders’ 
willingness to use LTIPs to influence managers to sponsor corporate activities with more debt. 
In contrast, stock options and cash bonus show a decreasing relationship with firm leverage. 
Thus, a stock options incentive discourages managerial risk appetite, which is inconsistent with 
the risk-motivated explanation, whilst the cash bonus result is consistent with risk reduction 
expectations (Hayes et al., 2012; Harris and Raviv, 1990). Significantly, the reported evidence 
seems to provide mixed support for the risk-motivated story. In particular, the convexity 
inherent in the share/stock options incentive is ineffective for reducing risk-related agency 
problems between the principal(s) and the agent(s) (Hayes et al., 2012; Lewellen, 2006). 
Consistent with expectations, shareholders use rather more LTIPs incentive to minimise the 
managerial risk incentive problem. This is interesting, because the Greenbury Report (1995) 
recommended that the remuneration committee should substitute stock options with LTIPs to 
prevent managerial excessive risk-taking. Also, the evidence on cash bonus supports risk 
reduction hypothesis.   
Additionally, the supplementary evidence revealed that shareholders apply more debt-like 
compensation (i.e. deferred/restricted stock) to induce managers to lower the firm’s debt ratio. 
This is significant, given the fact that deferred stock helps align the incentive of both 
shareholders and bondholders (debtholders), thereby reducing agency costs of debt (John and 
John, 1993; Kabir et al., 2013). In essence, the UK shareholders use restricted stock to induce 
managers to minimise the risk-shifting incentive problem.  
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Moreover, the chapter’s evidence also suggests that the firm’s growth opportunity interacts 
with managerial compensation to affect leverage. The chapter noted that the shareholders of 
high-growth (low-growth) firms award executives more stock-based incentive (LTIPs and 
stock options) and cash bonus to encourage (discourage) more risk-taking policy (increase debt 
ratio). More interestingly, a stock options incentive induces more borrowing for high-growth 
firms, consistent with the risk-motivated incentive argument (Coles et al., 2006; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010; Kini and Williams, 2012), implying that the risk-motivated feature of 
stock options to encourage more risk-taking (via borrowings) is limited to only high-growth 
opportunity firms. One surprising finding is that cash-motivated managers of high-growth 
firms tend to use more debt to sponsor corporate activities. This could possibly mean that such 
firm managers are able to generate enough cash flow to satisfy firm’s debt obligation as well 
as their accounting performance threshold in order to receive cash bonus compensation.  
Finally, the chapter also shows that the interaction of corporate governance with managerial 
compensation partly influence the firm’s capital structure (leverage). In particular, managers 
of a poorly (low)- monitored firm lower firm leverage as their incentive packages (LTIPs, stock 
options and cash bonus) increase, which is symptomatic of the managerial entrenchment effect. 
However, in high-monitored firms, LTIPs motivate managers to increase the debt ratio, 
whereas stock options are insensitive to increasing leverage. This indicates that high-monitored 
firms, which often enjoy lower cost of external finance, induce managers with an LTIPs 
incentive to afford a higher debt ratio in the capital structure.   
Overall, the supplied evidence tends to provide support for incentive alignment hypotheses 
rather than the radical risk-motivated incentive argument.  
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                                                        Chapter 6 
                                      6.0 Summary and Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
In this study, we investigate the interaction among the managerial compensation and risk-
taking activities. Specifically, the study examines the association between managerial 
compensation and investment and/or financial leverage. The underlying reasoning of this 
research is that shareholders through the board of directors design an efficient compensation 
scheme that aims to influence managerial risk-taking decisions. This is because the managers’ 
actions and decisions determine the probability distribution of the firm’s value, so shareholders 
via the compensation policy tend to induce managers to make optimal investment and financing 
decisions. 
The thesis has three broad objectives. First, it seeks to examine the association between 
executives’ compensation and investment activities using a sample of UK firms. Prior 
researchers have hugely concentrated on managerial compensation and research and 
development and/or capital expenditure (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Hayes et al., 2012; Kini and 
Williams, 2012; Chen et al., 2017), acquisitions (see Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Croci and 
Petmezas, 2015; Feitu-Ruiz and Rennboog, 2017) and innovation (e.g. Manso, 2011; Nguyen, 
2018). Unlike these prior scholarly studies, the current work provides a complete overview of 
the firm’s investment: research and development, capital expenditure, other fixed assets and, 
more importantly, fixed intangible activities in a single study. Given the substantial resources 
firm managers devote to other fixed assets and fixed intangibles, the managerial risk behaviour 
regarding such activity is unclear. In this respect, we argue that an important gap exists.  
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Second, the study aims to further examine the extent to which the level of managerial 
compensation influences investment distortions. Different from Jensen’s (1986) over-
investment hypothesis, the present study further extends the argument that the level (excess) 
of management compensation can induce investment distortions (under-investment or over-
investment). This view is consistent with the underlying argument of Strobl (2014), who 
conjectures that shareholders can purposefully design compensation to cause investment 
distortion. We explore the link between managerial excesses in compensation and the 
investment distortion probability. 
Third, the study also investigates managerial compensation and financial leverage. It is argued 
that UK firms (management) use debt more conservatively (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Antoniou et al., 2008). In fact, limited research exists in the UK on how executive 
compensation influences leverage level. There are a  few exceptions (e.g. Florackis and Ozkan, 
2009; Kabir et al., 2013); however, unlike this prior work – e.g. Florackis et al. (2009), who 
relate executive ownership to leverage – the current work utilises comprehensive data on 
managerial compensation grants and their effect on the firm’s observed leverage.  
In addition, the thesis further explores the extent to which the firm’s growth opportunity 
influences the relation between executive compensation and leverage nexus. This investigation 
revolves around the thinking that the leverage–compensation is likely to be affected by the 
firm’s growth prospects. Furthermore, managers of well-monitored or governed firms are 
likely to have reduced agency cost expenditure because such firms tend to make efficient 
operational decisions including leverage policy with minimal incentive problem. In line with 
this view, the study examines how the corporate governance presence impacts the linkage 
between executive compensation and financial leverage. 
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The rest of this concluding chapter summarises the main issues of the thesis, draws broad 
inferences from the key findings, and, finally, points to some unanswered or unresolved issues 
that need future attention.  
 
6.2 Summary of research findings 
This section presents a summary of the study’s key findings for the respective empirical 
chapters. Specifically, we delineate our empirical results into two chapters: investment and 
leverage. 
 
6.2.1 Managerial compensation and investment activities 
Chapter 4 starts our empirical chapters. It presents a detailed analysis and discussion of the 
relationship between executives’ pay incentives and the different types of investment activities 
by employing a three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression technique. First, the chapter builds 
on the executive compensation review conducted in Chapter 2 and formulates testable 
hypotheses (H1a, H1b and H1c; H2a, H2b and H2c; H3a, H3b and H3c; H4a, H4b and 
H4c). Second, it describes the main method employed in examining the causal effect of 
executives’ compensation on the value-critical investment decisions. Again, it discusses the 
measurement of the key variables and other control variables. It states the empirical model and 
the chosen estimation method (3SLS). Third, it conducts the empirical tests of the hypotheses 
and the results are presented and thoroughly discussed. The presented evidence (for hypotheses 
H1a–H1c) suggests that LTIPs (equity) is positively associated with capital expenditure 
projects. This implies that executives with a large component of LTIPs incentives are more 
likely to divert corporate funds to sponsor capital expenditure activities, which is consistent 
with prior work (e.g. Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Guay, 1999; Hayes et al., 2012). The 
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chapter also reports that stock options incentives encourage more spending on capital 
expenditure activities (Croci and Petmezas, 2015), while a cash bonus incentive discourages 
capital expenditure spending.  
Furthermore, the chapter finds that the LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus are all positively 
related to fixed intangible activities (hypotheses H2a–H2c). The finding tends to imply that 
managers are likely to allocate more corporate resources to fixed intangible when a large 
component of their incentives is either stock-based or cash-based compensation. This result 
raises a challenge to the present study because there is no direct evidence on the risk 
classification of the said activity. In other words, there is no specific investment literature that 
makes a clear distinction on the risk-related classification of fixed intangible. However, based 
on the intangible nature of such investment activity, the study predicts it has a high-risk nature, 
implying that both risk-motivated and risk-avoiding incentives encourage such activity.      
Moreover, the chapter provides some interesting findings on the research and development 
(R&D – hypotheses H3a–H3c) expenditure. The evidence shows that the stock-based (LTIPs 
and stock options) compensation is negatively and significantly related to R&D activity, 
suggesting that corporate executives are more likely to allocate firm resources away from R&D 
activity when a stock-based incentive constitutes a large component of their compensation 
packages. This is contrary to the risk-motivated incentive of stock-based compensation. Cash 
bonus incentive shows an increasing effect on R&D expense, implying that UK firm managers 
may tend to invest more on long-term (R&D) activity when a substantial amount of their pay 
package is the form of this type of incentive.  
Finally, on the other fixed assets expenditure evidence (i.e. when we separate other fixed assets 
expenditure from the capital expenditure – hypotheses H4a–H4c), the chapter finds the three 
compensation components (LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) to be inversely linked to such 
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activity. It suggests that the UK executives are likely to disinvest in other fixed assets activity 
as they receive more stock-based and cash bonus incentives. 
Chapter 4, section 4.7 further investigates the extent to which managerial excess compensation 
influences investment distortions. The key underlying aim is to empirically explore if 
executives’ compensation excess is as a result of shareholders’ purposeful attempt to encourage 
investment distortions. 
The subsection reviews relevant literature and develops the hypotheses (hypotheses H5a, H5b 
and H5c) to be tested. The chapter describes and estimates the main subsamples to be utilised 
in the analysis. It also states the empirical model (investment distortion probability model) and 
discusses the adopted estimation method (probit model) to test the hypotheses.  
The subsection establishes that managerial compensation excess induces investment 
distortions. Specifically, the positive excess compensation (over-compensated) stock-based 
incentives (LTIPs, stock options) is positively and significantly related to the probability of 
over-investing in capital expenditure activities. Similarly, a positive excess cash bonus (over-
compensated) increases the probability of capital expenditure over-investment. However, 
under-compensated managers in stock-based and cash bonus (negative excess stock-based and 
cash bonus) are less likely to cause distortion in capital expenditure activity. One should 
interpret the under-compensated incentives result with care because the reported coefficients 
are all insignificant. Further, the chapter also shows that over-compensated LTIPs and cash 
bonus incentives show a decreased probability of fixed intangible distortion (over-investment), 
however insignificant, while the over-compensated stock option is significantly associated with 
a reduced probability of fixed intangible over-investment, implying that rewarding executives 
with stock options above the optimal level is less likely to induce fixed intangible over-
investment. Also, under-compensated stock-based (LTIPs and stock options) managers are 
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unlikely to commit over-investment in fixed intangibles. Finally, it also reports that the over-
compensated LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus all show less likelihood of committing over-
investment in research and development. However, under-compensated LTIPs, stock options 
and cash bonus all show an increased R&D over-investment probability, but the coefficients 
for stock options and cash bonus lack statistical significance. 
The findings seem to suggest that shareholders’ deviation from the optimal compensation level 
induces managers to commit investment distortion probability in capital expenditure activity. 
Thus, over-compensated (LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) managers are more likely to 
over-invest in capital expenditure activity. Further, on the intangibles, one major implication 
of the findings is that the over-compensated incentives (LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus) 
have a decreased likelihood of committing over-investment in intangibles (fixed intangible and 
R&D). A possible reason could be that shareholders’ intentional deviation from the optimal 
compensation level to influence managers to cause distortion in intangibles tend to be 
ineffective. This is unsurprising, given that such activities are seen as risky and that UK 
managers are unwilling to overly invest in such activity even if they are generously 
remunerated.  
 
6.2.2 Managerial compensation and financial leverage 
Chapter 5 conducts an examination of the effect of managerial compensation on financial 
leverage. The chapter’s main idea centres on the view that shareholders award managers 
compensation to influence value-critical financial decisions. It reviews the existing material 
evidence and constructs a main sample and subsamples. It also formulates relevant testable 
hypotheses and states the empirical model needed to test the hypotheses. The chapter outlines 
the main estimation method employ to test the stated hypotheses (H6a–6e) before undertaking 
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the empirical tests and presenting and discussing the results. The chapter documents a positive 
relation between LTIPs and leverage. It implies that executives with a higher LTIPs component 
are likely to borrow more to sponsor corporate activities, consistent with the alignment 
hypothesis. Again, the chapter disaggregates LTIPs into performance stock and 
deferred/restricted stock and records that the deferred stock component is negative and 
significantly related to leverage ratio, signalling the fact that shareholders apply a debt-like pay 
incentive to influence managers to minimise the risk-shifting incentive problem and possible 
agency cost of debt, whilst performance stock encourages more debt financing. Furthermore, 
it shows that stock options and leverage are negatively and significantly linked, which is 
inconsistent with the risk-motivated incentive argument (Coles et al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 
2012). Similarly, the coefficient on cash bonus is negative and significant, postulating that 
cash-incentivised managers are likely to have a low corporate debt level, supporting risk 
reduction hypothesis. This is not surprising, given that a manager of a more levered firm needs 
to meet regular interest payments, which in turn reduces the available cash balance. 
Maintaining a low leverage level makes it easy for managers to meet the required cash flow 
balance, thereby enabling them to qualify for a cash bonus incentive. 
Moreover, the chapter considers the role of corporate governance within the context of the 
executive compensation and leverage relation. It rests on the assumption that firm-specific 
governance characteristics influence managerial compensation to affect the firm’s leverage 
level. The chapter defines two sub-groups representing low (below median) and high (above 
median) governance indicators level. It shows that, at low-monitored firms, stock-based and 
cash bonus compensation are negatively related to leverage. This tends to imply that managers 
in a low-monitored or governed firm are likely to borrow less when their residual interest in 
the form of LTIPs, stock options and cash bonus increases. In high-monitored firms, stock 
options and cash bonus are still negatively related with leverage, although the cash bonus 
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coefficient is insignificant, while LTIPs is positive and significant. The findings show that, as 
monitoring improves (via increase in large concentrated ownership), LTIPs-incentivised 
managers tend to become responsive to their LTIPs compensation package and increase the 
financial leverage level, but managers with higher stock options incentive are still likely to 
decrease the firm leverage ratio.    
The chapter also examines the interaction of managerial compensation and growth 
opportunities on the firm leverage. The idea is that managers of high-growth firms are often 
difficult to monitor because managers’ actions and decisions are unobservable to the owners. 
One way shareholders use compensation is to award managers more (less) stock-based (cash 
bonus) compensation to induce them (managers) to make appropriate financial decisions. Also, 
high-growth firms can suffer from under-investment problem if managers fail to make efficient 
leverage decisions (Core, 2001; MacLaughlin et al., 1996). With this, it is expected that 
executive compensation–leverage association would be influenced by the firm’s growth 
potential level. The chapter describes and constructs the growth opportunity proxy (market-to-
book) using high and low sub-groups and employs an OLS method to estimate the two 
categories. The chapter reports that managers of low-growth firms tend to borrow less when 
they receive more stock-based (LTIPs and stock options) and cash bonus incentives. At high-
growth firms, stock-based incentives and leverage are positively linked to debt level, implying 
that managers in such firms are more likely to increase the firm’s debt ratio as their residual 
incentives in the form of stocks increase. Thus, stock options positive effect on leverage, 
supports the risk-motivated incentive argument at only high growth firms. Similarly, cash 
bonus and leverage are positively related in high-growth firms, suggesting that managers with 
more cash bonus tend to increase leverage level, which is contrary to the risk reduction 
argument.  
In summary, the main implication of the study findings tends to suggest that UK shareholders 
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do not explicitly or intentionally utilise managerial compensation incentives for risk-taking 
motivated reasons, but rather for incentive alignment motives. The evidence on managerial 
compensation and financial leverage interdependence partly explains the assertion that the UK 
managers’ conservative debt behaviour (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Antoniou et al., 2008) 
seems to be influenced by the level and structure of their compensation incentives.   
 
6.3 Key conclusions, discussions, and practical and theoretical implications 
The study draws four major conclusions from the empirical findings. This subsection discusses 
these conclusions and their practical and theoretical relevance.  
 
6.3.1 Importance of optimal contracting theory (OCT) 
First and foremost, executive compensation incentives appear to be an important and useful 
tool in influencing managerial corporate decisions. In fact, most of the study’s key findings 
support this conclusion. First, our results show that shareholders offering compensation 
packages to top executives influence them to make optimal investment decisions. The 
underlying implication is that, as the quality of managerial investment improves albeit pay 
incentives, shareholders’ value increases. Second, our evidence further suggests that 
shareholders can intentionally deviate from the optimal level of compensation to induce 
managerial investment distortions. Third, we also show that executive compensation influences 
the quality of managerial financing decisions (leverage). Additionally, it is observed that a 
firm’s growth opportunity interacts with compensation incentives to influence managerial 
leverage decisions. Lastly, the evidence posits the view that managers of high-monitored firms 
afford higher leverage in their capital structure as they receive more pay incentives.  
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Furthermore, the reported findings have implications on the theories of managerial 
compensation: 1) optimal compensation theory (Holmstrom, 1979; Coles et al., 2006; Chava 
and Purnanandam, 2010; Kini and Williams, 2012; Strobl, 2014; Croci and Petzemas, 2015; 
Nguyen, 2018), and 2) managerial power hypothesis (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; 2004; 
Weisbach, 2007). For instance, the excesses in executive compensation are not as a result of 
managerial rent extraction, but rather as a result of shareholders’ intention to induce managerial 
investment distortion.  
Additionally, the current study’s evidence enhances our understanding on the theory of 
investment. The result seems to imply that the over-compensated (under-compensated) 
managers are more (less) likely to over-invest in capital expenditure projects over a long period 
of time. This is contrary to Coles et al.’s (2006) argument that shareholders temporarily deviate 
from the optimal managerial compensation to alter investment policy. Our finding suggests 
otherwise, implying the effectiveness of managerial compensation incentives in changing a 
firm’s investment dynamics. In contrast, the reported evidence on intangible investment 
distortions does not support the excessive managerial compensation hypothesis. It seems to 
postulate that the over-investment incentive resulting from excessive compensation is limited 
to capital expenditure activities.  
In general, the study’s key findings tend to show that the optimal contracting theory provides 
a potential explanation for the UK datasets. 
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6.4 Potential limitations of the study and the future research 
recommendations 
 
Despite the important contributions made by the current study to the relatively scanty UK 
literature, the following limitations were also observed and therefore the findings should be 
interpreted with these shortfalls in mind. Specifically, these limitations are presented under 
three main categories: namely, data and sample limitations, theoretical implications and proxy 
variables utilised in the analyses. 
 
6.4.1 Data and sample limitations 
Even though the data on executives’ compensation packages have improved since the 
implementation of many policy documents (i.e. Greenbury Report, 1995; Hampel Report, 
1998; Higgs Report, 2003), some companies, particularly smaller ones, often fall short of 
providing detailed and relevant information on executives’ incentives data (i.e. compensation 
packages and shareholdings stakes). The research’s initial annual report survey reveals that 
information. Consequently, the study sample was selected based on pre-set criteria. This non-
random selection method reveals the inherent sampling bias which is likely to limit the 
generalisability of the study’s findings.  
Additionally, our adopted selection procedure (sampling only FTSE 350 firms) resulted in a 
reduction in the researched firms’ size. Notwithstanding this, one advantage of the inherent 
firm size bias is that it helps to mitigate the survivorship bias which is likely to affect our 
sample composition. In particular, smaller firms are more likely to be delisted and easily 
overtaken by the larger ones. 
Moreover, the research selected non-financial companies listed on the FTSE 350 index, which 
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further shrank the sample size. The exclusion of financial, utilities and investment firms limits 
the generalisability of the results. Nevertheless, differences in accounting practices and 
regulations among financial and non-financial firms make this exclusion an important strategy. 
For example, it is expected that the firms’ executives compensation packages guide their 
selected policy measures (i.e. risk-taking investment and financial leverage policies). 
Therefore, such a dichotomy in accounting reporting can inhabit the linkage between risk-
taking activities and executives’ financial compensation packages. More so, the utilities 
companies are heavily regulated, which in turn could limit their management operational risk-
taking activities.    
Finally, limiting our datasets to UK-based companies implies that the interpretation of the 
findings outside the context of UK publicly listed firms (FTSE 350 index) needs to be done 
with extreme caution. This is because differences in governance practices as well as the 
development of the capital market system can affect risk-taking decisions of executive 
managers.  
 
6.4.2 Limitations of constructs and variables 
Another constraint faced by this research is the limited proxy variables utilised in the study 
analyses, which are based on theoretical and empirical works in constructing and measuring 
these variables. In terms of the key independent variables (LTIPs, stock options and cash 
bonus) which were manually collected, they fail to include some incentive plans. For instance, 
the study discovered that some firms issue a co-investment incentives plan which allows 
executives to invest part of their incentives into such a scheme. Due to the complication 
associated with the measurement, this study excluded this component in the long-term 
incentives plans (LTIPs). This is consistent with previous works (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Kini 
 309 
and Williams, 2012). In addition, the study also excluded executives’ pension plans, which can 
also provide useful information on the quality of managerial risk-taking activities. The non-
inclusion of pension schemes is due to the difficulty in estimating pension values, and therefore 
creates an avenue for further future study into this issue. Again, it is hoped that the omission 
of this variable (pension component) would not in any way have material implications for the 
supplied findings. Moreover, other managerial data including private investments, gender, 
experience, education, dual role, etc., were unobservable by the chosen model; however, it is 
hoped this would not affect the study findings. Although this research accounts for a large 
number of executives’ incentives and other related personal characteristics, it is anticipated that 
the findings and conclusions of this study should be considered with this fact in mind. Also, 
the estimations of other key dependent variables (e.g. proxy for investment distortions – over- 
or under-investment) and independent variables (compensation deviation or excess incentives) 
are all unobservable and need to be estimated. Such proxy variables may not represent the 
perfect measure of the intended constructs, which can bias the study’s findings and its 
conclusions. Therefore, it is important that this caveat is noted when interpreting the results of 
the analyses.  
In short, while the study acknowledges these limitations, it argues succinctly that the study’s 
inability to find appropriate proxies to quantify these effects would have no serious 
implications for the research findings. In fact, the data and variable constraints are indifferent 
to prior studies (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Kini and Williams, 2012; O’Connor et al., 2013; 
Eisdorfer et al., 2013; Nguyen, 2018).    
 
6.4.3 Theoretical and empirical delimitation 
Another important limitation that should be considered is specifically identifying the 
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theoretical and empirical implications of the study’s findings. Generally, the research implicitly 
assumes that shareholders offer different components of compensation to induce managerial 
risk-taking activities. In other words, the study’s general premise is that the quality of 
managerial value-critical decisions regarding investment and the concomitant financing 
options should reflect the effectiveness of managerial compensation schemes in constraining 
the opportunistic managerial behaviour. Accordingly, it shows the extent to which the level 
and the different components of executives’ compensation influence investment and/or 
leverage decisions. For example, stock-based (cash-based) compensation increases (decreases) 
risk-taking policies. This assumption may not be plausible, given that shareholders may apply 
incentives compensation for different motives. Again, the study’s classifications or definition 
of high- (low-) risk activities would be indifferent to the executive managers. Therefore, the 
reader should be aware of this fact when analysing the study’s findings.   
 
6.5 Areas for future research 
 
The findings of this research provide important evidence to show that managerial financial 
compensation incentives play a significant role in influencing the efficiency of managerial risk-
taking activities (e.g. investment and/or leverage decisions) by using simultaneous equation 
modelling. However, as indicated above, some other matters exist that are not covered by the 
current research which we believe have the potential to enhance our understanding on the risk-
related behaviour or attitude of managers given compensation incentives. Notably, some of the 
issues that remain unsettled are highlighted below: 
First, one attractive area for future research is to combine both managerial compensation 
incentives (i.e. secondary data) and primary data (thus, through interviews and questionnaire) 
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to specifically ascertain how managers behave relating to investment and financing decisions. 
Such an addition will give us direct evidence on managerial behaviour regarding risk-taking 
decisions.  
Another important area for consideration is to look at how executives’ pension scheme 
influences their risk-related decisions. The introduction of the companies’ code (2003/2009), 
for instance, has increased the reportage on executive pension contribution, and relating it to 
risk-taking activities (e.g. innovative expenditure) will give further fresh impetus on this 
relatively new stream of research.  
Finally, accounting for executives’ outside wealth incentive and gender together with 
compensation packages will contribute to influencing managerial risk behaviour. In tune with 
this thinking, subsequent research can look at the role of managers’ outside wealth, gender and 
compensation packages on their strategic decisions. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Mathematical proof of the anticipated econometric challenges  
 
Endogeneity concern 
This appendix provides a detailed mathematical proof of the practical econometric challenges 
inherent in our dataset which warrants the relevance of our chosen three-stage least square 
(3SLS) approach. We provide mathematical demonstration of the problem and show the 
robustness of the selected technique (3SLS) in addressing the such challenge.  For illustration 
purposes, we use investment variable throughout our discussion.   
We construct our investment model as follows: 
 Ia{ = 	 β+ + β,Ca{ + β6Χa{ + εa{ ………………………………………….…  (1) 
 
Where 𝑰𝒊𝒕, is the firm investment, 𝑪𝒊𝒕managerial compensation incentives (i.e. LTIPs, stock 
options and cash bonus), 𝜲𝒊𝒕 is firm’s observable characteristics based on prior literature (e.g. 
leverage, growth, firm size, cash flow, sales growth etc.), 𝜺𝒊𝒕 error term, and and 𝜷𝟏 is the 
coefficient of interest.   
 
Practical econometrics challenges 
As noted, these econometric issues are prevalent in our data. These include unobserved 
variables, measurement error, serial correlation and reverse causality could render other 
technique (e.g. OLS) ineffective. These issues make our prescribed technique (3SLS) 
theoretically and practically relevant.     
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More specifically, OLS parameter estimates will suffer from endogeneity bias in the presence 
of these econometrics issues presented by the data, where one or more explanatory variables 
are correlated with the error term i.e. E [𝐶'(𝜀'(] ¹ 0 or E [𝑋'(𝜀'(]¹ 0, leading to wrong causal 
inferences.   
To be more specific, we can define 𝜺𝒊𝒕 as a composite error term in this general form: 
𝜀'( = 𝜇'+𝜏( + 𝜌ÅÆÇ[,+ ∪'( …………………………………………………… (1a) 
Where µa and τ{ indicate unobserved individual and time effects, whiles 𝝆𝜺𝒊𝒕[𝟏and ∪𝒊𝒕represent 
serial correlation and white noise error term respectively. This implies that if the explanatory 
variable(s) are not strictly exogenous the noted econometric bias arises.  
A brief overview of the potential bias that are more likely to affect our data as well as the 
study’s results if OLS technique is applied are explained below. 
 
Unobserved heterogeneity   
The omitted variable bias may occur when a relevant explanatory variable, assumed to be 
correlated with the regressors is completely omitted from the model, and, or when such that 
individual unobserved effects are either industry or firm related characteristics are correlated 
with both investment and compensation incentives leading to possible econometrics bias often 
referred to as “unobserved heterogeneity”, i.e. E [𝐶'(𝜇'] ¹ 0 or E [𝑋'(𝜇'] ¹ 0.  
 
Let’s give mathematical proof of the unobserved heterogeneity bias when OLS estimator is 
applied to eq. (1). 
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 In a simplified form, we define conditional expectation of firm investment (𝑰𝒊𝒕), given Χ' and 
constant term, where: 
 Χ' = (𝛸'(,𝐶'(), β' = ( 𝛽,𝛽6)and𝜀'( = ( 𝜇'𝛶+ ∪𝒊𝒕),  
thus equation (1) is specified as follows:  
Ia{ = 	 β,Ca{ + β6Χa{ + εa{ ………………….……………………...  (2) 
Where; Χ' shows firm individual characteristics including intercept term, and managers 
compensation (𝑪𝒊𝒕), while β' is the coefficients and 𝝁𝒊and∪𝒊𝒕are unobserved factor and white 
noise. Specifically, we write eq (3) as; 
𝐼'( = 	𝛸′𝛽′	 + 𝜀'(…………………………………………..……….(3) 
 Here, we denote OLS estimator for β' in equation (3) by 𝚋𝟐, given as: 
𝚋6 = (∑ 𝑋,𝑋Y)Ð'Ñ, −, ∑ 𝑋'	Ð'Ñ, 𝑌' ………………………………….(3) 
Substituting eq. (1) into eq. (3) to obtain eq. (4) 
Ia{ = 	 β,Ca{ + β6Χa{ + µÓ + ∪{…………………………..…………  (4) 
𝚋𝟐 = 𝛽 + (∑ 𝑋'𝛸'Y)Ð'Ñ, −, ∑ 𝑋'	Ð'Ñ, 𝜇Ô + (∑ 𝑋'𝛸'Y)−,Ð'Ñ, ∑ 𝑋'	Ð'Ñ, ∪'………(5) 
Assuming the last term has expectation E [𝑋'	 ∪'] = 0, allows to show that the probability limit 
of 𝚋𝟐is stated as follows: 
Plim𝚋𝟐 = 𝛽 + ∑ E	[Xa	µa]γ[,×× ,  
where  𝛾 ≠ 0 or 𝛾> 0, hence the parameter estimates by OLS estimator will be biased and 
inconsistent. However, OLS coefficients will be asymptotically unbiased when E	[Xa	µa] = 0.  
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Measurement error  
Measurement error is another case where OLS estimator is likely to be inconsistent when the 
explanatory variable(s) is measured with error. For example, potential endogeneity bias may 
occur when the compensation variable is inaccurately measured because of corporate 
misreporting i.e. E	[Xa{	 ∪𝒊𝒕 |Ca{] ≠ 0.  Stating from eq. (1), we provide the step by step proof 
below: 
Ia{ = 	 β,Xa{ + β6Ca{ + εa{………………………………………… (1) 
 
We present eq. (1) in a linear model, 𝑦( = 	𝑥𝛽′	 + 𝜀'( …………... (7) 
where Ia{ = y (investment) ; x = explanatory variable including compensation and other 
exogenous (Ca{, Χa{), β' = ( 𝛽,𝛽6) and εa{ = error term 
x{ = Z{ + ∪{ ………………………………………………..… …(8) 
x{ is the measured explanatory variable with error, Z{ = true value, and ∪{ = measurement error. 
The linear model shows that the conditional expectation of 𝑦( given x{ and constant term will 
be biased and inconsistent because of the error measured explanatory variable i.e. E [ x{𝜀'(] > 
0, violating the classical linear regression consistency assumption. For instance, in cases where 
the measurement error shows positive, then the explanatory variable of interest (x{) will exhibit 
positive bias (∪{) whiles the original error (𝜀'() shows negative bias, thus  
E [ x{𝜀'(] < 0 (see equation (9). 
𝜀'( = 𝜇(- β6 ∪( ………………………………………..………...(9) 
We show inconsistency of OLS estimator denoting 𝛽6 by 𝚋𝟐 
Proof: 
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𝚋𝟐 = ∑ (Û[Û̅)(¸[ Ý¸)ÞÆßàá (ÛÇ[Û̅)ÞÇßà ……………………… ………………………….………………..(10) 
Where ?̅? indicates sample mean of the explanatory variable (x{), and substituting eq. (7), we 
obtain; 
𝚋𝟐 = β6 + â, ã äá (Û[Û̅)âƐÇ[ἕÝäÞÆßà(, ã )á (ÛÇ[Û̅)ÞÇßà . . …… ………………………………………..(11) 
Hence, as sample moments get close to the population moments, sample sizes correspondingly 
increase to infinity.   
Plim𝚋𝟐 = β6 + 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚	â, ã äá (Û[Û̅)âƐÇ[ἕÝäÞÆßà(, ã )á (ÛÇ[Û̅)ÞÇßà …… .…… .………………… . . ………….(12) 
 
From eq.(12), we derive𝚋𝟐    =  β6 	+	æ	[×ç	èç]é[×ç]   , where E[ε{] = 0, with last term nonzero 
probability limit .i.e. 𝜎6´ 
 
E[x{ε{] = E[(W{ + u{)(v{ − β6U{)] = −β6σî6  
𝑣(𝑥() = (𝑤( + 𝑈() = 𝜎ñ6 + 𝜎6´ 
 
Plim𝚋𝟐 = 𝛽6 ò1 − ôõ±ôö…………….. …………………………………….…….(15) 
Therefore𝚋𝟐is asymptotically unbiased in cases where 𝜎6´ = 0. However, with measurement 
error presence, the coefficient biased estimates may shift towards zero especially if  𝜎6´ is 
positive. Also, the constant term estimates will be biased as well i.e.   𝛽, = [y{,- β6𝑥{] 
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Reverse Causality   
Another potential econometric problem on endogeneity concern is reverse causality. This 
posits two-way impact among the dependent and independent variable. Thus, the conditional 
expectation of y (investment) given x (compensation) and vice versa. 
Investment model is given by:  
I{ = 	 β,X{ + β6C{ + εa{ ……………………………………………..…………..…..(1), 
Where I is the firm investment (dependent variable), C = compensation (endogenous variable), 
X = exogenous factors, Z{ = valid instruments and Ɛ = error term.  
Endogenous equation for compensation 
C{ = I{ +	β;Z{ + εa{ ……………………………………………………………………(17) 
Then, we solve eq. (1) and (17) for C{ and I{ to derive the reduced form.  
 𝐶( = ÷à,[÷ + ,,[÷ 𝑧( + ,,[÷ 𝜀(………………………………………..…………….......(18) 
𝐼( = ÷à,[÷ + ÷6,[÷ 𝑧( + ,,[÷ 𝜀(………………………………………..………………….(19) 
Cov [𝐶(, ε{] = ,,[÷ cov [𝑧(, ε{] + ,,[÷ V [ε{] = ,[÷ 
V [C{] = v [ ,,[÷ 𝑧( + ,,[÷ 𝜀(] = ,(,[÷) (V [Z{]+𝜎6) 
𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚	𝚋6    =  β6 	+	ùúé	[ùç,			èç]é[ùç]  
𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚	𝚋6    =  β6 	+ (1 − 𝛽6) é[ûç]± 
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As 0 <β6< 1 and σ6> 0, causing OLS estimates biased and inconsistent. In other words, if OLS 
is applied to the model, the coefficient estimates for β6 will overestimate the true value of the 
parameter of interest.  
Lastly, the presence of serial correlation in the data may cause endogeneity bias which will 
render OLS an ineffective estimation technique. This is plausible, where any persistent 
adjustment in the firm’s investment and financing decisions lead to the predetermined 
explanatory variable (executive compensations), although a time lag may exist between the 
policy decision time and respond periods. For example, a positive increase in CAPEX, R&D 
or leverage in year 1 may alter executive compensation incentives in the following year. Hence, 
E [𝜀'(	𝜀'([,] ≠ 0,where the error term (𝜺𝒊𝒕) may be defined as a composite error term which 
takes the specification as: 
𝜀'( = 𝜇'+𝜏( + 𝜌ÅÆÇ[,+ ∪'( ……………………………………………………… (6) 
Where, 𝝁𝒊and 𝝉𝒕represent unobserved individual and time effects, 𝝆is the serial correlation 
term and  ∪𝒊𝒕shows the white noise error term. 
 
Resolving endogeneity bias 
As indicated, two primary causes of endogeneity bias: a) when the explanatory variable(s) is 
correlated with the error term; 
 i.e. E [X{	|ε{] = cov [𝑋'(	𝜀'(] ¹ 0, where the error term is a composite term; 
𝜀'( = 𝜇'+𝜏( + 𝜌ÅÆÇ[,+∪a{; and b) when there is an issue of reverse causality between the 
dependent and independent variables.  
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We apply three-stage least squares (3SLS) to deal with this problem. Two steps involve; first, 
in the reduced form regression, we regress endogenous regressor, i.e. compensation incentives 
on all instruments (e.g. including dependent variable, relevant instruments and other exogenous 
determinants of the endogenous factor) to obtain the predicted values, and finally replacing 
endogenous variable with the predicted values in the right-hand side as independent variable 
including other exogenous determinants in the model of interest (original structural model).  
Our investment equation is given: 
I{ = 	 β,C{ + β6X{ + εa{, ……………………………………………………....…. (16),  
which can be represented in a linear form:  
 I =  𝑋′𝛽′ + Ɛ, ………………………………………………………………………  (20),    
where 𝑋′ = (C{, X{) and 𝛽′ (β,, β6).   
Where I{ is the firm investment (dependent variable), C{ = compensation (endogenous 
variable), X{ = exogenous determinants of firm investment and εa{ = error term. In fact, the 
parameter estimates for compensation (C{) will be biased and inconsistent when OLS technique 
is applied because of the violation of strict exogenous condition or assumption, thus, the 
covariance of the error term and explanatory variable is nonzero (i.e. C{εa{) ¹ 0 or (𝑋′𝜀'() ≠ 0.  
This implies that the coefficient estimates for compensation (β′)	from the OLS estimator will 
be biased because:  
𝚋 = βY + (𝑋′X)[,𝑋′Ɛ ,  E [𝚋] ¹βY, when the moment condition (𝑋′ Ɛ) is not equal to zero i.e. 
(𝑋′𝜀'() ≠ 0.  
Therefore, to make the coefficient estimates asymptotically unbiased using instrumental 
variable estimator we impose further statistical identification, thus, we apply the following 
moment conditions:  
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1. Relevant instrument(s) (Z) should be correlated with the regressor (C{ )  
i.e. E (𝑍′C{) > 0. 
2. The instrument (s) (Z) should be uncorrelated with the error term  
E (𝑍′𝜀'() = 0. 
3. Where (Z) should not be directly related to the dependent variable (I{)  
i.e. cov [I{ Z | X’] = 0. Specifically, this condition is known as exclusion restriction, 
which reflects the assumption that (Z) instruments are validly excluded from the 
original structural or investment model.   
Therefore, 
𝚋ý³ = (𝑍Y	𝑋′)[,𝑍′I{ =  (𝑍Y	𝑋′)[,𝑍′ (𝑋′𝛽′ + Ɛ) = βY + (𝑍Y	𝑋′)[, Z, Ɛ 
Where Z = valid instruments, 𝑋′ = explanatory variables C{Xa{)𝛽′ (β,, β6), Ɛ = error term and I{ = firm investment.  Hence, the coefficient estimates (𝚋ý³) is unbiased when the covariance 
of the instruments and error term is equal to zero i.e. (Z, Ɛ) = 0. Overall, this approach 
(instrumental variable technique) is more appropriate for single linear model.  
Moreover, the three-stage or three stages least squares (3SLS) is suitable for structural equation 
model or systems of equation. As described above (3SLS) and relevant to the study application, 
we employ 3SLS technique.    
From the original investment equation (16) 
I{ = 	 β,C{ + β6X{ + εa{, …………………………………………….………………….. (16).  
 For simplicity, we drop the subscripts in equation (16) and to derive 
 I =  β,C + γ6X + Ɛ …………………………………………………………..………....(20) 
In the reduced form equation, we derive compensation equation as follows:  
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C = β,I + γ;X + u ………………………………………………….……..……..…..(21) 
We simplify the reduced form using kth explanatory variable in vector notation; 
Cs = 	Zπs +µs ……………………………………………………….……………..(22) 
Where  Cs = 	compensation	incentives , Zπs = all instruments including dependent variable 
(investment), exogenous factors of compensation and the relevant instruments, and µs = error 
term.  
Applying OLS to equation (22), we obtain the predicted values,  
Ĉv = Z (𝑍Y	𝑍)[,𝑍′Cw.  
Where Ĉv = Cs if Z is in a column vector.  
In the second stage regression, we apply matrix of explanatory variables are replaced in the K 
columns of Ẍ in the standard model, where Ĉv is seen as matrix of instruments.  
Ĉ = Z (𝑍Y	𝑍)[,𝑍′		C 
Hence, the parameter estimates in the second stage is given by: 
𝚋ý³ = (ĈY	Ĉ	)[, Ĉ’ I, which can be stated in a three-stage least squares as: 
𝚋;þÿþ = [X' Z (𝑍Y	𝑍)[,𝑍′	𝑋][,𝑋′𝑍 (𝑍Y	𝑍′)[,Z I 
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 Summary of variables and measures  
Variables Definition Source/Compustat  
Dependent variables for risk-taking activities (Investment, Leverage)  
Investment 
Variables: 
CAPEX 
 
CAPEX2 
 
 
R&D expense 
Fixed intangible 
 
Financing 
measures: 
Leverage  
 
 
 
Capital Expenditure (Gross property, plant and equipment 
plus other fixed assets expenditure) to total assets.  
Other fixed assets expenditure (e.g. Patents acquired from 
other firms / acquisitions) to total assets                                                                                                            
 
Research and Development expense to total assets  
 
Fixed intangible assets to total assets 
 
 
Book leverage (short-term debt plus long-term debt) to total 
assets  
 
Market leverage(Total Debt divided by the (Equity book 
value + Equity Market value) 
 
 
 
            Compustat 
 
           Compustat 
 
            Compustat 
 
           Compustat 
 
           Compustat 
 
 
            Compustat 
   
   
Independent variables/ Executives compensation (for the respective financial 
year) 
 
Salary 
(SAL) 
 
Cash bonus  
 (CashB) 
 
Stock options 
(ESO) 
Total of executives salary (used as control variable for risk 
aversion) divided by total compensation. 
 
Total annual cash bonus of executives scaled by total 
compensation               
 
Total share options value (using Black and Scholes, 1973 – 
per share options is estimated using their method then 
multiplied by the number of stock options issued to 
executives). Share options value divided by total 
compensation. 
 
          Annual report 
 
 
 
          Annual report 
 
 
 
        Annual report 
 
Performance 
stock (PS) 
 
 
Deferred stock 
(DS) 
 
 
LTIPs  
 
Sum of face value of performance share awards (e.g. stock 
awarded multiplied by stock price) scaled by total 
compensation. 
 
Total Face value: deferred stock, deferred annual bonus 
awards, short-term deferred (e.g. stock awarded multiplied 
by stock price).  
 
Total value: performance stock plus deferred stock scaled by 
total compensation.  
 
      Annual report 
 
 
 
       Annual report 
 
 
 
       Annual report 
Total 
compensation 
 
Sum value: salary, cash bonus, stock options value, LTIPs 
 
       Annual report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 340 
 
Control variables / Firm characteristics   
Firm size 
 
      Natural log of total sales as a proxy 
 
. 
     Compustat 
Market-to-book 
Tangibility  
 
Cash flow 
 
Sales growth   
 Total assets – book equity + market equity / total assets 
 
 Net property, plant and equipment / total assets  
 
Defined as free cash flow scaled by total assets 
 
Defined as log of the ratio of sales in the current year to the 
sales in the previous year.  
 
      Compustat 
 
 
       Compustat 
 
       Compustat 
 
       Compustat 
Stock return 
 
Stock volatility 
 
Return on 
Assets  
 
Dividend pay-
out 
 
Altman’s Z-
score 
 
Monitoring 
mechanisms 
 
Large Own 
 
Defined as annual stock return over the fiscal year.  
 
Standard deviation of daily stock returns (log of stock returns 
variance)  
 
 EBITDA / Total assets 
 
 
An indicator variable of 1 otherwise 0 if firm’s makes cash 
dividend pay-out to shareholders    
 
[ 3.3 (EBIT / Total Assets) + 1.0 (Sales / Total Assets) + 1.4 
(Retained Profits / Total Assets) + 1.2 (Working Capital / 
Total Assets)] 
 
 
 
Percentage of shares held by large shareholders with at 
least 3% of the total firm shareholdings 
 
       Bloomberg 
 
        Bloomberg 
 
 
       Compustat 
       Compustat 
 
 
      Annual report 
 
 
     Compustat 
 
 
 
 
 
 Annual report 
Non-executives 
own (%)   
 
Percentage of shares held by non-executives’ directors 
divided by the firm’s total common shareholdings.   
 
 
Annual report 
Executives Characteristics  
Executives own. 
(%)  
 
 
CEOs age 
CFOs age  
Executive 
Average age  
Total annual shareholdings of the three executives (CEO, 
CFO and Chief operating officer) divided by the firm’s total 
common shareholdings. 
 
Row values of chief executive officer (CEO) Age -  CEO’s 
age)  
Row values of chief financial officer CFO Age  - CFO’s age  
 
Average age of CEO’s and CFO’s age 
 
 Annual report 
 
 
Annual report  
Annual report 
Annual report 
 
Year effect Dummies for the years 2006 to 2015 inclusive.                              Compustat 
Industry effect 
 
Dummies for each of the eight main industries.                              Compustat 
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